U.S. Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA), Chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, delivered the following opening remarks at a hearing on the Department of Defense's budget request for fixed-wing tactical and training aircraft programs.
Rep. Wittman's remarks as prepared for delivery:
I welcome everyone to our hearing to review the fiscal year 2025 budget request for the Department of Defense's fixed-wing tactical and training aircraft programs. I thank our witnesses for testifying today and look forward to our discussion.
As I've stated numerous times in the past, the National Defense Strategy is clear in its focus on China as our nation's pacing threat. However, I am still concerned the Department's current direction regarding the composition of the U.S. military's tactical fighter force structure and required capabilities still lacks clarity in defining force composition, capability, and capacity objectives.
As I review the plans again for each service like I did last year, two common threads remain particularly concerning. First, our fighter force structure continues to decrease. And second, we are not able to deliver replacement aircraft at affordable prices to achieve similar force structure capacity going forward. And as I've said year over year, our adversaries continue to outpace us, building and fielding their own lethal fighter capacity and capabilities.
For the Air Force, their fiscal year 2025 through fiscal year 2029 plan includes divesting 593 fighter aircraft but only buying back 244 new F-35A and F-15EX aircraft. The F-15EX program of record has been unexplainably truncated from the original 144 aircraft to only 98 aircraft. The Next Generation Air Dominance manned fighters is still many years away from fielding and will cost taxpayers "hundreds of millions of dollars." The Air Force has yet to figure out how they will buy their full complement of F-35A aircraft after noting their primary operating cost assumption of $4.1 million dollars per aircraft per year is unachievable. And while the Air Force's new Collaborative Combat Aircraft concept may hold promise in affordability and making up for fighter capacity shortfalls, there is still a long road ahead integrating autonomous capability seamlessly amongst manned platforms.
For the Navy and Marine Corps, it appears that they still maintain uncertainty regarding new aircraft procurement quantities with their decreased F-35 purchases over the Future Years Defense Plan. For the Navy, funding for the Next Generation Fighter — also known as F/A-XX — decreased by nearly $1.8 billion dollars this year, which is deeply concerning given how enthusiastic the Navy has been over the past couple of years convincing Congress that this new aircraft is an imperative need.
Finally, I want to discuss the F-35 program given that it is going to comprise a significant portion of our future tactical fighter fleet around the world, presuming we're still able to afford all 2,456 aircraft for the United States, and another approximately 1,000 aircraft for partners and foreign customers.
I want to unequivocally state that the F-35 will be the most advanced tactical fighter aircraft the U.S. has ever built; however, we must accelerate the final fielding of TR-3 hardware and Block 4 software as fast as possible. Although the program recently completed Initial Operational Test and Training activities and achieved the full-rate production milestone, we're still not out of the woods yet on this program. One of the biggest challenges surrounding this program is its need to better develop, test, and modify mission software to enable the quicker and more reliable fielding of operational capabilities to pilots. It's troubling that the most capable fighter ever built is reliant upon decades old software infrastructure and processes, while the United States must keep pace with an agile and very capable adversary. TR-3 still struggles to get delivered and we have numerous new aircraft stacking up on the production line awaiting acceptance and delivery. Last March, we were told that TR-3 would likely begin deliveries this month. That has not occurred, and it's now forecasted to begin delivery later this summer. Cost growth is upwards of over $900 million over budget, with the government responsible for funding 80% of the cost overrun. Additionally, when TR-3 aircraft do begin delivery, it will still take another 9 to 12 months for the software to achieve full functionality for any combat operations.
The F-35 propulsion and thermal management system modernization continues to progress in its nascent stages. This committee continues to gather facts and data about the existing problem and potential solutions. I'd like to understand more from our witnesses about the avionics cooling requirements that have been finally set by the services, in addition to understanding the technical risk, schedule, and system integration assessments the program office performed related to the major subsystems for power and fuel thermal management and electrical generation in making this proposal. It's imperative we understand the requirements and solutions that are being reviewed to sustain this vital combat capability over the next 50-plus years.
Finally, I would note that our nation's top defense tester Dr Schmidt has indicated that he is conflicted in matters related to Lockheed Martin and has indicated his intent to recuse himself on related matters. By statute, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has a unique role in providing congress an unvarnished assessment as to the adequacy of the most complex and costly acquisition programs like the Joint Strike Fighter. I look forward to better understanding how Dr Schmidt intends to perform that role with his conflict.
