Today, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, made the following remarks on the hearing titled “Fiscal Year 2017 National Security Space Activities.” For testimony and other hearing materials click here.
"Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on the Fiscal Year 2017 National Security Space activities of the Department of Defense.
We are honored to have a panel of experts who lead various areas of our national security space enterprise. The witnesses are:
General John Hyten
Commander, Air Force Space Command
Mr. Douglas Loverro
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy
Mr. Dyke Weatherington
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic and Intelligence Systems
Lieutenant General David Buck
Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space
Mr. Robert Cardillo
Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
And,
Mr. Frank Calvelli
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
After we finish with the unclassified testimony and questions and answers, we will adjourn to a closed session to continue our oversight in an appropriately secure fashion.
This is a large panel of witnesses, and we ask each of you to testify at this hearing because of the key role you have regarding national security space. However, seeing such a big panel on this subject may be indicative of the fragmented management of space.
For instance, a 2008 independent commission reported that 'there’s no one charge' of national security space and stated that 'without significant improvement in the leadership and management of National Security Space programs, US space preeminence will erode to the extent that space ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage.'
The issues that were raised, and the recommendations made, by the previous commissions continue to be timely…as we face unprecedented threats in national security space.
However, I recognize that changing a bureaucracy is a difficult undertaking, and even more so when you are part of that bureaucracy.
But we have to get this right because we cannot risk our space assets. I do not intend to focus on organization and management much today but I’d ask that each of you consider our national security space construct and provide some feedback to the committee by April 1st as we consider the best step forward to ensure we have the world’s leading national security space program now and long into the future.
Now, I’m going to change gears to another topic that you all know I am very passionate about … assured access to space. We are facing multiple challenges in this area, and I will not allow our space program to be put in jeopardy or the taxpayers to foot an unreasonable bill as we set the course for the future.
As I’ve said in the past, I know the men and women in our Air Force are trying their best to address the challenges facing our launch program, but I simply do not agree with the path it is attempting to take us down with regard to the replacement of the RD-180 Russian engine.
I am extremely concerned that the Air Force is taking on too much risk in what may amount to be a very expensive endeavor, while repeating many of the mistakes of the 1990s when the EELV program began.
Rather than directly addressing the Russian rocket engine problem we have, the Air Force is trying to recast the entire EELV program in a quest to create the ultimate competitive commercial industrial base.
Now, of course Congress doesn’t want a rocket engine alone that won’t get us into space. No one does; and any suggestion to the contrary is a strawman. We recognize that an engine can’t just be dropped in a launch vehicle without any interface work.
This is why the law in FY 16 specifically allowed the integration of a rocket propulsion system with a launch vehicle.
But just because an engine can’t be dropped into an Atlas doesn’t mean we should just start over on the EELV program.
I will to offer this chart for the record from the former Administrator of NASA, Dr. Mike Griffin which identifies launch vehicles that have been re-engined. This is a well understood process.
And this is why the past two NDAAs prohibited government funds to be used to develop new launch vehicles or new infrastructure … because we’ve already invested in that.
I look forward to talking about this more with you today, and thank you all for being with us regarding this important topic."
