

**H.R. 3838—STREAMLINING PROCUREMENT  
FOR EFFECTIVE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY  
AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION  
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

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## **DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS**

### **TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS**

#### **LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS**

## SUBTITLE B—AMENDMENTS TO GENERAL CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES, PROCEDURES, AND LIMITATIONS

### Section 815—Extension of Authority for Pilot Program for Development of Technology-Enhanced Capabilities with Partnership Intermediaries

This section would authorize a three year extension to section 851(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92, 10 U.S.C. 4901 note) allowing U.S. Special Operations Command to further evaluate the benefits, to include accelerated technology development realized through the authorities by providing relative data to determine if a greater benefit to the Department of Defense could be realized from a wider application.

## SUBTITLE G—OTHER MATTERS

### Section 861—Special Operations Command Urgent Innovative Technologies and Capabilities Pilot Program

This section would create a pilot program for United States Special Operations Command to accelerate the research, development, testing, procurement and initial sustainment of innovative technologies and equipment that enhance operational capabilities of Special Operations Forces to meet emerging mission requirements. This section would also require a report annually on the implementation and effectiveness of the program.

## TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

### LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

#### SUBTITLE F—OTHER MATTERS

### Section 1076—Procurement and Distribution of Sports Foods and Dietary Supplements to Members of the Armed Forces Assigned to the United States Special Operations Command

This section would authorize the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to procure and distribute to members of the Armed Forces assigned to USSOCOM sports foods and dietary supplements.

## TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

### LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

#### SUBTITLE A—ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

## Section 1201—Modification of Authority to Build Capacity of Foreign Security Forces

This section would make a technical correction to the availability of funds across fiscal years authorized under subsection (g)(2) of section 333 of title 10, United States Code.

# TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

## LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

### SUBTITLE B—DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

#### Section 1611—Clandestine Activities Vendor Database

The section would amend chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code to require the Department of Defense to establish, maintain, and continuously update a database for vendors supporting clandestine activities to facilitate deconfliction and risk assessment. The provision requires the Department to provide a report and briefing on the plan to the covered committees 90 days after enactment, a briefing 270 days after enactment on progress, and a written certification to the covered committees not later than 1 year after enactment that the requirements have been implemented.

#### Section 1612—Modification of Authority of Army Counterintelligence Agents to Execute Warrants and Make Arrests

This section would amend section 7377(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, by striking the 4-year period, thereby making the underlying authority for certain special agents of the Army Counterintelligence Command to execute warrants and make arrests permanent.

### SUBTITLE E—OTHER MATTERS

#### Section 1651—Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds

This section would allocate specific funding amounts for each program under the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program from the overall \$282.8 million that the committee would authorize for the CTR Program. The allocation under this section reflects the amount of the budget request for fiscal year 2026.

This section would also specify that funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for the CTR Program, established under the

Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (50 U.S.C. 3711), would be available for obligation for fiscal years 2026-2028.

# **BILL LANGUAGE**

1 **SEC. 815 [Log 82789]. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR**  
2 **PILOT PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF**  
3 **TECHNOLOGY-ENHANCED CAPABILITIES**  
4 **WITH PARTNERSHIP INTERMEDIARIES.**

5 Section 851(e) of the National Defense Authorization  
6 Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (10 U.S.C. 4901 note) is amend-  
7 ed by striking “September 30, 2025” and inserting “Sep-  
8 tember 30, 2028”.



## 1                   **Subtitle G—Other Matters**

### 2   **SEC. 861 [Log 82193]. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND UR-** 3                   **GENT INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND CA-** 4                   **PABILITIES PILOT PROGRAM.**

5           (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Commander of the  
6 United States Special Operations Command shall carry  
7 out a pilot program to be known as the “USSOCOM Ur-  
8 gent Innovative Technologies and Capabilities Pilot Pro-  
9 gram” (in this section referred to as the “Program”) to  
10 accelerate the research, development, testing, procure-  
11 ment, and initial sustainment of innovative technologies  
12 and equipment that enhance the operational capabilities  
13 of Special Operations Forces to meet emerging mission re-  
14 quirements.

15          (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The Commander shall—

16               (1) establish procedures for component special  
17 operations units to submit requests to the Com-  
18 mander for the inclusion of innovative technologies  
19 and equipment in the Program; and

20               (2) use authorities under section 167(e)(4) of  
21 title 10, United States Code, to carry out the Pro-  
22 gram.

23          (c) REPORT.—

24               (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year  
25 after the date of the enactment of this section, and

1       annually thereafter for the duration of the Program,  
2       the Commander of the United States Special Oper-  
3       ations Command shall submit to the congressional  
4       defense committees a report on the implementation  
5       and effectiveness of the Program.

6           (2) CONTENTS.—Each report shall include the  
7       following:

8           (A) A summary of activities carried out  
9       under the Program along with documentation  
10      of planned expenditures.

11          (B) An assessment of the effect of innova-  
12      tive technologies and equipment included in the  
13      Program on the operational capabilities of the  
14      United States Special Operations Command.

15          (C) Recommendations for the continuation,  
16      expansion, or modification of the Program.

17          (D) A description of any challenges en-  
18      countered and lessons learned.

19          (E) A description of any action using es-  
20      tablished procedures for a reprogramming of  
21      funds in an amount greater than the approved  
22      amount for such reprogramming, as established  
23      by Congress, to carry out the Program.

1       (d) SUNSET.—The authority to carry out the Pro-  
2 gram under this section shall terminate on the date that  
3 is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

1 **SEC. 1076 [Log 82717]. PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION**  
2 **OF SPORTS FOODS AND DIETARY SUPPLE-**  
3 **MENTS TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES**  
4 **ASSIGNED TO THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL**  
5 **OPERATIONS COMMAND.**

6 (a) PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION.—The Com-  
7 mander of the United States Special Operations Command  
8 may authorize—

9 (1) the procurement of sports foods and dietary  
10 supplements; and

11 (2) the distribution of such foods and supple-  
12 ments to members of the Armed Forces assigned to  
13 the United States Special Operations Command.

14 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commander of the  
16 United States Special Operations Command shall—

17 (A) establish policies for the procurement  
18 and distribution of sports foods and dietary  
19 supplements under this section; and

20 (B) require that such procurement and dis-  
21 tribution is in compliance with—

22 (i) Department of Defense Instruction  
23 6130.06, titled “Use of Dietary Supple-  
24 ments in the Department of Defense”; and

25 (ii) the prohibited dietary supplement  
26 ingredients list of the Department.

1           (2) POLICIES.—The policies established under  
2       paragraph (1) shall provide that—

3           (A) dietary supplements procured or dis-  
4       tributed under this section are required to be  
5       certified by a non-Department third-party certi-  
6       fying organization that Operation Supplement  
7       Safety of the Department has vetted for end-  
8       product quality assurance;

9           (B) dietary supplements and sports foods  
10      procured or distributed under this section are  
11      required to be free of contaminants and ingredi-  
12      ents and substances prohibited by the Depart-  
13      ment (including any ingredients and substances  
14      that are synonymous with such prohibited in-  
15      gredients and substances);

16          (C) sports foods and dietary supplements  
17      may only be distributed to members of the  
18      Armed Forces—

19           (i) by a credentialed and privileged  
20      registered (performance) dietitian or a  
21      medical clinician with prescribing authority  
22      who is assigned to or supporting the  
23      United States Special Operations Com-  
24      mand at the operational unit level; and

1 (ii) under the guidance and oversight  
2 of a primary care sports medicine physi-  
3 cian.

4 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The procurement and  
5 distribution of sports foods and dietary supplements under  
6 this section shall be construed to supplement and not sup-  
7 plant—

8 (1) any morale, welfare, or recreation funds or  
9 activities otherwise required or available; and

10 (2) any funding made available for, and services  
11 provided by, any dining facility of the Department.

1           **Subtitle A—Assistance and**  
2                           **Training**

3   **SEC. 1201. [LOG 82833] MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO**  
4                           **BUILD CAPACITY OF FOREIGN SECURITY**  
5                           **FORCES.**

6       Subsection (g)(2) of section 333 of title 10, United  
7 States Code, is amended by striking “made” after  
8 “Amounts”.

1     **Subtitle B—Defense Intelligence**  
2     **and Intelligence-Related Activities**  
3     **SEC. 1611.[Log 82407] CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES VENDOR**  
4             **DATABASE.**

5             (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title  
6     10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end  
7     the following new section:

8     **“§ 430e. Clandestine activities vendor database**

9             “(a) ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE.—The  
10     Secretary of Defense shall establish, maintain, and con-  
11     tinuously update a secure, centralized database containing  
12     a list of all commercial vendors that perform work for the  
13     Department of Defense in support of a clandestine activ-  
14     ity.

15             “(b) SCOPE.—The database required by subsection  
16     (a) shall include information on all commercial vendors,  
17     including all subcontractors, that have performed, are per-  
18     forming, or have agreed to perform work described in such  
19     subsection.

20             “(c) EXCLUSION OF VENDORS.—Notwithstanding  
21     subsections (a) and (b), if the Secretary of Defense deter-  
22     mines that a commercial vendor should not be included  
23     in the database required by subsection (a) due to oper-  
24     ational, counterintelligence, or other national security con-  
25     cerns, the Secretary—



1 “(1) may exclude the commercial vendor from  
2 the database required by subsection (a); and

3 “(2) not later than 7 days after making a de-  
4 termination that the commercial vendor should not  
5 be included in such database, shall submit to the  
6 congressional defense committees, the Select Com-  
7 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Perma-  
8 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House  
9 of Representatives notice of the determination that  
10 includes—

11 “(A) the type or category of vendor ex-  
12 cluded;

13 “(B) a synopsis of the contract and the  
14 scope of work involved; and

15 “(C) the rationale for exclusion from the  
16 database.

17 “(d) DECONFLICTION.—The Secretary of Defense  
18 shall ensure the database required by subsection (a) is  
19 used to—

20 “(1) deconflict clandestine activities of the De-  
21 partment of Defense that involve the use of commer-  
22 cial vendors; and

23 “(2) assess operational risk and counterintel-  
24 ligence exposure attributable to the use of commer-

1 cial vendors in support of clandestine activities of  
2 the Department of Defense.

3 “(e) CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY DEFINED.—In this sec-  
4 tion, the term ‘clandestine activity’ means any activity  
5 where it is intended that the role of the United States  
6 Government will not be apparent or acknowledged pub-  
7 licly.”.

8 (b) IMPLEMENTATION DEADLINE AND REPORTS.—

9 (1) IMPLEMENTATION DEADLINE AND CERTIFI-  
10 CATION.—Not later than one year after the date of  
11 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense  
12 shall—

13 (A) implement the requirements of section  
14 430e of title 10, United States Code, as added  
15 by subsection (a) of this section; and

16 (B) submit to the congressional defense  
17 committees, the Select Committee on Intel-  
18 ligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select  
19 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-  
20 resentatives a certification that such require-  
21 ments have been implemented.

22 (2) SUBMISSION OF PLAN.—Not later than 90  
23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
24 Secretary of Defense shall—

1 (A) submit to the committees described in  
2 paragraph (1)(B) a report containing the plan  
3 to implement the requirements of such section  
4 430e; and

5 (B) provide to such committees a briefing  
6 with respect to such plan.

7 (3) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 270  
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
9 Secretary of Defense shall provide to the committees  
10 described in paragraph (1)(B) a briefing describing  
11 the progress of the Secretary towards implementing  
12 the requirements of such section 430e.

1 **SEC. 1612.[Log 82129] MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF**  
2 **ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS TO**  
3 **EXECUTE WARRANTS AND MAKE ARRESTS.**

4 Section 7377(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code,  
5 is amended by striking “during the four-year period begin-  
6 ning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense  
7 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025,”.

1                   **Subtitle E—Other Matters**

2   **SEC. 1651.[Log 82867]. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION**  
3                   **FUNDS.**

4           (a) **FUNDING ALLOCATION.**—Of the \$282,830,000  
5 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of De-  
6 fense for fiscal year 2026 in section 301 and made avail-  
7 able by the funding table in division D for the Department  
8 of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program estab-  
9 lished under section 1321 of the Department of Defense  
10 Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (50 U.S.C. 3711), the  
11 following amounts may be obligated for the purposes spec-  
12 ified:

13                   (1) For delivery system threat reduction,  
14                   \$6,332,000.

15                   (2) For chemical security and elimination,  
16                   \$18,645,000.

17                   (3) For global nuclear security, \$30,621,000.

18                   (4) For biological threat reduction,  
19                   \$160,402,000.

20                   (5) For proliferation prevention, \$36,923,000.

21                   (6) For activities designated as Other Assess-  
22                   ments/Administration Costs, \$29,907,000.

23           (b) **SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT RE-**  
24 **DUCTION FUNDS.**—Funds appropriated pursuant to the  
25 authorization of appropriations in section 301 and made

1 available by the funding table in division D for the Depart-  
2 ment of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
3 shall be available for obligation for fiscal years 2026,  
4 2027, and 2028.

# **DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE**

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## **DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS**

### **TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS**

#### **ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST**

##### **OTHER MATTERS**

Open Vehicle Electronic Architecture for SOCOM Nonstandard Commercial Vehicles

The committee notes as the commercial automotive industry trends towards increasing proprietary digitalization, the sustained viability of U.S. Special



Operations Command's (USSOCOM) Nonstandard Commercial Vehicle (NSCV) fleet, embedded in the Family of Special Operations Vehicles (FOSOV), is at risk due to increasing technological constraints. The NSCV program is vital to USSOCOM, which utilizes these vehicles to conduct clandestine operations in operating areas that require teams to blend in with locally available vehicles. Currently, adaptations to the vehicle and the addition of desired performance upgrade capabilities require changes to the Vehicle Electronic Architecture (VEA). Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) do not provide access to their control software, so, at present, workarounds are required to layer in features and systems that special operations forces need to execute their missions. This status quo is not sustainable as OEMs become more protective of their control software and are unwilling to work with clients to alter this software. The committee is aware that at the same time as control over the NSCV fleet deteriorates, operations that warrant the use of NSCVs increase globally. Through the development of a USSOCOM owned and editable, open architecture VEA, special forces operators can maintain a more capable, more fuel efficient, more resilient NSCV fleet. Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the potential for increased investment in the further development and integration of open VEA solutions for the NSCV fleet. The briefing should include the current and future requirements for the NSCV fleet, projected costs of the integration of open VEA solutions, and the potential impact on missions if a solution is not resourced and applied to the NSCV fleet.

#### Pre-positioned Orbital Supply and Logistics for Special Operations

The committee notes the challenges special operations forces could have with resupply in contested and austere environments during critical or clandestine operations. The committee is aware of developing technology to allow for the pre-positioning of vital logistics in low-Earth orbit, potentially creating a more robust supply chain and enhancing warfighting. With the growing availability of a range of commercial reentry services, the ability to supply special operations forces deployed anywhere on the globe from pre-positioned orbital carriers could soon become a reality. Pre-positioned orbital carriers in low-Earth orbit could launch and maintain orbit while carrying a variety of special mission payloads, available to any forward deployed unit within a matter of minutes. For special forces operating in contested areas where traditional supply is unavailable, supply and logistics support from orbit could enhance the mission sustainment for these units and deliver additional capabilities in a rapidly evolving environment. Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 1, 2026, on the feasibility of pre-positioned orbital supply and logistics. The briefing should include the cost of development and employment, and what mission requirements could be supported by this concept.

## Use of Evidence Based Sports Medicine by U.S. Special Operations Command in the Treatment and Prevention of Musculoskeletal Injuries

The committee notes that the physical domain of wellness under the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) in the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) optimizes resources to maximize care, provides early access to reduce the impact of injury or reinjury, and leverages innovative technics in science to advance training and treatment.

The committee understands that USSOCOM continuously seeks to use the most innovative evidence-based techniques under the POTFF physical domain to ensure the best sports medicine; strength and conditioning; and performance nutrition is used by Special Operations Forces to prevent musculoskeletal injuries (MSKIs). The committee believes USSOCOM should explore all available evidence-based treatment modalities to treat MSKIs, to include newer concepts like Muscle Activation Technique (MAT) that are evidenced based and utilized by professional athletes.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command to provide the House Committee on Armed Services a briefing not later than March 31, 2026, on the following:

- (1) what are the current treatment modalities for personnel within USSOCOM to receive treatment for MSKIs at point of injury as well as preventative care;
- (2) how does USSOCOM determine which evidenced based techniques should be used to treat and prevent MSKIs;
- (3) in the last two years have there been any techniques that have been explored at USSOCOM, if so, were these techniques continued or not;
- (4) if there were techniques that were discontinued, what was the justification for not continuing them; and
- (5) any other matters the Commander deems relevant.

## TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

### ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

#### Baltic High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Deployment

The committee acknowledges the Department of Defense's efforts to support the development of precision strike capabilities in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). However, the committee is concerned that technical, procedural, or interoperability barriers may prevent these Baltic countries from effectively deploying HIMARS platforms and munitions during a crisis, potentially affecting collective defense objectives.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on its efforts to identify and mitigate obstacles to the deployment of HIMARS platforms and munitions among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in crisis scenarios. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) an assessment of current technical, logistical, and procedural barriers to collective deployment of HIMARS platforms and munitions among the three Baltic countries;

(2) a description of ongoing or planned initiatives to enhance interoperability and effective deployment of HIMARS, including modifications to systems, standardization of munitions, development of joint or multilateral operational protocols, or other measures;

(3) recommendations for policy, technical, or programmatic actions to enable rapid and secure deployment of HIMARS assets among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during a crisis;

(4) an evaluation of how these efforts support collective defense among the Baltic states and align with broader North Atlantic Treaty Organization interoperability goals; and

(5) any other information the Secretary considers relevant.

#### Enhancing the Security of the Baltic States

The committee affirms its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a strategic alliance that is critical to advancing United States national security objectives in Europe, the Indo-Pacific region, and around the world. However, the committee remains concerned regarding the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Russia's demonstrated aggression toward these countries, which represents a long-term existential threat to the NATO alliance. The committee observes that a June 2024 Department of Defense report entitled "Report on the Baltic Security Initiative," directed by the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (H. Rept. 118-301), recently confirmed these concerns and assessed the Baltic states are NATO's most vulnerable region where deficiencies in conventional military force posture and capabilities can be exploited by Russia to weaken the NATO alliance in pursuit of its larger strategic goal to redraw the borders of Europe and assert its influence through intimidation and the credible threat of military force. The committee also notes that the Baltic countries have consistently invested seriously in their own defense and rank among the highest in NATO for defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. This same 2024 report emphasized the importance of the Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) and its important role in improving the defensive military capabilities of these NATO member states.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than June 1, 2026, on the security of the Baltic States. The report shall include:

(1) an update on progress made in the implementation of the multi-year strategy and spending plan set forth in the June 2024 “Report on the Baltic Security Initiative”;

(2) an analysis of alternatives and associated costs required to attain an operational capability to detect and effectively respond to aircraft, ballistic missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial system threats prior to 2029;

(3) an update on Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs) related to Baltic security underway or completed from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2026;

(4) a description of new SSCIs for Baltic security proposed for fiscal year 2027 and beyond;

(5) a summary of BSI funding from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2026;

(6) a summary of allied contributions to Baltic security, including weapons, munitions, and equipment sales and transfers, force posture and presence, information and intelligence sharing, and other collaborative security measures; and

(7) a description of how the Department coordinates with allies on efforts to bolster the security of the Baltic States.

### Irregular Warfare Center

The committee commends the Department of Defense’s establishment and use of the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC). Since its establishment, the IWC has furthered its mission to prepare the warfighter to conduct irregular warfare across the spectrum of conflict through training courses and seminars offered throughout the Department and the inter-agency. The committee believes the IWC is a valuable asset for the Department and should continue to be utilized as the premiere center of excellence on the topic of Irregular Warfare. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Department’s long-term strategy for the Irregular Warfare Center. The briefing should include the funding and staffing needed to meet the long-term strategy, how the IWC supports the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, and any other information the Secretary deems relevant.

## TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

### ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

#### INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

#### Integration of Defense Intelligence Tools

The committee notes that the Defense Intelligence Agency is in the process of replacing the Military Intelligence Integrated Database with the Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System, or MARS. The MARS system is a cloud-based system for foundational military intelligence that will leverage investments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) to help intelligence analysts ingest vast amounts of data from across the intelligence community and ultimately deliver timely foundational military intelligence to warfighters and policymakers. Given rapid advancements in AI running parallel to the Defense Intelligence Agency's work to bring the MARS capability to fruition, the committee would like to better understand how MARS is being optimized to use AI and Machine Learning (ML) tools available today while also preparing for future developments. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, as necessary, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 31, 2026, on how MARS is working to incorporate existing AI and ML capabilities; guardrails, including legal and technical, for the incorporation of AI and ML into MARS; how MARS will be able to evolve, as necessary, to adapt to future capabilities; and any resource requirements to ensure MARS is able to meet the Defense Intelligence Agency's requirements and mission.

#### National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Capabilities to Support the Americas

The committee recognizes the important role the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency can play in monitoring, identifying, and providing disaster management and counterdrug support for North, Central, and South America. Geospatial intelligence can provide important information in support of national security objectives, and the committee notes that there are a number of airborne tools that can contribute to these datasets. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2025, on current capabilities the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency leverages to support national security priorities covering North, Central, and South America, including counterdrug and disaster management missions. Additionally, the briefing should include an assessment of collection requirements for fiscal year 2026 and any capability gaps if relevant to supporting these requirements.

#### Secure Compartment Information Facility Availability for AUKUS Partners

The committee recognizes the importance of the AUKUS partnership to support a free and open Indo-Pacific and its ability to further strengthen the ability of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom to support mutual defense and security interests. In order to foster the information sharing necessary to fully realize the full potential of the AUKUS partnership, the committee believes that it is necessary to have shared spaces where representatives from Australia and the United Kingdom can work with their United States counterparts, including the

ability for cleared individuals to use Secure Compartment Information Facilities, or SCIFs, as appropriate. Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2025, on the number of SCIFs available that allow for this level of collaboration; steps taken to convert additional SCIFs, if necessary; any challenges that currently exist to ensuring the Department of Defense is able to support such a capability; and an assessment of the resources necessary to support such SCIF development.

#### Status Update on the Codification of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

The committee continues to recognize the importance of consistent, independent oversight of Department of Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities, which ultimately enables the Department to continue to engage in and, importantly, succeed in executing these activities. Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159) codified the role of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official, who is charged with conducting such independent oversight, and directed the Secretary of Defense to review and update Department of Defense Directive 5148.13 accordingly.

Additionally, the committee notes that holistic, independent oversight of the Department's intelligence, intelligence-related, and sensitive activities protects and enables our servicemembers while also fostering a culture of accountability and high standards. It is imperative that the Department is able to conduct such oversight without silos to ensure these activities are carried out in a manner that is consistent with policy and law. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Department's progress towards executing the requirements laid out in Section 921 of Public Law 118-159, as well as the efforts to establish robust, coordinated oversight of these activities.

#### OTHER MATTERS

##### Artificial Intelligence-Enabled Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction

The committee notes that weapons of mass destruction can be triggered by a variety of wireless technologies, both traditional and emerging. The committee also recognizes that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is currently performing counter-weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) activities designed to counter these evolving threats from all ranges of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum. The committee believes that the Department should explore and validate the use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled RF spectrum sensing approaches to meet the requirement for quick reaction against unknown signal threats. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of DTRA to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 31, 2025, on efforts to

validate this mission requirement and to develop and field the technology to assist units performing CWMD missions counter this evolving threat.

### Digital Signature Management

The committee recognizes that adversaries are increasingly exploiting the commercial digital surveillance economy as a low-cost, low-risk method of targeting U.S. forces as well as vulnerabilities that the ever-changing ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) environment create. By reducing U.S. forces digital signature exposure and adversary tracking, digital force protection strengthens overall force protection, operational security, and strategic deception efforts across all domains of warfare. Effective digital force protection imposes costs on adversaries by complicating their ability to detect, track, or exploit U.S. personnel and assets through commercial data aggregation and other intelligence tools, as well as increase protection of U.S. personnel. The committee is concerned that special operations forces (SOF) with their global remit, inherent multi-domain focus, and as the deep sensor for the conventional force are especially vulnerable to adversarial exploitation of the commercial digital surveillance economy and UTS vulnerabilities. Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, United States Special Operations Command to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, that identifies existing vulnerabilities to SOF operators, any targeted UTS mitigation training conducted by the command, and whether there are commercially available secure communication and obfuscation technologies to protect personnel and support overall mission effectiveness.

### Prophylactic Medical Countermeasures for Radiation Exposure

The committee commends the Department of Defense's efforts to develop prophylactic medical countermeasures through the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense to protect against acute radiation syndrome for the Armed Forces. The committee also commends the Department on its recent publication of the 2024 Chemical and Biological Defense Program Enterprise Strategy that prioritizes the delivery of defensive capabilities to the Department as well as better integration with industry, interagency, academia, and our partner and allies. The committee notes the increase in potential use of chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons over the past decade by our adversaries and is concerned the Department has not made enough progress to ensure the protection of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Department's long-term strategy to ensure the availability of a prophylactic medical countermeasure for radiation exposure for the Armed Forces and civilian personnel in areas of threat around the world.