

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES EN BLOC #1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
4803	1	Jackson, Ronny	STR	NNSA plan for the modernization of the OST	EB 1
4816	3	Bacon, Don	STR	DRL to task the US Space Force to provide a briefing on the plan and status of the Satellite Control Network (SCN). The DRL expresses concern for the aging infrastructure of the SCN, the lack of capacity for a potential peer conflict, and tie timeline for the replacement system.	EB 1
4837	2	Ryan, Patrick	STR	Directs the DoD to assess vulnerabilities and produce a roadmap for fielding radiation-hardened components suited to small satellite operations in contested environments.	EB 1
5009	0	Turner, Michael	STR	Space Domain Awareness Capabilities	EB 1
5016	1	Kelly, Trent	STR	Expressing Committee concern about counter-hypersonic propulsion development and industrial base resiliency, and directing a brief from SECDEF on the plan for this issue.	EB 1
5022	1	Wilson, Joe	STR	Report on Beryllium Manufacturing Capabilities.	EB 1
5066	2	Bacon, Don	STR	Directs briefing on hybrid satellite communications systems including a plan that preserves both geosynchronous satellite and low earth orbit satellite solutions.	EB 1
5079	0	Crank, Jeff	STR	Directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing on the potential applications of Very Low Earth Orbit space systems.	EB 1
5136	0	Jackson, Ronny	STR	NNSA's plan to modernize warhead assembly and disassembly operations	EB 1
5137	4	DesJarlais, Scott	STR	DRL to understand the costs associated with the Lithium Processing Facility needs and potential alternative approaches to LPF that are currently not well understood, therefore, accurate cost, capability, and schedule comparisons between alternative options may not be feasible	EB 1
5185	0	Messmer, Mark B.	STR	The amendment requires the Director of the Space Development Agency to use middle tier acquisition for rapid fielding of satellites and associated systems for tranches 4, 5, and 6 of the proliferated warfighter space architecture of the Agency.	EB 1
5197	2	Vasquez, Gabe	STR	DRL requiring DOD to report on the feasibility, potential, and barriers to deploying electromechanical deployment platforms in orbit.	EB 1
5209	1	Smith, Adam	STR	Would limit the use of funds to apply the interpretation of high-level radioactive waste described in "Supplemental Notice Concerning U.S. Department of Energy Interpretation of High-Level Radioactive Waste" to waste located in the State of Washington, absent a waiver.	EB 1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
5233	2	Fallon, Pat	STR	Golden Dome Cybersecurity	EB 1
5235	1	Sorensen, Eric	STR	Requires a briefing on the impact of the loss of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which shared data with civilian entities to improve their weather forecasting models.	EB 1
5249	1	Crank, Jeff	STR	Directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to brief the Committee on options to maintain a second-source prototype capability for protected satellite communications programs.	EB 1
5282	1	Carbajal, Salud O.	STR	DRL requiring a briefing on the integration of space-based full motion video (FMV) and edge analytics to improve detection and tracking of dynamic on-orbit behavior.	EB 1
5293	1	Crank, Jeff	STR	Directs the Director of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to brief the Committee on the feasibility and potential cost benefits of adopting open architecture, modular, ground systems into space missions.	EB 1
5304	3	Turner, Michael	STR	Advancing Strategic Space Mobility: Nuclear Electric Propulsion Technology Assessment	EB 1
5350	1	Kiggans, Jennifer A.	STR	Directs DoD to brief committee on how to achieve affordable, "always on" satellite communications by using multi-orbit commercial networks, including current tests, a technical plan, and a roadmap to replace older systems.	EB 1
5353	0	Moulton, Seth	STR	Directs the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in coordination with the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to provide a briefing on the impact of Commercial Remote Sensing on Geospatial Intelligence Requirements	EB 1
5362	1	Jackson, Ronny	STR	Arms control inspection spending review	EB 1
5368	1	Moulton, Seth	STR	ANNUAL REPORT ON REQUESTS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS FOR REMOTE SENSING DATA.	EB 1
5380	1	Turner, Michael	STR	Resilience and Contingency Planning for Simultaneous Space and Undersea Infrastructure Attacks	EB 1
5415	2	Wittman, Robert	STR	National Security Launch Site Resiliency. Directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, to report on critical infrastructure support for national security launch capacity at state-owned and operated spaceports.	EB 1
5431	3	Whitesides, George	STR	DRL directing the Space Force to provide a briefing regarding opportunities to utilize commercial capabilities for low-cost, high-power, radiation-resilient satellite buses.	EB 1

LOG ID	REV	MEMBER	MARKUP LOC	DESCRIPTION	MARKUP ACT
5433	1	Whitesides, George	STR	DRL in support of the bill's establishment of a commercial weather data program of record.	EB 1
5454	1	Wittman, Robert	STR	Commercial LEO Resilient PNT. Directs the Secretary of the Air Force to deliver a report to the congressional defense committees assessing the capabilities of commercial LEO PNT satellite systems and their ability to provide resilient services.	EB 1
5530	0	Fallon, Pat	STR	EXTENSION OF DETERRENCE PILOT PROGRAM	EB 1
5571	1	Moulton, Seth	STR	Requires a report on the adequacy of the workforce of the National Nuclear Security Administration	EB 1
5581	0	Gooden, Lance	STR	Add "AND" to Sec. 1604 [Log 82395] - Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking Program (Pg.1014)	EB 1
5613	0	Rogers, Mike	STR	Comprehensive Strategy for GPS Capabilities	EB 1

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **National Nuclear Security Administration Plan for Office of Secure Transportation Modernization**

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) in supporting the nuclear security enterprise and the increasing long-term demand for transportation activities in connection with broader nuclear modernization efforts. Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 15, 2026, on the operational performance and long-term strategy of the Office of Secure Transportation. The briefing shall include:

- (1) a list of potential investments or modernization opportunities to enhance operation of the OST;
- (2) an analysis of existing transportation options and a determination on the feasibility of air transportation to support future OST missions; and
- (3) a summary of additional requirements associated with OST support for ongoing nuclear sustainment and modernization efforts.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026**

#### **Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Satellite Control Network Capacity**

The committee is aware of the reliance of the United States Space Force (USSF) and other US Government partners' reliance on the Satellite Control Network (SCN) for the tracking, telemetry, and commanding of many critical national security spacecraft on orbit as well as launch operations from the two main CONUS launch facilities. The committee is also aware that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office is currently acquiring the Satellite Communications Augmentation Resource (SCAR) program that is intended to modernize and augment the existing antennas through phased-array systems that will greatly increase the bandwidth. The committee is concerned that the existing SCN infrastructure needs constant repairs due to the age of the components and is not currently capable of supporting the projected communications needs for a peer conflict such as one with the People's Republic of China (PRC). These factors are compounded by the projected loss of useability of many network sites during such a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The committee is also concerned that the SCAR program is not projected to achieve initial operating capability status until ~2030, which is too late for current forecast timelines for potential conflict with the PRC.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to submit a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee not later than March 1, 2026, on the current state of the Satellite Control Network and, the resourcing needs for its continued maintenance, and the status of the SCAR program. This briefing shall also include:

- 1) the current operational status of each site and antenna within the SCN and the comprehensive maintenance plan for each site;
- 2) analysis of the current capacity based on today's user needs, the projected steady-state needs over the next three years based on forecasted mission growth, projected capacity for a peer-conflict within the next three years;
- 3) a comprehensive plan to address any identified capacity shortfalls under any of the above scenarios, to include all resourcing requirements; and
- 4) an update on the SCAR program, and resourcing needs to accelerate that program to meet capacity needs.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Ryan**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Ensuring Space Resilience through Radiation-Hardened Components for Small Satellites**

The committee recognizes the growing vulnerability of space systems to both natural radiation (solar storms, cosmic rays) and hostile threats such as nuclear anti-satellite weapons. As DoD expands its use of cost-effective, proliferated constellations—particularly beyond low earth orbit (LEO)—the risk of mission failure due to radiation becomes a critical concern. Smaller satellites now primarily use commercial electronics that lack radiation protection.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than March 1, 2026, on the following:

(1) an assessment of radiation risks to non-hardened satellites, especially those operating beyond LEO;

(2) an inventory of U.S. capabilities for radiation-hardened component development, and a gap analysis against projected needs;

(3) a plan to leverage existing research and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)-funded technologies to space-qualify and transition radiation-hardened subsystems—especially AI/ML-capable processors—to operational use, including Technology Readiness Level (TRL) advancement and in-space demonstrations;

(4) policy and acquisition strategies to strengthen domestic supply chains for radiation-hardened electronics, processors, and flight computers, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers while enabling dual-use deployment.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: MR. TURNER**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Space Domain Awareness Capabilities**

The committee acknowledges the critical importance of Space Domain Awareness (SDA) as a foundational element of national security space operations. As space becomes increasingly contested, congested, and competitive, the ability to detect, track, characterize, and attribute activities in space is essential to maintaining strategic advantage and operational readiness. The committee remains concerned that current SDA capabilities do not fully meet the needs of the U.S. Space Force and combatant commanders, particularly with respect to timely and persistent awareness of potential threats in low-earth and geosynchronous orbit.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations to continue pursuing a diverse range of mechanisms to address current and projected SDA capability gaps. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026, on current and planned SDA initiatives and coordination with allied and commercial partners.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: Mr. Trent Kelly**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Counter-Hypersonic Interceptor Propulsion**

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's ongoing efforts to counter hypersonic missile threats and the critical need to accelerate advanced interceptor propulsion technology to stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the House Committee on Armed Services no later than February 1, 2026, on the Department's strategy to advance next-generation hypersonic interceptor propulsion and expand the missile propulsion industrial base, including:

- (1) an assessment of current development timelines and capability gaps in hypersonic interceptor propulsion systems;
- (2) a plan to prioritize investment in next-generation propulsion technologies that enable faster and more cost-effective defeat of hypersonic threats;
- (3) a strategy to expand and diversify the domestic missile propulsion industrial base, ensuring resilient and redundant production capacity; and
- (4) metrics and milestones to measure progress in propulsion innovation and industrial base growth.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: Mr. Wilson**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Beryllium Manufacturing Capabilities**

The committee is aware that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is undergoing a comprehensive modernization effort to reconstitute the capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise (NSE), including beryllium capabilities. The committee understands commercial industry capabilities exist for beryllium, which have the potential to help meet the NSE's mission needs. Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2025, on the NSE's beryllium manufacturing capabilities. The briefing shall include the following:

- 1) an analysis of its current capacity and future demand for beryllium capabilities;
- 2) an analysis of capability gaps and challenges with respect to beryllium manufacturing; and
- 3) an assessment of the feasibility of commercial industry manufacturing capabilities to supplement the internal capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise and reduce programmatic risk.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026**

#### **Offered by Mr. Bacon of Nebraska**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

##### **Expediting Development of Hybrid Satellite Communications Systems**

The committee notes the recent Government Accountability Office report on satellite communications and its findings that the Department of Defense should expedite development and integration of hybrid satellite communication systems and networks. The committee is encouraged by the Department's work in identifying and fostering competition in the growing commercial space industry, which in turn lowers costs for the Department due to the entrance of new providers at different orbits with new technology. To ensure continued progress, the committee believes the Department should prioritize inclusion of diverse technologies, architectures, suppliers and orbits in defense solutions. Further, the committee encourages the Department to support civil regulatory agencies in pursuing a whole of government approach to ensure low earth orbit investments do not degrade the capabilities of satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than December 1, 2025 on the following:

- 1) the Department's plan to expedite the development and integration of hybrid satellite communication systems; and
- 2) how this plan will support a whole of government approach to regulation that preserves both geosynchronous satellite and low earth orbit satellite solutions.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Crank**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO) Space Operations**

The Committee recognizes the growing strategic potential of Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO) persistent surveillance, tactical ISR, and responsive sensing in contested environments. Historically constrained by atmospheric drag and limited propulsion, VLEO has become operationally viable due to modern advances in compact electric propulsion, aerodynamic spacecraft design, and onboard autonomy.

VLEO systems can offer ground sample distances below 20 cm with modest apertures, reduced latency for real-time edge processing, and a higher degree of stealth from ground-based sensors due to lower orbital altitude and rapid transit across observation arcs. These properties are especially relevant for tactical surveillance, denied-area sensing, and time-sensitive targeting. The Committee is concerned that the Department of Defense lacks a clear strategy to exploit the VLEO domain, despite emerging commercial capabilities and growing adversary interest. VLEO remains underrepresented in current national security space architectures and roadmaps.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026, that includes:

1. An assessment of potential defense mission applications for VLEO-based space systems, including ISR, dynamic targeting, tactical communications, and contested logistics support;
2. A technology survey of existing and emerging U.S. commercial capabilities related to VLEO platforms, including satellite buses, propulsion, thermal management, and onboard processing;
3. A cost-benefit and survivability comparison between VLEO architectures and conventional LEO/MEO satellite systems;
4. Recommendations for a demonstration and integration pathway, including use of prototyping authorities and dual-use procurement strategies.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Plan to Modernize Warhead Assembly and Disassembly Operations**

The committee recognizes the unique role of the Pantex Plant as the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) sole location for final assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons. The committee notes the increasing mission need for assembly and disassembly activities as major weapon modernization programs transition to production. Accordingly, the committee remains concerned that the NNSA has not updated its facilities at the Pantex Plant to keep pace with this increasing demand.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 1, 2026, on the NNSA's plan to modernize warhead assembly and disassembly operations. The briefing shall include, but is not limited to:

- (1) a 10-year forecast of future mission demand for warhead assembly and disassembly operations;
- (2) a prioritized description of current risks and limiting factors impacting assembly and disassembly operations at the Pantex Plant;
- (3) a description of planned activities and options to increase capacity and resiliency for weapon assembly and disassembly;
- (4) an analysis of alternative processes and new technologies that demonstrate the potential to increase efficiency in weapon assembly and disassembly operations; and
- (5) a modernization plan to address the Material Staging Capability mission needs.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: MR. DESJARLAIS**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### *Lithium Processing Facility*

The committee continues to support the modernization of lithium processing capabilities as a vital part of a responsive nuclear security enterprise. The committee notes continued growth in the estimated cost for the construction of the new Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) consideration of alternative approaches for lithium capabilities. However, while the design for LPF has reached 90% completion, potential alternative approaches are not well understood and, therefore, accurate cost, capability, and schedule comparisons between alternative options may not be feasible. Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the NNSA's strategy with respect to recapitalizing lithium capabilities. The briefing shall include:

- (1) an updated cost and schedule estimate for the Lithium Processing Facility;
- (2) an assessment of the remaining use life of Building 9204-2 (Beta-2);
- (3) a description of alternative acquisition strategies under consideration; and
- (4) a discussion of potential off-site options for processing steps, including consideration of associated feasibility, security, and logistical challenges.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3838**  
**OFFERED BY MR. MESSMER OF INDIANA**

Add at the appropriate place in subtitle A of title  
XVI the following new section:

1   **SEC. \_\_\_\_ . USE OF MIDDLE TIER ACQUISITION PROGRAM**  
2                   **FOR PROLIFERATED WARFIGHTER SPACE AR-**  
3                   **CHITECTURE   OF   SPACE   DEVELOPMENT**  
4                   **AGENCY.**

5       Section 1608(a) of the National Defense Authoriza-  
6   tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31; 10  
7   U.S.C. 2271 note) is amended by adding at the end the  
8   following new paragraphs:

9           “(4) Tranche 4.  
10          “(5) Tranche 5.  
11          “(6) Tranche 6.”.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: Mr. Vasquez**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Non-Propulsive Orbital Maneuvering Technologies**

The committee supports continued development of maneuver technologies that reduce reliance on consumable propulsion. As the Department of Defense expands activity in low Earth orbit (LEO) and plans for cislunar operations, it must pursue mobility solutions that avoid burdensome fuel logistics and enhance survivability. Electromechanical deployment platforms offer energy-efficient ways to reposition space assets for key space superiority missions while improving endurance and enabling new economic benefits in the space domain. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2026, assessing the feasibility, utility, integration potential, and barriers to operational use of non-propulsive maneuver technologies. A classified annex may be included.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3838**  
**OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF WASHINGTON**

At the appropriate place in title XXXI, insert the  
following new section:

1   **SEC. 31 \_\_\_\_ . LIMITATION RELATING TO RECLASSIFICATION**  
2                           **OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE.**

3           (a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided by subsection  
4 (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by  
5 this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026  
6 for the Department of Energy may be obligated or ex-  
7 pended by the Secretary of Energy to apply the interpreta-  
8 tion of high-level radioactive waste described in the notice  
9 published by the Secretary titled “Supplemental Notice  
10 Concerning U.S. Department of Energy Interpretation of  
11 High-Level Radioactive Waste” (84 Fed. Reg. 26835), or  
12 successor notice, with respect to such waste located in the  
13 State of Washington.

14           (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary may waive the limita-  
15 tion under subsection (a) relating to the reclassification  
16 of high-level radioactive waste if—

17                   (1) the Secretary submits to the appropriate  
18 congressional committees a notice of the waiver that  
19 includes—



1 (A) a justification for such reclassification;

2 (B) documentation from both the Environ-  
3 mental Protection Agency and the Department  
4 of Ecology of the State of Washington that in-  
5 dicates that such Agency and Department, re-  
6 spectively, concur with such reclassification, as  
7 required by the Hanford Federal Facility  
8 Agreement and Consent Order, signed on Janu-  
9 ary 10, 2025; and

10 (2) a period of 60 days has elapsed following  
11 the submission of such notice.

12 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-  
13 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-  
14 sional committees” means the following:

15 (1) The Committees on Armed Services of the  
16 House of Representatives and the Senate.

17 (2) The Subcommittees on Energy and Water  
18 Development of the Committees on Appropriations  
19 of the House of Representatives and the Senate.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: Mr. Fallon**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Golden Dome Cybersecurity**

The committee recognizes that without comprehensive cybersecurity integration from the outset, the next-generation air and missile defense architecture being developed pursuant to Executive Order 14186 and referred to as Golden Dome could be susceptible to cyber intrusions, leading to potential disruptions, data breaches, or compromised operational integrity. To enhance mission assurance, cybersecurity must be integrated at every level of the design, development, and deployment of the weapon system. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 31, 2026, identifying cybersecurity requirements for the Golden Dome effort. The report shall also include an analysis of the suitability of commercial off-the-shelf solutions to meet such requirements.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Sorensen**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Impact of Loss of Defense Meteorological Satellite Program**

The committee is aware that in 2026, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program will reach end of life and be decommissioned, and some capability will be lost during the transition to the replacement satellite architectures, namely in the loss of Special Sensor Microwave Imager Sounder (SSMIS) which is not planned to be launched on either the Weather System Follow-on Microwave (WSF-M) or Electro-Optical Infrared Weather System (EWS) due to prioritization. Further, the committee understands that this data contributed not only to Department of Defense Requirements, but was also shared with civil entities to provide additional data to improve their weather forecasting models.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2025 on:

- 1) How were the updated requirements and loss of SSMIS data for the WSF-M and EWS constellations coordinated and communicated across the Department of Defense and broader interagency, particularly given NOAA's use of that data in the National Hurricane Center?
- 2) At the time, was National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency notified of the loss of this data, and was there any concern raised during the Air Force acquisition process?
- 3) What capability gaps and corresponding operational risk will exist once DMSP is fully decommissioned and WSF-M and EWS are operational?
- 4) Is there a plan to address those gaps for the Department of Defense in future weather constellations?
- 5) What, if any, commercial vendors have solutions that could be purchased as data by the U.S. government that could fill the gap created by the lack of a follow-on sounder payload?
- 6) What would a cost estimate be for purchasing such commercial data?

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Crank**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Protected Satellite Communications Resiliency**

The Committee affirms the critical role of protected satellite communications in enabling secure, resilient, and survivable command and control for the joint force, particularly in contested environments. While the committee supports continued development of the Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS) program, it recognizes the risks associated with reliance on a single provider for such a mission-critical capability. To minimize risk to the industrial base and this critical capability, the Committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to explore options for maintaining an alternate prototype path through critical design review. This approach aligns with broader objectives of strengthening the national security space industrial base, workforce, and supply chain as well as enhancing acquisition flexibility.

Accordingly, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, in coordination with the Commander of Space Systems Command, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on options to maintain a second-source prototype capability for protected satellite communications programs. The briefing shall include an assessment of options to maintain a second-source prototype capability through critical design review for protected satellite communications; an evaluation of risks to mission assurance resulting from potential cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls in the Evolved Strategic SATCOM program; proposed mitigation strategies, including potential use of flexible acquisition authorities such as Other Transaction Authority; and an analysis of the implications for the national security space industrial base.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

**Offered by: Mr. Carbajal**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

### **Space-Based Visual Intelligence for Orbital Awareness**

The committee supports efforts to expand space domain awareness (SDA) through commercial technologies and encourages further integration of space-based full motion video (FMV) and edge analytics to improve detection and tracking of dynamic on-orbit behavior. FMV systems, especially those paired with automated processing and event-driven alerting, can enhance SDA by enabling real-time identification of anomalous maneuvers, proximity operations, and other spaceflight activity. These tools offer tactical benefits in increasingly congested and contested orbits.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee by March 1, 2026, that includes:

1. A review of Department efforts to evaluate FMV and edge analytics for SDA;
2. An assessment of how these tools could improve orbital behavior monitoring;
3. A roadmap for integrating FMV-derived insights into operational systems;
4. Recommendations for future SDA pilots leveraging video-based surveillance.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: MR. Crank**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Open Architecture Ground Systems for Space Missions**

The Committee is encouraged by the Missile Defense Agency's use of open architecture ground systems in recent missile defense tests. To reduce total life cycle costs and deliver at necessary speed, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, in consultation with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than March 1, 2026, on the feasibility and potential cost benefits of adopting open architecture, modular, ground systems into space missions.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Turner**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Advancing Strategic Space Mobility: Nuclear Electric Propulsion Technology Assessment**

The committee affirms the critical role of high-power nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) systems in enabling maneuver without fuel constraints. NEP architectures that deliver  $\geq 100$  kWe per thruster and offer adjustable specific impulse and thrust are essential to future cislunar operations. These systems enable extended-range mobility, dynamic payload repositioning, and support for power-intensive mission profiles, including persistent surveillance and logistics support.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations, to submit a brief to the House Armed Services Committee not later than March 1, 2026. The brief shall include:

1. A technology roadmap for developing and deploying NEP systems suitable for national security missions, including  $\geq 100$  kWe propulsion architectures and scalable thruster technologies;
2. An implementation plan aligning civil, defense, and commercial investments, with identification of ground-tested private-sector technologies for demonstration;
3. A threat assessment of PRC progress in space nuclear propulsion and implications for maneuver advantage;
4. Recommendations for demonstration infrastructure and orbital test missions by 2030;
5. A proposed acquisition plan and multi-year funding profile, including use of rapid acquisition and dual-use mechanisms.

A classified annex may be included as necessary.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Ms. Kiggans**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Affordable and “Always On” Resilient Commercial Satellite Communication Connectivity**

The committee recognizes that resilient satellite and network connectivity is critical to enabling United States and allied warfighters to maintain a tactical edge in future conflict scenarios. While the Department of Defense has traditionally relied on the Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) framework to ensure communications redundancy, the committee believes that emerging commercial satellite technologies—particularly non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) systems—now enable more dynamic, “always on” multi-orbit communications architectures.

The committee is concerned that current approaches to resilience are overly reliant on costly, redundant standby systems. The committee supports tighter integration of commercial satellite communications and military satellite communications to achieve affordable, resilient connectivity and reduce operational costs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 1, 2026, on the Department’s efforts to achieve secure, integrated, and cost-effective multi-orbit communications capabilities. The briefing should include the following:

- (1) a summary of past, current, or planned Department of Defense experiments involving secure integrated multi-orbit networking;
- (2) a reference architecture and implementation roadmap for operationalizing multi-orbit connectivity across the Department;
- (3) an investment strategy for transitioning from legacy PACE-based constructs to affordable, secure, multi-orbit communications, including:
- (4) recommended new contracting methodologies to procure affordable connectivity resilience;
- (5) estimated funding required to prioritize and accelerate the transition; and
- (6) a projection of future-year spending aligned with commercial NGSO satellite investments.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Moulton**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Impact of Commercial Remote Sensing on Geospatial Intelligence Requirements**

The committee recognizes the significant progress made by the commercial remote sensing sector in recent years, both in terms of collection capabilities and analytical tools. The committee believes it is critical to understand how these commercial capabilities are being leveraged and how advances may influence system acquisition requirements.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in coordination with the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026. The briefing shall include:

1. An assessment of the geospatial intelligence requirements that have historically been met by national technical means which can now be fulfilled by commercially available capabilities.
2. A description of how the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community are integrating commercial remote sensing into existing and planned systems, including any changes to acquisition strategies or system requirements.
3. Recommendations for future investments or organizational changes needed to fully leverage the commercial remote sensing ecosystem.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Jackson of Texas**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Arms Control Resources**

The committee notes that despite the benefits of existing arms control agreements in historically reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons of the U.S. and Russia, Russia's continued failure to comply with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements is destabilizing. The committee further observes the need to gain better understanding of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense to meet U.S. commitments for current arms control agreements. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than March 1, 2026, identifying Department of Defense resources surrounding existing arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements. For each agreement, the report shall include the following:

- (1) how such agreement has reduced requirements for the Services in the inventory of weapons;
- (2) a summary of implementation activities, including such ancillary activities as inspection preparedness training and planning, carried out during fiscal year 2025;
- (3) the number of personnel within the Department of Defense supporting implementation activities, to include government employees and contract support personnel;
- (4) an identification of the resources expended on implementation activities; and
- (5) any other relevant recommendations for streamlining or increasing the efficiency, as appropriate, of implementation-related activities.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3838**  
**OFFERED BY MR. MOULTON OF MASSACHUSETTS**

At the appropriate place in title X, insert the following new section:

1 **SEC. 10 \_\_\_\_ . ANNUAL REPORT ON REQUESTS OF COMBAT-**  
2 **ANT COMMANDS FOR REMOTE SENSING**  
3 **DATA.**

4 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than February 1,  
5 2026, and annually thereafter for a five-year period, the  
6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with  
7 the commanders of the combatant commands, shall submit  
8 to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of  
9 Representatives and the Senate a report on the requests  
10 of the combatant commands for data and information de-  
11 rived from remote sensing.

12 (b) MATTERS.—Each report under subsection (a)  
13 shall include, with respect to the two-year period preceding  
14 the date of the submission of that report and for each  
15 combatant command, the following information:

16 (1) An identification of the number of requests  
17 of that combatant command for data or information  
18 derived from remote sensing made to personnel of  
19 the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency during

1       such period, if any, including the number of any  
2       such requests denied, accepted but not completely  
3       fulfilled, and completely fulfilled, respectively.

4           (2) With respect to any such requests, an as-  
5       sessment of whether the time to provide the data or  
6       information requested was sufficient for the tactical  
7       purpose for which the data or information was re-  
8       quested.

9           (3) An identification of the number of any such  
10       requests not completely fulfilled and the reason, if  
11       any, given by personnel of the National Geospatial-  
12       Intelligence Agency for such lack of fulfillment.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: MR. TURNER**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Resilience and Contingency Planning for Simultaneous Space and Undersea Infrastructure Attacks**

The committee is concerned by the escalating threat posed by adversaries such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China to the critical space-based and undersea communications infrastructure that underpins United States military operations and national security. As publicly disclosed, Russia has developed an orbital nuclear anti-satellite weapon capable of devastating low Earth orbit (LEO). The Administration has publicly acknowledged this threat in an attempt to deter Russian space aggression. The detonation of such a weapon in space would trigger electromagnetic pulse effects, create widespread radiation hazards, and generate persistent orbital debris fields that could render large swaths of space unusable for decades. This would have catastrophic effects to satellite communications, missile warning, navigation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems essential to every facet of U.S. military operations.

The committee is equally concerned by the threat posed to global undersea fiber optic cables. These cables carry approximately 95 percent of international internet traffic, including military communications, financial transactions, and civilian infrastructure. A coordinated attack on these cables could paralyze transatlantic and Indo-Pacific communications, including strategic command pathways essential for the operation of U.S. forces worldwide.

The committee is concerned that a potential course of action may involve the simultaneous or sequential loss of both space-based and undersea networks, leaving the Department of Defense with degraded global situational awareness, compromised command authority, and an impaired ability to project power or respond to crises.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy, and the Commander of United States Cyber Command, to provide a classified briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026, on the Department's operational posture and contingency planning for the following scenarios:

(1) the loss of LEO capabilities resulting from the detonation of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon or other high-altitude nuclear device by Russia or another adversary, including the stated electromagnetic pulse effects, persistent orbital debris fields, and elevated radiation levels;

(2) the widespread severing or disabling of global undersea cable networks through hostile action by China, Russia, or another adversary; and

(3) the simultaneous or sequential degradation of both space-based assets and undersea cables.

The briefing for each scenario should also address:

(1) current posture, and continuity of operations frameworks for each scenario;

(2) the Department's ability to maintain nuclear command and control, joint force maneuver, global logistics, missile defense, and intelligence collection;

(3) the impacts to strategic communications, command and control, military readiness, and ground forces;

(4) an assessment of existing capability gaps, vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies, including resilient communications, redundant command authorities, and rapid reconstitution options;

(5) an overview of any planned or ongoing investments, research, or acquisition programs intended to strengthen resilience; and

(6) any recommendations for additional resources, authorities, or policy changes required to ensure that the Department can maintain credible deterrence and warfighting capability in these highly contested threat environments.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026**

### **Offered by: Mr. Wittman**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **National Security Launch Site Resiliency**

The committee recognizes the increasing volume of space launches from the United States, emphasizing the importance of expanding and improving launch infrastructure. As such, diversified national security launch sites are crucial for enhancing the resiliency of space launch capabilities.

The committee notes that additional capacity to support space launch is available at state sites, such as in Kodiak, Alaska and Wallops Island, Virginia, and urges the Department of Defense to explore opportunities to invest in the full utilization of the additional capacity.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee by February 1, 2026, including the following information regarding state-owned and operated spaceports that support, or can support, national security space missions:

(1) assessed critical infrastructure projects and investments needed at such state-owned and operated spaceports to improve their contributions to space launch capacity for national security purposes;

(2) an identification of facility improvements over the next five years that would enhance satellite processing capabilities, upgrade range safety systems, and provide mission-specific infrastructure; and

(3) a plan to develop metrics to assess how such facility improvements contribute to national security space launch capabilities and overall launch resiliency.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Whitesides**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Utilization of Commercial Capabilities for Multiple Orbit Applications**

The committee is aware of innovative efforts in the commercial space sector to develop low-cost, high-power (on the order of 20 kW), maneuverable, radiation-resilient satellite buses for use in multiple orbital domains. The committee strongly encourages the US Space Force to more broadly leverage ongoing private sector development and capitalize on opportunities to demonstrate the use of these capabilities in support of operational requirements in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geostationary Orbit (GEO), and Cislunar space.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 15, 2025 that includes:

- (1) Identification of opportunities to leverage existing commercial space sector low-cost, high power, maneuverable, radiation-resilient satellite buses for national security demonstration missions;
- (2) Analysis of potential payloads for such demonstration missions, particularly, but not limited to, those that might enable the Tactically Responsive Space and Golden Dome for America initiatives; and
- (3) A strategy for utilizing these innovative, commercial platforms to support future USSF requirements and programmatic investments.

This briefing should be unclassified but may include a classified annex.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Whitesides**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Commercial Weather Data Program of Record**

The committee reaffirms that space-based environmental monitoring is not merely a support function but a battlefield requirement. Timely, resilient weather intelligence underpins the safety of U.S. forces, satellite launches, hypersonic testing, ISR synchronization, and operational planning across all theaters. It is critical to strategic deterrence and warfighter survivability in contested environments.

Despite proven commercial capabilities, successful pilot programs, and bipartisan support, the committee remains concerned that the Department of Defense has not fully integrated commercial weather data into government systems. The committee believes that better integration of commercial space-based sensing data would address growing environmental awareness gaps.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, to assess the feasibility and advisability of establishing a Commercial Weather Data Program as a Program of Record and submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2026, outlining:

- (1) Where commercial weather data could augment existing Department of Defense weather systems to address all current weather gaps;
- (2) Funding estimates for procurement of commercial data to fill existing weather gaps with commercial data; and,
- (3) Cost and schedule estimate for the Department of Defense to integrate commercial weather data into existing government systems.

A classified annex may be included if necessary.

## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026**

#### **Offered by: Mr. Wittman**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

##### **Commercial Low Earth Orbit Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing**

The committee notes that U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is a linchpin of critical national security infrastructure and associated technologies. However, the committee is concerned that the United States is falling behind China in the field of satellite navigation in support of GPS, as the Chinese Communist Party has already supported the launch of several next-generation navigation satellites and announced plans to deploy hundreds more in the coming years. However, the committee is encouraged by private sector innovation in the United States, supported by growing commercial demand, to provide new satellite systems able to deliver resilient positioning, navigation, and timing solutions in the absence of degraded, denied, or otherwise limited GPS.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2026, on commercial satellite systems providing Low Earth Orbit (LEO) positioning, navigation, and timing services, and covering the following:

- (1) the ability of those satellite service providers to operate in the absence of GPS services;
- (2) an assessment of the relative ability of relevant satellite service providers to resist jamming and spoofing threats in comparison to existing GPS services;
- (3) an assessment of the capabilities of relevant satellite service providers to provide timing accuracy of less than 10 nanoseconds and position accuracy of less than 30 centimeters for stationary and mobile users, and any other metrics the Secretary considers relevant;
- (4) the ability of relevant satellite service providers to restore service if some or all satellites in the satellite system are disabled in a cadence, as determined by the Secretary, that may substantially decrease the time to service restoration compared to existing GPS service;
- (5) the feasibility and advisability of the Secretary entering into a production contract with a provider able to deliver the advanced capabilities detailed above and any barriers to doing so; and
- (6) any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3838**  
**OFFERED BY MR. FALLON OF TEXAS**

At the appropriate place in subtitle B of title XIII,  
insert the following:

**1 SEC. 13\_\_\_\_. EXTENSION OF DETERRENCE PILOT PROGRAM.**

2       Section 1314(c) of the National Defense Authoriza-  
3 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159; 10  
4 U.S.C. 311 note) is amended by striking “December 31,  
5 2027” and inserting “December 31, 2030”.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Moulton**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **National Nuclear Security Administration Workforce**

The committee commends the workforce at the National Nuclear Security Administration in carrying out one of the most technically complex and consequential missions of the United States Government. The committee believes that it is imperative the NNSA be staffed appropriately to address the increasing mission workload, to include delivering new nuclear warheads, at a rate that has not been achieved in decades and modernizing infrastructure across the entire nuclear weapons enterprise. The committee encourages the NNSA Administrator to evaluate mission requirements with workforce availability to ensure the successful execution of the no-fail mission tasked to the NNSA to meet Department of Defense requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator of NNSA to deliver a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than February 1, 2026, on the NNSA workforce required to successfully execute the mission of the NNSA, to include increased requirements across weapon development and infrastructure modernization.

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3838**  
**OFFERED BY MR. GOODEN OF TEXAS**

In subsection (c) of section 1604 **【Log 82395】**,  
strike “commercial-data analytics” and insert “commercial data and analytics”.



## **Amendment to H.R. 3838**

### **Offered by: Mr. Rogers**

In the appropriate place in the report to accompany H.R. 3838, insert the following new Directive Report Language:

#### **Comprehensive Strategy for GPS Capabilities**

The committee is concerned that despite its importance to the joint force and the civilian economy there is not a strategic comprehensive strategy from the U.S. Space Force for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). The committee notes that in 2024 the Department of the Air Force used the new section 229 authority to realign previously appropriated funds to address what it called an urgent operational development to begin work on what would become Resilient GPS (R-GPS) to provide additional smaller GPS space vehicles to provide on-orbit resilience.

The committee is troubled that despite this previously urgent need the fiscal year 2026 budget request did not include any requested funding for Resilient GPS (R-GPS) or procure any space vehicles for the program of record, GPS III Follow On (GPS IIIF). This lack of resource prioritization is a concerning development considering the vital role the GPS constellation plays for the joint force as it plans and conducts operations. The commercial space sector continues to demonstrate new and innovative approaches to PNT that could provide additional resiliency, protection against jamming, and faster deployment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026 that assesses and identifies the current and future threats to the current GPS system. The report should also include a comprehensive strategy for how the U.S. Space Force plans to address those threats to include plans for future procurement of existing programs, identification of capability gaps and how the service plans to address them, plans to address the deployment of ground user equipment, and the funding profile required.