Contact: Josh Holly; 202.226.3988
Hunter Opening Statement for Accountability during Contingency Operations Hearing
Washington D.C. – U.S. House Armed Services Committee Ranking Republican Duncan Hunter (R-CA) today released the following opening statement for the full committee’s hearing on accountability during contingency operations:
“Good morning, ladies and gentlemen and good morning again to our witnesses. We had the opportunity to speak for a little while before this hearing and I appreciate your willingness to stay with us and to shed some light on issues relating to contracting and distribution of materiel in Iraq. I mentioned this previously, but I would like to thank Secretary Gates and General Kicklighter again, for the record, for being proactive in sharing this information with Chairman Skelton and me and for continuing a dialogue with us as investigations continue.
“Today we’re going to address two separate issues, which have been loosely linked by the media in the sense that the issues were reported in the same series of articles. The first issue is allegations that bribes were paid to Army contracting officials in order to get lucrative contracts steered toward certain contractors. The second issue is the lack of accountability, as reported by the General Accountability Office, for weapons procured by the Department of Defense intended to equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
“While I am clearly concerned about the allegations of bribery, especially amongst field grade officers, and believe that such incidents set a poor example for the Iraqis we are meant to be mentoring, I am hopeful that the various investigations will show that the number of bribery cases we are seeing is an aberration caused by bad choices made by people in a localized environment, rather than a pervasive culture of corruption. I am also hopeful that we’ll hear today that the system did work in catching these individuals—because there will always be individuals who make bad choices. We expect to hear more about the lessons that the Army has learned and changes it will implement to make the system work more effectively.
“More troubling are the implications of the reports that weapons we have provided to the ISF may have fallen into the wrong hands. I think we must be realistic enough to know that we can’t maintain 100 percent control of property we provide to other nations’ security forces. But if, in fact, there is a wholesale movement of weapons—that U.S. taxpayers have paid for—into the hands of those who would do us harm or further destabilize the region. We must make resolving this problem one of our top priorities in theater. General Kicklighter has promised us that this will be his number one goal—to ensure that this is not happening.
“My judgment is that these two, distinct issues share a root cause, which is a lack of experience and standardized procedures for planning the administrative side of contingency operations. On one hand, we have a small contracting office ill-equipped to handle the volume of work it received when operations in Iraq began in earnest. As a result, the system was slower in catching irregularities than it would have otherwise been. We also inadvertently created an environment where those with less experience and those who might be more easily tempted to make self-serving decisions lacked the support structure to enable better decision-making. On the other hand, we have the Department of Defense assuming a new mission, with primary responsibility for equipping Iraqi Security Forces.
“Traditionally, this has been a State Department function, supported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. There are policies and procedures in place for such foreign military assistance. Yet in this case, the military entered uncharted waters. They made organizational changes to facilitate the training and equipping of ISF in order to secure transition to Iraq, but the new organization didn’t have the accountability procedures in place to maintain adequate records of weapons and equipment that they transferred to these forces. Again, we see a situation where an organization was ill-equipped to handle the administrative burden of contingency operations, because it lacked the personnel and systems necessary to enable accountability.
“This shared root-cause is an issue that this Committee has been trying to mitigate for nearly three years. Let me read to you some excerpts from the report accompanying the House passed version of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. In Section 813, we required the Secretary of Defense to establish a contingency contracting corps:
“’This corps would be directed by a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications who, when deployed, would report directly to the combatant commander in an area of operations requiring contingency contracting support…Training of the corps would take into account all relevant laws, regulations and polices related to contingency contracting and would be required even when the corps is not deployed…The committee intends that the contingency contracting corps maintain a sufficient level of readiness in peacetime to be able to rapidly deploy to emerging contingency operations. The commander of the contingency contracting corps should consider the development of a standardized contingency contracting handbook which summarizes all relevant laws, directives and regulations related to contingency contracting to assist the day-to-day operations of the contingency contracting workforce. Finally, the committee urges that contingency contracting corps utilize an integrated contracting and financial management system to ensure that contracting operations are not hindered by technological limitations that can be easily avoided through the use of readily available systems.’
“If these sorts of measures had been in place in 2004, we might not have experienced some of the problems we see today. Unfortunately, even in 2006, this provision was strongly resisted by some elements of the Department of Defense. We ultimately compromised with the Senate on the creation of a joint policy on contingency contracting and built further upon this requirement in last year’s bill.
“I gather from reading your testimony that the Army has at last established four contingency contracting brigades and the U.S. Central Command has established a Joint Contracting Command, led by an Air Force two-star general. I also understand that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is developing a contingency contracting manual and ensuring consistency in training in contingency contracting across the services. I am glad that some of these ideas are finally taking hold. We cannot afford to re-learn these lessons again and again in future theaters of operation. Therefore, I will look forward to additional information about the size, skill mix and deployment plan for these brigades and specifics on the training programs that are in development.
“Finally, I would like to remind everyone once more that our witnesses are not at liberty to comment on details of on-going investigations. Nevertheless, there is fertile ground for policy questions, which are equally, if not more important for the way forward.”
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From the House Report (109-89) for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006:
Section 813—Contingency Contracting Corps
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a contingency contracting corps through a joint policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This corps would be directed by a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications who, when deployed, would report directly to the combatant commander in an area of operations requiring contingency contracting support. The joint policy would provide that contingency contracting operations during combat operations would utilize the rapid acquisition authority authorized in section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), to the maximum extent appropriate. In addition, this section would attempt to leverage contingency contracting assets in both deployed and
non-deployed locations to efficiently carry out the mission of the contingency contracting corps. Training of the corps would take into account all relevant laws, regulations and polices related to contingency contracting and would be required even when the corps is not deployed.
The committee intends that the commander of the contingency contracting corps be appointed at a grade senior enough to interact effectively with a combatant commander. The committee believes that an officer in the rank of Lieutenant General, or Vice Admiral for the Navy, is appropriate for this responsibility. The committee intends that the contingency contracting corps maintains a sufficient level of readiness in peacetime to be able to rapidly deploy to emerging contingency operations. The commander of the contingency contracting corps should consider the development of a standardized contingency contracting handbook which summarizes all relevant laws, directives and regulations related to contingency contracting to assist the day-to-day operations of the contingency contracting workforce. Finally, the committee urges that contingency contracting corps utilize an integrated contracting and financial management system to ensure that contracting operations are not hindered by technological limitations that can be easily avoided through the use of readily available systems.
From Public Law (109-364), the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007:
SEC. 854. JOINT POLICIES ON REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION, CONTINGENCY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—
(1) JOINT POLICY REQUIREMENT.—Chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
‘‘§ 2333. Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting
‘‘(a) JOINT POLICY REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations.
‘(b) REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION MATTERS COVERED.—The joint policy for requirements definition required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:
‘‘(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts (such as for delivery of products or services, performance of work, or accomplishment of a project), to act as head of requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, if required, including leading a requirements review board involving all organizations concerned.
‘‘(2) An organizational approach to requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is designed to ensure that requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements United States Government and Department of Defense objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds.
‘‘(c) CONTINGENCY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MATTERS COVERED.—The joint policy for contingency program management required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:
‘‘(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate program management experience and qualifications, to act as head of program management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations, if required.
‘‘(2) A preplanned organizational approach to program management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is designed to ensure that the Department of Defense is prepared to conduct such program management.
‘‘(3) Identification of a deployable cadre of experts, with the appropriate tools and authority, and trained in processes under paragraph (6).
‘‘(4) Utilization of the hiring and appointment authorities necessary for the rapid deployment of personnel to ensure the availability of key personnel for sufficient lengths of time to provide for continuing program and project management.
‘‘(5) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be created by the Defense Acquisition University) to program management personnel in—
‘‘(A) the use of laws, regulations, policies, and directives related to program management in combat or contingency environments;
‘‘(B) the integration of cost, schedule, and performance objectives into practical acquisition strategies aligned with available resources and subject to effective oversight; and
‘‘(C) procedures of the Department of Defense related to funding mechanisms and contingency contract management.
‘‘(6) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel even when they are not deployed in a contingency operation.
‘‘(7) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of program management during contingency operations.
‘‘(d) CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING MATTERS COVERED.—
(1) The joint policy for contingency contracting required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:
‘‘(A) The designation of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service in each military department with the responsibility for administering the policy.
‘‘(B) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting during combat operations, post conflict operations, and contingency operations, who shall report directly to the commander of the combatant command in whose area of responsibility the operations occur.
‘‘(C) A sourcing approach to contingency contracting that is designed to ensure that each military department is prepared to conduct contingency contracting during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving interagency organizations, if required.
‘‘(D) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be created by the Defense Acquisition University) to contingency contracting personnel in—
‘‘(i) the use of law, regulations, policies, and directives related to contingency contracting operations;
‘‘(ii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition methods, including the use of exceptions to competition requirements under section 2304 of this title, sealed bidding, letter contracts, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity task orders, set asides under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)), undefinitized contract actions, and other tools available to expedite the delivery of goods and services during combat operations or post-conflict operations;
‘(iii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition authority, commanders’ emergency response program funds, and other tools unique to contingency contracting; and
‘‘(iv) instruction on the necessity for the prompt transition from the use of rapid acquisition authority to the use of full and open competition and other methods of contracting that maximize transparency in the acquisition process.
‘‘(E) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel even when they are not deployed in a contingency operation.
‘‘(F) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of contingency contracting.
‘‘(2) To the extent practicable, the joint policy for contingency contracting required by subsection (a) should be taken into account in the development of interagency plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations, consistent with the report submitted by the President under section 1035 of this Act on interagency operating procedures for the planning and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.
‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
‘‘(1) CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING PERSONNEL.—The term ‘contingency contracting personnel’ means members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are members of the defense acquisition workforce and, as part of their duties, are assigned to provide support to contingency operations (whether deployed or not).
‘‘(2) CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING.—The term ‘contingency contracting’ means all stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation.
‘‘(3) CONTINGENCY OPERATION.—The term ‘contingency operation’ has the meaning provided in section 101(13) of this title.
‘‘(4) ACQUISITION SUPPORT AGENCIES.—The term ‘acquisition support agencies’ means Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities that carry out and provide support for acquisition-related activities.
‘‘(5) CONTINGENCY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.—The term ‘contingency program management’ means the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.
‘‘(6) REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION.—The term ‘requirements definition’ means the process of translating policy objectives and mission needs into specific requirements, the description of which will be the basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered.’’.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
‘‘2333. Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency contracting, and program management.’’.
(b) DEADLINE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT POLICIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall develop the joint policies required under section 2333 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) REPORTS.—
(1) INTERIM REPORT.—
(A) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives an interim report on requirements definition, contingency contracting, and program management.
(B) MATTERS COVERED.—The report shall include discussions of the following:
(i) Progress in the development of the joint policies under section 2333 of title 10, United States Code.
(ii) The ability of the Armed Forces to support requirements definition, contingency contracting, and program management.
(iii) The ability of commanders of combatant commands to request requirements definition, contingency contracting, or program management support, and the ability of the military departments and the acquisition support agencies to respond to such requests and provide such support, including the availability of rapid acquisition personnel for such support.
(iv) The ability of the current civilian and military acquisition workforce to deploy to combat theaters of operations and to conduct requirements definition, contingency contracting, or program management activities during combat and during post-conflict, reconstruction, or other contingency operations.
(v) The effect of different periods of deployment on continuity in the acquisition process.
(2) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (1)(A) a final report on requirements definition, contingency contracting, and program management, containing a discussion of the implementation of the joint policies developed under section 2333 of title 10, United States Code (as so added), including updated discussions of the matters covered in the interim report. In addition, the report should include a discussion of the actions taken to ensure that the joint policies will be adequately resourced at the time of execution.