H.R. 3838—STREAMLINING PROCUREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—SPACE ACTIVITIES

Section 1602—Advance Payments for Commercial Satellite Communication Services

This section would allow advance payments to be made for commercial satellite communication services.

Section 1603—Noise Mitigation Regarding Space Launches

This section would amend Section 2276a(c)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to include in the definition of space launch activities the study and mitigation of noise caused by space launches.

Section 1604—Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Tracking Program

This section would require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a requirement for a tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking program to provide capabilities to the commanders of the combatant commands. This section would also require the Secretary of the Air Force to establish the tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking program as a program of record.

Section 1605—Reports on Spaceport of the Future Initiative

This section would require the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to submit an annual report to the congressional defense committees on the status of efforts being executed under the Spaceport of the Future initiative.

SUBTITLE C—NUCLEAR FORCES

Section 1622—Matters Relating to the Nuclear-Armed, Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

This section would make certain technical changes related to the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile program.

Section 1623—Prohibition on Reduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles of the United States

This section would prohibit the use of funds authorized for fiscal year 2026 from being used to reduce the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the United States below 400, or reduce the alert level of the ICBM force.

Section 1624—Strategy to Sustain Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Maximize End-of-Life Margin

This section would require the Secretary of the Air Force to annually submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy on the sustainment of the LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability and associated supporting systems. Additionally, the section would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to assess the strategy and provide the congressional defense committees with an annual report on its sufficiency.

Section 1625—Report on Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs

This section would require a report, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, with respect to the implementation of section 1621 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159).

SUBTITLE D—MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Section 1642—Golden Dome for America

This section would require annual reports and consolidated budget exhibits for activities related to the next generation missile defense architecture.

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

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SUBTITLE C—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 3122—Assessment of the National Nuclear Security Administration Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project

This section would require the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors of the National Nuclear Security Administration to carry out an independent assessment of the Spent Fuel Handling Facility Project. The committee believes that, in order to be independent, the assessment should be carried out by an entity or office independent of the project management staff, management and operating contractor, and subcontractors for the project.

TITLE XXXV—MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE D—OTHER MATTERS

Section 3534—Design and Construction of Missile Instrumentation Range Safety Vessels

This section would authorize the replacement of two missile instrumentation range safety vessels in the National Defense Reserve Fleet using a vessel construction manager model and commercial design standards.

BILL LANGUAGE

SEC. 1602.[Log 82210] ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SERVICES.

Section 3805 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b), by striking ''The head'' and inserting ''Except as provided by subsection (e), the head'';

(2) in subsection (c), by striking ''Advance'' and inserting ''Except as provided by subsection (e), advance''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(e) SPECIAL RULES FOR COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SERVICES.—(1) The head of the agency may satisfy the adequate security requirements of subsection (b) with respect to advance payments for commercial satellite communication services by making a written determination of—

''(A) the creditworthiness of the provider of such services; and

''(B) the ability of the provider to remain a going concern during the period of the advanced payment.

''(2) With respect to advance payments for commercial satellite communication services, subsection (c) shall

be administered by substituting '100 percent' for '15 percent'.''.

SEC. 1603.[Log 82845] NOISE MITIGATION REGARDING SPACE LAUNCHES.

Section 2276a(c)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting ", including such activities relating to studying and mitigating the noise caused by launches at launch sites of the Space Force" after "vehicle".

SEC. 1604.[Log 82395] TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND TRACKING PROGRAM.

(a) REQUIREMENTS OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS.—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish requirements pursuant to section 181 of title 10, United States Code, with respect to the tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking program providing capabilities to meet the requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands.

(b) PROGRAM OF RECORD.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall establish the tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking program as a program of record.

(c) TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND TRACKING PROGRAM DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking program'' means the pilot program carried out by the Space Force to use commercial-data analytics to provide surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking information to the combatant commands.

SEC. 1605.[Log 82846] REPORTS ON SPACEPORT OF THE FUTURE INITIATIVE.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than March 1 of each of 2027 through 2031, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the Spaceport of the Future initiative of the Space Force. Each such report shall include the following:

(1) A list of each project being carried out under such initiative (including projects at State space launch facilities), including—

(A) the status of the project;

(B) the estimated completion date of the project; and

(C) the total cost to complete the project.

(2) An assessment of additional funding required to implement such initiative beyond the funds estimated in the most recent future-years defense program under section 221 of title 10, United States Code.

(3) An assessment of including mission development zones under such initiative to promote research, development, innovation, and fielding of

space and other advanced technologies adjacent to Federal and State launch ranges.

(4) A summary of feedback from launch service providers, other spaceport tenants, and operators of non-Federal ranges to understand how such initiative can meet the needs of such providers, tenants, and operators, and any adjustments made in response to that feedback.

SEC. 1622.[Log 82165] MATTERS RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR-ARMED, SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE.

Section 1640(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31; 137 Stat. 595), as amended by section 1627 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159; 138 Stat. 2174), is amended—

(1) by striking paragraph (2);

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ''paragraph (3)'' and inserting ''paragraph (2)''; and

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5) as paragraphs (2) through (4), respectively.

SEC. 1623.[Log 82168] PROHIBITION ON REDUCTION OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2026 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the following, and the Department may not otherwise take any action to do the following:

(1) Reduce, or prepare to reduce, the responsiveness or alert level of the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States.

(2) Reduce, or prepare to reduce, the quantity of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States to a number less than 400.

(b) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply to any of the following activities:

(1) The maintenance or sustainment of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

(2) Ensuring the safety, security, or reliability of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

(3) Facilitating the transition from the LGM–30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile to the LGM–35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile.

SEC. 1624.[Log 82167]. STRATEGY TO SUSTAIN MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND MAXIMIZE END-OF-LIFE MARGIN.

(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Concurrent with the first submission to Congress of a budget pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, after the date of the enactment of this Act, and with each budget submitted to Congress pursuant to such section until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment determines the LGM–35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile reaches full operational capacity, the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Under Secretary, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy, with respect to the LGM–30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, associated ground systems, and other supporting systems to address aging components and maximize the end-of-life margin.

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A comprehensive identification of all significant age-related and supportability challenges for the LGM–30G Minuteman III inter-

continental ballistic missiles that includes a description of—

(i) efforts of the Secretary to address each such challenge; and

(ii) activities the Secretary intends to carry out to address each such challenge.

(B) A description of effects on the system performance of Minuteman III missiles that result from aging components, including such effects with respect to shortfalls in capability.

(C) A summary of test activities conducted with Minuteman III missiles during the calender year that precedes the date of the submission of the strategy, including a description of any observations of anomalous performance during such test activities.

(D) A discussion of opportunities to increase the end-of-life margin or overall performance of Minuteman III missiles.

(E) A statement of the total inventory of such Minuteman III missiles available to the United States, including spares.

(F) A forecast with respect to the asset attrition that includes an identification of key drivers of such asset attrition.

(G) An identification, as specific budget line items, of all funding with respect to the LGM–30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, associated ground systems, and other and supporting systems included in the budget of the Department of Defense for the fiscal year during which the strategy is submitted.

(H) An estimate of the amount of such funding the Secretary determines is necessary across the period covered by the most recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, United States Code, to ensure the continued effective operation of the the LGM–30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, associated ground systems, and other and supporting systems until the LGM–35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile reaches full operational capacity.

(b) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary shall review each strategy required under subsection (a) to assess whether the strategy is sufficient to ensure the continued effective operation of the LGM–30G

Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system until the LGM–35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile reaches full operational capacity.

(2) REPORTS.—During the period the requirement under subsection (a) is effective, the Under Secretary shall, not later than 45 days after any date on which a budget is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—

(A) the findings of the assessment required under paragraph (1);

(B) a discussion of any unfunded priorities and risk reduction opportunities with respect to the LGM–30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, associated ground systems, and other supporting systems; and

(C) any other matters as the Under Secretary determines appropriate.

SEC. 1625.[Log 82169]. REPORT ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE POLICY AND PROGRAMS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the continued implementation of the amendments made by section 1621 of the Servicemember Quality of Life National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159; 138 Stat. 2170) that includes—

(1) a proposal to consolidate administrative and resource support functions for personnel assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to a single office in the Department of Defense;

(2) a plan to clarify the relationships between—

(A) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs;

(B) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; and

(C) the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;

(3) a proposal for an organizational framework through which the Assistant Secretary will perform the portfolio management duties required under section 499c of title 10, United States Code;

(4) a description of resource requirements for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs; and

(5) such other matters as the Secretary determines appropriate.

SEC. 1642.[Log 82182] GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA.

(a) PLAN.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for the development and deployment of a next-generation air and missile defense architecture pursuant to Executive Order 14186 (90 Fed. Reg. 8767), or such successor order.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) An updated assessment of air and missile threats to the United States.

(B) A description of the system architecture of the next-generation air and missile defense architecture, including—

(i) the identification of each capability, program, and project considered to be part of such architecture;

(ii) a preliminary description of, cost estimate for, and schedule to achieve—

(I) initial operational capability; and

(II) full operational capability;

(iii) a description of relevant concepts of operations;

(iv) a plan with respect to integrating and maximizing interoperability of capabilities included in such architecture;

(v) a description of ground segment requirements to support the development and deployment of space-based capabilities included in such architecture; and

(vi) an identification of requirements with respect to the electromagnetic spectrum for the development and deployment of capabilities included in such architecture.

(C) An organizational construct defining roles and responsibilities for each participating element of the Department of Defense.

(D) An assessment of on-orbit testing and training requirements necessary for developing capabilities and ensuring long-term warfighting readiness of such architecture.

(E) A strategy for ensuring supply chain security and resilience.

(F) Identification of any additional legal authorities necessary to carry out or expedite the development and deployment of such architecture.

(G) Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.

(3) UPDATES.—Concurrent with the submission of the budget of the President to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for each of fiscal years 2028 through 2030, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees—

(A) an update to the plan under paragraph (1); and

(B) a consolidated budget exhibit identifying funding requested for the systems architecture described in the plan, including specific appropriation and line numbers, where appropriate.

(b) THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE POSTURE.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report—

(1) assessing the theater missile defense posture of the United States, including changes in the missile threat environment with respect to allies and partners of the United States and forward-deployed forces of the United States; and

(2) making recommendations, as appropriate, to—

(A) increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology development, capabilities, and operations;

(B) improve theater missile defenses of the forward-deployed forces of the United States and the territories, forces, and populations of allies of the United States; and

(C) increase and accelerate the provision of missile defense capabilities of the United States to allies and partners of the United States.

SEC. 3122. [Log 82181]. ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SPENT FUEL HANDLING RECAPITALIZATION PROJECT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors of the National Nuclear Security Administration shall carry out an independent assessment of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to such project—

(1) a root cause analysis to determine the underlying causes of the cost overruns, schedule delays and performance shortcomings;

(2) an analysis of—

(A) the quality assurance program of such project; and

(B) the corrective action processes and application of standards for nuclear quality assurance under such quality assurance program; and

(3) any other matter the Deputy Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Deputy Administrator completes the assessment required under subsection (a), the Deputy Administrators shall submit to the congres-

sional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States a report that includes the findings of such assessments.

SEC. 3534 [Log 82850]. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE INSTRUMENTATION RANGE SAFETY VESSELS.

(a) VESSEL CONSTRUCTION.—

(1) COMPLETION OF DESIGN.—Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, shall complete the design of missile instrumentation range safety vessels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet to allow for the construction of such vessels to begin in fiscal year 2027.

(2) AGREEMENT WITH VESSEL CONSTRUCTION MANAGER.—Notwithstanding section 8679 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of the Transportation, in consultation with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, shall seek to enter into an agreement with an appropriate vessel construction manager under which the vessel construction manager shall enter into a contract for the construction of not more than two such vessels in accordance with this section.

(3) DESIGN STANDARDS AND CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES.—Subject to paragraph (2), a vessel constructed pursuant to this section shall be con-

structed using commercial design standards and commercial construction practices that are consistent with the best interests of the Federal Government.

(b) CONSULTATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL ENTITIES.—The Secretary of Transportation shall consult and coordinate with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and may consult with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies regarding the vessel referred to in subsection (a) and activities associated with such vessel.

(c) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR USED VESSELS.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available to carry out this section may be used for the procurement of any used vessel.

(d) MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The Director of the Missile Defense Agency may transfer amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Missile Defense Agency for research, development, test, and evaluation to the Secretary of Transportation, to be used for the purposes authorized by this section. Any amount transferred pursuant to this subsection shall retain its original period of availability.

DIRECTIVE REPORT LANGUAGE

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DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XVI—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

SPACE ACTIVITIES

Advanced Commercial Space Weather Models

The committee recognizes the importance of advanced space weather forecasting for national security needs. Therefore, the committee encourages procurement of advanced commercial space weather models, and integration of AI-driven predictive analytics into operational systems to improve early detection of solar flares and coronal mass ejections, enhance anomaly attribution, and address the lower precision of space weather forecasting.

The committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on the benefits of procuring commercial space weather models, and feasibility of integrating AI-predictive analytics to improve the accuracy of current and future systems within the Space Force program of record. The briefing should include costs associated with implementing such changes.

Commercial Satellite Bus Integration

The committee notes that deployment of counter-space capabilities on-orbit by adversaries has increased in the past several years, as highlighted in recent unclassified reporting. The committee further notes that the U.S Space Force could better leverage the domestic industrial base as it expands and becomes more capable of producing configurable satellite buses for a wide range of mission areas, while eliminating the need for government-funded non-recurring engineering costs. The committee is concerned that while the Space Force is pursuing mission assurance through resilience and proliferation, its acquisition choices are not fully leveraging the innovation and investment of the domestic industrial base for proliferated space architectures.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition and Integration to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2026, on its plan to incentivize and increase acquisition of domestically produced, commercially available configurable satellite buses in current and future proliferated satellite architectures to achieve

competitive endurance, leverage existing private investment, and achieve programmatic and cost milestones. The report shall include an analysis of the following:

(1) the opportunity for the U.S. Space Force to leverage domestically produced configurable satellite buses utilizing novel acquisition approaches, including an estimate of potential cost savings of non-recurring engineering by utilizing commercialized satellite buses;

(2) prioritized mission areas for proliferated space architectures including preferred orbital regimes, numbers of satellites, and the industrial base capacity to meet these missions; and

(3) an analysis of acquisition policies, authorities, and practices that incentivize the reduction of non-recurring engineering costs to the Space Force for satellite bus modification in proliferated space architectures.

Commercial Space Command and Control Software

The committee notes that to address current and emerging complex threats in space the Department of the Air Force requires rapid delivery of critical space domain awareness (SDA) and Space Command and Control (C2) capabilities for the tracking and analysis of space assets, as well as related scenario planning and execution functions. To this end, the committee commends the Department's successful investment in cutting-edge commercial software technology, particularly the use of the Warp Core software platform, which leverages commercial capabilities for the secure ingestion, integration, analysis, visualization, and dissemination of data for SDA and Space C2 mission use cases at multiple classification levels, including Special Access Programs. This investment is particularly encouraging in light of the continuous challenges of other non-commercial software programs within the Department.

In addition to continuing Warp Core, the committee encourages the Department to invest in and operationalize complementary commercial capabilities to support U.S. Space Command's satellite order of battle management and adversary space data repository, Ion Trail, to increase battlespace awareness and space operations capabilities. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the following:

(1) the Space Force's future years defense program to operationalize and fund commercial capabilities for enterprise data management architecture within Warp Core to support SDA and Space C2;

(2) plans to add operational commercial software and machine learning capabilities to the Space C2 program in order to enable timely operations C2 and the execution of a joint targeting cycle, supported by Ion Trail; and

(3) the value of, and options for, using these commercial Space C2 and SDA capabilities, as well as commercial AI capabilities, to deliver capacity earlier than currently projected timelines with regard to related classified programs.

Commercially Developed Very Low Earth Orbit Systems

The committee recognizes the critical role of space domain awareness (SDA) in ensuring the security and operational effectiveness of U.S. space assets. As adversaries continue to advance their capabilities in space, the need for a persistent, responsive, and resilient SDA architecture has never been more pressing. The committee supports the research and development of commercially developed Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO) spacecraft, data, and analytics to enhance SDA operations. VLEO platforms and collection data offer unique advantages, including increased revisit rates, orbital diversity and resilience, improved electro-optical and infrared sensor resolution, and reduced signal latency, all of which contribute to real-time threat detection, tracking, and characterization of objects in space. Further, the committee recognizes the importance of the Tactical Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Tracking Program program in leveraging commercial data sources and analytics to deliver faster and more accessible information to our warfighters.

The committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on the possible benefits of commercially developed VLEO systems, what existing SDA requirements they could fulfill, and including how they could be integrated into the existing SDA architecture.

Domestic Silicon-Based Space Solar Production

The committee is encouraged by the Department's renewed focus on ensuring the defense industrial base is appropriately focused on the critical technologies required to sustain and modernize our military, particularly in space. The committee recognizes the importance of the domestic production of solar panels which are hardened to withstand the harsh environment of space, a critical component of our nation's space industrial base. Space solar panels are indispensable for ensuring reliable power generation for satellites, spacecraft, and other vital systems. The committee also recognizes the urgency of accelerating the domestic production of alternative space solar technology, as recent measures taken by the Chinese government to ban the export of strategic minerals, specifically gallium and germanium threaten to cut off the world's largest supplier of these minerals, dramatically increasing already extremely high costs and extremely long lead times associated with legacy technology. By fostering a robust domestic manufacturing capability for space-stable silicon solar panels, we can reduce our reliance on foreign supply chains, mitigate potential vulnerabilities, reduce costs and lead times, and generally enhance our nation's ability to maintain our leadership in space exploration and defense.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on the status of the domestic space solar manufacturing industrial base. The briefing shall include:

(1) an assessment of existing manufacturing facilities and their capacity to produce space-qualified solar cells and related components. This would include evaluations of production rates, costs and lead times, technological advancements, and the ability to meet both current and projected demand for defense and commercial satellite applications;

(2) an analysis of the supply chain for critical materials, such as gallium and germanium substrates used in space solar cells, wafers, and the identification of any potential vulnerabilities, including reliance on foreign sources;

(3) an overview of ongoing research and development efforts to advance space solar technologies, with an emphasis on scalability, cost, and lead times; and

(4) details of current and planned investments to sustain and expand the space solar manufacturing base, while diversifying the technology mix.

Ensuring U.S. Superiority in Space-Based LiDAR

The committee is concerned that, while China is advancing its space-based LiDAR capabilities, a critical technology for high-resolution Earth observation, precision targeting, strategic intelligence, and object detection and identification, U.S. investments in similar technology are not adequate to maintain space superiority in support of global combatant commander requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 31, 2026, outlining a strategic plan to sustain U.S. leadership in space-based LiDAR technology. The briefing shall include:

(1) evaluation of current U.S. efforts in LiDAR-equipped satellites, including the Space Development Agency's role in proliferated Low Earth Orbit (LEO) architectures, classified and unclassified programs, and existing capability gaps;

(2) recommendations to streamline commercial integration; and to reduce costs and development timelines;

(3) identification of key U.S. commercial LiDAR technology providers that can enhance national security applications;

(4) identification of capability gaps to prioritize for research, development, and rapid deployment of space-based LiDAR capabilities;

(5) strategies for enhanced collaboration with allied nations with regards to space-based LiDAR; and

(6) budgetary and policy recommendations to ensure sustained leadership and technological superiority in space-based LiDAR.

Expanding Payload Processing Capacity

The committee is concerned about the increasing strain on the existing payload processing infrastructure due to the steady growth in both Government and

commercial launches. Limited availability of processing capacity risks delaying the timely deployment of mission critical systems.

To meet the growing demand and maintain strategic competitiveness with our adversaries, the committee supports the acquisition of additional payload processing capacity. The committee further directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on how they plan to meet this growing demand in a way that prioritizes competitive, service-based payload processing capabilities that are independent of launch vehicle or spacecraft providers.

Extended Operations for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

The committee understands end-of-life satellites are disposed of every year as they are replaced with newer satellite constellations across the entire space community. These end-of-life satellites may still have mission utility to support operations and training, but are being disposed of due to a lack of funding and staffing levels needed to operate both the new constellations and the older constellations simultaneously. Retired satellites also effectively add to the rising amount of space debris, which restricts mobility for active Department of Defense assets in orbit. The committee understands that while there are programs of record to replace existing satellites providing critical weather and meteorological data, the existing Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites could continue to provide critical information to the warfighting community.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of The Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 21, 2026 regarding the DMSP constellation, to include how many satellites are disposed of annually and a cost-benefit-performance analysis to continue to extract mission value by operating the satellites by a commercial entity in lieu of disposal.

Hybrid Satellite Communication

The committee recognizes the Air Force's substantial investment in technology to connect various platforms to multiple commercial space internet systems. This investment has resulted in the development of multi-orbit software-defined radios and antennas capable of providing resilient communications through access to at least two frequency bands and satellites in three different orbital planes. These advancements have the potential to transform long-range communications across the Air Force fleet. However, the committee is concerned that the necessary funding to implement these systems on aircraft has not been adequately addressed in the President's Budget Request.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 30, 2025, on the Air Force plan to install resilient Hybrid SATCOM terminals on Air Force

Platforms and include the timeline for developing requirements, programing funding and installation milestones.

Modernizing Mission Assurance for Space Launch

The committee continues to recognize the importance of mission assurance for national security space launches. Mission assurance requirements have previously been based on limited ordering quantities, challenging highly energetic orbital requirements, complicated bespoke integration, and national security sensitivity and applied uniformly to all national security space launches regardless of their mission set. More recently the National Security Space Launch Program has endeavored to create tailored mission assurance requirements that more accurately reflect modern launch industry standards under Phase 3 that allowed for the selection of levels of mission assurance and risk according to the mission. Other launch programs managed by the Space Force, such as the Orbital Services Program and Sounding Rocket Program, have not updated their mission assurance requirements. The committee believes that the Orbital Services Program and Sounding Rocket Program serve important roles and functions for our nation's military and would benefit from a more modern and agile mission assurance structure.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to submit a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 30, 2025, on how the Space Force plans to modernize mission assurance requirements for launch across all their programs. The plan should include:

(1) a specific timeline, responsible offices, and measurable milestones for implementing modernized mission assurance requirements for experimental, test, prototype, and operational payloads in all Assured Access to Space launch programs, including the Orbital Services Program and Sounding Rocket Program; and

(2) a process for updating mission assurance requirements on a regular basis as launch cadence increases and more launch providers are onboarded into Space Force managed launch contracts.

National Security Space Launch Infrastructure

The committee recognizes the increasing volume of space launches from the United States, which necessitates expanded launch infrastructure, including potentially increased pad availability and allocation, to address the current capacity at existing ranges. Further, diversifying national security launch sites would enhance resiliency and foster competition in space launch capacity.

The committee is aware that the increased launch cadence may overstress current range infrastructure that is unique and restricted by geography due to hazard areas, overflight, and target orbital locations. These factors make range infrastructure, including specialized launch sites, especially valuable.

The committee notes that current investments have been primarily focused on the Eastern and Western ranges and that launch pad allocations have become increasingly competitive.

The committee encourages the Space Force to continue to work with the commercial launch providers and the operators of existing spaceports to identify current and future needs of the launch sector and opportunities for expanded national security launches at other active spaceports.

To fully understand the plans of the U.S. Space Force in addressing launch pad availability and range resilience efforts, the committee further directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services no later than March 1, 2026 that assesses and identifies critical infrastructure upgrades needed at state-owned and operated spaceports to support national security space missions, to include support facility improvements that enhance satellite processing capabilities, and upgraded range safety systems; and details the current allocation strategy for launch sites at the Eastern and Western ranges, to include:

(1) a list of current launch pad occupants, including those in use by commercial, government, and other service branches;

(2) the current and future activities conducted on each launch site by the government and other service branches;

(3) impacts resulting from road closures, increased vehicle traffic, facility evacuations and closures and effects on transportation, storage and payload and launch vehicle processing activities and launch due to manifest disruptions;

(4) steps taken to ensure a competitive, transparent, and cost-effective process is used in making site allocations determinations that is forward-looking;

(5) adequacy of existing infrastructure, port capacity, and the availability of commodities, water supply for launch deluge systems, and water retention and treatment facilities;

(6) impacts on national security payloads and operations when in transport, integration and processing or on the pad when super heavy launch vehicles are fueled, launched, and returned in the immediate vicinity;

(7) adequacy/availability of financial compensation for damages to buildings and hardware and disruptions to launch operations;

(8) assessment of current real estate instruments and other documents to determine whether such agreements contain adequate terms and conditions or require modification to reflect commercial terms;

(9) assessment of the need for additional documents/agreements to address the use of common launch infrastructure, range services and costs, common infrastructure development and improvements; and

(10) the need for additional or enhanced range management practices and procedures for establishing launch scheduling and launch manifest priorities, minimization of impacts to launch operations and coordination of transportation, storage and processing of launch hardware impacted by increased launch rates and

the introduction of a super heavy vehicle to the ranges, including impacts to National Air Space corridors and sea lanes.

Space Access, Mobility, and Logistics

The committee applauds the creation of a designated program office for Space Access, Mobility and Logistics (SAML) and acknowledges the ambitious need for mobility within space to meet U.S. Space Command's need for sustained space maneuver in the near-term. The committee notes the progress SAML has made through small-scale technology demonstrations to address these needs. However, the committee would like to see the program office also execute larger-scale demonstrations with commercial space systems that have achieved a high technology readiness level through public-private partnerships. Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026 detailing:

(1) how it intends to deliver foundational capabilities such as on-orbit mobility, refueling, orbit repositioning, sustained maneuver, and autonomous rendezvous, including the ability of providing on-orbit SML capabilities for unprepared satellites as quickly as possible; and

(2) a funding profile to support the SAML program office across the future years defense program.

Space Modulator Manipulator Project

The committee recognizes the significant advancements in industry and academia that have enabled new capabilities within the space domain. The committee understands that the U.S. Space Force has been working to develop a domestically vended, flight rate modular manipulator capability that can be mounted on spacecraft for peacetime servicing and logistical use, as well as defense against adversarial systems. The committee believes the U.S. Space Force should continue these efforts and supports the construction of a flight unit and testing of the actuator by the U.S. Space Force's Test program.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by February 15, 2026, on the need for a space-rated robotic arm. The briefing shall include:

(1) an evaluation of why this technology is critical in the context of space operations;

(2) a list of potential functional uses associated with a robotic arm in orbit;

(3) efforts by academic partners to support the U.S. Space Force's efforts and opportunities to expand partnerships with academic partners moving forward; and

(4) other ways that this American-made technology could fill gaps in United States Space Force capabilities.

Spaceflight Qualifying Commercial Solutions for Classified

The committee is concerned that the hardware encryptor supply chain has delayed national security space programs in the past. With the dramatic increase in spacecraft being launched in support of Department of Defense, the logistical challenges associated with the use of hardware encryption are negatively affecting responsiveness and performance.

Since 2010, the NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) solution has transformed the delivery of Information Assurance solutions to the Department of Defense by enabling secure communications and protection of classified information through an ever-expanding diverse set of commercial products, including software-based solutions. Significant savings have been reported using these CSfC software-based encryption capabilities over the traditional hardware encryptors. Spaceflight qualifying CSfC represents a major potential to resolve the logistical challenges associated with hardware encryptors, including the ability to load cryptographic keys after launch—reducing cost and increasing flexibility. Innovative application of CSfC may also enable the ability to configure cryptographic technology after launch and respond to an adversary's evolving Signals Intelligence capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 1, 2026 on the feasibility and requirements for spaceflight qualifying CSfC for national security missions. The briefing should include, but not be limited to:

(1) the requirements for a software-based encryption architecture for spacecraft connecting to national security systems or processing classified data;

(2) the process to validate and approve a software-based CSfC system for classified operations; and

(3) an assessment of the potential operational flexibility a software-based CSfC system will enable through dynamic platform and multi-level security.

Tactically Responsive Space

The committee notes the progress made on demonstrating Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) capabilities and its enduring role in securing our nation's interests in, from, and to space. The committee notes that TacRS is designed to challenge our traditional assumptions and processes by demonstrating the United States' capability to rapidly acquire, launch, and operate a space vehicle on operationally relevant timelines in order to respond to on-orbit threats while also leveraging the innovation from the commercial contributions and private sector innovation. TacRS includes not only operationally responsive launch, but also a wide range of other space based missions areas including Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and space control operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the House

Committee on Armed Services not later than February 6, 2026, on Tactically Responsive Space. This briefing shall include, at a minimum, the following items:

(1) a plan detailing a five-year roadmap for the development, demonstration, integration, and funding for TacRS to include launch and space systems;

(2) an evaluation of the current industrial base for TacRS that could be used for TacRS, SDA, space control missions, and any other emerging mission areas; and

(3) an evaluation of associated actions and milestones required to ensure successful operational integration of TacRS for both on-orbit and ground-based space systems.

NUCLEAR FORCES

Air Force Ballistic Missile and Reentry Test Activities

The committee continues to support the inclusion of a wide range of commercial space capabilities to support critical Department of Defense needs, and notes the reentry flight test bed program to support strategic system component development established pursuant to section 1645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).

The committee believes further opportunities exist to leverage commercial space capabilities to meet the Department's development and testing needs in a cost-effective manner, and notes the Department of the Air Force's projected investment in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities, including reentry systems, including technology maturation, risk reduction, advanced component development, and prototyping to validate new strategic technologies and upgrades. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services, not later than March 1, 2026, on Department of Air Force plans to integrate commercial space solutions to support the advancement of a range of technologies under development by the Air Force ICBM programs. The report should include:

(1) a summary of activities carried out in connection with the authority provided in section 1645 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024;

(2) a description of the Department of the Air Force ICBM component and sub-scale test needs within the next five years;

(3) commercial space capabilities available to support ICBM component and sup-scale test needs; and

(4) recommended funding levels necessary to fulfill the test needs identified in element (1).

MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Generative Artificial Intelligence Mission Planner

The committee notes that recent U.S. operations in the Red Sea highlight the urgent need for a Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control capability across the joint force. Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Force-Level Mission Planners that can be remotely deployed to multiple units would maximize lethality, as mission planning must account for the entire force, rather than individual units.

Additionally, the U.S. Navy requires AI-driven tactical mission planners connected to Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) to enable the Chief of Naval Operations' 2024 Navigation Plan directive to "Fight From the MOC." This need is amplified as the fleet integrates next-generation sensors like AN/SPY-6. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Navy Program Executive Officer for Integrated Weapons Systems, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on a program to develop and deploy generative AI mission planning capabilities to IAMD Aegis BMD ships. The briefing should include a notional program schedule, and costs to develop and deploy such a capability.

Aerial Target Requirements for Integrated Air and Missile Defense Testing

The committee recognizes the critical role of aerial defense systems in protecting U.S. forces and key installations against a broad spectrum of aerial threats, including hypersonic weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rockets, artillery, and unmanned aerial systems. As the Department of Defense continues to develop and integrate integrated air and missile defense technologies, the committee emphasizes the necessity of robust testing and evaluation to ensure effectiveness against evolving and increasingly sophisticated threats.

To ensure a rigorous and repeatable test environment, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Missile Defense Agency, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 28, 2026, on the Department's plan for utilizing aerial targets in defense system testing. The briefing shall include:

(1) an assessment of current and future aerial target requirements to replicate threats emerging defense systems are expected to counter;

(2) a plan for integrating aerial target testing into evaluation efforts, including joint service and allied interoperability assessments; and

(3) budgetary considerations for the procurement and sustainment of aerial targets in support of integrated air and missile defense programs of record.

Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System for Guam

The committee continues to support efforts to improve the defense of Guam against the full spectrum of advanced missile threats and notes the Department's progress toward finalizing the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) System on Guam.

In order to better understand the EIAMD's impact on Guam's utilities and infrastructure, the committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 1, 2026, describing such impacts, including impacts to electrical power, water, wastewater, stormwater and solid waste management systems. The briefing shall also include a description of required infrastructure improvements, to include an assessment of adequate housing on Guam for the increased military and civilian presence on the land once the system if fully deployed, as well as the development and consideration of alternatives in the EIS process.

Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 30, 2026, assessing the feasibility and advisability of establishing an Economic Adjustment Committee for Guam.

Hypersonic Defense

The committee remains concerned about the growth of adversary offensive hypersonic systems and the development schedule for U.S. capabilities to defend against such threats. The committee notes that the budget request included $200.6 million for the Missile Defense Agency's Hypersonic Defense program, and Congress has provided significant additional resources to accelerate the development of hypersonic defense systems. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 1, 2026, on possible options to accelerate the delivery of hypersonic defense capabilities. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) an updated assessment of options for accelerating the Glide Phase Interceptor program based current resources;

(2) an assessment of the feasibility of utilizing a spiral development approach that incrementally delivers capability to accelerate schedule; and

(3) an assessment of the feasibility of developing an interim hypersonic defense capability prior to the Initial Operational Capability planned for the Glide Phase Interceptor program.

Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor

The committee understand the Army plans to fully modernize Patriot battalions through the annual procurement of Low Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radars. Given the long-term nature of this plan, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 1, 2026, on the feasibility of entering into a multiyear contract for procurement of the LTADMS. The briefing should include the following:

(1) an estimated timeline for equipping all Patriot battalions with LTAMDS under the current program of record;

(2) an analysis of at least two different multi-year contract options that vary in either duration or quantity, at least one of which assumes an average procurement of three battalions of radars per year;

(3) an assessment of potential cost and schedule savings that could be achieved through a multiyear procurement approach;

(4) an assessment of potential impacts to the industrial base that could be achieved through a multiyear procurement approach; and

(5) any other matters the Secretary of the Army considers appropriate.

OTHER MATTERS

Assessment of Hypersonic Materials Manufacturing and Industrial Base Resilience

The committee supports the Department of Defense's ongoing efforts to mature and expand the U.S. hypersonic industrial base, which is critical to enabling current and future hypersonic and reentry technology and capability development and production necessary to meet the National Defense Strategy. To ensure readiness and resilience in the face of evolving threats, the committee emphasizes the need for a comprehensive evaluation of the industrial base supporting hypersonic weapons and strategic-system reentry vehicle production. The committee recognizes the critical role of the hypersonic weapons industrial base in national security. Advanced materials, particularly high-temperature Thermal Protection System (TPS) materials like Carbon/Carbon composites are essential for hypersonic and reentry systems. However, manufacturing bottlenecks, including slow material densification processes, limit production capacity and scalability. To address these challenges, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Armed Services Committee no later than March 31, 2026, assessing the state of the hypersonic and strategic-systems reentry vehicle industrial base. The briefing shall include:

(1) an evaluation of current Carbon/Carbon composite densification capabilities and constraints;

(2) an analysis of alternative densification processes, including those processes currently being explored by the industrial base, that could dramatically speed production and provide cost efficiencies;

(3) a review of industrial bottlenecks in fabrication, machining, and assembly, with recommendations to enhance scalability;

(4) an evaluation of material durability under extreme conditions;

(5) recommendations for targeted investments to strengthen production capacity, workforce, and infrastructure; and

(6) strategies to optimize production rates, reduce costs, and decrease reliance on foreign supply chains.

Availability of Rayon-based Materials

The committee recognizes the critical role that ablative materials play in the performance and reliability of defense systems, including solid rocket motors, reentry vehicles, and other high-temperature applications. However, the Department of Defense remains reliant on rayon-based materials, which face supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing costs, and limitations in performance relative to modern material science advancements. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by April 1, 2026, on the feasibility of replacing rayon-based materials in ablative systems with an improved alternative. The briefing shall include an assessment of viable alternatives, a proposed timeline for integration into existing and future systems, and any legislative or funding recommendations necessary to support the transition.

Utilization of Commercial Reusable Hypersonic Test Beds as a Service

The committee is concerned that the United States continues to lag significantly behind the hypersonic testing and training cadence of competitor nations, which threatens the U.S. strategic and technological advantage in hypersonic defense capabilities and force proficiency and readiness against hypersonic threats. One significant challenge is the use of high-cost attritable test articles for use in non-intercept testing such as detection, tracking and targeting. The committee notes that the utilization of reusable commercial options would provide cost savings and support an increase in much-needed testing and training cadence.

The committee supports utilizing commercial and reusable hypersonic test beds for the purposes of targeting, tracking, and training, as a service and ensure industry-owned test articles are representative of emerging threats and in use for increased hypersonic-defense flight testing. The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in consultation with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2026, on the benefits of commercial and reusable hypersonic test beds and how they plan to collaborate with industry to take advantage of these test articles. The briefing should include proposed costs to implement such approach.

DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Kansas City Non-nuclear Component Expansion Transformation

The committee continues to support the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) effort to increase the Kansas City National Security Campus' capacity and capability, known as the Kansas City Non-nuclear Component Expansion Transformation (KCNExT), and notes NNSA's continued evaluation of the best approach to gaining new infrastructure in a timely and cost-effective manner. Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than April 1, 2026, assessing funding mechanisms for KCNExT, including an assessment of the relative merits of alternative approaches, including incremental funding purchase and sale agreements.

National Nuclear Security Administration Cloud Computing Strategy

The committee notes the ongoing effort by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to modernize its digital infrastructure and enable closer collaboration between its geographically dispersed Federal offices, laboratories, plants, and sites. The committee is interested in a better understanding of NNSA's long-term plans with respect to increased utilization of cloud computing capabilities. Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 2, 2026, on NNSA's approach to an enterprise-wide cloud computing strategy. The briefing shall include:

(1) a summary of current enterprise-wide guidance with respect to utilizing commercial cloud computing capabilities, including guidance for determining the appropriate mix of on-premises computing and cloud services;

(2) a description of cloud computing utilization across the nuclear security enterprise and an assessment of the level of coordination between federal and contractor activities;

(3) an assessment of the total cost of ownership between on-premises and commercial cloud that includes such elements as computing labor, cost to construct and maintain high performance compute facilities, data centers, power, cooling, and associated infrastructure;

(4) an assessment of the enterprise's current utilization level for cloud computing capabilities, compared to commercial industry best practices and Federal agencies with similar defense and national security missions; and

(5) an analysis of the feasibility of and potential efficiencies from establishing a common set of cloud-enabled software or interoperable digital tools for nuclear weapon design, production and maintenance activities.