# H.R. 8800—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

# SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

# SUMMARY OF BILL LANGUAGE

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## DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

# TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

## LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

### SUBTITLE A—SPACE ACTIVITIES

#### Sec. 1602—Reorganization of Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise

This section would repeal the requirement for the Council on Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Enterprise, and instead require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to designate a single official from the Department of Defense as the principal official with responsibility for the oversight of the Department of Defense position, navigation, and timing enterprise to include alternative position, navigation, and timing efforts and report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The committee recognizes that despite previous efforts to improve oversight and execution of the PNT programs of the department, there remains a concerning lack of clear direction and sense of urgency to address existing gaps and plan for both near term and future requirements. Position, navigation, and timing is foundational to everything the joint force does, but despite this it continues to be plagued by a lack of senior oversight. User equipment is consistently out of phase with the space segment because of lack of prioritization by the services. The Next-Generation Operational Control System (OCX), slated to be the new ground system, was recently canceled after decades of mismanagement by both the program office and the contractor. The space segment has only recently gotten past a backlog of unlaunched vehicles due to launch vehicle delays.

The committee also notes that there has been no updated strategy from the Department of Defense on how it plans to posture the PNT enterprise to deal with increasing threats to the space segments and exponential increase in jamming experienced by the joint force. There are many proposals to include multi-orbit constellations, commercial services, and non-space based alternative PNT solutions that the committee believes should be considered.

The committee notes that the Department needs a single individual who can be responsible and accountable for this vital mission. This section would also require the lead official to certify annually that the service budgets are fully funding user equipment and ground control systems for the PNT enterprise.

#### Sec. 1603—Space Launch Support Services and Alternative Launch Procurement Process

This section would extend the indirect launch cost caps for 5 years and would make changes to the alternative launch procurement notifications.

Sec. 1604—Spaceport of the Future Initiative

This section would require the Department of the Air Force to report back to the committee the status of any policy recommendations made previously, require the creation a single program to manage the Spaceport of the Future Initiative that reports to the Program Acquisition Executive for Space Access, and requires with the budget each year a list of prioritized investments for the Spaceport of the Future infrastructure efforts.

SUBTITLE C—NUCLEAR FORCES

Sec. 1633—Quadrennial Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and Control System

This section would amend section 492a of title 10, United States Code, to require a report on modernizing the nuclear enterprise be submitted quadrennially.

Sec. 1637—Space Launch Complex 46

This section would prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from taking any action to reduce or modify the United States Navy's use of Space Launch Complex 46 until the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense committees a notification that certain conditions have been met, consistent with the Memorandum of Agreement between the Director, Strategic Systems Programs and the United States Space Force for the development and acceptance of replacement facilities for Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46), dated April 2, 2026.

SUBTITLE D—MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Sec. 1641—Next-Generation Integrated Air and Missile Defense System Munitions Strategy

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit to a plan to the congressional defense committees for the acquisition of munitions for the next-generation air and missile defense architecture being developed pursuant to Executive Order 14186 (90 Fed. Reg. 8767).

# DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

# TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

## LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

### SUBTITLE B—PROGRAM AUTHORIZATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

#### Sec. 3112—Modification To Implementation of Programs for Acceleration of Replacement of Cesium Blood Irradiation Sources

This section would amend section 6156 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project to pay the full cost of replacing blood irradiation devices covered by the program.

#### Sec. 3113—Other Transaction Authority

This section would authorize the Administrator for Nuclear Security to utilize other transaction authority available elsewhere in title 10, United States Code.

#### Sec. 3114—Extension of Alternative Personnel System of the National Nuclear Security Administration

This section would extend the National Nuclear Security Administration's current Pay Banding and Performance-Based Pay Adjustment Demonstration Project in use since 2007, and codify the project as section 3242 of title 50, United States Code.

#### Sec. 3115—Deadline for Commencement of High Explosive Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility

This section would amend section 3127 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) to accelerate the deadline for commencement of operations for Project 21-D-510, the High Explosive Synthesis, Formulation, and Production facility.

### SUBTITLE C—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

#### Sec. 3121—Technical and Conforming Amendments Relating to Codification of Atomic Energy Defense Provisions

This section would make certain technical corrections to chapter XX of title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 3122—Modification of Submission Deadline for Certain Selected Acquisition Reports

This section would amend section 6125 of title 10, United States Code, to require certain acquisition reports be submitted within 30 days after the date on which the President transmits the budget to Congress.

# BILL LANGUAGE

**SEC. 1602.[Log 84988] REORGANIZATION OF OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING ENTERPRISE.**

(a) REPEAL.—Section 2279b of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

(b) DESIGNATION OF OFFICIAL.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Chapter 135 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2279 the following new section:

**"§ 2279a. Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise**

''(a) DESIGNATION.—(1) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall designate a single official of the Department of Defense (other than the Chief Information Officer of the Department) as the principal official of the Department with responsibility for the oversight of the Department of Defense positioning, navigation, and timing enterprise.

''(2) The official designated under paragraph (1) shall report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense positioning, navigation, and timing enterprise (in-

cluding alternative positioning, navigation, and timing efforts of the Department).

''(b) DUTIES.—The Secretary—

''(1) shall assign to the official designated under subsection (a)(1)—

''(A) any duty the Secretary determines appropriate from among the duties carried out by the former Council on Oversight of the Department of Defense Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise as of January 1, 2026; and

''(B) any other duty the Secretary determines appropriate; and

''(2) may delegate to other officials of the Department any such duty described in paragraph (1)(A) not assigned to the official designated under subsection (a).

''(c) ANNUAL CERTIFICATIONS; LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—(1) At the same time as the President submits to Congress the annual budget request under section 1105 of title 31 for a fiscal year, the official designated under subsection (a)(1) shall submit to the congressional defense committees, with respect to each military department—

''(A) a certification that such budget request would fully fund the user equipment and ground control systems of the Department of Defense positioning, navigation, and timing enterprise; or

''(B) a notice that such budget request would not fully fund such user equipment and ground control systems.

''(2) Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2028 or any fiscal year thereafter for the travel expenses of the Secretary of a military department, not more than 90 percent may be obligated or expended during a fiscal year covered by a budget request for which the official designated under subsection (a)(1) did not make a certification under paragraph (1)(A).''.

(2) TIMING.—The Secretary of Defense shall designate the official under section 2279a of title 10, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**SEC. 1603.[Log 85399] SPACE LAUNCH SUPPORT SERVICES AND ALTERNATIVE LAUNCH PROCUREMENT PROCESS.**

(a) EXTENSION OF TRANSITION LIMITATIONS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—Section 2276a(e) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ''fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026'' and inserting ''fiscal years 2024 through 2031''.

(b) NOTIFICATION OF USE OF ALTERNATIVE LAUNCH PROCUREMENT.—Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 10 U.S.C. 2276 note) is amended—

(1) by striking ''the Secretary of Defense'' both places it appears and inserting ''the portfolio acquisition executive of the Space Force'';

(2) by striking ''the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office'' and inserting ''the Director of the Office of Space Launch of the National Reconnaissance Office''; and

(3) by striking ''the Director of National Intelligence'' and inserting ''the Director of the Office of Space Launch''.

**SEC. 1604.[Log 84986] SPACEPORT OF THE FUTURE INITIATIVE.**

(a) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—Section 1608 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60; 139 Stat. 1177) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(c) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

''(1) SINGLE PROGRAM.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall carry out the Spaceport of the Future initiative as a single program of the Space Force overseen by the portfolio acquisition executive for space access pursuant to section 1732 of title 10, United States Code.

''(2) PRIORITIZED INVESTMENTS.—As a part of the defense budget materials (as defined in section 239 of title 10, United States Code) for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2031, the portfolio acquisition executive for space access shall submit to the congressional defense committees a list of prioritized investments required for infrastructure efforts under the Spaceport of the Future initiative.''.

(b) ANNUAL UPDATES.—Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of such section is amended to read as follows:

''(3) ANNUAL UPDATES.—Not later than March 31 of each of 2027 through 2031, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees

an update on the Spaceport of the Future initiative, including with respect to—

"(A) project status;

"(B) estimated completion dates;

"(C) total costs;

"(D) any updated assessments of funding or infrastructure needs; and

"(E) the status of any policy recommendations described in paragraph (2)(D).".

**SEC. 1633.[Log 85705] QUADRENNIAL REPORT ON THE PLAN FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM.**

Section 492a of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:

(1) In the heading, by striking ''**Biennial**'' and inserting ''**Quadrennial**''.

(2) In subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ''2029'' and inserting ''2027, and on a quadrennial basis thereafter,''; and

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''enhance the safety, security, and reliability of'' and inserting ''sustain and modernize''; and

(ii) in subparagraph (F)—

(I) by striking ''10-year period following the date of the report'' and inserting ''period covered by the future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of this title''; and

(II) by striking ''such 10-year period'' and inserting ''such period''.

**SEC. 1637.[Log 85642] SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX 46.**

The Secretary of the Air Force may not take any action to reduce or modify the exclusive and priority use of Space Launch Complex 46 by the Secretary of the Navy until the date on which the Chief of Naval Operations submits to the congressional defense committees a notification that—

(1) the test capabilities and infrastructure at Space Launch Complex 51 are equivalent to such capabilities and infrastructure at Space Launch Complex 46 with respect to meeting the mission needs of the Secretary of the Navy; and

(2) the Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs has issued a final acceptance and certification of the facilities at Space Launch Complex 51.

# Subtitle D—Missile Defense Programs

**SEC. 1641.[Log 85624] NEXT-GENERATION INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM MUNITIONS STRATEGY.**

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an alternative plan with respect to procuring munitions for the next-generation air and missile defense architecture being developed pursuant to Executive Order 14186 (90 Fed. Reg. 8767).

(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A summary of the munitions and associated procurement quantities necessary to meet mission objectives by 2028.

(2) An assessment of current and near-term planned production capacity for each munition.

(3) An overview of alternative munitions with potential air and missile defense capability, including the production capacity of each such munition.

(4) An evaluation of the feasibility of incorporating alternative munitions into the next-genera-

tion air and missile defense architecture and associated effects on operational performance.

**SEC. 3112.[Log 85702] MODIFICATION TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS FOR ACCELERATION OF REPLACEMENT OF CESIUM BLOOD IRRADIATION SOURCES.**

Section 6156(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ''50 percent of the per-device cost'' and inserting ''100 percent of the cost''.

**SEC. 3113.[Log 85625] OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITY.**

Chapter 608 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 6328 the following new section:

**"§ 6329. Other transaction authority**

''(a) AUTHORITY.—In addition to other acquisition authorities, the Administrator may exercise the acquisition authorities referred to in sections 4021 and 4022 of this title to enhance the mission effectiveness of the Administration or to improve the nuclear security enterprise, subject to the provisions of this section.

''(b) ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY.—In carrying out this section, section 4021 and 4022 of this title shall be applied as follows:

''(1) By substituting 'Administrator' for 'Secretary of Defense', 'Secretary', and 'covered official'.

''(2) By substituting 'Administration' for 'Department of Defense' and 'agency'.

''(3) By substituting 'nontraditional government contractor' for 'nontraditional defense contractor'.

''(4) By substituting 'construction' for 'military construction'.

''(c) DELEGATION.—The Administrator may not delegate the authority under subsection (a) to any official other than the Principal Deputy Administrator.

''(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) Not later than March 1, 2028, and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the use by the Administrator of the authority under subsection (a).

''(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall contain the following:

''(A) The number of transactions entered into using the authority under subsection (a).

''(B) The participants to each such transaction.

''(C) The purpose of each such the transaction.

''(D) The amount of each such transaction.

''(E) Any recommendations by the Administrator for legislative changes to improve the use of such authority.''.

**SEC. 3114.[Log 85703] EXTENSION OF ALTERNATIVE PERSONNEL SYSTEM OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.**

Section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 50 U.S.C. 2441 note prec.) is—

(1) amended in subsection (a)(1), by striking ''until the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ''through December 31, 2032'';

(2) transferred to subtitle C of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2441 et seq.);

(3) inserted after section 3241A of such Act; and

(4) redesignated as section 3242.

**SEC. 3115.[Log 85627] DEADLINE FOR COMMENCEMENT OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE SYNTHESIS, FORMULATION, AND PRODUCTION FACILITY.**

Section 3127(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31; 137 Stat. 794) is amended by striking ''2034'' and inserting ''2032''.

# Subtitle C—Reports and Other Matters

**SEC. 3121.[Log 85622] TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO CODIFICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROVISIONS.**

(a) SECTION 6114.—Section 6114 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(9), by striking ''summary or''; and

(2) in subsection (d)(1)(A)—

(A) in clause (i), by striking ''subsection (d)(4)(A)(i)'' and inserting ''subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)''; and

(B) in clause (ii)—

(i) by striking ''subsection (d)(4)'' and inserting ''subsection (c)(4)''; and

(ii) by striking ''subparagraph (B)'' and inserting ''subparagraph (C)''.

(b) SECTION 6125.—Section 6125 of such title is amended in the section heading by striking ''**acquisition reports**'' and inserting ''**Acquisition Reports**''.

(c) SECTION 6171.—Section 6171 of such title is amended in the section heading by striking ''**environ-**

**mental cleanup account**'' and inserting ''**Environmental Cleanup Account**''.

(d) SECTION 6180.—Section 6180(c) of such title is amended to read as follows:

''(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall act through the Deputy Secretary of Energy, in coordination with such other officials of the Department as the Deputy Secretary determines appropriate.''.

(e) SECTION 6222.—Section 6222(c)(2)(D) of such title is amended by inserting ''pursuant'' after ''completed''.

(f) SECTION 6226.—Section 6226 of such title is amended in the section heading by striking ''**Annual**'' and inserting ''**Biennial**''.

(g) SECTION 6272.—Section 6272(a) of such title is amended by striking ''sections 5791 and 5792'' and inserting ''sections 6281 and 6282''.

(h) SECTION 6322.—Section 6322 of such title is amended in the section heading by striking ''**and report**''.

(i) SECTION 6332.—Section 6332 of such title is amended—

(1) by striking ''Of the funds'' and inserting ''(a) AUTHORITY.—Of the funds'';

(2) by striking ''in this Act or subsequent'' and inserting ''in any'';

(3) by striking ''Acts,'' and inserting ''Act,'';

(4) by striking '': *Provided,* That the'' and inserting ''. The'';

(5) by striking '': *Provided further,* That'' and inserting a period; and

(6) by striking ''notwithstanding Department'' and inserting the following:

''(b) ELIGIBILITY.—Notwithstanding Department''.

(j) SECTION 6334.—Section 6334 of such title is amended—

(1) by striking ''Of the funds'' and inserting ''Beginning October 1, 2015, of the funds'';

(2) by striking ''this or any subsequent Act'' and inserting ''any Act''; and

(3) by striking the colon and all that follows through ''2015''.

(k) SECTION 6353.—Section 6353 of such title is amended—

(1) by striking ''The Administrator may'' and inserting ''(a) AUTHORITY.—The Administrator may'';

(2) by striking '': *Provided,*'' and inserting a period;

(3) by striking ''That of the amount'' and inserting the following:

''(b) AMOUNTS.—Of the amount'';

(4) in subsection (b), as so designated—

(A) by striking ''these activities'' and inserting ''the activities under subsection (a)'';

(B) by striking '': *Provided further,* That'' and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking ''for purposes of this section,'' and inserting the following:

''(c) COVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITY DEFINED.—In this section:''; and

(5) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c), as so designated, by striking ''Nevada Test Site'' and inserting ''Nevada National Security Site''.

**SEC. 3122.[Log 85700] MODIFICATION OF SUBMISSION DEADLINE FOR CERTAIN SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS.**

Section 6125(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ''At the end of the first quarter of each fiscal year'' and inserting ''Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President transmits to Congress the budget for the following fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31''.

# DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE

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# DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

## TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

### ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

#### SPACE ACTIVITIES

##### AI-Equipped Secure Satellite Communications for Missile Defense

The committee notes that the Department's efforts to rapidly deploy a comprehensive homeland missile defense architecture, in addition to the expanding and integrating regional missile defense systems, will require real-time integration of data from multiple sensor types to generate a clear and accurate operational picture. Advanced missile defense terminals must rapidly transmit precise missile track data to operational units with minimal latency to support lethal engagements. Direct delivery of tactical data from space requires time-sensitive decision-making, secure on-orbit encryption of tactical data links, and resilient space-based processing capabilities. The committee notes that routing time-sensitive missile tracking data through ground stations for downlink and uplink processing may introduce latency that could affect interceptor timelines in certain operational scenarios.

Therefore, the committee directs the Direct Reporting Manager for Golden Dome, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2027, on the feasibility, operational utility, and integration considerations associated with procuring and integrating commercially available low earth orbit space terminals into future missile defense architectures. The briefing should include the following information:

(1) an examination of the latency implications associated with routing time-sensitive missile tracking data through ground stations for downlink and uplink processing, including an assessment of whether such latency could affect interceptor timelines or operational effectiveness in high-tempo engagements;

(2) an assessment of commercially available terminals capable of combining electronic warfare for terrestrial and space domain awareness, artificial intelligence-enabled sensor fusion, and secure tactical communications using software-defined radio and programmable on-orbit cryptography;

(3) an evaluation of the ability of such terminals to provide target detection, identification, geolocation, sensor fusion, and target tracking consistent with relevant low-earth orbit mission requirements;

(4) an analysis of the latency, resiliency, cybersecurity, and encryption considerations associated with direct space-based tactical data delivery compared to ground station-dependent architectures; and

(5) an assessment of acquisition pathways, testing requirements, cost considerations, and timelines associated with integrating such capabilities into the Golden Dome future missile defense architectures.

Commercial Satellite Buses in Proliferated Space Architectures

The committee notes the importance of proliferated space architectures for enabling resilience and mission assurance for national security needs derived from space-based capabilities. Further, the committee believes the Space Force should fully leverage the expansion of the commercial satellite bus market to continue proliferation across low-earth, medium-earth, and geosynchronous-earth orbits to increase resiliency of future architectures.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than May 1, 2027, on how the core mission areas of the United States Space Force would benefit from leveraging advancements in commercial providers across all orbital regimes through the acquisition of productized, domestically produced commercial satellite buses. The briefing should include:

(1) an assessment of how the Space Force is leveraging the commercial satellite bus marketplace to support its plans to develop and deploy proliferated space architectures across all mission areas and orbital regimes in the current program of record;

(2) an assessment of areas where commercial satellite bus providers can address future requirements of the Space Force;

(3) an assessment of the current commercial industrial base capacity, by orbit, to support Space Force proliferated architectures; and

(4) estimated cost and schedule savings of transitioning to acquisition strategies that fully take advantage of commercial satellite bus procurement compared to the Government being responsible for non-recurring engineering costs of developing mission-unique satellite buses.

Ensuring Hybrid Space Architectures Remain Open to Trusted Allied Vendors

The committee notes the importance of the Hybrid Space Architecture (HSA) program, which provides global, ubiquitous, and secure internet connectivity throughout the space domain for commercial, civil, and military users, including international allies and partners. The committee further notes that trusted international allies and partners possess mature commercial space capabilities that could contribute to a resilient hybrid space architecture. The committee encourages acquisition and governance approaches that facilitate participation by trusted allied vendors in HSAs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 31, 2027, on how the Department of Defense is ensuring that

HSA efforts remain open to participation by trusted allied vendors. The briefing should include:

(1) a description of current policies or acquisition approaches governing industry participation in HSA efforts, including but not limited to, the Defense Innovation Unit's HSA Prototype and Pilot program(s);

(2) an assessment of how trusted allied commercial vendors are being considered or incorporated into hybrid space architecture development and demonstration activities;

(3) an identification of any statutory, policy, or security barriers that limit participation by trusted allied vendors; and

(4) an explanation of how the Department plans to ensure interoperability, security, and coalition integration while maintaining an open and competitive HSA.

Hybrid Satellite Communications

The committee recognizes the increasing strategic, operational, and tactical importance of resilient satellite communications (SATCOM) for command and control and situational awareness across all domains to enable successful U.S. warfighting and lethality. Commercial SATCOM capabilities have expanded significantly across multiple orbital regimes (low-earth, medium-earth, and geosynchronous orbits) and frequency bands, creating opportunities for enhanced resilience through diversified procurement approaches. To benefit from this capability and capacity, the committee encourages the Department to prioritize innovative ways to procure commercial SATCOM as a service and deploy hybrid multi-band terminals.

The committee supports acquisition approaches that provide access to multiple commercial SATCOM capabilities across all orbital regimes and frequency bands by leveraging unified vendor-agnostic integrators capable of managing end-to-end service delivery.

The committee believes the department should, whenever possible, support the imperative of building out SATCOM architectures with the long-term goal of multi-vendor resiliency. SATCOM modernization is being contemplated across the Department, and the committee believes unique platform or mission constraints should not drive stovepiped communications architectures.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the service secretaries, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on acquisition approaches for commercial SATCOM and a Hybrid SATCOM implementation strategy. The briefing should include:

(1) an assessment of the operational benefits of communications path diversity using multi-vendor capable commercial integrators that combine multi-orbit, multi-bandwidth SATCOM services with available terrestrial-based networks and private network gateways for no-fail missions such as VIP transport, nuclear

command, control, and communications aircraft, and other critical national security requirements;

(2) a description of the potential cost savings of using multi-vendor capable integrators as opposed to singular contractual vehicles for specific frequency bands or vendors that provide a single SATCOM pathway;

(3) the current Hybrid SATCOM acquisition and implementation strategy;

(4) an inventory of platforms being considered for SATCOM modernization and estimated timelines for completing fielding of new SATCOM capabilities by service;

(5) the readiness of the defense industrial base to produce interoperable terminals and antennas to support a hybrid architecture; and

(6) how each service intends to prioritize multi-constellation, multi-band, multi-orbit solutions over single-vendor solutions.

## Improvements to the Firefly Algorithm

The committee continues to support the Department of Defense's contributions to the National Guard-staffed FireGuard program to detect and monitor wildfires in coordination with the United States Forest Service and other entities. The committee notes the support from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) on the FireFly algorithm and work of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) on the FireHawk program, which ingest data from multiple sources, are integral in assisting firefighters in characterizing the size, scope, and intensity of active wildfires and for purposes of evacuation notifications and to support to civil organizations. The committee notes that the commercial sector has been developing advanced tools and techniques that could be beneficial to both the FireFly algorithm and more broadly the FireGuard program. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of NGA, in coordination with the Commander of NASIC, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2027, on options to improve the FireFly algorithm, and opportunities to incorporate commercial techniques to improve wildfire notification, characterization, and tracking in support of the FireGuard program.

## In-Space Mobility Industrial Base and Supply Chain

The committee notes the importance of in-space mobility to national security space missions, including maneuver, orbital logistics, and operational flexibility in contested environments. The committee notes that certain propulsion and fluid-control components essential to in-space mobility rely on constrained industrial capacity, including limited-source suppliers, foreign dependencies, or insufficient surge capability. These factors may affect the Department of Defense’s ability to field and sustain space systems capable of maneuver, repositioning, refueling, servicing, and reconstitution.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on supply chain risks associated with in-space mobility capabilities. The briefing should include the following:

(1) an assessment of the current domestic and allied industrial base for propulsion components, including thrusters, valves, and other components required for in-space mobility;

(2) identification of supply chain vulnerabilities, including foreign dependencies, limited-source suppliers, sub-tier fragility, and barriers to scaling production;

(3) an evaluation of how these vulnerabilities affect the Department of Defense's ability to field resilient and maneuverable space architectures on mission-relevant timelines;

(4) an assessment of ongoing Department of Defense efforts to mitigate such risks, including industrial base investments, qualification of alternate suppliers, and use of commercial and non-traditional vendors; and

(5) recommendations for acquisition and industrial base actions within existing authorities to strengthen domestic production and reduce foreign dependence.

## National Security Space Launch Lane One

The committee believes that the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 approach, as stated by Space Systems Command, is to provide assured access to space for the integrated space architecture at affordable prices and to lower the costs of national security space launches through competition between multiple commercial providers.

The committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to assess NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 acquisitions and missions, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, with commercial space industry representatives, as appropriate. The committee encourages review of the cost, schedule, performance, and impacts to mission assurance of each awarded mission in NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 to date and the impact competition has had in maximizing commercial bids, developing new entrants, and ensuring corporate diversity. Further, the committee believes there could be cost and schedule efficiencies gained through NSSL Lane 1 given excess capacity in launch vehicles.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than June 1, 2027, on how NSSL Phase 3

could fully take advantage of commercial advancement in launch vehicles; including an assessment on:

(1) the potential use of excess launch vehicle capacity to integrate additional payloads (government or commercial), whereas the government is not the integrator, and such payloads do not adversely impact the national security mission;

(2) permitting increased mission assurance levels to compensate for launching a higher quantity of payloads per launch;

(3) consideration for pricing per payload rather than by the price of a launch vehicle;

(4) offering task orders that allow for the aggregation of payloads being delivered to similar orbital planes;

(5) removing the requirement to adhere to the NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2 Standard Interface Specification for Lane 1 launches;

(6) removing the requirement for any specific launch location to take advantage of a best value solution proposed by the launch service provider; and

(7) analysis of alternative solutions that may be applicable for future awards, including with respect to strategic, operational, and financial considerations.

Nuclear Fission Power to Enable Dynamic Space Operations

The committee recognizes the potential high-power nuclear fission could have on future Space Force requirements for sustained in-space operations, and as the Department's reliance on maneuverable and power-intensive systems increases, enduring and resilient power generation will be essential to support offensive and defensive space control, long-duration mobility, high-duty-cycle sensing, secure communications, and autonomous operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Space Operations, to provide an unclassified briefing, with a classified annex, if necessary, to the House Committee on Armed Services Committee not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's plan to develop and field operational nuclear fission power systems for in-space operations. The briefing should include:

(1) operational nuclear fission power requirements across anticipated Department of Defense missions, to include in low-earth orbit, mid-earth orbit, geosynchronous orbit, cislunar space, and other deep-space environments;

(2) an assessment of barriers and capability gaps that have prevented previous nuclear fission efforts from conducting in-space deployment and testing;

(3) an overview of previous congressional funding and Department expenditures related to in-space nuclear fission capabilities since fiscal year 2017;

(4) a proposed architecture and acquisition pathway for operational in-space nuclear fission power capabilities, including technology maturation milestones, test and evaluation plans, and integration with Space Force programs;

(5) a funding and resource plan identifying need investments through fiscal year 2035, including opportunities for interagency and commercial collaboration, to deliver an in-space nuclear fission power capability; and

(6) a risk assessment, and mitigation options, for deploying in-space nuclear fission power capabilities.

Operational Test and Training Infrastructure Use of Commercial Space Capabilities

The committee recognizes the growing importance of realistic, on-orbit training environments to prepare Space Force Guardians to recognize, characterize, and respond to increasingly complex and aggressive behaviors in space. The committee notes that commercially operated on-orbit systems now provide mature capabilities that could support operational test, training, and threat-representative environments in ways that are not achievable through ground-based or purely simulated systems alone.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, in coordination with the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Infrastructure, to examine leveraging commercially available on-orbit assets to the maximum extent practicable to support training, test, and exercise activities. Such capabilities may include, but are not limited to, rendezvous and proximity operations, inspection, maneuver characterization, space domain awareness, and other activities relevant to contested space operations.

To enable rapid integration, the committee encourages the Space Force to utilize flexible contracting and funding mechanisms, including other transaction authorities, commercial solutions openings, broad agency announcements, and reimbursable agreements, as appropriate, to engage commercial providers and reduce barriers to entry for non-traditional performers. The committee further directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration and the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Infrastructure, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than June 30, 2027, on the following:

(1) a plan to integrate commercial on-orbit capabilities into Operational Test and Training Infrastructure-supported training and test activities;

(2) the funding and contracting mechanisms to be used to procure such capabilities;

(3) a proposed timeline for initial operational use, with the goal of incorporating commercial assets into Guardian training events within 12 to 24 months; and

(4) any policy, classification, or authorities barriers that may inhibit the use of commercial systems for training purposes.

Proliferated Ground Architectures for Space

The committee notes the significant priority and resources dedicated to increasing the effectiveness and resilience of space-based capabilities by leveraging commercial technologies and business models from the United States' industrial base. While the committee has long been a proponent of these efforts, the committee notes that the priority has been given to space-based capabilities and comparable priority and resources have not been dedicated to implementing a ground architecture that also leverages commercial advances in technology and business models, such as phased array antennas and proliferated satellite ground services being developed by the industrial base. Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than May 1, 2027, on the benefits of acquiring commercial ground services to support current and emerging national security space requirements. The briefing should include the following:

(1) an assessment of the operational risk to missions relying on legacy, government-operated ground segment infrastructure, including vulnerabilities arising from a lack of resilience and capacity;

(2) a comprehensive assessment of current and future requirements for ground segment capability and capacity across the national security space enterprise, including frequency bands, geographies, orbits, and other relevant parameters;

(3) an evaluation of the potential benefits of leveraging commercial ground architectures to mitigate the identified risks and address the capacity and capability requirements laid out in (1) and (2); and

(4) a plan for leveraging commercial ground architectures to enhance resilience and effectiveness across the space enterprise, including long-term funding and acquisition strategies such as other transaction authorities, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, working capital funds, and other agile, commercial-friendly purchasing mechanisms.

## U.S. Space Force Warfare Center

In the committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. Rept. 119-39), the Senate Committee on Armed Services required a briefing on Space Force education and the feasibility of establishing a dedicated Center for Orbital Warfare. The committee continues to recognize the importance of increasing Guardian expertise in mission areas, including orbital warfare, electronic warfare, and cyberspace warfare, in order to provide integrated tactical and operational capabilities to joint warfighters.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 31, 2027, on the potential stand-up of a U.S. Space Force (USSF) Warfare Center. The briefing should include:

(1) analysis of existing warfare center functions within USSF and where they are currently located;

(2) analysis on how a USSF Warfare Center could "provide integrated tactical and operational solutions to warfighters, MAJCOMs and COCOMs" based on the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center's method of "collaborate and integrate to dominate";

(3) need for experienced operators based on existing force design of similar organizations, such as the Air Force Warfare Center and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, resulting in the need for USSF end strength increases;

(4) a cost-benefit analysis of creating a dedicated Warfare Center as opposed to including these duties in an established Space Force Delta; and

(5) capability and capacity to operate space weapon systems (live or virtually) in support of warfare center missions and associated costs.

### Very Low Earth Orbit Resilience

The committee is encouraged by the U.S. Space Force (USSF) focus on advancing very low earth orbit (VLEO) capabilities as a critical enabler of space domain awareness, resilience, and responsive operations. The committee is concerned that U.S. space assets operating in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) could face a rapidly evolving threat environment, including kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons, electronic warfare, nuclear weapons, and growing orbital debris. The committee recognizes that resilient VLEO constellations—enabled by advances in propulsion, materials, autonomous orbital management, and power systems—have the potential to provide enhanced responsiveness, higher-resolution sensing, orbital diversity, and deterrence against debris-generating and nuclear radiation threats through inherent survivability and rapid reconstitution, improving continuity of operations under contested conditions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the inclusion of VLEO satellites into USSF architectures. The briefing should include the following:

(1) an assessment of the physical, radiological, electromagnetic pulse, and debris-related effects of a nuclear detonation in space on satellites operating in VLEO compared to satellites operating in traditional LEO regimes;

(2) an evaluation of the degree to which orbital altitude, atmospheric characteristics, orbital decay timelines, and natural debris-clearing effects influence post-detonation survivability and reconstitution timelines;

(3) an analysis of the resilience advantages and limitations associated with VLEO architectures in the context of nuclear radiation belts, electromagnetic pulse effects, and debris-generating events; and

(4) a description of how VLEO survivability considerations are incorporated into broader space resilience and integrated defense architecture planning.

## NUCLEAR FORCES

## Addressing Strategic System Subsystem and Component Test Needs with Commercial Reentry Flight Tests

The committee continues to support the inclusion of a wide range of commercial space capabilities to support critical Department of Defense needs, and notes the strategic flight test bed program that supports strategic systems' component development and maturation established pursuant to section 1645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).

The committee notes further opportunities exist to leverage commercial capabilities to meet the Department's development and testing needs in a cost-effective manner. To that end, the committee encourages the Director of the Navy's Strategic System Program (SSP) office to leverage commercial capabilities during the technology maturation, risk reduction, advanced component development, and prototyping phases for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) re-entry vehicles, to include the assessment of future upgrades. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of SSP to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the plans to integrate commercial solutions to support the advancement of technologies considered in the Department of the Navy's strategic systems reentry technology roadmap. The briefing should include:

(1) a summary of activities carried out in connection with the authorities provided in section 1645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) and section 1625 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159);

(2) a description of the Department of the Navy SLBM component and subscale test needs, to include thermal protection system technologies within the next five years;

(3) commercial space capabilities available to support SLBM component and sub-scale test needs; and

(4) recommended funding levels necessary to fulfill the test needs identified in (1).

## Department of Defense Efforts for Nuclear Risk Reduction with China

The committee is concerned with the rapid expansion of China's nuclear forces and its potential implications, including those for future nuclear risk reduction measures. As China's strategic capabilities evolve, the risk of miscalculation, misinterpretation, or accidental escalation increases, posing a significant challenge to national security. The committee recognizes that the Administration has made clear its desire for future arms control and risk reduction agreements addressing nuclear peer arsenals, including China and Russia.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department of Defense's activities in support of this objective, including:

(1) a description of how the Department of Defense is supporting the interagency process with respect China strategic engagement;

(2) a description of the Department's activities in support of arms control and risk reduction objectives, including recommendations, if any, provided by the Department on key attributes of a future multi-lateral arms control agreement that would contribute to nuclear risk reduction and multi-lateral strategic stability;

(3) an analysis of the military implications of potential transparency and verification measures, such as launch notifications or data exchanges, that could be implemented multi-laterally to build mutual confidence without compromising operational security; and

(4) an assessment of current hotline capabilities and protocols between the Department of Defense and the People's Liberation Army, including recommendations for improving real-time communication during strategic tensions.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

### Structural Health of Launch Facilities

The committee understands that commercial software and robotic inspection technology can provide enhanced, detailed, digitally encoded, localized time-series data to measure the material health of infrastructure, and that such technology can provide significant efficiency benefits when deployed early in construction to document baseline data. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to consider leveraging these technologies and lessons learned from associated best practices in the private sector to the maximum extent practicable.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Critical Major Weapon Systems, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of leveraging robotic inspection technology and associated commercial software tools for material health inspection of Minuteman III ballistic missile infrastructure.

## MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

### Excess Radars for Homeland Defense

The committee recognizes the need for improved domain awareness for defense of the homeland from air and missile threats and notes the potential use of already-procured sensors for this purpose. Specifically, the committee is aware of radar arrays awaiting installation that may have the potential to be utilized in support of homeland air and missile defense needs. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and suitability of utilizing stored and undeployed radar assets to enhance integrated air and missile defense of the homeland. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) an inventory of radars and related assets awaiting installation, as well as planned deliveries over the next five years;

(2) an analysis of the suitability of systems identified in paragraph (1) in a ground-based configuration to meet sensing requirements related to integrated air and missile defense;

(3) consideration of existing sustainment and logistics networks, electronic protection capabilities, spectrum co-existence, non-interference with commercial aircraft, integration with existing effectors, and the relevance of these factors for accelerated fielding of a ground-based configuration; and

(4) the associated funding and schedule required to address impacts to existing programs of record as a result of repurposing any radars for integrated air and missile defense of the homeland.

Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor

The committee is concerned that the Army has not adequately defined the requirements for spares for Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radars to ensure the system stays fully mission capable to meet requirements for air defense of forward-deployed forces. This may risk operational availability, which would undermine the significant investment made in LTAMDS.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the sustainment and sparing plan for LTAMDS. The briefing should also include the following:

(1) a system sustainment strategy overview and support concept that details the sustainment needs of the LTAMDS radar for warfighter requirements;

(2) a maintenance planning framework that ensures long-term readiness of deployed systems;

(3) an integrated approach that supports initial and recurring spares and repairs;

(4) a plan for sustaining engineering services;

(5) identification of near-term mission support gaps and mitigation recommendations related to currently deployed systems; and

(6) any additional considerations the Secretary deems necessary.

Missile Defense Agency Digital Modernization

The committee notes the budget request for fiscal year 2027 for the Missile Defense Agency includes significant investment in cybersecurity, digital modernization, artificial intelligence and associated technologies as part of the Missile Defense System – Next (MDS-Next) initiative. While the committee recognizes the need for modernization and the adoption of new and innovative digital technologies, the committee notes such a process must be appropriately time-phased as part of a long-term deliberate strategy to obtain enduring results and limit mission disruption. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the

Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than September 30, 2026, on the digital modernization elements included in the MDS-Next initiative. The briefing shall include:

(1) the current gaps in cybersecurity, digital modernization, and implementation of artificial intelligence the initiative intends to address;

(2) a detailed description of the entire project, to include infrastructure needed to support the future MDS-Next initiative; and

(3) total funding estimates and the timeline needed to complete implementation of projects associated with the initiative.

## Patriot Interceptor Procurement

The committee supports the Army's continued investment in Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) to address the spectrum of current and future aerial threats and notes the ongoing efforts to address munitions production capacity within the domestic defense industrial base. The committee further notes that the Army's procurement of Patriot interceptors in recent budget requests has been for the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE), and not for the PAC-2 Guided Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T), which has complemented the MSE in real-world engagements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on missile inventories for Patriot. The briefing should include:

(1) an overview of the capabilities and limitations of both PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors against current and emerging theater ballistic missile and air breathing threats;

(2) current stockpile levels for PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors, planned deliveries of both types across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and an assessment of inventory sufficiency relative to approved force growth, and remaining shelf-life;

(3) a description of the Army's Total Munitions Requirement for the Patriot family of interceptors; and

(4) any recommendations to address shortfalls in inventory, to include additional procurement of PAC-2 interceptors, modernization of the PAC-2 missile, and development of a new interceptor for the Patriot system.

## TEAMS Next Transition

The committee understands that the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) TEAMS Next program has successfully executed a system-of-systems engineering, integration, and global testing approach that underpins and enables the current worldwide Missile Defense System (MDS). The committee is aware that MDA plans to compete for future engineering, facility, test, acquisition, and logistics work under the MDA Agile Professional Services Solutions (MAPSS) vehicle and seeks to

better understand the potential risk of mission disruption during the transition from TEAMS Next to MAPSS.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the MDA to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on the plan to transition to the MAPSS contract structure. The briefing should include the following:

(1) a current schedule of transition activities, target award dates, and remaining decision points for the planned transition to MAPSS contracts;

(2) a summary of lessons learned from transition activities to-date;

(3) a description of expiration dates for existing legacy TEAMS Next contracts;

(4) a cost-benefit analysis of transitioning to a MAPSS procurement approach; and

(5) identification of risk mitigation measures, including consideration of adjustments to the transition schedule, to minimize disruption to ongoing missile defense mission activities.

# DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

## TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

### ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

#### Material Staging Capability

The committee notes that the budget request included $22.5 million to support preliminary design activities for the Material Staging Capability project at the Pantex Plant. The committee supports the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) renewed focus on this project, which will address documented mission needs to improve security and operations for stockpile modernization, surveillance, and dismantlement activities at the site. While the committee appreciates that the NNSA continues to refine its conceptual design, in support of establishing a cost and schedule baseline for the project, the committee is concerned by the absence of resources for this effort in the Future Years Nuclear Security Program.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 15, 2027, on the status of the Material Staging Capability project, including a finalized conceptual design and initial cost estimate.

#### Next-Generation Pulsed Power Capabilities

The committee recognizes the ongoing cooperation between the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and commercial industry with respect to next-generation fusion technologies and high-yield experimentation capabilities. The committee encourages NNSA to continue to look for opportunities to increase this collaboration as it works to define technical requirements related to future high-yield experimentation needs. Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2027, on NNSA's long-term experimentation requirements in high-yield physics regimes and related partnership opportunities with commercial industry.

## Procurement of U.S.-Origin Uranium

The committee remains concerned about domestic capacity to supply unobligated and unencumbered uranium to meet national security mission needs. Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2027, on the National Nuclear Security Administration's plans with respect to the availability and procurement of U.S.-origin unobligated and unencumbered uranium for defense mission needs. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) a summary of current and projected domestic uranium mining and conversion capacity;

(2) an analysis of projected requirements for unobligated, unencumbered, domestic uranium to meet national security missions;

(3) an assessment of how projected increases in domestic and global commercial demand for mined uranium and conversion services may affect availability of U.S.-origin uranium;

(4) an overview of NNSA's ongoing coordination with other relevant government stakeholders on domestic uranium availability; and

(5) options and recommendations for procurement of U.S.-origin uranium and conversion services, including consideration of a strategic uranium reserve concept.