Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military:

Bridging the Gap

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations

December 2010
ABOUT THE COVER: VILLAGE VISITORS

Afgan children of the Janqadam village flock to see U.S. Army soldiers and airmen during a routine check on the community’s agricultural projects outside Bagram Airfield in Parwan province, Afghanistan, Aug. 24, 2009. The soldiers and airmen are assigned to the Kentucky Agribusiness Development Team. A greenhouse and vineyard are focal projects with a goal to increase yields for the villagers, enabling them to earn extra money at nearby markets.

*U.S. Army photo by Spc. William E. Henry*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Introduction

Beyond the Roadmap: Establishing New Priorities

Beyond the Roadmap: Providing Opportunities for Language Learning and Maintenance throughout a Career

Beyond the 2008 O&I Report: Recent Initiatives

Today’s Educational Environment: Addressing the Larger Challenge

Findings and Recommendations

Summary

Appendix A: Hearing, Meetings, Briefings, and Travel

Appendix B: Supporting Documents

Appendix C: General McChrystal and Secretary Gates Memoranda

Appendix D: Marine Corps Information Paper

Appendix E: Interagency Language Roundtable Scale

Appendix F: Chairman Mullen Memorandum

Appendix G: Secretary Gates Memorandum

Appendix H: Joint Staff Information Paper

Appendix I: Related Legislation in the 111th Congress
INTRODUCTION

Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change.

Quadrennial Defense Review
February 2010

Purpose. Too often Congressional oversight suffers from lack of follow-through on issues examined in hearings and briefings. On some occasions the needed changes are subsequently effected and may go unnoticed by Congress. On others, recommendations made by committees and their subcommittees are overlooked or forgotten as new issues emerge, competing for the attention of departments and agencies. Opportunities to make improvements are lost when problems are identified but implementation of proposed solutions falls short.

With the need for more consistent oversight in mind, the House Armed Services Committee on Oversight and Investigations (the Subcommittee) chose to reexamine the progress that the Department of Defense (the Department) has made to date in carrying out the recommendations made in the Subcommittee’s November 2008 report, Building Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment, (the 2008 O&I Report). In support of this update, the Subcommittee received departmental and service briefings, and conducted fact-finding trips to the service language and culture centers which culminating in a hearing in 2010 with the senior language authorities from the Department and Joint Staff, and a subject matter expert from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

In a parallel effort, the Senate report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act had directed GAO to review the Department’s plans for the development of language and cultural awareness capabilities. The Senate report expressed concern that the Department’s efforts at the time were “not as effective as they could be” and raised the possibility that they were “underresourced.” Although GAO undertook its evaluation at about the same time as the O&I Subcommittee investigation, its charter focused more narrowly on the Department’s high-level guidance, its ability to validate the combatant commanders language and regional proficiency requirements, and the existence of measurable performance goals and objectives. GAO’s review, DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better

2 Report 110-77, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (June 5, 2007), Title X, Subtitle E.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency (the 2009 GAO Report), shared many of the same conclusions as the 2008 O&I Report, notably that the 43 unprioritized tasks comprising the core of January 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (the Roadmap), while a step in the right direction, did not constitute the coherent strategic plan necessary for the significant organizational change needed to effect a transformation.

Significantly, the Subcommittee and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) observed the lack of a strategic plan for giving the services clear guidance. The Department’s efforts at improving language skills and cultural awareness in its service members and civilians do not represent an academic exercise but continue to have profound implications for the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Scope. The 2008 O&I report focused primarily on the capabilities of the military’s general purpose forces. It appeared at the time and still looks as if, the programs involving language professionals such as foreign area officers and cryptanalysts have clearly identified requirements and processes for meeting them. The question of what measure of language skills and cultural awareness is needed within the general purpose forces was, and still is to some degree, less well-defined. Furthermore, it was impossible to ignore the role that the nation’s educational system, primarily at the elementary and secondary (K-12) levels, plays in the challenges facing the Department. This study maintains the focus on the general purpose forces and the population that they draw from.

The core of this review centers on the nine recommendations contained in the 2008 O&I Report. Additionally, there were a number of concerns brought up in the report that did not rise to the point of formal findings and recommendations, but still merit some attention. Finally, since the publication of the 2008 O&I Report, new issues and related initiatives concerning foreign language skills and cultural awareness have arisen and deserve discussion.

Approach. The nine recommendations in the 2008 O&I Report were not necessarily arranged from general to more specific but rather simply the order in which they had appeared in the document. The first three recommendations dealt with the Department’s top-level leadership function, setting policy for the services and balancing the requirements of the combatant commands with the services’ role as force providers. The fourth recommendation, aimed at improving the ability to track language proficiency in the general purpose forces, although directed at the services, facilitates the ability of the Joint Staff to assist the combatant commands in responding to crises as was recently the case with identifying Creole speakers for supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the wake of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. These four, combined with a related discussion of the Department’s response to recent counterinsurgency training guidance coming from the Afghan theater, are discussed together in the section,
“Beyond the Roadmap: Establishing New Priorities.”

Four of the remaining recommendations dealt with providing opportunities to acquire and maintain foreign language proficiency within the services, the government, and the nation more broadly. While the last recommendation dealt with making the recruiting of personnel with language skills and regional expertise a higher priority, it also spoke to allowing for the maintenance of language proficiency throughout their careers. These five recommendations are addressed in the section, “Beyond the Roadmap: Providing More Opportunities for Language Learning and Maintenance throughout a Career.”

A third analytical section, “Beyond the 2008 O&I Report: Recent Initiatives,” looks at four topics that did not merit formal recommendations in the 2008 O&I Report: the changing role of the Defense Language Institute, service strategies, service language and cultural centers, and Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Pay. It also includes a discussion of the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program which was recently implemented and a brief examination of some language learning technologies that are coming into the market. The last analytical section, “Today’s Educational Environment: Addressing the Larger Challenge,” covers three issues related to addressing the larger question of improving, or at least mitigating, the state of the educational infrastructure for language instruction in the United States.
Background. Although not a new problem, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for operational forces to improve their foreign language and cultural awareness capabilities. The Department recognized this, and its Strategic Planning Guidance for 2006-2011, issued in March 2004, one year after the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (the Second Gulf War), called for a comprehensive roadmap for “language transformation.” The Strategic Planning Guidance directed that the Roadmap would:

(1) create foundational language and regional area expertise;

(2) build a surge capacity for language and cultural resources;

(3) establish a cadre of language specialists with advanced proficiency, and;

(4) better manage and promote military personnel with language skills and regional expertise.

To accomplish the four goals above, the Roadmap identified 43 related tasks to be implemented within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the services, and the combatant commands. In early 2008, as the Subcommittee was beginning its review, the Department judged the Roadmap to be nearly complete, with most of the tasks considered complete.

Among the initial tasks, the Department had to establish an organizational structure to support the transformation. The first action required under the goal of creating “foundational language and regional area expertise” was the establishment of a Language Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) which was to issue updated guidance to reflect the new policy that foreign language and regional expertise are “critical competencies essential to the DOD mission.” Another preliminary step was the appointment of officials to act as senior language authorities for their services and to serve on the newly-created Defense Language Steering Committee.

The Roadmap also called on the Department to compile and publish an annual “Strategic Language List” to give the services guidance on languages for which there is a critical need. It divides them into two categories: those languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and Pashtu, for which

---

5 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, Department of Defense (February 2005), 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 4.
9 Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus, Department of Defense Instruction 7280.03 (August 20, 2007), 8.
there is a substantial need for the next ten years, and those languages such as African dialects for which the Department is willing to accept a degree of risk and rely on outside (civilian) contractors, the National Language Service Corps, or allied personnel. The services have the flexibility to add other languages “essential to their mission needs.” The Navy, for example, includes Haitian Creole on its strategic language list.

U.S. Navy Petty Officer Lonnie Davis hands candy to children in Takoradi, Ghana, on Dec. 26, 2007, near Essikado hospital, where Africa Partnership Station volunteers spent the day completing painting projects. APS is a multi-national effort to provide training and humanitarian assistance in nine West African countries.

USMC Photo/U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Elizabeth Merriam

---

10 Ibid.
11 FY 2010 Strategic Language List, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum (December 3, 2009).
BEYOND THE ROADMAP: ESTABLISHING NEW PRIORITIES

We are moving beyond the Roadmap by continuing to refine processes for generating and prioritizing language and regional requirements, by providing strategic direction, and adapting existing programs to ensure we have the right mix of language and regional skills.

Mrs. Nancy Weaver
Director, Defense Language Office
Testimony before the O&I Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee
June 29, 2010

The 2008 O&I Report contained four recommendations aimed at improving the Department’s overall management of foreign language and culture capabilities. These dealt with clarifying the relationship of foreign language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise to traditional warfighting competencies; developing a comprehensive strategic plan with thorough guidance to the services; implementing a formal process to identify and prioritize the warfighters’ needs; and, tracking language skills in the general purpose forces. An assessment of the Department’s and Joint Staff’s efforts and progress in these areas follows.

Critical Competencies. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of foreign language and cultural competency for the armed forces. At the time of the Subcommittee’s initial investigation, documents such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Language and Regional Expertise Planning and Department of Defense Directive, Defense Language Program had identified language skills and regional expertise as “critical warfighting skills” or “critical competencies” respectively. The latter states:

It is DOD policy, that foreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills appropriate to the Department of Defense’s mission needs.

Top-level service direction, however, appeared to be silent or lagging in this regard. Consequently, in the 2008 O&I Report, the Subcommittee recommended that:

O&I Recommendation: DOD should clarify its policy characterizing foreign

---

14 Ibid.
language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as critical or core competencies essential to DOD missions.15

The intent was that subsequent service policies would reflect this guidance. The characterization of these capabilities in the current service language and culture strategies, including three written since the 2008 O&I Report, still falls short of assigning them the level of importance assigned the Department and Joint Staff directives.

The December 2009 *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* states that “language proficiency and understanding of foreign culture are vital enablers for full spectrum operations.”16 The Navy has not updated its January 2008 *U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness Strategy* which also refers to these capabilities as “enablers.”17 The *Air Force Culture, Region & Language Flight Plan* treats them similarly, describing “appropriate culture, region, language and negotiation skills” as a “force-enhancing capability.”18 The May 2010 draft of the Marine Corps Language, Regional, and Culture Strategy: 2010-1015 qualifies its guidance with the disclaimer that the standards for this training are “not to be construed as ‘go/no-go’ criteria for deployment.”19

This connotes that while there is recognition of an increased need for these capabilities, their treatment in service policy falls short of regarding them as a core competencies essential to DOD missions. At least one commander in the U.S. Central Command theater, however, characterized foreign language expertise as something more than an enabler. In fact, recent departmental guidance approaches the norm of “go/no-go” criteria for personnel deploying to Afghanistan.

**Recent Departmental Guidance.** In November 2009, General Stanley McChrystal issued a policy memorandum in which he provided guidance on the counterinsurgency training and proficiency that he expected of personnel in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). McChrystal’s policy guidance stated that all service members deploying to Afghanistan should master basic greetings and expressions in Dari and that one member at the platoon level should have a fundamental proficiency in the language.20 Some media reports quoted the letter as stating that, “language training is as important as marksmanship,” although the actual phrase

---

15 *Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military*, 65 (emphasis added).
16 “Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1, 2009, ii.
used was “language skill [in Dari] is as important as your other combat skills.”  

This was subsequently followed by a May 2010 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in which he directed the services to adopt General McChrystal’s criteria for forces provided to ISAF. Copies of the McChrystal and Gates documents and an accompanying Joint Staff information paper on “Language and Cultural Programs Supporting Operations in Afghanistan” are included as Appendices C and D. The services should reconsider whether the designation as “enablers” or “enhancements” captures the weight and import that experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated. The Subcommittee expects that subsequent strategic-level guidance will reflect this point of view and will fully embrace language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise as core competencies on an equal plane with traditional tactical proficiency for the general purpose forces.

**Comprehensive Strategy.** The 2009 GAO report concluded that the Roadmap, lacking measurable performance goals or funding priorities linked to those objectives, did not constitute a strategic plan for effective transformation. Previously, the 2008 Subcommittee report had made the following recommendation:

**O&I Recommendation:** Beyond the Roadmap, DOD should develop a comprehensive foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise strategy that includes a prioritization of efforts and resources.

The Department currently reports that it is in final stages of staffing the *Language, Regional, and Cultural Capabilities Strategic Plan* (the Strategic Plan) which it considers a companion or sequel to the Roadmap. According to the director of the Defense Language Office, the drafting of the Strategic Plan was delayed for the purpose of synchronizing its contents with the February 2010 QDR.

While the Strategic Plan has been in the drafting and coordination phases, this year two of services have issued, and one is close to issuing, their own strategic plans for foreign language and cultural awareness training absent current written guidance from the Department. Apart from the lack of recognition of language skills as a core competency in the most recently-published service strategies, no deficiencies were noted directly related to the extended timeline. It would have been preferable, however, to have avoided a two-year gap between the completion

---

24 OSD and Joint Staff, *Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff*, June 11, 2010, and Weaver, HASC Written Testimony, 4.
of tasks in the Roadmap and the promulgation of new over-arching direction. Furthermore, the likelihood exists that the service strategies will have to be modified to conform with the Strategic Plan when it is published.

**Identifying the Warfighters’ Needs.** Even as the goals and objectives in the Roadmap were nearing completion, the Department acknowledged that it was having difficulty identifying the combatant commands’ foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise requirements. A regular process for identifying these requirements had been established, but the combatant commands were afforded a considerable degree of latitude in developing their own formats, resulting in information that was difficult to correlate. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), for example, was providing the most extensive input based in part on a detailed analysis of its operational plans. Other combatant commands were using less-comprehensive criteria. This created an impediment to synthesizing and prioritizing requirements across the combatant commands.

The 2008 O&I Report explained the rationale for the importance of developing an improved approach for requirements:

> Adopting and employing a satisfactory process for determining the combatant command’s requirements is critical because the Services depend, in large part, on those requirements to inform their force development programs. The Services cannot transform the force to meet the new 21st century demands if they do not know what the demands are and how to train and prepare their personnel.

Consequently, the Strategic Plan will establish processes for determining the requirements for language, culture, and regional expertise in the general purpose forces to address this shortcoming:

**O&I Recommendation:** DOD should address the deficiencies in the requirements generation process for combatant commands’ operational needs, and it should establish a process for identifying emerging and future capability requirements.

The joint staff has developed a common format for requirements submission and is

---

27 Ibid.
29 *Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military*, 65.
conducting two practical tests called capabilities-based assessments (CBAs).30 The Army is carrying out the Department’s CBA for developing a process for the combatant commanders to determine the language requirements derived from their operational and contingency plans in addition to those connected with their theater engagement exercises and activities.31 The Navy is involved in a similar effort for culture and regional expertise.32 While having individual services, rather than the joint staff, conduct the CBAs may diminish the possibility of other service cultures and perspectives informing the findings, there is an advantage to having an organization with responsibility as a force provider who will then recruit, train, and educate personnel in order to meet those demands performing the assessment. Additionally, the services reportedly were able to carry out the CBAs more quickly than a joint evaluation would have been able to do.33

Thus far the Army’s efforts have resulted in standardized models for language requirements generation that were tested at U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, two headquarters on different ends on the spectrum in terms of supporting fully-developed operational plans.34 The Joint Staff hopes to provide the services with validated requirements in the spring of 2011.35 The standardized application of the improved methodology should provide the services with a more accurate demand signal of what capabilities they should be producing in their forces. The Department recognizes that the Navy’s effort to design an additional framework for determining needs for cultural expertise may be a more difficult challenge.36

While the Department has addressed deficiencies in the requirements generation process for combatant commanders’ operational needs, it has taken an inordinate amount of time to do so. The new methodology has been nearly two years in development, and the CBAs will not be completed until 2011. A second concern is whether the new process will be agile enough to identify emerging and future capability requirements. In fact, the Subcommittee received testimony that the capabilities based assessments were oriented toward the combatant commands’ “steady state security posture(s).”37

Recent developments in the Afghanistan theater raise the question of the agility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff and their ability to refocus the services’ efforts

30 OSD and Joint Staff, Briefing.
32 U.S. Navy, Center for Language, Culture and Regional Expertise Briefing to HASC Staff, June 8, 2010.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Brigadier General Walter Golden, Oral Testimony.
37 Brigadier General Walter Golden, Oral Testimony (emphasis added).
when necessary in providing properly-trained forces. The current framework has not been responsive to the needs of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Neither U.S. Central Command nor the Joint Staff anticipated the need for foreign language training specifically like that directed by General McChrystal’s November 10, 2009 memorandum, which came eight years into the war. General McChrystal’s guidance came to the services through the Secretary and does not appear to have directly involved the Defense Department Language Office or the directorate of the Joint Staff responsible for language and culture training.\textsuperscript{38} Inherent in the new requirements generation process should be the ability to more quickly respond to, if not anticipate, changes in a dynamic security environment.

**Tracking Language Skills in the General Purpose Force.** The 2008 O&I Report found that the services’ lacked the capacity to comprehensively track the language skills of non-professional linguists, especially those at the lower range of the Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency (ILR) scale (levels 1+ and below).\textsuperscript{39} A fuller description of the various ILR levels is given in Appendix E. The report made the following recommendation:

**O&I Recommendation:** *The Services should use a secondary occupational code or special experience identifier for personnel who, while not language professionals, have validated [language] training/skills or regional expertise.*

The 2008 O&I Report did note that a limiting factor in the services’ ability to comply with this recommendation would be the lack of a widely-available testing mechanism for the lower ranges. The Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPTs) are primarily designed to differentiate abilities at the middle range, that of limited working proficiency and professional working proficiency (ILR 2 and 3). Special Forces routinely use oral proficiency interviews for the lower levels, but they rely on contracted native speakers as evaluators. Computer-based tests are under development at the Defense Language Institute in several languages which should begin to fill this gap.

Processes for identifying and tracking personnel with regional expertise are not as developed as those for language skills. The services are generally able to track personnel who have received regional expertise by virtue of professional military education and training, but not necessarily those who may have acquired proficiency through life experience, in college, or through off-duty education. Testing for this skill set with criteria analogous to that of the ILR scale is still in the conceptual phase.\textsuperscript{40}

---

\textsuperscript{38} BG Richard Longo, Response to Question for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap: Bearing the Burden for Today’s Educational Shortcomings, June 29, 2010, CHARRTS No. HASCOL-04-004.

\textsuperscript{39} *Building Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military*, 43-44.

\textsuperscript{40} OSD and Joint Staff Briefing.
In May 2009 the Air Force approved plans to expand the assignment of special experience identifiers (SEIs) throughout the service based on the LEAP model. Current plans would award SEIs to officers and enlisted personnel, who already possess limited working proficiency (2/2+) or higher in at least one modality, either the reading or listening portion of a DLPT. Candidates would be expected to reach limited working proficiency in both modalities within one to two years. The Air Force plans to extend this program to its civilian personnel as well.  

The Army, like all the services, can search its personnel and training databases to identify soldiers with language skills. This takes the form of those who, at accession, identify themselves as possessing some foreign language ability and those who have actually taken a DLPT. The Army awards a “skill qualification identifier” to all enlisted soldiers who score a 2/2 on the DLPT. The Army reports that it is still developing a methodology to track varying levels of regional and cultural skills.

In May 2010, the Marine Corps created a secondary military occupational specialty code to provide the ability to quickly identify personnel with critical language skills for short-notice requirements. This program is for Marines outside of the traditional linguist specialties. Marines qualify for this designation by achieving at least limited working proficiency (2/2+) in at least two of three modalities (listening, reading, speaking) in a language on the Strategic Language List.

The Navy has a similar proposal, still in the conceptual phase, for assigning a designator for non-professional enlisted linguists. This initiative, which is still under review, would only award the designator to sailors who satisfactorily tested in a critical language, but not to those with proficiency in a non-critical language.

The services have all improved their abilities to identify personnel with language skills as the Navy was able to do in the case of Haitian Creole in response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti. There is still an uneven capability, however, in the ability to track non-career linguists with an elementary proficiency (ILR 1+ and below) who have not taken a DLPT. These service members, who presumably would be able to improve their language skills with less training than others, may represent a pool of untapped potential, especially as not every assignment requires

---

41 U.S. Air Force, Language and Culture Briefing, Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, June 18, 2010.
42 U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing, Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, June 18, 2010.
43 Ibid.
45 U.S. Navy Language and Culture Briefing, Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, June 18, 2010.
46 Ibid.
basic working proficiency (ILR 2) or higher. As enhanced means of testing language skills at the elementary proficiency level (ILR 1) are fielded, the services should continue to improve their processes and databases to capture this capability.

Marines with 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, Company F, 2nd platoon, listen intently as Mustafa Amanyar, interpreter and foreign language specialist, Defense Training Systems, and a native of north Kabul, Afghanistan, teaches them how to say thank you in Pashto during a Cultural Lane class at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows on May 20, 2010.

USMC Photo/U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Reece E. Lodder
Cultural knowledge and linguistic ability are some of the best weapons in the struggle against terrorism. Mastering these weapons can mean the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Representative Gabrielle Giffords
Commencement Address at the Defense Language Institute
August 2009

The 2008 O&I report contained five recommendations aimed at enhancing opportunities to acquire and maintain foreign language proficiency within the services, for the government, and across the nation more broadly. The first two dealt with improving opportunities for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) students to study foreign languages and, in fact, for making it a requirement. While ideally foreign language acquisition is best begun as early as possible, the four years cadets and midshipmen spend in ROTC programs and at the service academies presents the last realistic opportunity for officers to develop higher levels of proficiency, especially in the more difficult languages. Taking even a full year out of an officer’s career later on rarely produces higher than limited working proficiency (ILR 2) in difficult languages. Accordingly, the 2008 O&I Report called for an increased emphasis on language study for cadets and midshipmen.

Leveraging ROTC Units. The House of Representatives version of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) called for a pilot program, to begin in October 2010, to expand access to critical and strategic languages to as many military personnel as possible. The pilot was to run through 2015, and there was a related requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the effectiveness of the programs at the end of that year. This provision, however, was not enacted into law.

The NDAA for FY2010, as passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President did, however, contain a closely-related provision directing the Secretary of Defense to establish language training centers at universities and the senior military colleges, and to accelerate the development of expertise in critical and strategic languages.47 This provision was, to some extent, prompted by a recommendation in the 2008 O&I report:

47 The senior military colleges are: North Georgia College & State University, Norwich University, Texas A&M University, The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
O&I Recommendation: The Department should consider targeting its ROTC Language and Culture Project grants toward its largest feeder schools, such as the five senior military colleges, to develop critical language programs at those schools that are developing the greatest number of officers.

In implementing the above recommendation and related legislation, the Department has expanded the Reserve Officer Training Corps Language and Culture Project which had been in operation since 2007. The new program, Project Global Officers, is now making grants to 24 institutions, averaging $500,000, through the National Security Education Program’s (NSEP) International Institute for Education. These are universities that sponsor ROTC programs or are in cross-town partnerships with those institutions.

These grants augment existing language department programs to establish tutoring centers and hire faculty for critical languages, and for immersion and summer study scholarships for ROTC students in these languages. Project Global Officers (Project GO) provides funding primarily for the study of Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, and Persian. The Department reports that the program has funded over 480 domestic and overseas summer scholarships for ROTC students to date.

All but one of the senior military colleges (SMCs) have been awarded grants. Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Virginia Tech) has not applied for funding. Virginia Tech ROTC students, however, can apply to Project GO through the other participating institutions as this program is open to all ROTC students nationwide.

In August, 2010 the Department published a study, the 2008-09 Combined Annual Report for the National Security Education Program (2008-09 NSEP Report) to review the effectiveness of Project GO, among other programs that fall under NSEP. It found that the participating institutions were having a difficult time attracting ROTC students into critical language study. This was in part due to the fact that over half of Air Force and Navy ROTC students major in technical fields of study not requiring language electives. Moreover, many were reluctant to enroll in difficult languages as their grade point averages were a major factor in their precedence.

---

48 OSD and Joint Staff Briefing.
49 Ibid.
50 Languages include: Arabic (multiple dialects), Chinese (Mandarin), Russian, Persian (Dari, Farsi, Tajik), Uzbek, Pashto, Swahili, Wolof, and Korean.
51 OSD and Joint Staff Briefing.
52 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University has not been awarded a Project Global Officer grant.
for selecting a career field.\textsuperscript{56}

One of the 2008-09 NSEP Report’s findings was that ROTC students preferred to engage in language study over the summer. Most of the Project GO sites, according to the report, are now focusing their efforts toward summer language training and study abroad programs. During the summer of 2009, the last period for which figures are available, 236 scholarships were awarded to ROTC students for study of critical languages in the United States or overseas.\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{ROTC and Service Academy Programs}. The 2008 O&I Report was not alone in promoting language study in four-year pre-commissioning programs. The recent independent panel which reviewed the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review went as far as to recommend that “[f]oreign language proficiency should be a requirement for commissioning from ROTC and the service academies.”\textsuperscript{58} This recommendation mirrored that of the 2008 O&I Report:

\textbf{O&I Recommendation—Promote Language Study in ROTC:} Where the Services otherwise have not, they should begin to require that ROTC cadets and midshipmen study a foreign language, preferably the less commonly taught languages.

All Air Force ROTC scholarship cadets in non-technical degree programs are required to take a minimum of 12 semester hours of a foreign language. This commonly equates to four semester-length courses, although it could be fewer in more difficult languages with associated longer laboratory classes. As of March 2010, 630 cadets are enrolled in a foreign language. The Air Force reports that 21% of these cadets are studying a “less commonly taught language.” There are no plans to impose a foreign language requirement on those enrolled in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields.\textsuperscript{59}

The Air Force Foreign Language Express (FLEX) program offers scholarships to prospective ROTC cadets willing to major in a “critical needs” foreign language as determined by the Air Force strategic language list. The program also applies to foreign area studies majors whose areas are related to a critical needs language and who take at least 21 hours of that language. Moreover, the Air Forces pays a foreign language skill proficiency bonus to contract (scholarship) ROTC cadets who are studying abroad, participating in immersion programs, or taking courses in languages on the Air Force strategic language list.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{56} OSD and Joint Staff Briefing.
\textsuperscript{57} National Security Education Program (NSEP) 2008-2009 Report, 43-44.
\textsuperscript{59} U.S. Air Force, Language and Culture Briefing.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
Rather than requiring foreign language for its ROTC students, the Army takes a different approach. Beginning in June 2009, the U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) began offering Culture and Language Incentive Pay (CLIP) to its ROTC cadets who satisfactorily complete coursework in a strategic foreign language or its associated cultural studies. Now in its second year, this program is available to all cadets, not just scholarship students or those in humanities or social science majors. CLIP pays $250 per semester hour for courses that qualify. About 1,300 ROTC cadets have taken advantage of this program to date.61

Navy ROTC midshipmen have a similar requirement as their Air Force counterparts, four semesters for non-technical majors. The Navy has also instituted dedicated scholarships for critical language and area studies majors with an eventual goal of 90-120 participants per year. There are 18 presently enrolled. The Marine Corps draws officers from Navy ROTC units but does not offer scholarships directed toward prospective language and area studies. Its humanities and social science majors share the same language requirement as those midshipmen intending on serving in the Navy.62

The 2008 O&I Report did not specifically include the service academies in its recommendations, but the four years that cadets and midshipmen spend there offers the same window of opportunity for acquiring language skills that exists for ROTC students. The U.S. Military and U.S. Air Force Academies require all cadets to take or validate at least two semesters of foreign language instruction. Humanities and social science majors are required to complete four semesters.63 The U.S. Naval Academy, however, only requires humanities and social science majors to take a foreign language, and has the same four-semester requirement as its sister academies. The majority of midshipmen are technical majors and are not required to study a foreign language but may study it as an elective.64

**National Security Education Program.** At the time of the 2008 O&I Report, the Department identified challenges in placing significant numbers of NSEP aid recipients in civilian positions within the U.S. government.65 These are former undergraduate students (Boren Scholars) who received scholarships to study in a “critical” foreign country, and former graduate students (Boren Fellows) who studied abroad or in the United States in critical foreign languages, disciplines, and area studies. These individuals are obligated to exercise “good faith to seek employment in a national security position.”66 The Department reported that common impediments involved

---

61 U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing.
62 U.S. Navy, Language and Culture Briefing.
64 U.S. Navy Language and Culture Briefing.
65 *Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military*, 57.
66 “Foreign Language and International Studies: Federal Aid Under Title VI of the Higher Education Act,”
security clearance issues related to foreign travel, some of which was in connection with immersion studies, and relatives living abroad in the case of heritage speakers.67 Expressing concern that the Department was not seeing an adequate return on its investment, the 2008 O&I Report made the following recommendation:

O&I Recommendation: The Department should improve its program to place NSEP Fellows in appropriate positions in the Department to fulfill their service commitments. Furthermore, the Department should work to provide employment opportunities for these fellows in a career path that uses their critical skills.

The National Security Education Program (NSEP) 2008-2009 Report shows that as of December 2009, about half of the aid recipients have fulfilled the service requirement:

Of the 1,996 Boren Scholars who incurred a service requirement, 739 have completed their service in the Federal Government, 157 in higher education, and 21 have worked in both government and education. Of the 1,448 Boren Fellows who incurred a service requirement, 437 have served in the Federal Government, 432 in higher education, and 41 have worked in both government and education.68

It should be noted that some of the award recipients are still involved in their studies and would not yet be seeking employment. The report notes that some award recipients who have completed their studies are in the process of actively seeking employment that would fulfill their obligation.69

Although the Department is making efforts to place its Boren Scholars and Fellows in government, there are still a significant number who presumably made a good faith effort but were unable to secure federal employment. Congress, for its part, has worked with NSEP to provide a realistic and flexible framework for awardees to fulfill the obligation for their scholarships, expanding the acceptable employers from the Department of Defense to other national security-related departments and agencies in the government.70 In the case of award recipients unable to secure a job in the federal government, Congress has allowed them to satisfy their obligation by service in the education field.71 To further improve on the Department’s return on investment, Congress has authorized NSEP award recipients to bypass the normal federal competitive hiring process and be hired directly by a department or agency.72

67 Dr. Robert Slater, Director, NSEP, Briefing to O&I Chairman, May 6, 2010.
69 Ibid.
The Department also recently implemented what it calls the “Professional Development Program (PDP).” This is a two-year trial currently underway to assist NSEP fellows in competing for positions in government related to their language skills and expertise. To date, six NSEP interns are participating in the PDP: four foreign affairs specialists in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and two foreign language instructors at the United States Air Force Academy.\footnote{Mrs. Nancy Weaver, Response to Question for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap: Bearing the Burden for Today’s Educational Shortcomings, June 29, 2010, CHARRTS No. HASCOI-04-014.}

**Department of Defense K-12 Schools.** The 2008 O&I Report found that while the Department supported foreign language instruction in the K-12 schools that it operates, it was not placing “a particular emphasis” on this element of the curricula and made the following recommendation: \footnote{Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military, 59.}

**O&I Recommendation:** *The Department should place greater emphasis on critical languages and cultural programs in its own K-12 school system to make these a model for producing students with higher proficiency levels in critical languages.*

The Subcommittee noted that the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), the organization that oversees the 194 schools, has provided some noteworthy opportunities for language and culture learning. The system has undertaken a number of initiatives to include Chinese classes, Host Nation Studies, and the introduction of Spanish in elementary school. The high schools require completion of a minimum of two years study in a foreign language for all students, not just those considering post-secondary education.\footnote{Ibid.}

Although offerings vary by grade level and location, some schools have courses in Arabic and Mandarin Chinese.\footnote{DODEA Curriculum: Foreign Language, http://www.dodea.edu/curriculum/foreignLanguage.cfm, accessed on August 31, 2010.} Arabic instruction is limited to schools in Arabic-speaking countries. In part in response to parent demand, the study of Chinese has grown from a handful of students in four middle schools in academic year 2006-2007 to 1,200 students in over 21 middle and high schools in the current academic year.\footnote{DODA foreign language courses include: Arabic, Chinese (Mandarin), French, Korean, German, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.}
These 76 elementary schools in 11 countries overseas offer “Host Nations Studies” classes in their curricula, taught by host nation teachers, that provide an introduction on the language and culture of the country in which the students are living.\footnote{Nancy Weaver, Written Testimony, Hearing before the Subcommittee and Oversight, Beyond the Defense Transformation Roadmap, June 29, 2010.} By its nature, the number of schools offering Host Nation Studies is limited by the number of overseas U.S. bases with elementary schools, and apart from a growth in student population, is not subject to increase. DODEA’s rationale for not expanding this program to middle schools and high schools centers on the difficulty in satisfying U.S. certification standards for foreign teachers at this level and the broader culture- and language-related curricula already available to older students.\footnote{DODEA, Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, 14 October 2010.} Some of the overseas elementary schools also offer partial immersion classes in which non-foreign language subjects such as mathematics, science, and social studies are taught in the host language.\footnote{DODEA Foreign Language and Host Nation Studies, http://www.eu.dodea.edu/curriculum/foreignLanguage.php, accessed on August 31, 2010.} DODEA reports that it is expanding partial immersion classes to some of its schools in the United States in academic year 2011-2012.\footnote{DODEA Briefing.}

In academic year 2006-2008, DODEA started its Foreign Language in Elementary School (FLES) program which is Spanish-language instruction for grades K-3.\footnote{Ibid.} Since the publication of the 2008 O&I Report, 63 elementary schools, or about half, offer FLES. Although not a critical language, Spanish was chosen because of its portability and continuation in school systems outside the DODEA system.\footnote{Ibid.} DODEA reports that it understands that this gap between grade 3 and middle school represents a lack of continuity and a lost opportunity in early foreign language acquisition. The DODEA acting director is considering plans to expand the FLES program to include grades 4 and 5, and even to pre-school, however, lack of funding is cited as the major impediment to further growth in this program, both to grades 4 and 5, and beyond the current 63 schools.\footnote{Ibid.}

Fully recognizing that DODEA schools have a high student turnover and receive children from public schools with varying academic curricula, the Department should seriously consider funding programs that provide as much continuity as possible for uninterrupted study of a foreign language in its primary and secondary schools. The FLES program in Spanish and Chinese instruction in middle and high schools demonstrate potential in this regard. These suggestions aside, DODEA’s language programs are in many ways a model for the nation’s schools. The Department appears to have placed additional emphasis in a number of areas since the 2008 O&I Report.
Recruiting Initiatives. While the last recommendation did not deal directly with providing opportunities to acquire foreign language proficiency, it did speak in part to allowing for the maintenance of language proficiency throughout the careers of personnel recruited for their language ability.

O&I Recommendation—Maintaining and Utilizing Language and Cultural Skills: The Services should ensure that, aside from the heritage and native speaker programs, their recruiters and human resources communities understand the importance the Department attaches to recruiting personnel with language abilities and regional/cultural expertise, empowering them to maintain proficiency throughout their careers, and placing them in assignments where those skills can best be utilized.

The Air Force is in the initial stages of instituting what it is calling the Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). Currently aimed at the entry-level officer corps, this initiative identifies and recruits candidates with language ability and, working with the Air Force Personnel Center, tailors opportunities for language study, to include immersion, throughout the officer’s career. A participant who has been selected for officer training, but is waiting for a seat to open in the training pipeline would be commissioned early and given language training in the interim. Other opportunities might come later, for example, when a lieutenant is waiting for a class to start for Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training (flight school).85

There are 192 participants in the program, 20% of whom are at the limited working proficiency (ILR 2/2) in reading and listening. Of these, there are 14 Arabic and 12 Chinese (Mandarin) students. The Air Force has authorized a foreign language proficiency bonus for participants. Without this program, the language skills that these officers brought to the Air Force would likely have atrophied. Depending on the results of the officer program, the Air Force may extend similar opportunities to enlisted and civilian personnel.86

In addition to recruiting heritage and native speakers as interpreters and translators, the Army has established the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MASNI) Program. Beginning in February 2009, the Army is recruiting foreign citizens living in the United States, targeting speakers of 35 languages, for service in the general purpose forces as an eventual path to citizenship. The Army reports that it has enlisted 792 soldiers under this program.87

The Navy’s Heritage Language Recruiting Program brings in 200 sailors per year in 25 languages and dialects. The Navy reports that about 150 of these sailors speak critical

---

85 Air Force, Culture and Language Center, Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, June 8, 2010.
86 Ibid.
87 U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing.
languages. These are not interpreters or translators, but rather are intended to serve in what the Navy calls “hearts and minds ratings,” those fields such as naval construction and corpsmen, where they are readily available for assignment to contingency operations and likely be in contact with local nationals. The Marine Corps identifies foreign language speakers at accessions, but it does not have a program designed specifically to recruit them.88

The first Navy Sailors to participate in the Secretary of Defense's Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) pilot program are issued the oath of citizenship by Stacey Summers, branch chief from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Chicago field office on February 15, 2010.

USN Photo/Scott A. Thornbloom

88 U.S. Navy, Language and Culture Briefing.
BEYOND THE 2008 O&I REPORT: RECENT INITIATIVES

Our best commanders were those who were culturally astute—they were the ones who could identify the network and the fabric of society, all the different elements of it, whether it is economic, political, tribal . . .

Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, USA
Remarks at the Defense Language Institute
April 2009

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The primary mission of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) remains training career or professional linguists with an emphasis on supporting the intelligence community. The Center has adapted, however, to the services’ requirements for language skills for the general purpose forces, especially for those deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. In existence at the time of the 2008 O&I report, the Field Support Division continues to provide Language Familiarization and Area Studies Teams (LFASTs) to deploying units. The Field Support Division also operates Language Training Detachments (LTDs) on major installations. These are permanent instructor groups which support language training for career linguists and for small unit leaders deploying to Afghanistan.

In addition to instructor support, the DLIFLC develops and distributes foreign language materials to the general purpose forces. These include Language Skill Kits (LSKs) which are pocket-size pamphlets to include a compact disk (CD). LSKs exist in 30 languages and emphasize tactical vocabulary and situations. The Center reports that it delivers 250,000 LSKs annually to deploying units.89 In January 2009, the Center announced a new product called “Headstart” which is a digital video disk (DVD) that runs modules with 80 hours of self-paced, interactive instruction. There are Headstart DVDs in Arabic (Iraqi dialect), Persian (Dari), and Pashto.90

The DLIFLC has recognized the need for a means, other than the current DLPT, for testing at the elementary proficiency level (ILR 1). The DLPT requires three to four hours to administer and is primarily designed to differentiate within the levels of limited working proficiency (ILR 2) and professional working proficiency (ILR 3). Consequently, it has very few questions aimed at the lower levels raising the question of its precision at that range. The DLIFLC’s quarterly magazine reports the development of a Very Low Range DLPT (VLR) which is designed to address service needs for shorter tests with questions that can accurately

assess language skill below the limited proficiency level (ILR 2).\textsuperscript{91} The VLR is scheduled to be available in a limited number of languages to include Iraqi dialect in the summer of 2011.\textsuperscript{92}

**Service Strategies:** In addition to responding to the Subcommittee’s comments in the 2008 O&I Report, the services have developed or are in the process of developing foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise strategies. The Air Force finalized its service strategy in May 2009 with the publication of the *Air Force Culture, Region, and Language Flight Plan*, using as its central concept, Airmen Statesmen, i.e., “airmen skilled enough to influence behavior in culturally complex settings.” The Air Force determined that all airmen need some level of cultural awareness, specifically what it calls “culture general” content, knowledge not related to a specific region or connected with a particular foreign language. The Air Force strategy views the need for language skills as depending on an individual airman’s mission and role.\textsuperscript{93}

The Army’s December 2009 *Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* focuses on the analytical details of how to think about generating a force with the appropriate levels of proficiency and characterizes development of cultural capability as the main effort with development of language capability as the supporting effort. The strategy proposes closing gaps in the Army’s culture and foreign language capabilities in two ways: “building unit capability and expanding the scope of leader development.” The strategy sees overall unit capability as consisting of a specific mix of language and cultural proficiency levels which will vary by unit depending on the echelon and assigned mission.\textsuperscript{94}

The Navy, which issued the *U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy* in January 2008, also considers cultural awareness to be the critical training needed by all Navy personnel, with language proficiency and regional expertise needed by only some personnel. The strategy calls for establishing a framework for more accurately defining the Navy’s foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities requirements. In addition to language professionals and regional experts, the strategy notes that the Navy may need “[o]ther language-skilled Sailors and civilians with sufficient proficiency to interact with foreign nationals at the working level.”\textsuperscript{95}

The Marine Corps’ document, *Marine Corps Language, Regional, and Culture Strategy: 2010-2015* is in draft, but as of May 2010 it outlined two programs for the general purpose forces: pre-deployment training and the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization


\textsuperscript{92} Plans include VLR DLPTs in French, Spanish, Korean, Chinese, and Persian (Farsi), and Arabic (Iraqi dialect).

\textsuperscript{93}“Air Force Culture, Region, and Language Flight Plan.”

\textsuperscript{94}“Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy.”

\textsuperscript{95}“U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy.”
(RCLF) program in which all career Marines will be required to focus on one of 17 regions. The geographical division of the regions themselves, and the number of Marines dedicated to each one, is based on high-level Departmental guidance (Guidance for the Employment of the Force), intelligence products (intermediate threat assessments), and service headquarters guidance. This new effort is unique among the services and merits an expanded treatment as it may serve as a model. The Air Force is considering adopting a similar program.

Marine officers are assigned a region and a related foreign language while at The Basic School, which all new lieutenants attend. The Marine Corps makes its determination of assignments after considering the individual’s interest and desires, prior experience and studies, and the needs of the service. The enlisted component of the program is still in its early stages, but envisions assigning regions to Marines after their first reenlistment. Promotion to the ranks of major and gunnery sergeant will be contingent on passing tests in the applicable language and culture. A significant portion of the studies, and the testing, will be conducted through distance learning, some of which will require off-duty time. Currently, the Marine Corps is relying primarily on web-based foreign language instruction.

Service Language and Culture Centers. The services have established language and culture centers with the same general purpose and scope of operations. These centers do not typically provide language and culture instruction on site, but provide materials and mobile training teams to deploying forces. Since the publication of the 2008 O&I Report, the centers have been increasingly called upon to assist with pre-deployment training and with language and culture curricula at their services’ professional military education (PME) schools. Additionally, where a specific training, translating, or interpreting capability may not be resident with that service, the centers facilitate support from other sources such as the Defense Language Institute in Monterrey, California or hire contractors to fill the need. Using contractors or local interpreters, however, often brings another set of challenges with attendant security risks or in some instances, lower or unknown quality.

The services take slightly different approaches as to the location and organization of their centers. The Air Force Culture and Language Center is part of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. This provides the advantages of not just proximity to, but that of sharing the same headquarters as, most Air Force PME institutions, such as the Air Command and Staff College, which assists in the integration of language, culture, and regional expertise into those schools’ curricula. The Marine Corps takes a similar approach with its

96 U.S. Marine Corps, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), Briefing to House Armed Services Committee Staff, June 8, 2010.
97 Air Force Culture and Language Center Briefing.
98 House Armed Services Committee staff delegation to the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), Quantico, VA, June 15, 2009.
99 Ibid.
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at Quantico, Virginia. While it is adjacent to the Marine Corps University, it is subordinate to the Marine Corps Training Command rather than intelligence-related schools in keeping with the center’s current focus on pre-deployment preparation of units rotating to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center, located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona and the Navy’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture near Pensacola, Florida are both co-located with intelligence-related schools. While there were no problems observed with the two centers performing their missions with this arrangement, it could create the perception that the services associate language and culture training with intelligence specialists. The reality, however, is that both the Army and Navy centers share the focus of the other services’ centers on supporting general purpose forces.

U.S. Army Capt. Mark Moretti sits hand in hand with Shamshir Khan, one of the most senior Korengal Valley elders, on the Korengal Outpost in Kunar province, Afghanistan on April 13, 2010. Moretti, who has led soldiers on the outpost since 2009, welcomed Khan and other elders to offer an orientation of all the buildings and equipment that would be left behind for the people of the valley.

USA Photo/Spc. David Jackson

**Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Pay.** Defense Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) pay is an additional compensation for service members who demonstrate proficiency in one or more foreign languages through annual evaluation by the DLPT or through an oral proficiency interview (OPI). FLPB pay can provide an incentive for service members to self-identify, take the DLPT voluntarily, and sustain capability in foreign languages. This pay can be

---

100 House Armed Services Committee staff delegation to U.S. Marine Corps, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), June 15, 2010.
101 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Culture Center Presentation, “Training to Internalize Competency,” April 19, 2010, at Culture Summit IV; and U.S. Navy Center for Language, Culture and Regional Expertise Briefing.
as much as $1000 per month for those testing at higher levels in multiple languages. In most cases, service members have to demonstrate at least a limited working proficiency (ILR 2) in reading and listening and be serving in a foreign language-related specialty to receive this additional pay. FLPB rates also vary depending on the specific language, based on the Department’s and services’ needs. The services may authorize payment for individuals whose duties require some proficiency at lower levels. Their policies, however, vary widely for FLPB pay to non-linguists at levels below limited working proficiency (ILR 2).

With the exception of languages on the Strategic Language List (SLL) that the Defense Language Office terms “dominant in the force,” languages such as Spanish and French for which sufficient capability already exists, the Army pays FLPB to all Soldiers with limited working proficiency (level 2) or higher in the reading and listening modalities. The Army reports that a proposal to pay at lower proficiency levels for critical languages is being staffed. The Army requires its special operations forces to test at the same level as its general purpose forces and does not pay FLPB below limited working proficiency (ILR 2).

With the exception of languages considered “dominant in the force,” the Navy pays FLPB to all Sailors who test at limited working proficiency (ILR 2) or higher for languages on the strategic language list. The Navy also pays for elementary proficiency (ILR 1) in contingency situations in which a Sailor’s foreign language skills are required. The Navy pays FLPB to Sailors serving in its “expeditionary forces,” to include its special operations forces for elementary proficiency (ILR 1).

Also with the exception of languages considered “dominant in the force,” the Air Force pays FLPB to all Airmen who test at limited working proficiency (ILR 2) or higher. Unlike other services, however, the Air Force will authorize FLPB for higher proficiency levels for languages dominant in the force. German, Italian, French, Russian, and Portuguese, and Tagalog require professional working proficiency (ILR 3). Airmen must possess full professional proficiency (level 4) to receive DLPB for Spanish. The Air Force does not have a blanket

102 Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB), Department of Defense Instruction 7280.03 (20 August 2007), 5-6.
103 Ibid., 6.
105 U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing.
106 Dominant in the force languages include Spanish, German, Italian, French, Russian, and Portuguese.
107 RADM Daniel Holloway, Response to Question for the Record, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, June 29, 2010, CHARRTS No. HASCOI-04-002.
108 Ibid.
109 Mr. Don Get, Response to Question for the Record, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, June 29, 2010, CHARRTS No. HASCOI-
policy authorizing FLPB for elementary proficiency (ILR 1) in designated languages, but does allow career field personnel managers the option of making special exceptions for individual language-coded billets.\textsuperscript{110} The Air Force pays its special operations force personnel for elementary proficiency, but does require them to advance to limited working proficiency (ILR 2) after two years to continuing drawing FLPB.\textsuperscript{111}

The Marine Corps remains the only service that pays FLPB to any member with elementary proficiency (ILR 1) in designated languages which it considers critical.\textsuperscript{112} Included in this policy are Marines serving in the service’s special operations forces. With the exception of languages that the Defense Language Office terms “dominant in the force,” the Marine Corps pays FLPB to all Marines with limited working proficiency (ILR 2).\textsuperscript{113}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{FLPB Pay Policies by Service}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Service} & \textbf{FLPB to Non-Language Professionals?} & \textbf{FLPB for DLPT Below 2/2?} & \textbf{Special Operations Forces Policy} \\
\hline
Army & For Strategic Language List (SLL) languages not dominant in the force at the 2/2 level and above & Not currently & For 2/2 proficiency and above \\
\hline
Navy & For SLL languages not dominant in the force at the 2/2 level and above & If required in operational contingencies & For 1/1 proficiency and above \\
\hline
Air Force & For SLL languages not dominant in the force at the 2/2 level and above & Only by individual exception & For 1/1 proficiency and above \\
\hline
Marine Corps & For languages not dominant in the force at the 2/2 and above. & For 1/1 or above in critical languages regardless of billet or specialty & For 1/1 proficiency and above in languages “critical to mission success” \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{04-002.} \textsuperscript{110} Ibid. \textsuperscript{111} Ibid. \textsuperscript{112} Eligible languages include: select African languages, Arabic, Assyrian, Kurdish, Pashto, Persian (Farsi, Dari, and Tajik), Punjabi, select Philippine languages, select Turkish languages, and Urdu. \textsuperscript{113} Col Dmitri Henry, Response to Question for the Record, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, June 29, 2010, CHARRTS No. HASCOL-04-002.
The 2008 O&I Report raised the issue of varying service policies in eligibility of their special operations forces (SOF) for FLPB.\footnote{Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military, 47.} All services with the exception of the Army pay their SOF personnel FLPB at the elementary proficiency level (ILR 1). The Army requires level 2 proficiency which may not necessarily be required to perform the SOF mission. Given the propensity of SOF to operate in a joint environment, this disparity could affect morale.

**Afghanistan Pakistan Hands.** Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the establishment of the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) program in August 2009. The charter document for this initiative, reproduced in Appendix F, states that:

This program will create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement across the battlefield. The APH program will develop and use a cohort of experts who speak the local language, are culturally attuned, and are focused on the problem for an extended period of time.\footnote{Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, “Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) Program,” 28 August 2009.}

The idea was to create a cadre, initially of about 600 officers, senior enlisted personnel, and civilians—preferably with prior experience in the region—who would receive intensive language and cultural training and return for subsequent tours. The composition of the cadre was apportioned among the services. Surprisingly, the Marine Corps, whose commandant views his service’s significant presence in Afghanistan as a long-term commitment\footnote{Walter Pincus, “Taliban May be Misleading its Forces on Timetable, U.S. General Says,” Washington Post, August 24, 2009, A1.} has only 22 billets\footnote{MarAdmin 0599/09, Afghan Pakistan Hands Program (APH), October 6, 2009.} compared to the Army’s 220 or 217 for the Air Force.\footnote{U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing and U.S. Air Force, Language and Culture Briefing.} Recent subsequent guidance from the Secretary of Defense, reproduced in Appendix G, raises the target number for APH to 912 personnel and calls the program, “the Department of Defense’s top personnel priority.”\footnote{Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Personnel Resources and Administrative Support for the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) Program,” May 5, 2010.}

The services’ approaches to APH vary slightly, but this illustrative sequence shows the five major phases:\footnote{House Armed Services Committee staff delegation to U.S. Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture, Corry Station, Pensacola, FL, June 9, 2010.}

- 6 months of language and culture training
- 12 months assignment in-theater
- 12 months in a billet outside of theater but supporting operations in theater
- 6 months of refresher language and culture training
6-12 months assignment in theater

Each of the services is organizing three groups, called “cohorts” which will successively serve in-theater. The first cohort of 85 “AfPak Hands” is currently in theater and will be replaced by a second that is presently in its language and culture training.\footnote{U.S. Air Force, Language and Culture Briefing.}

While APH does promise to achieve its intended goal of providing a measure of “greater continuity,” it may represent a questionable return on investment. Two six-month training periods and a year-long assignment in a key billet outside of theater is an inordinately high cost that produces potentially only one additional in-theater assignment as a return, and that may be as short as six months. Additionally, the minimum commitment to the program was set relatively short, at three years. Understandably, this was done so as not to make participation detrimental to members’ career progression by taking them out of their primary specialties for prolonged periods of time.\footnote{Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, 28 August 2009.} If, however, APH is truly “the Department of Defense’s top personnel priority,” then the Department ought to consider building a select group of experts within the program.\footnote{Secretary of Defense Memorandum, May 5, 2010.} It should examine the feasibility of creating a designator for tracking AfPak Hands and ensuring that senior-level billets requiring an extensive knowledge of the language and culture will eventually be filled by members on their third or even fourth assignment in theater. Given that the program is still in its early stages, the subsequent progress of the program merits further study and consideration.

**Technology.** Technology is increasingly a contributing factor to language skills and cultural awareness learning, especially during the demanding pre-deployment training period and for language maintenance during deployments. Interactive language learning software, such as DLIFLC’s Headstart DVDs, using avatar-based simulations, leverage information technology to deliver language and cultural training. More advanced game-based simulations are also being developed, such as the Tactical Iraqi programs at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which not only teaches language and cultural understanding, but incorporates culturally specific non-verbal communications in scenarios that accurately reflect the operational environment in which service members will find themselves. Although technology has limitations in replicating the dynamics of human communication, simple, one-way handheld translator devices are in use by service members in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. The Department also continues to develop more advanced automated machine translation capabilities to support intelligence and strategic planning functions, thus reducing the burden on limited numbers of human translators.

The services continue to rely on online delivery of training materials, and the Department also maintains its emphasis on portable data formats, using laptops, portable devices, and smart...
phones, as a way to allow service members to continue training en-route to theater and under circumstances of disconnected operations. The Army, for example, has a contract with Rosetta Stone that makes this commercial software available to Soldiers and Army civilians with an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Special Operations Forces, have bought licenses for Transparent Language’s CL-150 materials. The CL-150 suite encompasses a broad range of resources that includes Operational Language and Culture Kits, Language Pro courseware with interactive video scenarios, and Rapid Rote “flashcards,” many with audio support, that can be downloaded to service members iPhones, iTouch, and iPad devices. CL-150 also provides diagnostic assessments for service members preparing for the DLPT in which examinees only see questions at or near their estimated ILR level. Given the flexibility, scope, and demand for the CL-150 learning materials, there is a disparity in a joint environment where Marine, Navy, and Special Operations personnel have access while those from the Air Force and Army general purpose forces do not.

The Department has recognized that technology is a critical component in facilitating language and culture learning and maintains the Joint Language University “superportal.” Once service members register for an account on this site, they can enroll in distance learning classes and access resources such as SCOLA. SCOLA, also subscribed to by colleges, universities, and K-12 schools, makes available multimedia “InstaClass” programs, typically cable news broadcasts, consisting of a video clip, transcript in the foreign language, English translation, a vocabulary list, and quiz. The InstaClass format currently supports 37 foreign languages.


USMC Photo/Cpl. Ruben D. Maestre
We must support programs that cultivate interest and scholarship in foreign languages and intercultural affairs, including international exchange programs. This will allow citizens to build connections with peoples overseas and to develop skills and contacts that will help them thrive in a global economy.

The Language Flagship Initiative. The 2008 O&I Report found that the United States, as a whole, lacks the educational infrastructure for foreign language instruction that can produce the individuals the country needs not only for national security, but for economic competitiveness. Consequently, the Department finds itself involved in programs, such as the Language Flagship, aimed at increasing the availability of foreign language study opportunities for both its personnel and, more broadly, for the American public.

The Language Flagship is a departmental program that is funded through NSEP. Its primary focus is on building national capacity by enhancing language and regional studies in undergraduate programs called “Flagship Centers” in order to produce students at full working proficiency (ILR 4), or even higher, in key languages. NSEP augments language departments’ annual budgets to provide opportunities for more intensive classroom coursework, immersion studies abroad, and enrollment in foreign institutions of higher learning. At the time of the 2008 O&I report there were 12 Flagship Centers. As of May 2010 there were 22. Additionally, through the Universities of Oregon, Michigan, and Ohio, NSEP indirectly sponsors three experimental K-12 programs that are designed in part to prepare students for their respective Flagship Centers.

Under the auspices of the Language Flagship, NSEP works with states to convene summits to develop federal-state partnerships or “roadmaps” for improving language education in their K-16 systems. At the time of the 2008 O&I Report, three states, Oregon, Texas, and Ohio, had held summits and put together roadmaps. Two years later, the Subcommittee received testimony that there were only two additional states, California and Utah, in the preliminary stages of developing their own roadmaps. Recognizing the tremendous potential of these

124 There are Flagship Centers for Arabic, Chinese, Hindu/Urdu, Korean, Persian, and Russian. In addition, Howard University is the Flagship Center for African languages.
125 Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military, 57.
126 Mrs. Nancy Weaver, Oral Testimony, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Beyond
partnerships, this slow progress raises the issue of what obstacles exist to more states focusing on early language education in their K-16 systems.

The impediment for further involvement by the states appears to be not a lack of interest, but lack of funding beyond the money provided by the Department of Defense. The Department has indicated a willingness to continue to provide initial funding and advisors for states willing to undertake this initiative but not continual funding. Although the Department has been able to make inroads in addressing national language education shortfalls, real progress will require support from other stakeholders within the national, state, and local governments, and the private sector.

**National Language Service Corps.** The National Language Service Corps (NLSC) aimed to establish a 1,000-person cadre of highly proficient foreign language speakers by 2010 who would be available to federal agencies in time of need. Original funding, which has since been taken over by the Department, came from the Fiscal Year 2005 Intelligence Authorization Act for a three-year pilot project. General Dynamics Information Technology was awarded the contract for launching NLSC to include establishing a 24-hour operational support center.  

In January 2008, NLSC began recruiting for speakers of the ten pilot languages of Hausa, Hindi, Indonesian, Mandarin Chinese, Marshallese, Russian, Somali, Swahili, Thai, and Vietnamese. NSEP, which managed the contract, reports that its choice of these languages was guided by several factors. The overall objective was to select languages that would allow and challenge the pilot program to develop and evaluate marketing and recruiting processes across many types of language communities, to include those with different size populations, those relatively new in the United States, and those less commonly taught. Another consideration, especially for incorporating the three African languages, was to include languages that have current and future value to the United States government. Arabic was specifically avoided. NSEP indicated that its rationale was that this community was already a known quantity for recruiting and marketing.

NLSC screened applicants and certified their language proficiency levels. Volunteers, all U.S. citizens, are available as on-call federal employees in domestic and international crises. As of August 2010, NLSC had grown to 1415 members with documented proficiency in 106 languages. As a quality control measure, agencies employing NLSC members complete user

---

127 Mr. William Casten, Program Director, National Language Service Corps, briefing to House Armed Services Committee staff, August 31, 2010.
130 Mr. William Casten Briefing.
feedback assessments on the members’ performance.\textsuperscript{131}

As part of the pilot, NLSC conducted five activation exercises with other federal agencies in the United States and overseas. NLSC called up 34 members of which 16 went on the assignment and 18 were in a standby status. There were over a hundred or so members contacted during the process of identifying which members were available and in selecting the best candidates for assignments among those individuals.\textsuperscript{132}

The Department has funded the program through FY11. The value of NLSC appears to be in large measure in the recruiting and maintenance of the data base of U.S. citizen potential volunteers to deploy for contingency operations. The issue of whether the stand-alone operations center function could be subsumed into the Joint Staff has not been studied. Such integration could facilitate employment of the NLSC’s members into combatant commands’ exercises, particularly at U.S. Northern Command, and real-world operations. At a minimum, the NLSC membership data base is a national asset that would be hard to replace if it were allowed to lapse.

\textbf{Language Instruction in Recruit Training.} Although, language instruction in recruit training did not rise to the level of a formal recommendation in the 2008 O&I Report, the idea came up during the investigation phase.\textsuperscript{133} It resurfaced again in the hearing for this study, and testimony concluded that no services have adopted this practice.\textsuperscript{134} The Secretary’s endorsement of General McChrystal’s Counterinsurgency Training Guidance, that “language skill is as important as your other combat skills” raises the issue of whether language orientation or instruction should begin in recruit training where other warfighting fundamentals such as marksmanship are introduced. Although most of the services include a general culture class in recruit training, none at present teach, or provide an orientation to, foreign languages. This may represent a lost opportunity.

In part because it has the longest recruit training program among the services at 13 weeks, the Marine Corps was asked to comment on the practicability of adding foreign language instruction. The proposal was made with the suggestion that the training would be done in very short lessons or orientation on a daily basis, for instance in conjunction with meals. The Marine Corps response, included as Appendix D, stated that the condensed schedule was not conducive to “the lengthy and intensive study required of learning a foreign language.”\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] “Report on Fully Operational Corps,” 30.
\item[133] Representative Vic Snyder, Testimony, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, \textit{Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities}, September 10, 2008.
\item[135] U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command Information Paper, “Cultural and Language Training in
The demanding and concentrated nature of the recruit training environment certainly poses challenges to inserting any additional subject matter. Consequently, the introduction of a new element of instruction generally requires the removal or modification of another activity or event in the schedule. Still, the length of time required to achieve even elementary proficiency (ILR 1) in a foreign language argues strongly in favor of starting the process as early as possible, perhaps even as early as in the delayed entry programs where candidates are often given preparatory physical training. If the services take seriously that competence in a foreign language is as important as other combat skills, then creative methods and techniques should be explored to initiate foreign language instruction, or at least orientation, in recruit training. One approach that might be considered is short classes during meal times.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although it is evident that the Department, Joint Staff, and services have made considerable progress in implementing the recommendations of the 2008 O&I Report, some have not been fully realized, and in some cases, new challenges have arisen. The Subcommittee makes the following findings and recommendations.\textsuperscript{136}

Updated findings and recommendations from the 2008 O&I Report:

1. **Finding.** While departmental-level guidance recognizes an increased need for language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise, the description by the services as “enablers” still falls short of treating them as a core competency essential to the Department’s missions. Moreover, General McChrystal’s 2009 policy memorandum and Secretary Gates’ subsequent 2010 endorsement raises the emphasis for language proficiency to the same level as other combat skills for forces deploying to Afghanistan.

   **Recommendation.** The services policies should recognize language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise as core competencies on the same level as traditional combat skills.

2. **Finding.** Although the Department reports that it is in the final staffing of the Language, Regional, and Cultural Capabilities Plan, the Subcommittee has not had an opportunity to review the document to determine whether it constitutes a comprehensive strategic plan.

   **Recommendation.** The Department should expedite the publication of the Language, Regional, and Cultural Capabilities Plan and brief appropriate Congressional staffs. If the plan is still in draft on January 1, 2010, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) should brief the House Armed Services Committee Staff within 30 days on the plan’s status.

3. **Finding.** The current framework for validating combatant commanders’ language requirements of the combatant commanders was not responsive to the needs of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. It appears that neither U.S. Central Command nor the Joint Staff anticipated the foreign language training directed by General McChrystal’s November 2009 policy memorandum, which came eight years into the war.

\textsuperscript{136} Recommendations 5, (leveraging ROTC units), and recommendation 7 (NSEP Fellows), from the 2008 O&I Report have been accomplished and the findings associated with them do not have corresponding recommendations.)
Recommendation. The Department should ensure that inherent in the new requirements generation process for combatant commanders’ language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise, should be the ability to more quickly respond to, if not anticipate, changes in a dynamic security environment.

4. Finding. The services have all improved their abilities to identify non-linguist personnel and foreign area officers with language skills, although the Navy still needs to assign a skill identifier. However, there remains an uneven capability in the ability to track personnel with an elementary proficiency (1+ and below) who have not taken a Defense Language Proficiency Test.

Recommendation. As enhanced means of testing language skills at the elementary proficiency level are fielded, the services should continue to improve their tracking processes in order to capture this capability in their personnel databases.

5. Finding. Project Global Officers has expanded the foreign language study opportunities for ROTC students, particularly at the largest “feeder schools.” This program merits the Department’s continued support.

6. Finding. While some innovative language study programs, such as the Air Force Foreign Language Express program and the Army Culture and Language Incentive Pay bonus have been established, ROTC students in technical majors are not required to study a foreign language. ROTC graduates from technical majors share the possibility with their humanities and social science counterparts of serving on active duty in assignments requiring some foreign language skill.

Recommendation. The services should require ROTC students with technical majors to study a foreign language, preferably the less commonly taught languages.

7. Finding. The Department has improved its program to place National Security Education Program Fellows in appropriate positions in fulfillment of their service obligation. Given the large number of scholarship recipients who have not fulfilled their service obligation, however, this challenge warrants continued attention.

8. Finding. Although the Department’s K-12 school system’s foreign language programs are in many ways a model for the nation’s schools, there are shortfalls that hinder the systematic and continuous study of a foreign language, particularly the lack of Foreign Language in Elementary School (FLES) program in grades 4 and 5, and the increasing demand for high school Chinese
classes.

**Recommendation.** The Department should expand and fund programs, such as FLES and high school Chinese classes, which provide continuity for the uninterrupted study of a foreign language.

9. **Finding.** With the exception of the Marine Corps, the services have programs to recruit candidates with foreign language proficiency. All the services, however, need additional emphasis in recruiting enlisted personnel who have foreign language proficiency, apart from the heritage and native speaker communities.

**Recommendation.** The services should formulate and implement policies for recruiters emphasizing the importance the Department places on language skills and provide incentives to identify and enlist candidates with proficiency in critical languages.

**Findings and recommendations from other issues:**

**Finding.** The differences in service policies with regard to authorizing FLPB pay for their special operations forces creates a disparity in compensation for personnel with identical foreign language proficiency.

**Recommendation.** The services should standardize their policies regarding paying Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus to their special operations forces.

**Finding.** The Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) program, while a step in the right direction in terms of providing greater continuity in manning the counterinsurgency forces, does not go far enough in that it requires minimal (two) in-theater tours for participants. This is not entirely consistent with its standing as “the Department of Defense’s top personnel priority.”

**Recommendation.** The Department should examine the feasibility of creating a designator for tracking AfPak Hands and ensuring that senior-level billets requiring an extensive knowledge of the language and culture will eventually be filled by members on their third or subsequent tours in theater.

**Finding.** While the services introduce general cultural awareness in recruit training, none currently teach or provide an orientation in foreign languages. Given the length of time required for gaining foreign language proficiency, this represents a missed opportunity for a basic introduction.
**Recommendation.** The services should investigate what creative methods and techniques might allow for beginning language instruction or orientation in recruit training. Possible ideas include utilizing meal times during boot camp or the period while awaiting entry into a recruit training class.

U.S. Army Lt. Col. James Zieba, a judge advocate, listens to the chief judge of Kapisa province, Abdul Manan Atazada, discuss plans to build a jail in Kapisa province’s Tagab valley district, Afghanistan on August 25, 2009. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the status of local judges, plans to build a new courthouse and jail, and for coalition judge advocates to meet local lawmen.

*USA Photo/Spc. William E. Henry*
SUMMARY

The following “stoplight” chart provides a summary of the Department’s and services’ progress in accomplishing the recommendations contained in the 2008 O&I Report. Progress has been made towards findings shaded in yellow, but they still require action to complete. Findings in light green are nearly complete. Findings in dark green are essentially complete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Action Status</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Action Required</td>
<td>• The Services should recognize foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness as critical or core competencies essential to DOD missions. • Status: Service policies still fall short of departmental guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Action Required</td>
<td>• DOD should develop a comprehensive foreign language, cultural awareness, and regional expertise strategy that includes a prioritization of efforts and resources. • Status: The departmental strategic plan is pending final review and signature. Unable to evaluate whether it prioritizes efforts and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nearly Complete</td>
<td>• DOD should address the deficiencies in the requirements generation process for combatant commands’ operational needs, and it should establish a process for identifying emerging and future requirements. • Status: Capabilities Based Assessments to be completed in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nearly Complete</td>
<td>• The services should use a secondary occupational code or special experience identifier for personnel, who, while not language professionals, have validate training/skills or regional expertise. • Status: All services except the Navy have developed identifiers, and new tests for personnel with low-range skills are scheduled to be fielded in early 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>• The Department should consider targeting its ROTC Language and Culture Project grants toward its largest feeder schools to develop critical language programs at those schools that are developing the greatest number of officers. • Status: Complete. Project Global Officer Program now at 24 institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Action Required</td>
<td>• Where the Services otherwise have not, they should begin to require that ROTC cadets and midshipmen study a foreign language, preferably the less commonly taught languages. • Status: While some innovative programs have been implemented, ROTC students in technical majors are still not required to take a foreign language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>• The Department should improve its program to place NSEP Fellows in appropriate positions in the Department to fulfill their service commitments. Furthermore, the Department should work to provide employment opportunities for these fellows. • Status: NSEP and Congress have established a workable framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nearly Complete</td>
<td>• The Department should place greater emphasis on critical languages and cultural programs in its own K-12 school system to make these a model for producing students with higher proficiency levels in critical languages. • Status: While DODEA is a model for language education in many ways, there are a number of areas requiring additional emphasis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Action Required</td>
<td>• The Services should ensure that, aside from the heritage and native speaker programs, their recruiters and human resources communities understand the importance the Department attaches to recruiting personnel with language abilities and regional/cultural expertise. • Status: The Air Force’s Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP) is a model.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
O&I HEARING


Witnesses:

Mrs. Nancy Weaver
Director, Defense Language Office
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

Brigadier General Walter Golden, USA
Director, J-1 Manpower and Personnel
Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ms Sharon Pickup
Director, Office of Defense Capabilities and Management
Government Accountability Office

Subject Matter Experts (Service Senior Language Authorities):

Navy: Rear Admiral Daniel Holloway
Director
Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (OPNAV N13)

Army: Brigadier General Richard Longo
Director of Training
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G/3/5/7)

USAF: Mr. Don Get
Senior Language Authority
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (A1)

USMC: Colonel Dmitri Henry
Incoming Commanding Officer
Marine Corps Intelligence Command
SENATE HEARING


Witnesses:

Panel 1

David Maurer
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team
U.S. Government Accountability Office

Jeffrey Neal
Chief Human Capital Officer
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Nancy Weaver
Director, Defense Language Office
U.S. Department of Defense

Panel 2

The Honorable David Chu
Former Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness
U.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Richard Brecht
Executive Director for Advanced Study of Language
University of Maryland

Dr. Daniel Davidson
President
Joint National Committee for Languages and the National Council for Languages and International Studies

COMMITTEE BRIEFING


Briefer:
General Stanley McChrystal, USA
Commander
U.S. Forces Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force

MEMBER MEETING

O&I Subcommittee Chairman and Dr. Robert Slater, Director, National Security Education Program, May 6, 2010.

STAFF MEETINGS AND BRIEFINGS

Mr. John Dunavan, Vice President of Business Development, Little Planet Learning, May 12, 2010.

Staff from Office of Representative Patrick Murphy, May 14, 2010.

Flagship Language Group Breakfast, June 8, 2010.

Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, June 11, 2010.


U.S. Army, Language and Culture Briefing, June 18, 2010.


Mr. Michael Quinlan, President, Transparent Language, June 18, 2010.

Mr. Peter Shrider, Customer Relations Manager, Alelo, June 20, 2010.

Ms Susan Frost, Vice President and Mr. Allen Todd, Senior Policy Associate, Sheridan Group Symposium, July 13, 2010.

Language Learning in a Global Age Policy Briefing, sponsored by: the Asia Society Partnership for Global Learning, the National Education Association (NEA), the Committee for Economic Development (CED), the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), and the Joint National Committee on Languages (JNCL), July 20, 2010.

Mr. John Dunavan, Vice President of Business Development, Little Planet Learning, July 29, 2010.
Mr. William Casten, Program Director, National Language Service Corps, August 31, 2010.

Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) Briefing, October 14, 2010.

**STAFF TRAVEL**

Culture Summit IV (Sponsored by U.S. Army TRADOC Culture Center), Shaping the Environment by Using Cross-Cultural Competency, Tucson, AZ, April 19-20.


U.S. Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture, Corry Station, Pensacola, FL, June 9, 2010.

Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, June 15, 2010.
APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS


NON-GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS


MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance

1. You must understand the mission; understand what we're trying to accomplish - and why. This means you must master COIN in both theory and practical implementation. Only with this understanding can you be an asset to the force and not a liability. The purpose of this training guidance is to convey to each and every one of you, what is most important to focus your limited training time on before you deploy and once you are in country. Commanders must work within my intent and train our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians into a mature force capable of executing complex, multi-service, interagency missions they will soon encounter. Commanders and Sergeants must train their Troops in a way that fosters initiative in their subordinates. Develop the Strategic Corporal. Everyone must understand this training guidance, be able to execute it, and become ISAF’s Ambassadors throughout the country. Below are the key points of my training guidance:

   a. Master the basics. Become an expert in your field. Whatever your job, train on it, over and over again, so you can accomplish the routine tasks, routinely. Whether you are an Army medic, a Naval aviator, Marine infantryman, or Air Force EOD technician, train to become the absolute best in your field. Everyone, regardless of your nationality, branch of service or military specialty, must be able to shoot, move, communicate, and medicate.

   b. The People are the Prize. We all must understand the people of Afghanistan. Operate in a way that respects their culture and religion. Treat them with respect. Ask yourself, “How would I want Soldiers to treat me and my family?” Learn to hold effective Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with community leaders to help you establish trust. Do not rely on simply attending a course on Afghan culture. I expect commanders to weave cultural scenarios into every training event and teach your subordinates to interact with other cultures. Be creative. Use role players from other organizations. Share and trade ideas.

   c. Driving. Every interaction with the population, whether positive or negative, influences the Afghans’ perceptions of ISAF. Our overly-aggressive driving alienates local citizens and potentially drives them into the arms of the insurgency. Ensure every member of your organization reads and understands the tactical driving directive, dtd 26 August 2009.

   d. Escalation of Force. Understand my tactical directive regarding EOF procedures ISAF SOP 373, dtd 18 October 2008, applies. All deploying personnel require training in the Afghanistan specific EOF procedures mandated by CRDSFAR-A/COMISAF. EOF training should be conducted as individual and collective events and should be incorporated into all pre-mobilization training to ensure that the procedures become second nature.
e. Fire Support. The ability accurately to call in both ground and air fire support is a critical task, as well as understanding when it is, or isn’t, appropriate to use. Study and train the Tactical Callout, to give you additional options. Know my Tactical Directive regarding Close Air Support (CAS). BDE Commanders must ensure their units have enough Joint Fire Observers (JFO) to support dispersed operations. As we grow our partnering capacity with the Afghan National Army and Police, these numbers will significantly increase. Both in pre-deployment training and in theater, I encourage Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACs) to teach, coach, and mentor both JFOs and leadership, to ensure this critical skill is cross-leveled at the lowest level.

f. Language Training. Everyone should learn basic language skills. Every deployed person should be able to greet locals and say “thank you”. Each platoon, or like sized organization, that will have regular contact with the population should have at least one leader that speaks Dari at least the O+ level, with a goal of a level 1 in oral communication. These personnel will not replace interpreters, but will enhance the capabilities of the unit. This language skill is as important as your other basic combat skills.

g. Detainee Operations. From the point of capture, to the hand over to the appropriate Afghan authorities, I expect that our Troops are thoroughly trained in how to conduct detention operations, to include: the handling, tactical questioning, and procedures for processing of detainees. Troops must know the guidelines and limitations applicable when operating under ISAF and the different guidelines and limitations applicable to OEF detention operations.

h. Counter-IED (C-IED) training. Insurgents continue to employ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to attack our Troops and these strikes are responsible for approximately 60% of all our casualties in Afghanistan. C-IED Training must be a continual point of focus for deploying forces and must be flexible enough to rapidly incorporate changes to both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Commanders must leverage the vast amount of counter-IED expertise from the Joint Improvised Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Improvised Explosive Defeat Capabilities Integration Team (CIT), and other organizations.

i. You must understand your Operational Environment. Traditional Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is insufficient and it is intimate knowledge of the Human Terrain that is paramount. Know the society’s leadership systems; learn the National, Provincial, and district government structure. Understand the familial, clan and tribal cultures. What are the relationships and tensions among the separate groups? All of us must learn the ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) methodology to refine our awareness of the operational environment. This gives us an understanding of civil considerations from the point of view of the population, insurgent, and counterinsurgent. Incorporate early into your training program so concepts can be woven into all of your exercises, as you prepare to deploy.

j. ANSF Partnership. “Arguably, the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007. Train your Soldiers to be advisors, coaches, mentors, and
HQ ISAF  
SUBJECT: COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance

responsible partners. Learn how to build relationships. I expect Commanders to arrive into the theater with a thorough understanding of the structure of Afghan Security Forces (ANA/ANP/ANBP). Become an expert on how they are recruited, resourced, and retained. Master rapport building. Look at your Afghan Security Force partners as team members in your platoon, company, battalion, or brigade. Learn to influence, rather than direct, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). I want you to understand how to take your partnership from supported by ANSF to supporting ANSF.

k. **Know the Civilian component to our Civil/Military Team.** Understand how they are organized, their missions, and whom they support. Know the difference between USAID, Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture and our partner nations' civil capabilities. More importantly, find out how you can work together to accomplish your missions. Help me create unity of effort. Leverage their considerable experience. Understand the tools that they use, like the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) that can assist all of us, both military and civilian, with providing a common view of the sources of instability.

l. **Learn the Integrated Civil/Military Decision Making Structure.** The U.S. Department of State, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and USFOR-A/ISAF have developed a cooperative leadership framework, the Integrated Command Team (ICT), that will be working together from the district level up to each Regional Command. The ICT consists of, at a minimum, the company/battalion commander, senior U.S. civilian lead, and PMT or equivalent lead. The purpose of this single command team is to ensure CIV/MIL operational planning is integrated into a comprehensive strategy agreed upon by all agencies involved in conducting operations.

m. **Information Management Centers (Fusion Cells).** This rapidly emerging capability, collocated with each Regional Command, is being built to assist commanders with creating unity of effort among the various civilian/military/coalition organizations within each AOR. Learn the capabilities and limitations of each of the organizations participating in your regional fusion cells. Understand how to leverage these centers of information/intelligence sharing to best develop unity of effort and unity of purpose in your AOR. I encourage our National/Training Centers to replicate these powerful enablers so commanders and staffs become accustomed to interagency and inter-service coordination and operations.

n. **Know the enablers.** Understand the capabilities and limitations all of the organic, and non-organic, enablers that you can leverage to assist you with your mission. Learn the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Anticipate decentralized operations and train multiple operators on the various systems. Build more capacity than you think you'll need. Know what HUMINT/SIGINT resources you can leverage. What benefits can they provide you during your missions? Practice pushing capabilities down to the lowest levels.

o. **Train decentralized operations to the lowest level.** It is especially important that senior leadership develop a trust in and empower subordinate leaders to make appropriate, timely decisions. While senior leaders must maintain acute situational
HQ ISAF
SUBJECT: COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance

Awareness, decentralized control usually provides greater success and credibility with our Afghan security force partners in the dynamic environment we encounter daily.

p. Money as a Weapon System - Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and ISAF Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF). You must become experts at leveraging the various funds available to you to assist the local population. Know which funds to use to solve your particular problem and how to make it happen quickly. CERP funds are important enablers that provide commander's with the ability to initiate small, quick-impact projects and may also be used for condolence payments. POERF provides commanders with the means to respond quickly to urgent requirements for humanitarian assistance immediately following ISAF military operations. Solatia payments, or compensation for loss, are most often made using Operations and Maintenance-Army (OMA) funds. In order to rapidly execute CERP projects, I expect Commanders and staff, from the company through the BCT level, to understand the CERP nomination and boarding processes. Additionally, Commanders must ensure that they have the appropriate number of Project Managers (PM), Paying Agents (PA), and Contracting Officers to be able to execute effective development operations.

q. Develop Learning Organizations. “This is a game of wits and will. You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.” General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, 2004. We need our deploying forces to be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations upon arrival; however, once you are in country, continue to grow your base of knowledge every day. Learn, share, and disseminate information and intelligence quickly. Flatten the organization. Break down the barriers that impede your progress towards a common goal. Be inquisitive. Question your assumptions. Do not think that you have it “right”. If a tactic works this week, it may not work the next.

2. Although challenging, the task our Nations have asked us to accomplish is by no means impossible. If you are not already deployed, you will be soon be entering a complex environment for which the most effective asset we have is a thinking, well-trained Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine. On the same day, you may find yourself meeting with Afghan tribal elders to hear their concerns about the lack of water; conducting a combined patrol with an Afghan National Army platoon; and finally assisting a Provincial Reconstruction Team with the delivery of supplies to build a local school. Anticipate, adapt, and embrace change. I have the utmost confidence that you, and your leaders, will be prepared to prevail in this joint endeavour.

Encl
ISAF Cdr’s Counterinsurgency Guidance

Stanley A. McChrystal
General, US Army
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces - Afghanistan
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Implementing Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance to Support
Execution of the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy

The Department’s highest priority is to execute the President’s strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which the President described to the American people on
December 1, 2009. The keys to our immediate and long-term success are twofold:
facilitating the development of an Afghan government capable of maintaining internal
security and providing effective, responsive governance and enhancing host nation
capacity to eliminate internal violent extremists and their sanctuaries. Department
Components must refocus their efforts to provide ready and resourced U.S. forces to
achieve these objectives. It is essential that the Department expand the scope of our
preparation in order to place even greater emphasis on COIN principles, and that we also
closely coordinate with the other U.S. Government departments and agencies to secure
the required resources and authorities to execute the President’s strategy.

To implement the strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan successfully, U.S. forces
and the DoD civilians who support them must be prepared for the operational,
geographic, linguistic, and cultural complexities of that environment. We must align our
training, personnel processes, and programs to provide deploying units, leaders and staffs
with language, cultural, tactical, and interagency skills required to conduct COIN
operations successfully in support of the Government of Afghanistan.

The U.S. Armed Forces and DoD civilian personnel conducting security assistance
operations in Pakistan have similar requirements for language skills, cultural awareness,
civil-military integration, and knowledge regarding public sector and host nation
institutions.
To achieve these ends, the Department shall:

- Ensure all DoD military and civilian personnel deploying to Afghanistan are trained to joint theater-specific COIN qualification standards, in compliance with “COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance” issued November 10, 2009 (attached).

  - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall immediately focus the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) on the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to establish, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command (Centcom) and the Services, joint, theater-specific, COIN qualification standards for military and civilian personnel.

  - The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall develop Programs of Instruction for pre-deployment training in accordance with the qualification standards developed by CDRUSCENTCOM and JCISFA.

- Institutionalize and provide sufficient resources to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program to develop and deploy a cadre of regionally aligned, language-qualified experts who are proficient in COIN doctrine.

- Establish specialized training in developing governance institutions and security structures for personnel assigned as advisors to government ministries and security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and institutionalize this capability.

- Leverage the operational and joint training capabilities of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to support COIN operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and maximize support of whole-of-government efforts in theater.

- Increase civilian workforce and military liaison participation in interagency assignments, particularly those U.S. departments and agencies with personnel on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- Align reporting activities and systems to assess the Department’s readiness and performance coherently and consistently in each of the above task areas.

To support these objectives, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Military Departments, shall issue specific implementation guidance and clarify roles and responsibilities to all Department Components as soon as possible.
I expect all Department Components to identify opportunities to reinvest and reward critical expertise and modify training and personnel processes to ensure success in the region. I look forward to your full support.

Attachment:
As stated
Subject: CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE TRAINING IN MARINE CORPS RECRUIT TRAINING

Background. The Marine Corps recognizes and places great importance on culture and language training and education to enable all Marines to more effectively relate to indigenous people in areas to which they are deployed. Recruit Training introduces the concept of operational culture and the need for foreign language skills for Marines. These concepts are evaluated instruction and presented in a classroom environment. Recruit Training is an intense period of transformation for those who aspire to be Marines. It focuses on introducing the fundamentals of being a Marine in a very condensed schedule. Such an environment is not conducive to the lengthy and intensive study required of learning a foreign language. Subsequent to recruit training, significant pre-deployment instruction in the culture and language targeted to the area to which units will deploy is conducted. Beyond this, other language training is available to selected Marines who have a demonstrated aptitude and a high probability of retention for further service.

Operational Culture Concept Class. Recruits receive a one-hour class on cultural factors that influence the environment, the definition of culture, elements of cultural terrain, and cultural understanding as a Warfighting tool. They are afterwards tested on a comprehensive written examination.

The Marine Corps Foreign Language Program (MCFLP) Class. Recruits receive a one-hour class on MCFLP. Recruits who are self-professed foreign language speakers are identified and subsequently tested on their language proficiency. The resulting proficiency score is included in the recruit’s record for future identification.

Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP). PTP is where Marines of a deploying unit receive cultural and language training focused on the area of operations to where they will be assigned. Early in PTP training, The Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language (CAOCL) provides operational culture and language familiarization instruction via Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and pre-positioned cultural mentors. Later in PTP, training is conducted in a field environment during Desert Talon, Mojave Viper, and other TECOM
approved alternate training exercises. Operational culture and language familiarization training remain an integral part of these phases and culminates in an assessment at the conclusion of the exercise. The Marine Corps recognizes

Subject: CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE TRAINING IN MARINE CORPS RECRUIT TRAINING

language and culture skills as critical enablers to accomplishing its assigned missions across the spectrum of operations.

**Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program.** Our enduring effort to train and educate our Marines is encapsulated in the (RCLF) Program. Its mission is to ensure that all Marines are globally prepared and regionally focused so that they are effective at planning and executing missions in culturally complex 21st Century operating environments. This is a career-long education and training program for both officer and enlisted personnel that blends both resident and distance learning with common skills and pre-deployment training. Throughout the program Marines study a specific strategic region and corresponding language, while deepening their ability to navigate across all cultures.

**Conclusions.** The Marine Corps has a vigorous culture and language program designed to be presented at a time when the deploying Marine will get focused training from a professional MTT in the specific culture and language. The RCLF Program is designed to provide a portion of a unit at any given time with some officers or staff non-commissioned officers who have been trained and educated about a given region to which the unit will be deployed.

Prepared by: Mr. Bruce W. Raich, Training Management and Evaluation Section, Ground Training Branch, TECOM, bruce.raich@usmc.mil, (703) 432-0480

Reviewed by: Mr. Dennis Judge, Head, Ground Training Branch, TECOM, dennis.judge@usmc.mil, (703) 784-2553
APPENDIX E: THE INTERAGENCY LANGUAGE ROUNDTABLE SCALE

The Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale is a set of descriptions of abilities to communicate in a language. It was originally developed by the Interagency Language Roundtable, which included representation by United States Foreign Service Institute, the predecessor of the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC). It consists of descriptions of five levels of language proficiency, and is the standard grading scale for language proficiency in the Federal service.

ILR Level 1 - Elementary proficiency

This is the first and essential level of the scale, often called S-1 or Level 1. The following describes the traits of an ILR Level 1 individual:

- can fulfill travelling needs and conduct themselves in a polite manner
- able to use questions and answers for simple topics within a limited level of experience
- able to understand basic questions and speech, which allows for guides, such as slower speech or repetition, to aid understanding
- has only a vocabulary large enough to communicate the most basic of needs; also makes frequent punctuation and grammatical mistakes in writing of the language
- The majority of individuals classified as S-1 are able to perform most basic functions using the language. This includes buying goods, reading the time, ordering simple meals and asking for minimal directions.

ILR Level 2 - Limited working proficiency

Limited working proficiency is the second level in the scale. This level is sometimes referred to as S-2 or level 2. A person at this level is described as follows:

- able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements
- can handle with confidence most basic social situations including introductions and casual conversations about current events, work, family, and autobiographical information
- can handle limited work requirements, needing help in handling any complications or difficulties; can get the gist of most conversations on non-technical subjects (i.e. topics which require no specialized knowledge), and has a speaking vocabulary sufficient to respond simply with some circumlocutions
- has an accent which, though often quite faulty, is intelligible
- can usually handle elementary constructions quite accurately but does not have thorough or confident control of the grammar.

ILR Level 3 - Professional working proficiency

Professional working proficiency is the third level in the scale. This level is sometimes referred to as S-3 or Level 3. S-3 is what is usually used to measure how many people in the world know a given language. A person at this level is described as follows:

- able to speak the language with sufficient structural accuracy and vocabulary to participate effectively in most conversations on practical, social, and professional topics
- can discuss particular interests and special fields of competence with reasonable ease
- has comprehension which is quite complete for a normal rate of speech
- has a general vocabulary which is broad enough that he or she rarely has to grope for a word
- has an accent which may be obviously foreign; has a good control of grammar; and whose errors virtually never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the native speaker.
**ILR Level 4 - Full professional proficiency**

Full professional proficiency is the fourth level in the scale. This level is sometimes referred to as S-4 or level 4. A person at this level is described as follows:

- able to use the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs
- can understand and participate in any conversations within the range of own personal and professional experience with a high degree of fluency and precision of vocabulary
- would rarely be taken for a native speaker, but can respond appropriately even in unfamiliar situations
- makes only quite rare and unpattered errors of pronunciation and grammar
- can handle informal interpreting from and into the language.

**ILR Level 5 - Native or bilingual proficiency**

Native or bilingual proficiency is the fifth level in the scale. This level is sometimes referred to as S-5 or level 5. A person at this level is described as follows:

- has a speaking proficiency equivalent to that of an educated native speaker
- has complete fluency in the language, such that speech on all levels is fully accepted by educated native speakers in all of its features, including breadth of vocabulary and idiom, colloquialisms, and pertinent cultural references.

Source: Defense Language Institute Website:
http://www.dliacr.edu/archive/documents/DLPT_Credit_by_Exam_Policy.pdf and
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commanders of the Combatant Commands

Subject: Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) Program

1. The President has directed that we disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and prevent its return to either country in the future. This will be a long, hard fought struggle. I firmly believe that in order to succeed, we must change the paradigm of how we man our counterinsurgency (COIN) forces. Therefore the Department is establishing the Afghan Pakistan Hands (APH) program.

2. This program will create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement across the battlefield. The APH program will develop and use a cohort of experts who speak the local language, are culturally attuned, and are focused on the problem for an extended period of time.

3. AFPAK Hands will rotate between positions in CONUS and in theater that directly influence the USG strategy in the region. Although centrally managed, this program will produce experts that serve in designated chains of command protecting unity of command while ensuring unity of effort.

4. I expect the Services to take comprehensive action to ensure AFPAK Hands are not disadvantaged for volunteering or being selected to serve in this cutting edge initiative. I expect AFPAK Hands to be given constructive credit when serving in positions outside of a common career path. Services, with assistance of OSD (P&R) and the Joint Staff, will review current personnel policies and adapt them where necessary to sustain this vital program.

5. I expect the Services to support unique assignment practices to protect the AFPAK Hands program and ensure the experience and skills continue to be reinvested against this problem.

6. We must work as rapidly as we can to get the best people to support this program. We do not have a lot of time. We will break routines down that we are comfortable with in terms of generating people, making sure they are taken care of and recognizing that this is our top priority.

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Personnel Resources and Administrative Support for the Afghanistan Pakistan
Hands (APH) Program

The APH Program is a defense priority. Skilled APH personnel are vital to
successful disruption, dismantling, and defeat of al-Qaida in these two countries and
prevention of its return in the future. This is the Department of Defense’s top personnel
priority and necessitates our commitment to dedicate the right number and highest quality
of professionals that the Department of Defense has to offer. Proper program management
is also essential to enable the APH Program to focus on the critical mission at hand.

A cohort of 912 language-capable, culturally attuned, counterinsurgency experts will
enable this program to create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement across
the battlefield. The Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and the Defense
Agencies must marshal talented personnel in senior grades to sustain this contingency effort.

Accordingly, I am establishing an APH Management Element (AME) to provide
APH Program oversight and coordinate necessary personnel and administrative support
for the APH Program. The Joint Staff will oversee the program, with each Military
Department, USSOCOM, and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Civilian Personnel Policy providing support personnel consistent with provisions identified
in the attachment. This effort is critical to the Department of Defense and the Nation; all
components must give the AME their full support. As the Department of Defense has not
yet explicitly resourced administrative support for the AME, the Director of the Joint Staff,
Pakistan Afghanistan Cell, should work with the Joint Staff, Comptroller, to ensure
adequate resources are made available to staff fully the civilian requirements of the AME.

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
Commanders of the Combatant Commands
Directors of the Defense Agencies
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

APH PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Joint Staff PACC: Immediate action to realign 5 existing PACC positions and personnel to serve as the AME staff.

APH personnel will be assigned to the AME as overstrength requirements with duty at a regional hub. APH personnel will be systematically detailed (sent TDY/TAD/TCS) from these regional hubs to forward organizations, out-of-theater organizations, or pre-deployment training duties during their assignments to the AME.

LIAISONS FOR PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>OSD/CEW</th>
<th>SOCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Army will provide one Warrant Officer and one senior enlisted

Military Departments and USSOCOM: Immediate action to detail liaisons (officers or enlisted) to the AME for up to 24 months to coordinate actions with respective Military Department representatives and activities to provide for training, equipping, utilization, and movement of personnel in support of the APH Program

Air Force: Follow-on action reserved by the PACC to detail one additional liaison, upon need, to coordinate actions for large APH contingent (FOC: 225 Air Force).

Military Departments are also required to identify contact information for National Capital Region organizations and personnel performing reachback support. This information should be provided to the Joint Staff Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell.

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) will detail (via MOA/MOU) one YC-3 Human Resource Specialist liaison to serve as a supervisor for Military Department and CEW liaisons and as overall Human Resource Management lead (with funding for this position provided by USCENTCOM) and one liaison to coordinate actions to provide for training, equipping, utilization, staffing actions, and movement of Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel participating in the APH Program.
SUBJECT: Language and Cultural Programs Supporting Operations in Afghanistan

1. Purpose: To provide information to the HASC Professional Staff Members.

2. Strategic Message: The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) provides culturally-based foreign language instruction to deploying Service Members through Language Training Detachments (LTDs) and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). Additionally, the TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) provides cultural pre-deployment MTT instruction. In FY10 to date, DLIFLC has provided pre-deployment language training to approximately 7,500 Service Members deploying to Afghanistan – approximately 700 targeting the level 0+/1 proficiency – and TCC has provided cultural pre-deployment training to approximately 10,500 Soldiers.

3. Facts:

   a. Afghanistan/Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands LTDs. The Joint Staff created the AFPAK Hands program to build a cadre of language-capable Service Members in Afghanistan to support GEN McChrystal’s requirements for level 1 proficiency speakers in Pashto, Dari, and Urdu. AFPAK Hands targets 843 mid-grade officers, senior NCOs and civilians from all Services to specialize in the Afghan region for 3-5 years. On 1 September 2009, DLIFLC established an AFPAK Hands LTD to support the program. To date 222 personnel have completed language training through (64 non-AFPAK Hands taking advantage of the training), 74 are currently in training, and 80 personnel are programmed to begin training in July 2010. The first AFPAK Hands personnel began arriving in theater in May 2010 – 86 will be in theater by mid-May.

   b. Campaign Continuity (CC) LTDs. Whereas AFPAK Hands is a Joint Staff program that targets individuals for specific billets, the Army established CC LTDs to target units deploying to Afghanistan. Army launched three pilot CC LTDs in FY10 at Forts Campbell, Drum, and Carson to support COMISAF’s language training requirements. All three sites are fully operational, instructing a total of 377 Soldiers, with approximately 150 more receiving training before the end of FY10. Fort Lewis has executed a similar training regimen since 2005 to support operations in Iraq; however, shifted focus to Afghanistan in January 2009, and has trained 50 Soldiers in Pashto to date.

   c. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). In FY09, DLIFLC language MTTs trained 15,794 Service Members in Afghan languages. In FY10 to date, DLIFLC has trained approximately 6,800 Service Member in Afghan languages, averaging 30 hours of instruction. TCC has provided an average of eight hours of cultural instruction to approximately 10,500 Soldiers.

   d. LTD Programming/Funding. DLIFLC is programmed in FY11-15 to expand its LTD instruction to four sites to support the Joint Staff AFPAK Hands program and to a total of 10 sites for the general purpose forces (1 Joint, 6 Army, 2 USMC, and 1 USAF). Once fully established, these LTDs will provide approximately 3,500 Service Members annually with level 1 Afghan language skills.
**APPENDIX I: RELATED LEGISLATION IN THE 111TH CONGRESS**

**Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act:** This legislation contained a provision directing the Secretary of Defense to establish language training centers at universities and the senior military colleges,\(^1\) to accelerate the development of expertise in critical and strategic languages.\(^2\)

**National Language Coordination Act of 2009.** Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced this bill in May 2009. It has four co-sponsors. The bill would establish a National Foreign Language Coordination Council (NFLCC) in the Executive Office of the President, directed by a National Language Advisor. The NFLCC would be on the level of the National Security Council with cabinet and cabinet-level heads as member to include the Secretaries of Education, Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence. The Advisor, appointed by the President, would oversee, coordinate, and implement “national security and language education initiatives.” The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. No further action has been taken.\(^3\)

**U.S.-China Language Engagement Act.** Representative Susan Davis (D-CA) introduced this bill in May 2009. It has seven co-sponsors. The bill would create a program in the Department of Education that would award competitive three-year grants to local educational agencies for “innovative model programs establishing, improving, or expanding Chinese language and cultural studies in elementary and secondary schools.” It was referred to the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education. No further action has been taken.\(^4\)

**U.S. and the World Education Act.** Representative Loretta Sanchez introduced this bill in July 2009. It has 1 co-sponsor. The bill includes a federal competitive grant program to promote international education in elementary and secondary schools. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor. No further action has been taken.\(^5\)

**Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act:** The House version of the bill contains report language directing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the services’ language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness training of the general purpose forces, particularly for ground components. This would be a follow-on to the June 2009 report, “DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Proficiency.” GAO is in the initial stages of this study, having sent the Department a notification letter and having set the date for their initial meeting.\(^6\)

---

\(^1\) The senior military colleges are: North Georgia College & State University, Norwich University, Texas A&M University, The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.


Excellence and Innovation in Language Learning Act. Representative Rush Holt introduced this bill in July 2010. It has two co-sponsors. The bill would authorize $400 million for teaching foreign languages to elementary and secondary students. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor. No further action has been taken.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{7} U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, \textit{Excellence and Innovation in Language Learning Act}, 111\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2nd Sess., 2010, H.R. 6036.