Today, Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH), Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, made the following remarks, as prepared for delivery, on the Subcommittee's hearing titled "Air Force Airborne ISR Program in the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request." For testimony and to watch the hearing click here.
"The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs contained in the Air Force's fiscal year 2019 budget request.
I want to welcome our witnesses for today's panel:
• Lieutenant General Jerry Harris, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements;
• Ms. Susan Thornton, a member of the Air Force's Senior Executive Service and Director of Air Force Information Dominance Acquisition Programs;
• Lieutenant General Anthony Ierardi, Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and,
• Lieutenant General John Dolan, Director of Operations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We thank all of you for your service and being with us here today, and look forward to your testimony.
After reviewing the Air Force's fiscal year 2019 budget request, the subcommittee is somewhat satisfied with its content and funding levels provided for the airborne ISR enterprise.
The budget request appears to support what is needed to sustain the legacy fleet of ISR platforms, but the subcommittee is disappointed that there is no significant capacity growth in the Air Force's airborne ISR portfolio to meet more airborne ISR requirements.
ISR is the pacesetter for operations. In short, ISR is a combat multiplier that not only informs our commanders where they need to engage---but also where NOT to engage and what areas to avoid.
With the exception of full-motion video capability provided for counter-terrorism support, there appears to be stagnation in the remainder of the ISR portfolio for other critical intelligence needs.
This stagnation maintains the ISR capacity short fall and should be reversed to fill more combatant commander's intelligence requirements.
We understand that we cannot afford to satisfy all combatant commander ISR requirements, but consistently we see year-after-year ISR fulfillment rates for critical intelligence areas in single digit percentages and with higher risk than there should be. It concerns me that there is not more effort within all the services to achieve more ISR capacity for our combatant commanders.
I am pleased, however, to see that the Air Force has finally removed the uncertainty regarding the high-altitude ISR capability that the U-2 and RQ-4 Global Hawk provide, and that both platforms will be sustained and modernized well into the future.
There is one major point of contention in the budget request that we'll need to work through, but I am confident that we can reach a satisfactory compromise. The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization program, also known as just 'J-STARS Recap,' and the Air Force's decision to terminate this program on essentially the eve of the source-selection decision.
The Air Force is requesting to forego the J-STARS Recap program in favor of fielding a concept called Advanced Battle Management System, or 'A-B-M-S'. At the moment, there appear to be multiple disconnects with this concept, and I want to highlight a few that stand-out.
First and foremost, this new concept appears to contradict the years of extensive analyses and testimony to Congress that underpin the current validated requirements. From as early as December 2011, when the Air Force completed its Analysis of Alternatives, to as late as August 2016, when the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the J-STARS Recap Capability Development Document…which is the document that justifies how and why a platform is being designed against the validated requirements…all conclusions pointed to a capability consisting of a business-jet sized aircraft with a reduced crew, that would provide at the tactical edge of the contested battlefield, on-board, real-time Battle Management Command and Control, and Moving Target Indicator intelligence to the warfighter maneuvering on the ground.
These years of analysis were modeled against anti-access, area-denial threats per the previous Administration's defense strategy of 2012 which identified that 'states such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access, area-denial environments.'
There is not enough time to go through all the analyses completed by many entities within the Department, but the committee staff provided a comprehensive summary to each Member office outlining specific details.
Second, the Air Force plans to rely upon unmanned aircraft capabilities and sensors in Increment one of ABMS that the Analysis of Alternatives has already determined would not meet full-spectrum requirements.
Further, the Air Force now wants to rely upon the Airborne Warning and Control System, or 'A-WAX' aircraft to do Battle Management, Command and Control for ground forces, in addition to its primary mission of providing Battle Management, Command and Control for airborne forces – all without increasing the crew size or adding additional mission spaces on-board the aircraft to effectively perform this mission because the aircraft has no physical growth capacity.
Third, ABMS is not forecasted to reach Initial Operational Capability until 2035, which is 11 years after J-STARS Recap would begin fielding. ABMS is not forecasted to reach Full Operational Capability until 2042, which theoretically is 6 years prior to when J-STARS Recap is scheduled to begin retirement. This schedule of course assumes that everything goes as planned and that all technologies and capabilities within the ABMS, many of which are still yet to be developed, are fielded without issue.
Finally, the J-STARS Recap aircraft is being designed as a true open-architecture, open-mission systems capability with a highly advanced 5th generation radar and robust communication and Battle Management, Command and Control suite of capabilities. This is a hallmark example of acquisition reform this committee has been pushing, and it does not make since why this capability is not being used as the foundation for the ABMS concept.
As we move forward in understanding the ABMS concept, we also need to understand where the risks to the warfighter lie, and what risk mitigation paths we can take in the near and mid-term to ensure that the validated requirements of the ground warfighter are met without question.
To put it all into perspective, we understand that the projected threats to our forces are real, and that the Air Force has submitted a budget that does not include J-STARS Recap. However, completely walking away from this program may prove to be an unacceptable level of risk to our warfighters for this committee.
As we continue to build the FY19 NDAA, we hope to learn more and look forward to working with the Air Force on a path forward that will both mitigate risk to the warfighter and invest in the new Air Force programs that the Air Force is proposing."
