H.R. 3838—STREAMLINING PROCUREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

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This section would direct the Comptroller General of the United States, beginning on March 1, 2026, to continue providing annual reports to the congressional defense committees for the duration of F-35 aircraft production activities. The report would monitor the F-35 aircraft program and subprograms, including requirements, cost, scope, and schedule. It would also include an assessment of the Department's efforts to modernize the F-35 aircraft, and any other issues the Comptroller General determines to be appropriate.

The committee notes that over the last two decades, the Department of Defense has invested significant resources to develop and procure F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. The committee supports the continued efforts to modernize the F-

35 aircraft capabilities and systems but is concerned that given the program's history of cost growth and schedule delays, continued monitoring and oversight is critical. The committee expects the Department must be able to deliver new capabilities and complete modernization efforts while meeting affordable cost, schedule, and capability performance targets.

TITLE IX—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

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Section 911—Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office

This section would codify the Joint Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office as a jointly manned activity of the Department of Defense responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all Department efforts to defeat small unmanned aircraft systems as a weapon of strategic influence.

Section 913—Determination of Lead Organization Responsible for Approval and Validation of Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Components

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct an analysis of the current resourcing of the Defense Innovation Unit's (DIU) Blue Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) List and Framework. Following the assessment, this section would require the Secretary of Defense to transition the DIU Blue UAS List and Framework to a different Department of Defense component, or increase the resources and personnel at DIU if the determination is made that DIU is the best-suited Department organization to maintain the program.

TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

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Section 1077—Pilot Program on Enhanced Use of Advanced Sensor Networks to Improve Air Force Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Capabilities for Base Defense

This section would establish a pilot program at no less than two Air Force installations to demonstrate the efficacy of shared situational awareness data from

civilian sensor networks to military installation defense systems for the purposes of monitoring and identifying non-compliant small unmanned aircraft systems at domestic military installations.

BILL LANGUAGE

SEC. 132 [Log 82224]. ANNUAL GAO REVIEWS OF THE F–35 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.

(a) ANNUAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not later than March 1, 2026, and on an annual basis thereafter until the termination date specified in subsection (c), the Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(1) complete a review of the F–35 aircraft program; and

(2) submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the review.

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each review and report under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of—

(1) the cost, scope, and schedule of the F–35 aircraft program and its subprograms;

(2) the status of the efforts of the Department of Defense to modernize the F–35 aircraft; and

(3) such other matters relating to the F–35 aircraft program as the Comptroller General determines appropriate.

(c) TERMINATION DATE.—The requirements of this section shall terminate on the date on which all development, production, and fielding activities under the F–35 aircraft acquisition program have ceased.

Subtitle B—Other Department of Defense Organization and Management Matters

SEC. 911 [Log 82163]. JOINT COUNTER-SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OFFICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter I of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"§ 199. Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office

''(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of Defense a joint activity to be known as the 'Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office' (referred to in this section as the 'Office').

''(b) DIRECTOR.—

''(1) There is a Director of the Office (referred to in this section as the 'Director') who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among personnel of the Department of Defense who are—

''(A) general or flag officers of the covered armed forces; or

''(B) members of the Senior Executive Service.

''(2) The Director shall report directly to Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve as the prin-

cipal advisor to the Deputy Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on counter-small unmanned aircraft system matters.

''(c) ORGANIZATION.—The Office shall—

''(1) be designated as a jointly manned activity; and

''(2) shall consist of such other subordinate organizational elements as the Director determines appropriate, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

''(d) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Office shall do the following:

''(1) Lead, advocate, coordinate, and focus all Department of Defense actions in support of efforts of the combatant commands and the covered armed forces to defeat small unmanned aircraft systems (referred to in this section as 'sUAS') as weapons of strategic influence.

''(2) Integrate all counter-sUAS solutions throughout the Department of Defense, seeking interagency assistance as necessary.

''(3) Identify innovative near-term (executable within a 5 year timeframe) counter-sUAS solutions.

''(4) Coordinate with other components of the Department of Defense to carry out ongoing mid-

term (covering a 5-10 year timeframe) research and development initiatives and long-term (covering a timeframe exceeding 10 years) science and technology efforts that could help address the counter-sUAS threat.

''(5) Coordinate efforts of the Department of Defense to identify, assess, and disrupt adversarial unmanned aircraft system supply chains and financial threat networks that support such supply chains.

''(6) Coordinate with the United States Northern Command, or any successor entity serving as the lead synchronizer for homeland counter small unmanned aircraft systems, to develop and deploy counter-sUAS capabilities for homeland defense.

''(7) Develop and share counter-sUAS training tools, expertise, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for components of the Department of Defense that address needs of the joint force, deploying forces, installation defense within and outside the United States, and other relevant scenarios.

''(8) Coordinate efforts across the Department of Defense to develop, test, evaluate, and procure counter-sUAS kinetic and non-kinetic defeat capabilities, including—

''(A) systems to sense, identify, track, and defeat small unmanned aircraft systems, both kinetically and non-kinetically;

''(B) command and control systems; and

''(C) such other capabilities the Director determines appropriate.

''(9) Carry out the counter-sUAS validation and acquisition responsibilities described in subsections (e) and (f).

''(10) Develop and regularly update a counter-sUAS strategic plan in accordance with subsection (g).

''(11) Carry out such other activities relating to counter-sUAS as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

''(e) APPROVAL AND VALIDATION OF COUNTER-sUAS SYSTEMS.—

''(1) The Office shall serve as the entity within the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for the validation and approval of counter-sUAS systems for procurement and use by the Department.

''(2) In coordination with other components of the Department of Defense, the Director shall develop, maintain, and regularly update a list of

counter-sUAS systems that are validated and approved for procurement and use by the Department as described in paragraph (1). The Director shall ensure that each counter-sUAS system on the list has been vetted by the Office and has proven to be effective for use by the Department in countering sUAS.

''(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), no component of the Department of Defense may procure a counter-sUAS system unless such system—

''(A) has been validated and approved by the Office under paragraph (1); and

''(B) is included on the list maintained under paragraph (2).

''(4) The service acquisition executive of the military department concerned (in the case of a procurement by a military department) or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (in the case of a procurement not under the authority of a service acquisition executive) may waive the restriction under paragraph (3), on a case-by-case basis, by submitting to the congressional defense committees—

''(A) notice of the intent to issue such a waiver; and

"(B) an explanation of the reasons for issuing the waiver.

"(f) ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT DIVISION.—The Director shall establish and maintain an acquisition oversight division within the Office. The acquisition oversight division shall—

"(1) include acquisition professionals from relevant Program Executive Offices within each covered armed force;

"(2) support and facilitate efforts of the covered armed forces—

"(A) to budget and plan for the integration and sustainment of counter-sUAS capabilities that are approved and validated by the Office under subsection (e); and

"(B) to efficiently and effectively transition such capabilities into operational use; and

"(3) have such other duties and responsibilities as the Director determines appropriate.

"(g) COUNTER-sUAS STRATEGIC PLAN.—

"(1) The Director shall coordinate with relevant components of the Department of Defense, to develop, publish, and regularly update a strategic plan for the counter-sUAS activities of the Department, which shall include—

''(A) measures to coordinate the various counter-sUAS efforts of the Department to ensure cohesion among such efforts;

''(B) guidance for counter-sUAS related investment and manpower decisions across the Department, including necessary science and technology investments; and

''(C) performance measures, goals, and lines of effort required to achieve the strategic objectives of the plan.

''(2) Not later than 120 days after the date on which the Office commences operations, the Director shall complete and submit to the congressional defense committees the initial strategic plan developed under paragraph (1).

''(3) Not less frequently than once every two years after completion of the initial strategic plan under paragraph (2), the Director shall—

''(A) update the plan; and

''(B) submit the updated plan to the congressional defense committees.

''(4) Following completion of each version of the strategic plan under this subsection, each commander of a geographic combatant command shall develop an implementation plan to guide the combat-

ant command overseen by that commander in achieving the vision, mission, goals, and performance measures of the strategic plan.

''(h) ANNUAL REPORTS.—On an annual basis, the Director shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—

''(1) a summary of the activities of the Office over the period covered by the report, including a description of—

''(A) the progress of the Office in carrying out the requirements of this section; and

''(B) the metrics used to measure such progress; and

''(2) a summary of the expenditures made by the Office in the period covered by the report for counter-sUAS related research, development, test, and evaluation, procurement, and sustainment activities.

''(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

''(1) The term 'counter-sUAS system' means a system or device capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of a small unmanned aircraft or small unmanned aircraft system.

''(2) The term 'covered armed forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force.

''(3) The terms 'small unmanned aircraft', 'unmanned aircraft', and 'unmanned aircraft system' have the meanings given those terms in section 44801 of title 49.''.

(b) STRATEGY AND FUNDING PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—

(1) a strategy to ensure the Joint Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office has the funding and other resources necessary to execute its responsibilities, as required under section 199 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)); and

(2) a plan for funding the Office across the period covered by the most recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, United States Code (as of the date of the report).

SEC. 913 [Log 82817]. DETERMINATION OF LEAD ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR APPROVAL AND VALIDATION OF CERTAIN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS.

(a) DETERMINATION REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall determine—

(1) whether the Defense Innovation Unit should continue to be the organization within the Department of Defense with primary responsibility for the execution of the Blue UAS Cleared List and the Blue UAS Framework (collectively referred to in this section as the ''Blue UAS Initiatives''); or

(2) whether another organization within the Department should assume primary responsibility for executing the Blue UAS Initiatives.

(b) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.—In making the determination required under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall—

(1) conduct a thorough analysis of the Blue UAS Initiatives as executed by the Defense Innovation Unit at the time of the determination;

(2) assess whether the Unit, as of the time of the determination, has adequate resources and capabilities (including personnel, funding, and authorities) to effectively scale and execute the Initiatives across the Department of Defense; and

(3) identify one or more other organizations within the Department of Defense that could more effectively scale and execute the Initiatives across the Department.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—

(1) the Secretary's final determination under subsection (a); and

(2)(A) in the event the Secretary determines that the Defense Innovation Unit should continue to have primary responsibility for the Blue UAS Initiatives as described in subsection (a)(1), a strategy for providing the Unit with any additional resources (including funding, personnel, and authorities) needed for the Unit to effectively execute and scale the Initiatives across the Department of Defense; or

(B) in the event the Secretary determines that another organization within the Department should assume primary responsibility administering and executing the Initiatives as described in subsection (a)(2), a plan with milestones for transferring the Initiatives (including all associated funding, per-

sonnel, and authorities) from the Unit to such other organization.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Following the submittal of the report required under subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense shall commence implementation of the resourcing strategy described in subsection (c)(2)(A) or the transfer plan described in subsection (c)(2)(B) (as the case may be).

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term ''Blue UAS Cleared List'' means the initiative executed by the Defense Innovation Unit (as of the date of the enactment of this Act) pursuant to which the Unit maintains a list of approved small unmanned aircraft systems that—

(A) are validated as cyber-secure and safe to fly; and

(B) comply with applicable requirements of—

(i) section 848 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 10 U.S.C. 4871 note);

(ii) section 817(b) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263; 10 U.S.C. 4871 note); and

(iii) the American Security Drone Act of 2023 (subtitle B of title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31; 41 U.S.C. note prec. 3901)).

(2) The term ''Blue UAS Framework'' means the initiative executed by the Defense Innovation Unit (as of the date of the enactment of this Act) pursuant to which the Unit validates unmanned aircraft system components, subcomponents, modules, and software for use by the Department of Defense.

SEC. 1077 [Log 82249]. PILOT PROGRAM ON ENHANCED USE OF ADVANCED SENSOR NETWORKS TO IMPROVE AIR FORCE COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM CAPABILITIES FOR BASE DEFENSE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, shall carry out a pilot program, to be known as the ''Enhancing Cooperation for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program'', under which the Secretary shall incorporate the use of civilian civil airspace sensor networks into Air Force data processing systems to—

(1) improve base defense against small unmanned aircraft systems (in this section referred to as ''sUAS'');

(2) inform the development of counter-unmanned aircraft system capabilities that are suitable for use inside the United States and in the National Airspace System; and

(3) enhance cooperation with law enforcement, State and local partners, and other Federal departments and agencies to counter domestic threats.

(b) LOCATIONS.—The Secretary, in coordination with the Administrator, shall select at least two military instal-

lations located in the United States at which to conduct the pilot program. In selecting such military installations, the Secretary shall consider the potential for the Air Force to—

(1) access advanced civilian airspace sensor networks;

(2) leverage public-private partnerships that enable multi-use of airspace awareness capabilities for public safety, defense of critical infrastructure to include Department of Defense installations, and protection of civil aviation; and

(3) minimize the potential for negatively affecting civil aircraft operations in the National Airspace System.

(c) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the pilot program are—

(1) to demonstrate the efficacy of shared situational awareness data from civilian sensor networks to military installation defense systems;

(2) to provide the Air Force with access to air space awareness data derived from civilian airspace sensor networks to increase the ability of the Air Force to defend bases from the threats posed by sUAS;

(3) to determine any authority, capability, and capacity barriers to enhancing cooperation between the Air Force, civilian partners, and other Federal, State, and local government entities to extend the over-the-horizon identification of potential sUAS threats beyond the current range of existing domestic base defense systems; and

(4) to improve the data-sharing frameworks for airspace data between the Air Force and various stakeholders for the purpose of base defense.

(d) CONTRACT AUTHORITY.—In carrying out the pilot program, the Secretary of the Air Force may enter into one or more contracts for the procurement of additional technologies capable of—

(1) leveraging commercial or Government off-the-shelf detect-track-defeat systems;

(2) integrating and using civilian airspace awareness data to serve as an early warning capability specifically to help identify and monitor non-compliant sUAS; and

(3) informing appropriate communication mechanisms between military installations and local law enforcement agencies to report and track non-compliant air vehicles, deter incursions, and foster potential prosecution.

(e) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of all activities carried out under the pilot program at an installation selected for such program, the Secretary shall provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a briefing that includes a description of—

(1) the manner in which the program was conducted at such installation; and

(2) any results achieved under the program at such installation.

(f) TERMINATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The authority to carry out a pilot program under this section shall terminate on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EARLY TERMINATION OPTION.—The Secretary of the Air Force may request the termination of the pilot program before the date specified in paragraph (1) if the Secretary—

(A) determines that administrative, legal, performance, or other factors indicate the program will not be successful; and

(B) submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate notice in writing of such determination.

DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Feasibility and Advisability of Combining CH-47F and MH-47G Contracts

The committee is aware that the Army and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) currently procure the CH-47F and MH-47G Chinook on two separate contract vehicles with different funding lines, acquisition and contracting authorities, and aircraft configurations. The committee believes there could be cost savings for the Army and USSOCOM if these contracts were combined. Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the feasibility and advisability of combining the CH-47F and MH-47G contracts. The report shall also include, but not be limited to:

(1) any potential cost savings or program efficiencies that could be found as a result of combining procurement contracts; and

(2) any potential cost savings as a result of using multi-year procurement contracting, including through the use of Advance Procurement funding.

Future Long Range Assault Aircraft Medical Evacuation Capability for Army National Guard

The committee is aware of potential capability gaps in medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) platform availability, particularly within the National Guard. The Army's Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) procurement strategy, with initial fielding projected for 2031, could provide an opportunity to assess the optimal distribution of FLRAA MEDEVAC assets across the Active Component and National Guard to maximize operational readiness.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026, on the feasibility and strategic impact of integrating FLRAA MEDEVAC capabilities within the Army National Guard. The report shall include:

(1) an assessment of the current MEDEVAC capability distribution between the Active Component and National Guard, including readiness levels and operational effectiveness;

(2) an evaluation of potential National Guard units for initial FLRAA MEDEVAC fielding based on infrastructure, training readiness, and strategic location;

(3) a review of existing and projected MEDEVAC capability gaps and how FLRAA integration could address these gaps;

(4) an analysis of training and sustainment requirements for National Guard units to operate FLRAA MEDEVAC aircraft effectively; and

(5) a timeline and recommendations for FLRAA procurement and fielding within the National Guard.

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 Enduring Shield

The committee is concerned that the Army's focus on development of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability Second Interceptor may be failing to incorporate a necessary element of design commonality through the standardization of magazine design, a highly successful practice demonstrated by the Navy's Mark 41 vertical launch system. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 31, 2026, on the Army's intent to standardize Enduring Shield's magazine design for the Second Interceptor development and production.

PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Effectiveness of Humvee Rollover Prevention Kits

The committee notes the Department of the Army's efforts to reduce the risk of rollover incidents for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The committee is concerned with better understanding the impact and effectiveness of these safety investments and whether they have made a difference in minimizing accidents, injury, and death for soldiers. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than December 1, 2025, that includes:

(1) the annual number of Class A mishaps and rollover incidents involving Army HMMWVs and how many of the HMMWVs involved in those incidents that were anti-lock braking system/electronic stability control (ABS/ESC) equipped;

(2) the percentage of all Army HMMWVs that are involved in Class A or B mishaps annually, in comparison to the percentage of all ABS/ESC equipped Army HMMWVs involved in Class A or B mishaps; and

(3) any other metrics or data on the impact of HMMWV safety upgrades that the Secretary deems appropriate.

M240 and M249 Operationally Ready Inventory

The committee's ongoing concerns regarding the Army's current efforts to sustain the M240 medium machine gun program of record and a viable operationally ready inventory continues to grow given the level of drawdown of the weapon system for Ukraine. Briefings to the committee to date have provided little insight into the known, but undefined, concerns with the operational status of the weapon systems in inventory. The Army's sustainment plan and industrial base approach remain unclear, and the Army has programmed little or no procurement funding for the M240 within the fiscal year 2025 budget. Further, as communicated in past legislation, the committee remains concerned that the Army's lack of a sustainment strategy could result in a decline or elimination of industrial capacity to manufacture this critical weapon system. Finally, the committee was recently made aware of similar issues within the M249 program.

Therefore, given the level of concern communicated through past National Defense Authorization Acts and the Ukraine drawdown, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 15, 2025, detailing:

(1) what is required to identify the current operational status of the M240 and M249 inventory;

(2) how the Army will address the average monthly demand for sustainment given the drawdowns have depleted the M240 and M249 inventory; and

(3) the Army's plan to sustain the M240 and M249 into the future and assure the viability of our industrial base to produce the weapon system.

PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Army Ammunitions Industrial Base

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Army's efforts to expand and improve the ammunition industrial base, including its plans to contract for the modernization, expansion, or construction of new facilities; review the workforce available for those facilities; and identify and obtain critical materials. The review should assess the extent to which the Army has implemented its plans, any associated challenges, and the extent to which the Army's planning adheres to leading practices. The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than May 1, 2026, on the findings of the review.

OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Army Tactical Intelligence Targeting Node

The committee is aware of ongoing efforts within the Army to develop the Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) to modernize the Army's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ground stations. This type of capability enhances Army commanders' ability to collect, process, and disseminate critical battlefield information at the tactical edge, improves situational awareness, and supports long-range precision fires. The committee supports Army efforts to develop TITAN as a software-centric platform defined by modular open systems architecture in collaboration with multiple industry partners.

However, the committee is concerned the Army has not sufficiently developed and defined associated concepts of operation (CONOPS) and concepts of employment for the TITAN platform, nor a clear strategy to procure TITAN systems during low-rate initial production (LRIP) leading to effective and efficient transition to full-rate production. For example, absent a CONOPS regarding the anticipated echelon(s) for deployment of TITAN, operational test and evaluation may be hampered due to uncertainty regarding the characteristics of an operationally relevant and suitable environment.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Army's schedule for procuring TITAN systems and plan for how the Army intends to field TITAN to the Army's Active Duty, special operations forces, Reserve, and National Guard. This briefing should include, but not be limited to:

(1) how the concept of operations for TITAN is being matured in time to inform development and operational test and evaluation;

(2) how the Army is tracking progress for TITAN, to include metrics and milestones for deliverables;

(3) an update on the current state of the Army TITAN, to include plans for production and deployment; and

(4) a thorough analysis of the funding and resource requirements to ensure full-rate production and continued operation and sustainment of Army TITAN.

Diversifying the Army's Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Inventory

The committee recognizes the complex threat environment the Joint Force faces from advanced adversarial unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and supports the military services' recent efforts to utilize novel contracting approaches to procure Group 3 defeat interceptors and integrate innovative systems into existing programs.

The committee is concerned, however, that adversarial production and use of advanced Group 3 systems is outpacing the quantity of effectors the Army has budgeted in their existing counter-UAS programs of records. The committee remains concerned that the Army does not have a long-term plan, nor accompanying budget materials across the Future Years Defense Program to sustain these systems or procure them at scale across the Army. This situation not only risks a budget shortfall on sustainment of existing systems but also fails to address the threat in key theaters including U.S. Central Command.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Army to diversify and expand available counter-UAS systems and directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Army's plan to utilize existing authorities to procure combat-validated counter-UAS interceptors from additional vendors over the next five years.

Enhanced Mobility and Dispersion of Army Command Posts

The committee is aware of ongoing efforts within the Army to develop mobile and dispersed command posts and believes these initiatives are critical to ensuring survivability of Army forces on contested battlefields. These initiatives, however, will also require innovative power generation solutions that are similarly lightweight, scalable, and mobile. The Army's legacy power generation systems might not be effective in meeting the requirements of these new mobile and dispersed command posts. The committee is aware that the Army is developing modular and scalable next-generation power systems that can operate as an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) or detached generator. These systems show promise in addressing capability gaps associated with power generation for dispersed command posts in dynamic and contested battlefields.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the development, integration, and deployment plans for next generation APUs to support dispersed command posts. The briefing shall include, but not be limited to:

(1) an overview of any development, test, integration, and demonstration activity for the next generation APU, particularly as it relates to command post applications; and

(2) a roadmap for integrating next generation APUs into current and future command post programs, including timelines, funding requirements, and an identification of key stakeholders in the Army acquisition process.

Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System

The committee notes the successful use of the Army's Land Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) in the field since 2005. This system has been a critical element at forward operating bases, defending against rocket, mortar, artillery, and drone threats.

The committee is encouraged to learn that the Air Force is considering LPWS for the air base air defense (ABAD) mission, particularly for agile combat employment (ACE) locations. Redesign of the gun and sensor pallet is needed to transport the system on the more widely available C-130 fleet. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 28, 2026, on the suitability of LPWS to meet ABAD requirements, estimated cost and schedule to redesign the current Army configuration to be more deployable, and any other recommendations for utilization of this system to support the ACE mission.

Modernization of Army Landmine Detection and Breaching

The committee is aware of ongoing efforts within the Army to modernize landmine detection and breaching capabilities. New technologies including unmanned aerial systems and autonomy could provide greater standoff landmine detection, classification, and geolocation capabilities to enable autonomous clearing and reduce personnel and equipment put in harm's way during breaching operations. The committee supports these efforts and directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Army's acquisition plans and timeline for autonomous landmine detection and breaching systems.

OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY

Items of Special Interest

Tethered Small Unmanned Aerial Systems for Navy Force Protection

The committee recognizes that tethered small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) offer persistent surveillance capabilities for force protection and incident response and could provide enhanced operational safety, particularly when deployed near airfields at fixed operating bases and domestic installations. The committee

commends the Navy for its investment in research and development to strengthen force protection and encourages the continued integration of technologies, such as tethered drones, to safeguard military personnel, critical technologies, and weapon systems across Navy installations. Tethered sUAS could be paired with additional detection, sensing, and sUAS capabilities to provide a layered systems-of-systems solution for force protection at installations. The committee encourages the Navy to continue these efforts. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on the Navy's plans to develop and integrate tethered sUAS solutions for force protection and incident response on Navy installations.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Multi-Role Collaborative Combat Aircraft

The committee continues to monitor progress around development and testing of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) Increment 1 and remains supportive of plans to field CCA aircraft in progressively capable increments. However, the committee questions the budget and schedule impacts of potential plans to align future increments to narrow, independent mission sets, which could require development of multiple aircraft at higher cost to the taxpayer in order to meet warfighter needs. The committee encourages exploration of a multi-role aircraft capable of supporting a range of mission sets, including weapons delivery, sensing, electronic warfare, and communications, to provide maximum flexibility to warfighters.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than February 13, 2026, on the mission sets planned for future CCA increments, associated power requirements and solutions under consideration, cost, schedule, and strategic and operational implications associated with pursuing multi-mission aircraft.

RC-135 Data Transmission Resiliency

The committee is aware that the RC-135 Rivet Joint can encounter data transmission limitations due to environmental factors, aircraft maneuvers, and inherent system constraints such as limited bandwidth and throughput. These limitations could:

(1) hinder the platform's ability to share time-critical intelligence data with other Joint All-Domain Command and Control nodes in real-time;

(2) restrict the situational awareness of commanders and warfighters across all domains;

(3) delay decision-making processes; and

(4) potentially impede effective execution of joint operations in a high threat environment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Air Force's plan to acquire, test, and deploy data synchronization solutions for the RC-135 Rivet Joint fleet. The briefing shall include, but not be limited to:

(1) a time-phased plan and funding profile required across the future years defense plan to acquire, test, and deploy such solutions; and

(2) an assessment of how these solutions, to include commercial solutions, will optimize data synchronization, enhance datalink redundancy, and ensure multi-domain connectivity and data resiliency.

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Items of Special Interest

Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile

The committee notes that the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program is one of two tactical hypersonic missile capabilities under development by the Air Force. The committee understands its offensive strike capability will enable the Air Force to hold fixed, high-value, time-sensitive targets at risk in contested environments from appropriate stand-off distances. Traveling at higher altitudes and faster speeds makes HACM highly survivable and maneuverable in the space between traditional air defense systems and ballistic missile defense systems, where current gaps exist.

The committee notes that industry has been working since 2019 to develop, produce, and integrate high-speed technologies into air-breathing hypersonic weapons, to ultimately produce the next generation of tactical missile systems. The committee is concerned the Air Force continues working towards program maturity but does not currently have a clear path forward to meaningful production. This potentially jeopardizes fielding the weapon in tactically relevant quantities and puts the nascent hypersonics industrial base at risk. The committee recognizes that the current HACM program intends to only deliver a quantity of approximately 12 initial HACM missiles through 2028 but does not have a clear path to establishing sustained production. The committee believes the Air Force must field tactically relevant quantities of offensive HACM systems within the decade to offset near-peer adversary advantage in hypersonic weapons.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and House Committee on Armed Services, not later than March 6, 2026, that outlines a plan to transition the HACM program to production to ensure that tactically relevant quantities of missiles begin delivery not later than the beginning of fiscal year 2030. The plan should be

unclassified but may also include a classified annex. Finally, the plan should include, but is not limited to the following elements of information:

(1) funding and key milestones required by each fiscal year to ensure that tactically relevant quantities of HACM are delivered consistent with the plan;

(2) details on producibility or capability enhancements that would facilitate an accelerated initial operational capacity of HACM weapons; and

(3) facilitation and supply chain investments, with associated schedule timelines, to support the plan.

PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE

Items of Special Interest

Electronic Warfare Testing and Requirements for Group 1-3 Unmanned Aerial Systems and Loitering Munitions

The committee has observed Russia's effective use of Global Positioning System (GPS) and radio frequency (RF) jammers against Group 1 to Group 3 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and loitering munitions in combat in Ukraine. The widespread use of these types of jammers makes it imperative for the Department of Defense to procure and field Group 1-3 UAS and loitering munitions that can operate effectively against adversary electronic warfare (EW) systems. The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has not established a baseline capability standard for Group 1-3 UAS and loitering munitions to operate against adversary EW systems, a process by which to rapidly incorporate the latest adversary EW developments into the Group 1-3 UAS and loitering munitions requirements process, and a physical and virtual testing program to ensure all Group 1-3 UAS and loitering munitions the Department fields can operate successfully against adversary EW systems.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, assessing the Department's ability to employ Group 1-3 UAS and loitering munitions effectively against adversary EW systems. The briefing shall include, but not be limited to:

(1) how the Department tests Group 1-3 UAS in realistic EW environments prior to system fielding; and

(2) what requirements exist for EW protections for Group 1-3 UAS to enable operations in RF and GPS denied environments.

Expendable Active Decoys on Fixed-Wing Aircraft

The committee is aware of recent efforts by the Department of Defense to integrate expendable active decoys (EAD) on fixed-wing aircraft, significantly enhancing the aircraft's survivability in contested environments. The committee understands that the EAD provides a modular and adaptable solution capable of

being integrated into a range of piloted and unpiloted aircraft, providing advanced protection against rapidly evolving radar-guided threats. The committee supports efforts to integrate this capability onto platforms.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than December 1, 2025, on the current and future integration of EAD onto piloted and unpiloted platforms. The report should include, at a minimum:

(1) a detailed summary of all current efforts to integrate EAD capability on manned and unmanned platforms;

(2) an assessment of opportunities to integrate EAD capability into other current and planned future platforms; and

(3) an assessment of funding programmed for EAD deployment in the Fiscal Year 2026
Future Years Defense Program, as well as identification of any additional funding needed to expand integration of the capability to additional platforms.

The report should be submitted in an unclassified format, but may also contain a classified annex, if required.

Exploring Modern Approaches to Missile Inventory Shortfalls

The committee remains concerned that the Department of Defense's projected inventory of precision-guided munitions is insufficient to deter or prevail in a conflict with a near-peer adversary. The committee notes that the current industrial base lacks the capacity to surge production of affordable weapons systems to fulfill the quantity demanded within the timeframe required to deter or win a conflict.

The committee is encouraged by the establishment of the Enterprise Test Vehicle (ETV) program, a recent collaboration between the Air Force Armament Directorate and the Defense Innovation Unit. The ETV program is prioritizing partnerships with manufacturers new to the defense industrial base to develop rapidly producible advanced air vehicles that are highly capable, low cost, and modular. These manufacturers are utilizing innovative processes and commercial off-the-shelf components to enable high-speed production at scale to meet surges in demand.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Army, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 15, 2025, on plans to enter into production contracts for advanced air vehicles with new market entrants that employ innovative and cost-effective processes including digital engineering, additive manufacturing, and minimization of part count and supply chain dependencies. The briefing should include an assessment of how these manufacturing techniques can be utilized by other programs of record in the production of advanced, multi-mission air vehicles.

Perimeter Security Docking Stations

The committee believes the integration of small drones and unmanned docking systems onto military installations could be used to enhance perimeter security for ground, aerial, and sea-based incursions at U.S. military installations. These technologies could offer enhanced surveillance, rapid response capabilities, and cost-effective solutions for installation security. For example, these technologies could allow for real-time monitoring of vast areas that are otherwise challenging to patrol with limited resources. These autonomous systems could also be deployed quickly in response to security breaches, providing a flexible and rapid response mechanism at a lower operational cost than traditional security measures. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Department of Defense's plans to integrate small drones and associated unmanned docking stations onto military installations for installation security.

Platform Agnostic Weapon System for Solider-Operated Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

The committee is aware of Department of Defense efforts to develop platform agnostic glide munitions to enable soldiers at the tactical level to organically deliver fires with small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS). These platform independent kinetic weapon systems could enable sUAS systems to close kill chains directly from a single platform and could enhance force protection and soldier lethality. The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the Department's plans to develop and integrate sUAS-delivered droppable kinetic weapon systems, an assessment of existing capabilities that could fill capability gaps, and any potential fielding opportunities for these systems.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, ARMY

Items of Special Interest

Army Transformation Initiative

While the committee supports the Army's intent to divest of systems that are no longer relevant on the battlefield, and to more rapidly field new systems, the committee is concerned with the manner in which the Army presented its plans to Congress, the lack of supporting analysis, and the apparent lack of strategy and vision for what the Army should look like in 2030, 2035, and beyond. The Army has yet to provide complete budgetary details, tradeoffs, and risk assessments of proposed divestments and investments of capabilities and programs associated with

its Army Transformation Initiative. Additionally, the committee must be informed of the Army's future force structure and end strength targets in its pursuit of eliminating waste and optimization, as well as the details for planned unit inactivations or assignments of new missions, broken out by Active and Reserve Components.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 1, 2025, that addresses fiscal year 2026 budgetary impacts and funding requirements across the Future Years Defense Program, capability-based requirements and identification of capability gaps as a result of planned divestments, and an implementation plan for the Army Transformation Initiative efforts.

In addition, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to inform the congressional defense committees, not later than 30 days prior to implementation, of any additional proposed changes taking place as part of the Army Transformation Initiative or broader transformation efforts.

Combat Vehicle Transmission Industrial Base

The committee is concerned about the Army's plans to modernize the equipment and tooling in the combat vehicle transmission facility called Plant 14. The committee notes that Plant 14, which produces transmissions for the Abrams main battle tank as well as several other combat vehicles, is unique in the U.S. combat vehicle industrial base as the Army owns approximately 55 percent of the machines, fixtures, tooling and other capital equipment in the factory. This partnership benefits the Army and the taxpayer because it ensures availability and readiness of the tracked vehicle transmission industrial base to support the nation in time of conflict. The committee understands that the Plant 14 arrangement allows the facility to maintain a trained and skilled workforce while also meeting consistent demand from the supply base, independent of the ebb and flow of domestic requirements. Further, Plant 14 supports continued sustainment of the Abrams tank that is expected to be in the Army's inventory through 2050.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than December 15, 2025, on the modernization of the Plant 14 combat vehicle transmission industrial base. The report shall include the following:

(1) the Army's plan to modernize Plant 14 to ensure readiness in time of conflict as well as the funding required by year to complete such modernization; and

(2) options to establish a distinct budget line separate from the Abrams Upgrade Program that would allow the Army to properly resource industrial base facilities that are not Government-Owned Contractor-Operated or Government-Owned Government-Operated facilities.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY

Items of Special Interest

Integration of Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System into F/A-18 and E/A-18 Aircraft Fleets

The committee acknowledges that Auto Ground Collision Avoidance Systems (Auto GCAS) are crucial for tactical fighter aircraft due to the inherent risks and demands of their operations. The committee understands that Auto GCAS has many benefits for aircrews.

Auto GCAS can prevent Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), which is a major cause of tactical fighter aircrew fatalities. Tactical fighter operations often involve high speeds, low altitudes, and complex maneuvers, increasing the risk of aircrews becoming disoriented or fixated on a target. Auto GCAS monitors the aircraft's trajectory relative to the ground and automatically takes control to prevent a collision if a crash is imminent. Auto GCAS can be used as risk mitigation for aircrew incapacitation. High gravitational forces experienced during maneuvers can cause aircrews to lose consciousness or become spatially disoriented. If an aircrew becomes incapacitated during flight, Auto GCAS can intervene, automatically executing a recovery maneuver to steer the aircraft away from the ground. Auto GCAS can enhance aircrew situational awareness. Advanced cockpit systems and helmet-mounted displays provide pilots with crucial flight data and threat information. Auto GCAS adds another layer of safety by actively monitoring for ground collision threats, allowing pilots to focus on their mission while having a safety back-up in place. Auto GCAS can optimize mission effectiveness, mitigating the risk of ground collisions. Auto GCAS allows aircrews to fly more aggressively and perform critical tactical maneuvers at lower altitudes with increased confidence. This enhanced safety contributes to increased mission effectiveness and reduces the loss of valuable aircraft and highly trained aircrews. In summary, Auto GCAS provides a crucial automated safety feature that complements aircrew skills and training, safeguarding against human error, aircrew incapacitation, and the inherent risks of tactical fighter operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than March 16, 2026, that explains the plans of the Secretary to integrate Auto GCAS capability into the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft of the Department of the Navy. The report should also describe the acquisition strategy, cost, schedule, testing, and fielding plans of Auto GCAS into these tactical fighter aircraft.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE-WIDE

Items of Special Interest

Execution of CL-20 Incorporation and Deployment

The committee understands that the Department of Defense is considering the incorporation of hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane (CL-20) to modernize its munitions portfolio and enhance the range, lethality, stealth, and survivability of

missile and precision-strike systems. CL-20 offers superior energy density, reduced smoke emissions, and enhanced propulsion efficiency, aligning with section 243(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 Public Law (117-328), which identifies it as an energetic material capable of enhancing warhead lethality and propellant performance.

The committee encourages the Department of Defense to explore expedited fielding pathways, including rapid prototyping mechanisms and accelerated acquisition processes, to align with warfighter-driven requirements. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2026, on:

(1) status of CL-20 incorporation in weapon systems including efforts to leverage commercially available solutions through a multi-vendor approach, as well as targeted comparative performance evaluations of CL-20 against existing energetics where relevant to specific weapon systems;

(2) provide the fielding timelines and lethality objectives, along with modeling, simulation, and trade-space analysis comparing CL-20 with baseline and alternative formulations, including industrial base sustainment considerations; and

(3) detail bridge capability plans and procurement strategies via the Defense Logistics Agency to ensure adequate supply of CL-20 and its precursors.

Integration of Terrestrial-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Systems for Global Positioning System Denied Environments

The committee recognizes the increasing threat of global positioning system (GPS) interference, particularly the growing occurrences of GPS spoofing and jamming in conflict zones and contested environments. As adversaries continue to develop and deploy electronic warfare capabilities that can disrupt and degrade GPS, the Department of Defense should ensure that U.S. forces have access to resilient and Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) capabilities. The committee is aware of ongoing efforts across the Joint Force to develop and field APNT solutions, including terrestrial based systems. For example, the Army has tested terrestrial APNT solutions at the Army's Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Assessment Exercise (PNTAX) and have demonstrated that such systems can maintain functionality despite GPS jamming and spoofing. These types of systems could also be scaled across multiple platforms, including ground combat vehicles, unmanned systems, and airborne assets.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the feasibility, operational impact, and cost-effectiveness of integrating terrestrial-based APNT solutions into the Department's broader PNT architecture. The briefing shall include, but not be limited to:

(1) an evaluation of the effectiveness of terrestrial-based PNT solutions in mitigating GPS denial threats; and

(2) a review of the investment required for integrating terrestrial APNT capabilities, including for procurement, testing, and sustainment.