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McHugh Opening Statement for Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism Hearing
Washington, D.C. – U.S. House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member John M. McHugh (R-NY) today released the following prepared remarks for the committee’s hearing regarding recent recommendations released by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism:
“Thank you to our Chairman, Ike Skelton, for holding today’s hearing on the findings and recommendations proposed by the congressionally-mandated Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. As this committee begins the 111th Congress, we remain committed to protecting U.S. national security interests and vigilant in our oversight responsibilities to ensure that the U.S. military remains strong and capable to meet the complex and evolving security demands of the 21st Century.
“First, I would like to thank our witnesses for their service and commitment to working on this important national and international security concern. Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
“Today’s hearing is especially timely. The recent U.S. sanctions placed on individuals and private companies from Europe and Asia who were involved with the A.Q. Khan nuclear-proliferation network remind us of the willful intent of actors around the world to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.
“There is a clear nexus between WMD proliferation and terrorism. The challenge is not new. Since September 11th, we have known the harsh reality that al-Qaeda seeks weapons of mass destruction to inflict the maximum amount of human suffering, geopolitical disorder and economic damage. Since 2001, we have remained unyielding in our efforts to prevent al-Qaeda from planning and executing a successful attack on the United States. However, this statement is not made without caution. Despite our best efforts, I concur with the Commission that ‘our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.’
“As your report highlights, you are here to ‘convey the sobering reality that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses.’ I expect we’ll hear further details about what those risks and threats are, as well as your assessment of our nation’s activities, initiatives and programs to mitigate our vulnerability to these risks.
“This week marks the beginning of a new Administration. As such we all have an opportunity to work in a bipartisan fashion to develop a comprehensive and concrete strategy to ensure we have a diverse set of tools to counter WMD threats. This strategy must include nonproliferation efforts, but also look more broadly at areas such as: technology investments, missile defenses, emergency response capabilities and interagency and international coordination activities that could prevent and limit the damage caused by WMD proliferation and terrorism. The Commission’s recommendations are a foundation for this approach.
“In particular, I believe that this committee will need to work with the new Administration to address the following:
“First, the events or miscalculations that could trigger a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan-India. The November Mumbai attacks illustrate the unwavering tension between these two nations. U.S. policy should not waver on pressing the Pakistani government and military to do all it can to deny al-Qaeda and other militants sanctuary within its borders. I am interested in your assessment of the security and command and control of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons programs.
“Second, Russia’s recent actions, including the restriction of natural gas to Europe, its actions in Georgia and threats to target Europe with nuclear missiles in response to missile defense proposals, have spurred geopolitical tension with the West. The Commission acknowledges our foreign policy differences, but advises that these disagreements should not prevent us from working together in areas where we have a mutual interest, such as WMD proliferation. I’m curious as to how Russia views the WMD threat to its national security interests? For example, does it view the threat of an Iranian nuclear program similarly to how we view it? If we don’t see eye-to-eye on the threat, how does that impact our confidence in Russia’s commitment to remain a reliable partner in threat reduction?
“Your report also found that several existing nuclear weapons states, such as Russia and China, are building up their nuclear arsenals, and I suspect these decisions are being made without respect to U.S. nuclear capabilities. How do you explain this phenomenon?
“Third, Iran and North Korea. Recently, former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, stated that Iran is ‘moving inexorably toward becoming a nuclear power.’ He also stated that ‘if North Korea and Iran cannot be contained, we face the real danger of a cascade of proliferation’ of nuclear-armed states. Your report concludes that our nation’s fundamental objectives are clear and compelling vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, ‘Iran must cease all of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons; North Korea must dismantle its nuclear program.’ However, some would argue the diplomacy and sanctions implemented to-date have been ineffective. So, the question becomes how do we approach these two challenges differently?
“Lastly, the determination and adaptability of our enemy to acquire and employ WMD technologies or materials are real. In your findings, the Commission emphasized the importance of understanding and addressing biological terrorism. You acknowledged that the spread of biotechnology enables advances in medicine but also increases the availability of pathogens and technologies for malicious purposes. Looking ahead, I am deeply concerned about the spread of nuclear technologies and materials. As more and more nations develop indigenous nuclear energy programs and can produce nuclear fuel, we are perhaps expanding the inventory of available nuclear materials and know-how that may be sold on the black market to potential terrorists or be used to build ‘starter nuclear bomb’ kits. From your perspective, what control and verification protocols or assurances need to be put in place to curb proliferation risks? Do you think international protocols have kept pace with global demand for energy, and affordable nuclear energy specifically?
“Before concluding, I want to mention another congressional commission, the U.S. Strategic Commission, established by this committee. It has been charged with examining our strategic posture. Its interim report was issued in December and highlighted the need to maintain a secure, reliable deterrence force for the foreseeable future but also design a nuclear program that contributes to decreasing the global dangers of proliferation. I see a natural complement to your two bodies of work and would be interested in your thoughts on this approach.
“Again, I commend you, your fellow commissioners, and staff for your work to address these complex and challenging issues affecting our national security.”
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