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STATEMENT OF

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U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

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1 **Strategic Environment and Adversarial Challenges**

2 The Indo-Pacific remains the Department of Defense's priority theater. The region is
3 marked by increasing tension and disorder. Revanchist and revisionist powers take
4 action to consolidate their positions and advance their designs. This action threatens
5 U.S. national interests. Accordingly, the United States Indo-Pacific Command
6 (USINDOPACOM) operates as a resolute and ready Joint Force that is always prepared
7 to fight and win.

8 **China**

9 China continues to pursue unprecedented military modernization and increasingly
10 aggressive behavior that threatens the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our partners.

11 China is developing and integrating cutting-edge technologies – AI, hypersonic and
12 advanced missiles, and space-based capabilities – at an alarming pace. China's anti-
13 access/area denial capabilities are designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating
14 within the first and second island chains. China is outpacing the U.S. in testing not only
15 these critical technologies but also technologies from across their military industrial
16 base.

17 In 2024, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) demonstrated its growing capabilities
18 through persistent multi-domain pressurization activities of increasing scope, scale,
19 complexity, and number against Taiwan – combined with a significantly expanded daily
20 air and maritime presence. China employs a multi-faceted approach combining military
21 pressure, cognitive and cyber operations, and economic coercion. China's development

22 of advanced missile systems, space and counter space capabilities, hypersonic
23 weapons, chemical and biological weapons, a growing nuclear arsenal, and expanding
24 maritime capabilities presents an evolving challenge to regional stability.

25 Beijing's aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not just exercises – they are dress
26 rehearsals for forced unification. The PLA escalated military pressure against Taiwan by
27 300% in 2024, through activities such as Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) entries
28 and centerline crossings. In the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over
29 contested features and sovereign rights over international waters. It uses coercive
30 behavior and bare aggression to exert its excessive sovereignty claims, including
31 harassing Philippine and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partner
32 vessels in vital sea lanes that carry over one-third of global maritime trade.

33 **North Korea**

34 North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons, other WMDs, and ballistic
35 missiles – including submarine-launched systems – poses a direct threat to the U.S.
36 homeland and allies. In October 2024, North Korea launched a new solid-propellant
37 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – its third new ICBM since 2022. This latest
38 ICBM is larger than its predecessor, suggesting it could carry a larger nuclear payload
39 to the U.S. homeland. In 2024, North Korea conducted its largest ballistic missile salvo
40 to date, simultaneously launching 18 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from a
41 single location.

42 More troubling still is North Korea's deepening relationship with Russia. North Korea
43 has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, rockets, and thousands of containers of
44 munitions since late 2022 to support Russia's war against Ukraine. North Korea
45 expanded its support in October 2024 with at least 12,000 combat forces. These forces
46 sustained over 4,000 casualties by the end of 2024. I assess North Korea is attempting
47 to gain Russian assistance in developing space launch vehicles, military satellites, one-
48 way attack drones, missile technology, and advanced submarine propulsion technology.

49 **Russia**

50 Russia has significantly modernized its Pacific Fleet since 2021 with particular growth of
51 its submarine fleet. In 2024 alone, Russia's Pacific Fleet received three new
52 submarines: a Severodvinsk II SSGN, a Kilo SS, and a Dolgorukiy II SSBN – totaling
53 seven new submarines over the last three years. Additionally, Russian maritime
54 operations have expanded geographically into the Bering Sea.

55 Russia's growing military cooperation with China, including joint exercises in the Pacific,
56 adds another layer of complexity to the Indo-Pacific security environment. Their
57 combined operations demonstrate increasing sophistication that potentially complicates
58 USINDOPACOM response options in a crisis. In 2024, China and Russia conducted
59 multiple combined naval and air operations, including bomber patrols near Alaska and
60 Guam. Combined military activity in 2024 included an inaugural coast guard patrol, two
61 naval patrols, three naval exercises, and two bomber patrols. The November bomber

62 patrol included China's nuclear-capable H-6Ns, the first iteration in which both nations
63 used aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland.

64 The deepening cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea threatens to
65 exacerbate and accelerate security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, degrading safety and
66 security and accelerating existing tensions and disputes in the region. Together, these
67 countries' growing ties create a complex, interconnected challenge to U.S. national
68 security and regional stability.

69 **USINDOPACOM Approach**

70 **Deterrence, Crisis, Conflict**

71 USINDOPACOM deters challenges to regional stability and security in competition and
72 crisis while ensuring the ability to prevail in conflict against any adversary. In
73 coordination with allies and partners, the Joint Force develops and demonstrates the
74 ability to deny adversaries' strategic objectives in all domains. At all times, the Joint
75 Force is operating effectively in the information environment. Credible, prompt, and
76 sustained combat power, visible across the Indo-Pacific region, will deter acts of military
77 aggression that destabilize the region, undermine security and stability, and threaten the
78 security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States.

79 In 2024, USINDOPACOM conducted twenty major Joint Force exercises across the
80 area of responsibility. These exercises demonstrated capability, built combined

81 capacity, showcased multi-domain operations, advanced new capabilities, and
82 supported partner force integration. Recent examples include:

- 83 • Exercise Valiant Shield, a multinational, biennial field training exercise focused
84 on integrating interoperability in a multi-domain environment. The exercise built
85 real-world proficiency in detecting, locating, tracking, and engaging units at sea,
86 in the air, in space, on land, and in cyberspace – including the successful
87 employment of Precision Strike Missiles from an Autonomous Multi-domain
88 Launcher at Palau International Airport.
- 89 • Expanded trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia in the U.S.-Japan
90 command post exercise, Keen Edge, to advance closer operational collaboration.
91 Operationally, forces are conducting reciprocal deployments of fighter and
92 transport aircraft to all three countries in 2025 through Exercise Cope North,
93 Exercise Bushido Guardian, and Exercise Pitch Black.
- 94 • Continued trilateral cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK),
95 demonstrated by the first two iterations of multidomain exercise Freedom Shield.
96 Forces also conducted joint bomber flights and other combined exercises,
97 including on January 15, 2025, when two Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-2s and
98 two Republic of Korea Air Force F-15Ks escorted two U.S. Air Force B-1B
99 Lancers in a trilateral flight.
- 100 • Increased multilateral coordination with the Philippines as practiced in Exercise
101 Balikatan and Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activities (MMCAs), consistently
102 building operational complexity. Balikatan's 39th iteration in 2024 featured 16,000

103 Philippine, Australian, French, and U.S. military participants preparing for
104 contingencies, disasters, and protecting Philippine sovereignty. The 40th iteration
105 of Balikatan commences later this month and will integrate cutting-edge
106 technologies focused on archipelagic security. Recent MMCAs included
107 Philippine, Japanese, Australian, Canadian, and U.S. units.

- 108 • Exercise Pacific Steller [sic], a Multi-Large Deck Event in the Philippine Sea
109 focused on improving multi-domain capability with ships from U.S. Navy Carrier
110 Strike Group ONE, a French Carrier Strike Group, and the Japan Maritime Self-
111 Defense Force.
- 112 • Bilateral MCAs with the Philippines in the South China Sea, aimed at enhancing
113 interoperability between our two nations' maritime forces. Participants included
114 U.S. Navy's USS CARL VINSON aircraft carrier, along with the USS STERETT
115 destroyer, USS PRINCETON cruiser, and the Philippine Navy's BRP Andrés
116 Bonifacio offshore patrol vessel and BRP Antonio Luna frigate.
- 117 • The 44th Joint Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand, the largest joint and combined
118 exercise in the Indo-Pacific region, involving approximately 30 nations and 3,200
119 U.S. personnel.
- 120 • In total, 120 joint or combined exercises demonstrating interoperability and
121 response capacity to include Super Garuda Shield, Salaknib, Balikatan, Malabar,
122 and Tiger Triumph.

123 These operations are vital to maintaining peace and stability in the region, but they
124 comprise only part of our comprehensive approach to deterrence. DoD's primary

125 strategic objective in the Indo-Pacific is to deter China by prioritizing combat credible
126 military forces postured in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the command operates a
127 layer of forces west of the international dateline that demonstrates dynamic combat
128 power and the immediate ability to respond to adversarial action. These forces conduct
129 theater security cooperation to improve the capacity of U.S. allies and partners,
130 increase interoperability, and demonstrate to adversaries that conflict includes the
131 prospect of coalition operations.

132 In crisis, the Joint Force will gain early leverage over a range of scenarios and assess
133 and adjust with decision superiority. The Joint Force must see, understand, decide, and
134 act faster than any adversary to reduce the risk of miscalculation. Aligned with
135 USNORTHCOM for homeland defense, USSPACECOM for activities in the space
136 domain, USCYBERCOM for activities in the cyber domain, and USSTRATCOM to
137 sustain strategic deterrence effects, USINDOPACOM forces are flexible and responsive
138 to a range of crisis scenarios.

139 If deterrence fails, an integrated Joint Force will fight to deny the adversary's strategic
140 objectives. USINDOPACOM will set conditions to prevail and gain victory.

141 **Concentration Areas**

142 Aligned to Secretary of Defense priorities, the command upholds warfighting as the
143 central principle of every operation. The Joint Force maintains uncompromising and
144 clear standards to maximize combat readiness in the Indo-Pacific and ensure we
145 remain the strongest and most lethal force in the world. Within this framework,

146 USINDOPACOM executes its operations through four integrated concentration areas:
147 accelerate and suffuse information effects into planning; build, integrate, and employ
148 advanced all domain dynamic combat power; strengthen alliances and partnerships;
149 and improve theater posture to achieve expanded maneuver.

150 ***Information Effects***

151 USINDOPACOM's approach elevates integrating informational and physical power into
152 a core organizing, planning, and execution principle for all operations, activities, and
153 investments (OAs). Because deterrence is at the center of the command's mission, the
154 Joint Force must build the link between desired information effects and physical OAs to
155 assure adversary cognition of U.S. capability and will. This requires integrating the full
156 spectrum of capabilities into each exercise and operation conducted in this theater.
157 USINDOPACOM will be ready to conduct Counter-Command, Control, Computing,
158 Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (C-
159 C5ISR) in support of operations.

160 ***Advanced All Domain Dynamic Combat Power***

161 Joint Forces operate forward with lethal and credible combat power. These forces gain
162 and sustain access to deter aggression, reassure the region of U.S. military
163 commitment, and maintain access to the maritime commons vital to U.S. security and
164 prosperity.

165 Of particular note, USINDOPACOM is increasing dynamic combat power through
166 experimentation. The Joint Force continues Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
167 (RDER) experimentation at Joint Force exercises Valiant Shield, Northern Edge, and
168 Gray Flag, along with Service or RDER specific events, such as at Balikatan and
169 Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX). Experimentation in realistic scenarios
170 addresses integration of new capabilities into existing forces, verifies prototype maturity,
171 and develops or refines concepts of operation.

172 While forces remain ready and lethal, USINDOPACOM requires continued investment
173 in space superiority, AI-aided command and control, autonomous and AI-driven
174 systems, and other capabilities to maintain advantage. The 'required capabilities'
175 section contains additional detail.

176 ***Alliances and Partnerships***

177 The U.S. network of allies and partners represents a tremendous asymmetric
178 advantage in the Indo-Pacific. No competitor or adversary can match the combined
179 strength and capabilities of this network. In addition to the geographic advantages U.S.
180 alliances and partnerships confer, these relationships demonstrate legitimacy and
181 increase capacity. To do so, USINDOPACOM must enable key allies and partners to
182 acquire the necessary capabilities to defend themselves while improving combined
183 interoperability through bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations.

184 U.S. bilateral and multilateral relationships continue to strengthen across the region:

185 Japan: The United States and Japan are working together to modernize U.S.-Japan
186 Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities with a special emphasis on coordinated
187 Command and Control (C2), bolstering bilateral presence in the Southwest Islands, and
188 enhancing Japan's counterstrike capabilities. Exercises Resolute Dragon and Keen
189 Sword introduced new bilateral capabilities and forces into the Sakishima Islands and
190 Japan continues to increase participation in multilateral exercises and operations.
191 USINDOPACOM is coordinating closely with Japan Joint Staff as they stand up the new
192 Japan Joint Operations Command, and implementing Phase One of the upgrade of U.S.
193 Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters. Japan has significantly enhanced its
194 counterstrike capabilities in recent years, including planned procurement of the
195 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the planned development of upgraded
196 Type-12 Surface-to-Ship Missile (SSM), and development of Hyper Velocity Glide
197 Projectile (HVGP)-Counterstrike Indigenous Capability.

198 Republic of Korea: The ROK remains an unwavering ally with global impacts. The
199 United States continues to demonstrate the full scale of security commitments to the
200 ROK through training, exercises, and operations. The ROK also continues to increase
201 its defense spending to enhance capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and is the fifth
202 largest purchaser of Foreign Military Sales. Annual joint/combined exercises, Freedom
203 Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield, enhance U.S.-ROK interoperability and regional
204 security. Trilateral cooperation continues in real-time North Korea missile warning data
205 sharing between the United States, ROK, and Japan. The U.S.-ROK Alliance also
206 continues to explore opportunities to deepen defense industrial cooperation as well as

207 science and technology collaboration to leverage the ROK's status leaders in emerging
208 technologies such as AI and its world-class shipbuilding industry.

209 Australia: The United States is Australia's most important strategic partner in the Indo-
210 Pacific. Australia actively seeks to deepen its partnership with the United States through
211 military engagements including combined naval operations in the South China Sea,
212 force posture initiatives, and technology cooperation. We are enhancing our force
213 posture cooperation work and operational experimentation across nearly all domains
214 enabling both countries to respond more quickly. The AUKUS agreement is a
215 generational opportunity to deepen our cooperation on advanced military capabilities.
216 Further, Australia invests in the U.S. defense acquisition system through cooperative
217 development programs such as the P-8, F-35, MQ-4, and NextGen Jammer. In addition,
218 U.S. Space Force-led Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) program
219 partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom will increase critical Space Domain
220 Awareness to support continued efforts to maintain freedom of access and protect our
221 collective interests in Space.

222 Philippines: Significant and deepening strategic alignment between the United States
223 and the Philippines challenges China's malign behavior. The United States and the
224 Philippines strengthen bilateral force readiness and interoperability through training and
225 operations. The United States has brought high-end capabilities to bear at exercises
226 hosted by the Philippines like Balikatan and Salaknib. In 2024, Salaknib featured live
227 fire field training events stressing activities such as fire support, communications, and
228 engineering. Additionally, the United States and the Philippines conducted bilateral and

229 multilateral MCAs in the South China Sea, continue to expand access and cooperation
230 under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with four new EDCA
231 sites announced in 2023, and finalized the General Security of Military Information
232 Agreement (GSOMIA) to facilitate more robust information exchanges.

233 Taiwan: The United States and Taiwan maintain a substantive and robust relationship
234 enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three U.S.-People's Republic of China
235 Joint Communiqués and the Six Assurances. As outlined in the TRA, the United States
236 is committed to a policy of maintaining the "capacity of the United States to resist any
237 resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
238 or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." Consistent with the TRA, the command
239 helps enable Taiwan to build a self-defense capability that is credible, resilient,
240 distributed, and cost-effective. Taiwan recently committed to strengthening its reserve
241 forces and continues to fund foreign and indigenous acquisition programs, as well as
242 improve training and readiness.

243 India: Over the past decade, our defense partnership has seen transformative growth
244 through increasingly complex military exercises, defense sales, and strategic dialogue.
245 The U.S. is bolstering our defense partnership with India through operational
246 coordination, information sharing, collaboration with likeminded partners, and defense
247 industrial and technology cooperation. A strong and capable India—in durable
248 partnership with the United States—can help provide security and deter conflict in the
249 Indo-Pacific.

250 Pacific Island Countries: The United States engages Pacific Island countries to support
251 their ability to protect their sovereignty and sovereign rights against external threats and
252 aggression. This engagement is a core effort to strengthen peace, stability, and
253 deterrence across the Indo-Pacific region. USINDOPACOM continues to strengthen
254 relationships with the Pacific Island countries including the Freely Associated States
255 (Republic of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and Republic of the Marshall
256 Islands), Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste through infrastructure
257 investments to support critical infrastructure resiliency and posture initiatives, exercises,
258 and security cooperation activities.

259 United Kingdom (UK): U.S. and UK collaboration strengthens security and prosperity in
260 the Indo-Pacific through combined and multilateral exercises, AUKUS initiatives, and
261 aligned strategic priorities. The UK demonstrates its enduring commitment to the Indo-
262 Pacific through deployments such as the 2021 Carrier Strike Group and the 2025
263 Operation HIGHMAST, led by UK Carrier Strike Group 25. Continued UK support for the
264 U.S. military presence on Diego Garcia remains critical for U.S. national security.

265 France: France has a significant presence in the region through its territories of New
266 Caledonia and French Polynesia. France's Carrier Strike Group (CSG) deployed to the
267 region in early January and conducted the La Pérouse 2025 exercise. The French-led
268 exercise involved U.S. and allied navies focused on improving maritime surveillance,
269 interdiction, and air operations, reinforcing the commitment to a free and open Indo-
270 Pacific As part of this deployment, France's CSG also operated with the U.S. Seventh
271 Fleet in the Philippine Sea.

272 Association of Southeast Asia Nations: ASEAN is the most influential multilateral
273 institution in the Indo-Pacific. It represents a regional population of 677 million people
274 and a collective gross domestic product of \$3.8 trillion USD. U.S. forces facilitate
275 capacity building in Indo-Pacific nations through recurring multilateral and bilateral
276 exercises, and planning is ongoing for an ASEAN/U.S. Maritime Exercise to be
277 conducted in 2025. USINDOPACOM will participate at varying levels in the next series
278 of ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus activities—which reflects the highest-level
279 defense consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN.

280 QUAD: The diplomatic partnership known as the Quad, comprising the United States,
281 Japan, Australia, and India, is deepening and narrowing its focus on issues of
282 consequence. Accordingly, these nations' military partnership grows as
283 USINDOPACOM takes steps in unison with partners to routinize multilateral activities
284 such as Exercise Malabar, which brings our navies together to enhance interoperability.
285 Through regular senior leader engagements, tabletop exercises, and staff talks the
286 command is working closely with allies and partners to advance a shared vision for a
287 region where all nations can thrive, free from coercion and intimidation.

288 US-PHL-AUS-JPN: This emergent quadrilateral regional group first convened at the
289 Shangri La Dialogue in 2023. Priorities include strategic messaging, combined and
290 coordinated operations and activities, and capacity building through defense
291 modernization. Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States demonstrate our
292 shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific through bilateral and multilateral
293 MCAs in the maritime domain.

294 US-JPN-ROK: Robust multilateral engagement between the United States, Japan, and
295 the ROK demonstrates our shared commitment to regional security and stability. U.S.
296 multilateral activities with Japan and the ROK include joint training exercises—
297 highlighted by the new trilateral Exercise Freedom Edge—subject matter expert
298 exchanges, real-time North Korea missile warning data sharing, and capacity-building
299 initiatives aimed at enhancing our combined ability to respond to regional challenges
300 and promote a more integrated and effective regional security architecture.

301 US-JPN-AUS: Multilateral activities with Japan and Australia advance a shared vision of
302 a coercion-free region. These activities include joint exercises, integrated air and missile
303 defense (IAMD) collaboration, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response
304 cooperation. The annual Trilateral Maritime Exercise enhances interoperability and
305 promotes maritime security among our naval forces. USINDOPACOM also collaborates
306 closely with Japan and Australia to advance trilateral cooperation on emerging issues
307 like cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems, while strengthening
308 existing cooperation in areas such as trilateral fighter training and air and missile
309 defense.

310 ***Theater Posture***

311 Maintaining an agile posture and substantial forward presence ensures
312 USINDOPACOM forces stand ready to rapidly and effectively respond to crisis in the
313 region, deter malign activities, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. The command

314 undertakes posture initiatives to maintain consistent readiness while distributing our
315 forces in ways that complicate adversary planning.

316 Military construction plays a major role in achieving this expanded maneuver and
317 enhanced posture. USINDOPACOM's Joint Posture Management Office provides joint
318 construction management to support designated lead services, service components,
319 and joint task forces. Since 2023, this organization has used Operation and
320 Maintenance (O&M) funding to streamline project identification and conduct joint
321 planning that integrates requirements across all service components. Many of these
322 identified requirements have rapidly moved to execution through the unspecified minor
323 military construction (UMMC) authority granted to USINDOPACOM in the FY 2024
324 NDAA.

325 The command has effectively used expanded UMMC authority and the accompanying
326 O&M, Defense-Wide appropriation of \$69 million to fund and execute projects across
327 the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of
328 Micronesia. This authority, paired with targeted exercise-related construction, has
329 enabled rapid improvements to posture in the region.

330 The U.S. network of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is pivotal to the Joint
331 Force's success in crisis or conflict. Securing access, basing, and overflight (ABO) with
332 the right forces at the right times ensures a mobile and distributed force disposition.
333 USINDOPACOM works unceasingly to improve bilateral and multilateral relationships,
334 secure agreements, and enhance interoperability. Such efforts include executing highly-

335 visible military construction projects, conducting increasingly frequent and complex
336 exercises with allies and partners, and pursuing ABO-focused agreements with critically
337 situated allies and partners.

338 **Required Military Capabilities**

339 To maintain credible deterrence and, if necessary, prevail in conflict, USINDOPACOM
340 requires sustained investment in the capabilities outlined below. Every effort supports at
341 least one of the seven joint functions, while many programs have cross-cutting
342 applications. These capabilities align with the forthcoming congressionally mandated
343 Section 1313 Independent Assessment that will specify capabilities and resources at
344 the classified level.

345 **C5ISR and C-C5ISR**

346 Modern warfare demands superior information systems that can function effectively in
347 highly contested environments to enable a decision-making advantage. Advanced AI
348 and machine learning systems play a critical role in this effort.

349 These AI systems already enhance fidelity and speed, allowing our personnel to focus
350 on complex decision-making that requires human judgment. Inside the headquarters,
351 AI-enabled tools reduce the time required for mission planning from days to hours, while
352 improving the quality and thoroughness of Joint Force analysis.

353 Developing advanced ISR platforms for persistent surveillance will provide commanders
354 with comprehensive awareness of the battlespace. These platforms must operate in
355 denied environments and provide critical data for exploitation despite sophisticated
356 counter-ISR measures. Enhanced cyber defense capabilities will protect our critical
357 systems from increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks.

358 Space superiority is essential to our operations across all domains. U.S. adversaries are
359 rapidly developing sophisticated counter-space capabilities, including direct-ascent anti-
360 satellite weapons, co-orbital threats, and advanced jamming systems. To maintain our
361 competitive advantage, USINDOPACOM and USSPACECOM require resilient space-
362 based systems that operate through contested domains without capability degradation.
363 This includes enhanced space domain awareness systems, combat credible defensive
364 counter-space systems, and rapidly deployable satellite constellations that provide
365 redundancy and complicate adversary targeting.

366 U.S. space architecture must continue to proliferate smaller, distributed systems that
367 provide redundancy and complicate adversary targeting. USINDOPACOM requires
368 enhanced ground-based space surveillance networks throughout the Indo-Pacific
369 region, coupled with mobile counter-space assets rapidly deployable to austere
370 locations.

371 To achieve comprehensive threat tracking and identification, USINDOPACOM must
372 integrate space-based sensor networks that provide persistent coverage across vast
373 distances. These systems will work in concert with advanced weapons, which the Joint

374 Force develops for defense against various threats, including unmanned systems and
375 adversary C5ISR capabilities. Enhanced command and control systems will enable
376 rapid decision-making and coordinated responses across the theater. In particular,
377 USINDOPACOM requires long-range persistent targeting, comprehensive battle
378 management, and joint edge networks.

379 **Fires**

380 Long-range strike provides critical combat power and deterrent effects across the Indo-
381 Pacific. To enable effective, all domain fires across the vast Pacific theater,
382 USINDOPACOM must implement a comprehensive modernization strategy that
383 adheres to the “make-before-break” principle. As we transition to advanced platforms
384 like the Virginia-class block V with the Virginia payload module, the B-21 Raider, and
385 Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft, we must sustain and upgrade our existing
386 capabilities to ensure persistent mass of fires.

387 Advanced long-range air-to-air missiles enable engagement of adversary aircraft at
388 extended ranges, while enhanced electronic warfare and counter-air systems provide
389 decisive advantages in contested airspace. Enhanced aerial refueling abilities remain
390 essential for supporting extended operations across the vast distances of the Pacific
391 theater. This includes both tanker fleet modernization and the development of
392 innovative refueling concepts to support distributed operations.

393 A resilient and versatile stand-off capability complicates enemy planning, forcing them
394 to dedicate resources to defend against a wider range of threats and creating
395 opportunities for friendly forces to maneuver and engage on favorable terms.
396 Accelerating delivery of long-range anti-ship missiles is critical to counter peer
397 competitor surface forces and ensuring the Joint Force's ability to maintain sea control
398 in contested waters. Additionally, ground-based fires are increasingly valuable force
399 multipliers. USINDOPACOM will pursue additional training and exercises involving
400 systems such as Typhon and ROGUE/NMESIS.

401 **Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific**

402 Strengthening Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) in the Indo-Pacific depends on
403 the deployment of capabilities such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
404 batteries. These IAMD systems, and others like them, provide a dual function:
405 protecting key bases and infrastructure while enhancing regional deterrence. Periodic
406 upgrades to these systems enhance radar and interceptor capabilities, improving the
407 discrimination of air and missile threats and weapons system integration. These
408 upgrades increase accuracy and provide second-shot opportunities, ultimately
409 enhancing lethality and survivability.

410 In parallel, the United States must urgently develop counter-hypersonic systems,
411 particularly the Glide Phase Interceptor, to address emerging threats that challenge our
412 traditional missile defense systems. AI-enabled fire control systems hold essential
413 importance to engaging these high-speed and maneuverable threats, providing

414 automated battle management and coordinated engagement recommendations across
415 multiple defensive layers.

416 To achieve early warning and comprehensive threat tracking, the Joint Force needs
417 integrated space-based sensor networks that provide persistent coverage across vast
418 distances. These systems will work in concert with advanced weapons, which the Joint
419 Force develops for point defense against various threats, including unmanned aerial
420 systems and cruise missiles. Enhanced command and control systems for integrated air
421 defense will enable rapid decision-making and coordinated responses across the
422 theater.

423 ***Guam Defense System***

424 Guam requires persistent 360-degree IAMD against advanced missiles including
425 ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic threats. The Guam Defense System is a cornerstone of
426 regional deterrence and a critical component of U.S. IAMD strategy. The initial
427 capability, beyond the currently employed Task Force Talon, is on plan to deliver by the
428 end of FY27. Responsive to evolving threats in the region, the IAMD approach in Guam
429 must be resource-informed and provide increased survivability, resilience, and flexibility.

430 **Sustaining the Force**

431 Success in any contingency depends on robust logistics and infrastructure networks
432 that can withstand sophisticated attacks while supporting distributed operations.
433 Hardening existing facilities against missile and cyber-attacks represents the Joint

434 Force's first line of defense and requires significant investment in protective measures
435 and redundant systems.

436 USINDOPACOM continues to develop Joint Theater Distribution Center site concepts.
437 These locations will serve as critical logistics distribution nodes for receiving,
438 processing, and redistributing supplies across the Joint Force.

439 The command focuses on enhancing resiliency and agility by increasing the number of
440 locations with access to assured fuel inventories and/or government-owned stocks.
441 Over the past year, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy has delivered eighteen
442 access points through a variety of acquisition approaches. USINDOPACOM continues
443 to expand capability through other means, such as leasing assured fuel stores in
444 Defense Fuel Support Points throughout the Indo-Pacific theater.

445 Since FY21, USINDOPACOM has planned major MILCON projects to increase fuel
446 posture, including completed projects at the Port of Darwin and RAAF Darwin. We also
447 continue to operationalize our afloat consolidation tanker operations throughout the
448 Indo-Pacific and to refine this usage through increasing activity associated with
449 inventory repositioning.

450 Sustaining our forces in contested environments is critical. To support this effort, the
451 Joint Force must leverage initiatives such as Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF),
452 to strategically partner with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Initiatives like RSF,
453 the multi-national Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, and the U.S. –
454 Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation for Acquisition and Sustainment facilitate shared

455 investment for co-sustainment, enhancing deterrence, readiness, and lethality even in
456 contested environments.

457 **Autonomous and AI-Driven Systems Capabilities**

458 AI-enabled autonomous systems provide significant and affordable asymmetric
459 advantage. Forces able to develop, integrate, deploy, and rapidly adapt intelligent
460 systems to changing conditions have defeated numerically superior opponents
461 equipped with legacy technology. Layered, coordinated, asymmetric strategies
462 alongside conventional weapons can defeat larger attacking forces.

463 Uncrewed surface vehicles, autonomous aerial systems, low-cost one-way attack
464 systems, and intelligent counter-unmanned aircraft systems capabilities from various
465 vendors are key enablers. Expanded acquisition of additional autonomous aerial
466 systems, AI-driven undersea vehicles, and enabling technologies for full deployment will
467 provide critical capability in the Indo-Pacific.

468 Posture and ABO remain key considerations for most autonomous systems due to
469 range and endurance limitations. Additionally, planning and execution are underway for
470 procurement, storage, operational testing, concept refinement, training, and
471 maintenance of these intelligent systems.

472 **Maritime Domain Awareness and Sea Control**

473 USINDOPACOM's ability to maintain freedom of navigation and counter maritime
474 threats requires significant investment in maritime assets. Advanced systems

475 revolutionize maritime domain awareness, using machine learning algorithms to
476 process data from multiple sensors and platforms to identify patterns of behavior and
477 detect anomalies that could indicate hostile activity.

478 Extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles will enable persistent surveillance and
479 reconnaissance in contested waters. The U.S. Navy and industry must deliver the
480 Constellation-class frigate program to provide the distributed maritime operations
481 essential for operating in contested environments. Finally, improved shipyard production
482 to deliver and deploy Virginia-class submarines with enhanced payload modules is a
483 critical component of undersea warfare.

484 In addition to the U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard serves as a vital instrument of power,
485 essential to America's national and economic security in the Indo-Pacific. The Coast
486 Guard provides a unique blend of diplomatic, military, economic, and law enforcement
487 tools often in areas in which DoD does not normally maintain presence – to include the
488 Arctic.

489 **Conclusion**

490 As the most consequential opponent, China poses real and serious challenges to our
491 military superiority. However, these challenges also present opportunities for reform and
492 establishing enduring advantage. While USINDOPACOM faces significant challenges, I
493 remain confident in our deterrence posture and ability to defend U.S. interests and

494 maintain regional stability—but the trajectory must change. China is out-producing the
495 United States in air, maritime, and missile capability.

496 The investments and capabilities outlined here are essential to preserving security,
497 freedom, and prosperity. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) was designed to counter
498 the China threat by investing in key readiness and capability development initiatives.
499 Funding requested, specific, and enduring capabilities would advance the intent of this
500 initiative and deliver major posture improvements. Examples include hardened
501 infrastructure, prepositioning of munitions and equipment, enhanced rotational
502 presence, and improved allied interoperability.

503 The United States faces serious challenges, but the Joint Force remains confident,
504 resolute, and determined to prevail. Deterrence remains our highest duty. It must be
505 backed by real, winning combat power. Thank you for your continued support of
506 USINDOPACOM. Together we advance the security, freedom, and prosperity of the
507 American people and our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.

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