| Today, Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA), of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower & Projection Forces, made the following statement about the Subcommittee's hearing titled "Capacity of the U.S. Navy to Project Power with Large Surface Combatants:"
"Earlier this year, our committee met with an outside panel of witnesses to discuss the role of surface forces in presence, deterrence and warfighting. Today, the subcommittee plans to continue this discussion and to get a better understanding of the requirements for surface forces and the capabilities and capacities that our cruisers and destroyers can bring to bear. I am particularly pleased to have two distinguished Navy witnesses to testify before our subcommittee: RADM Vic Mercado, Director, Assessment Division (N81) and RADM Peter Fanta, Director, Surface Warfare (N96).
Thank you all for being here and testifying today.
The Nation faces a number of critical decisions concerning its large surface combatant fleet, and to make these decisions, Congress must be aware of both the growing demands upon our large surface combatants and the Navy’s plans to meet them. Our multi-mission cruisers and destroyers are the workhorses of our fleet, and rarely do they receive the same degree of attention that aircraft carriers and submarines do.
I continue to be impressed with the capabilities and technologies that the surface Navy provides to the combatant commanders. The Aegis air and missile defense system is the envy of the world. They are so good that these systems are being sold abroad and replicated in land-based, Aegis ashore missile systems. However, the surface Navy may also be a victim of its own success. The Navy large surface combatants are now being tasked with meeting a seemingly insatiable demand for theater ballistic missile defense capabilities, in addition to the carrier strike group escort missions. This BMD support can only be provided at the expense of other surface navy missions.
Looking ahead, this demand for large surface combatant capabilities is likely to grow. The proliferation of high-end capabilities and the adoption of 'anti-access/area-denial' strategies by our competitors suggest that our naval forces will need to operate in a contested environment in which our forces will need 360 degree air and missile defense coverage. In this environment, the defense of our carriers may require more than the five air and missile defense-capable escorts assigned to that mission today. In this environment, moreover, our large surface combatants may face air and ballistic missile threats simultaneously, something that only the ships with the most modern Aegis combat systems can do. Finally, the Navy’s new concept of 'distributed lethality' calls for 'hunter-killer groups' that would create additional demand for surface combatants.
Although the Navy is investing heavily in small surface combatants, these vessels lack the area air warfare capabilities needed to augment cruisers or destroyers in their air and missile defense missions. Indeed, in certain circumstances, these smaller vessels might themselves require a cruiser or destroyer escort.
From a supply perspective, the Navy has implemented an 'optimized fleet response plan' to better manage the fleet deployment cycle. The intention is to reduce a typical deployment and increase the predictability and regularity of the overall maintenance/training cycle. Unfortunately, this decision reduces the operational availability of large surface combatants.
Finally, the Navy has also embarked on a modernization of the cruiser force structure that would eliminate five Ballistic Missile Defense suites from the cruisers. Furthermore, the Navy would prefer to mothball 11 cruisers for up to 11 years. Once again, both of these actions increase the requirements on existing fleet.
In conclusion, it seems clear to me that demands being placed upon our surface Navy exceed the limited supply of large surface combatants. The increasing BMD requirements, the complexity of war in an A2/AD environment, the new concept of distributed lethality, and the air warfare limitations on the Littoral Combat Ship are all contributing to an increase in requirements. At the same time, the supply of large surface combatants is decreasing because of the slow pace of large surface combatant modernization, a new deployment model, and the Navy’s plans to inactivate cruisers.
To reverse this decline, we need to take steps to increase our large surface combatant force structure and accelerate our modernization efforts. I look forward to better understanding from our witnesses which door the Navy chooses. It is important that we maintain a fleet of large surface combatants that provides our commanders with the capabilities and capacities they need to fight and win in future conflicts." |
