U.S. Representative Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, delivered the following opening remarks at a hearing on the Fiscal Year 2025 budget request for nuclear forces and atomic energy defense activities and programs.
Rep. Lamborn's remarks as prepared for delivery:
The subcommittee meets today to review the fiscal year 2025 budget requests of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy for the nuclear enterprise.
To begin with, I was pleased to see nuclear modernization strongly supported in this year's budget request.
As we have discussed in other hearings, the Department faced many tough budget choices this year and accepted risk in several areas. The prioritization shown for nuclear activities in this budget request reflects a recognition that nuclear attack remains the only existential threat our nation faces and, therefore, strategic deterrence must continue being our highest priority mission.
However, I remain concerned that we are not doing enough to prepare for a future nuclear environment that will be more competitive and less stable than ever.
As the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded in its report last year, simply executing modernization plans developed over a decade ago will not be sufficient to meet the evolving threat environment.
For example, Russia, which maintains the world's largest nuclear arsenal, continues to expand its stockpile in addition to development novel delivery systems while illegally suspending its participation in the New Start Treaty.
Today, China has more than 500 operational nuclear weapons, double the number since 2020, and the Department of Defense projects it will possess over 1,500 by 2035 (likely sooner). They are building fields of missile silos and stealth bombers while developing a space architecture that greatly increases their ability to target and hold at risk the United States and its allies. Importantly, China's nuclear breakout was not anticipated when our nuclear modernization was originally conceived.
Beyond Russia and China, North Korea and Iran continue down a dangerous path of "additive transactional relations" with Russia to develop advanced missile technology.
The development of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, mandated by Congress in the FY 2024 defense authorization bill, will help address these threats. Still, I believe we must take additional steps and seek other creative solutions to ensure we avoid a deterrence gap in the next decade.
This concern also applies to the National Nuclear Security Administration. While I'm happy to see the intense level of support included in this budget request for production modernization, I'm concerned this has come at the expense of Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering activities.
Ultimately, our nation requires both a responsive production infrastructure and a weapons laboratory complex that are second to none, and we must ensure NNSA's topline is sufficient to achieve both of these goals.
Finally, I know the Sentinel missile program is at the forefront of our minds – and rightly so. This program is expected to recapitalize the land-based leg of the triad by replacing the aging Minuteman system which has been deployed for over 50 years, despite being designed for a 10-year service life.
However, I want to remind my colleagues that the Sentinel program is under a Nunn McCurdy review, which will limit what our witnesses can discuss here today.
While Dr. LaPlante, who leads that review, can discuss its structure and process, he cannot comment on its substance, or presume its outcome. Similarly, General Gebara and Dr. Narang can comment on the need for the triad, the role ICBM capabilities play, and the unique contributions they make to deterrence. Still, they will similarly be unable to make comments about Sentinel that would presume the outcome of Dr. LaPlante's review.
We all want to know what led to the Nunn McCurdy breach, why it happened, and what we're going to do to get the program back on track. I am committed to having that discussion – but it will need to wait until a later date.
