Contact: Josh Holly (HASC), 202-226-3988
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Roscoe Bartlett
Hearing on Navy Destroyer Acquisition Programs
Washington, D.C. – Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), Ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, released the following opening statement for the subcommittee’s hearing on Navy acquisition programs:
“Good morning to both panels, Admiral McCullough, Ms. Stiller, Mr. O’Rourke, Mr. Francis, and Dr. Labs. It’s a pleasure to have you here with us today, even though I am sympathetic to the challenge you both face. For years now—in fact, even up to a few months ago—the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) have sent you to testify before this subcommittee to explain and, at times, to defend the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. In particular, we have long debated the wisdom of developing the DDG 1000. But I understand, after speaking to the Secretary last week, that the Navy has finally come to the conclusion that the nation would be better served by extending the DDG 51 production line and halting the DDG 1000 line at 2 ships. Now you have joined us with the daunting task of explaining this about-face and the consequences of such a decision.
“It is appropriate for Congress to question this decision and to assume the role of devil’s advocate, to ensure that we do not haphazardly embark in another major deviation to the shipbuilding plan. But I will tell you up front what I told the Secretary—I for one applaud this move. The Chairman and I have both said, over and over, that the Navy will never achieve a 313-ship Navy without either top line relief or a significant change in the mix of platforms. The Navy’s shipbuilding plan was based on several assumptions, none of which were realistic. The Navy postulated that:
· “Personnel costs would not increase, because the Navy’s active end strength could be reduced. I’ll note that this has not proved true for any of the Navy’s sister services.
· “There would be no increase in operations & maintenance accounts. But the price of fuel alone has invalidated this assumption. Overall DOD fuel expenditures grew by 380% from FY1997 to FY2007, even though fuel purchases only grew by 26% during this time frame.
· “Funding for research and development would be reduced and stay low—in effect, trading for today’s capabilities on the back of tomorrow’s sailors. But, given the challenges we have seen in developing technologies for many of our current platforms, this, too, does not hold true.
· “Shipbuilding funds would be protected among the procurement accounts. One could argue the Navy has done this to a certain extent, but we have real shortages in other areas, such as naval aviation. Moreover, cost increases within the shipbuilding accounts come at the expense of other shipbuilding programs – as we have seen with T-AKE, LCS, and LPD-17.
· “Requirements and cost growth could be prevented on future ships. Again, LCS has been a prime example of the fallacy of this assumption.
“Therefore, given that not one of these assumptions has been shown to be plausible, then the only other alternative is to look at the mix of platforms. The DDG 1000 program is the obvious first choice for re-evaluation because it is the largest and the most expensive combatant we are building, and surface combatants are the backbone of our battle force. And, it is undeniable that the costs for this program have grown. The original Navy estimate for the fifth DD(X) was between $1.06 and $1.23 billion. Now the Navy estimates it will cost double that -- approximately $2.3 billion. Many independent analysts have cautioned about the potential impacts to the Navy, should the costs of DDG 1000 continue to grow. Some of our witnesses today are among that number, but I’ll quote Bob Work from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who has stated, ‘Indeed, even if the Navy’s optimistic ship cost estimates prove to be true, it seems certain that the seven DDG 1000s and 19 CG(X)s will continue to have inevitable, disproportionate impacts on plans for the future surface battle line and the larger 313-ship battle fleet.’ Moreover, I have repeatedly stated that a class of seven ships is no class at all, but rather a technology demonstration on a massive scale. When I learned that it was unlikely the DDG 1000 hull could be used in the CG(X) program, the begrudging support I had for this program began to fade.
“However, I will issue one note of caution. As we re-evaluate our platform mix, we must ensure that we choose platforms that will optimize the capabilities of our fleet for the future threat—not to fight yesterday and today’s wars. We also do not want to artificially adjust the mix of high-end multi-mission combatants and low-end focused mission ships, exclusively based on cost. In many respects, this is the history of the convoluted DD-21/DD(X)/DDG 1000 program. Consideration must be given to both the future operating environment and to economics. To that end, I want to hear more about the analysis the Navy’s has done regarding future mission sets. If we do not build five more DDG 1000’s, what risk are we assuming? What will our Navy not be able to do? In the past, we have been told that the DDG 1000 will be significantly more stealthy, which would be necessary for both ship self defense and to improve the ship’s land attack mission. We were also told that the Navy needed to reduce ships’ manning. DDG 1000 has an estimated crew size of less than half that of a DDG 51. And, we were told that the introduction of an integrated power system would improve ship survivability, reduce fuel consumption, and open the door for new directed energy weapon systems. What is to be the fate of these technologies and the investments we have made? Are these factors no longer as important as others?
“There are many more issues than these to consider, but I am eager to hear from our witnesses and to give members an opportunity to ask questions. To our witnesses, I remind you, as always, that we value and respect your opinions. All we ask is that you lay out the true warfighting requirements and be clear about what risks we must accept with the funding choices we will have to make.”
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