Today, Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, made the following remarks, as prepared for delivery, on the Subcommittee's joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Readiness titled "Naval Surface Forces Readiness: Are Navy Reforms Adequate?"
"I thank the gentleman for yielding and I too want to thank Admiral Grady and Admiral Aquilino for attending this important hearing.
"Last year, we had a hearing with Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson to discuss Navy reforms recommended to respond to deficient readiness highlighted by the loss of 17 sailors aboard the USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald. These readiness reforms were codified in the Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Reviews (SRR). Navy continues to make progress toward accomplishing the goals that Navy leadership determined would be necessary to correct deficient readiness. However, the committee has learned much since that hearing that appears unaddressed in these seminal documents. For example:
"We have learned that the readiness deficiencies are systemic and engross the entire fleet;
"We have learned that severe manning deficiencies exist afloat because of an imbalance in the afloat/ashore billeting and an overall deficit in afloat billets;
"We have learned that Navy allows ships to begin the basic and advanced pre-deployment training without the required number of sailors;
"We have learned that the limited notice INSURV inspections are bearing a true depiction of the material readiness of the fleet. The readiness picture is not as pretty as when ships have months to prepare and cannibalize their fellow shipmates; and finally,
"We have learned that the basic and advanced tenets of enlisted training are perilously askew and will take years to rebuild.
"In summary, the basic elements of manning, training and equipping are challenged across the fleet and will take years of leadership focus and sustained funding to correct.
"My fear is that Navy will measure their progress against the CR/SRR checklist and will miss the fundamental overhaul necessary to right a sinking ship. Because these systematic challenges were not adequately addressed in the Comprehensive Review or the Strategic Readiness Review, we will undershoot the mark and miss true structural reform.
"Some pundits have indicated that the sailors that stood the watch on the decks of the USS John S. McCain and the USS Fitzgerald were at fault and cited numerous safeguards that failed to prevent these tragic deaths. However, I have come to an alternative conclusion. It is apparent that senior leadership failed to put adequate systems in place to prevent these collisions. It is apparent that senior leadership's acceptance of unnecessary risk to meet COCOM demands led to the deaths of 17 of our nation's finest. It is apparent that Navy classifies innumerous products to hide the true depth of readiness challenges that plague the Navy today. And it is most apparent, to me, that if the appropriate reforms are not properly implemented, these problems—and these deaths—will continue.
"Last year, Dr. Holmes of the Navy War College asked, "Who Watches the Watchers in the United States Navy". At a hearing with Secretary Spencer and CNO Richardson on this same subject, I indicated that I will watch the watchers. I remain committed to ensuring that we do not forget the lives lost on the USS John S. McCain and the USS Fitzgerald. I look forward to continuing to advocate for these fallen sailors and ensuring real structural reforms are put in place.
"Toward this endeavor, I think that the Navy has a long way to go to ensure minimum standards are set in place to ensure basic safety and mission proficiency."
