

**STATEMENT BY**

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Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, distinguished Members of the Sub-committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to testify today about the important work the Department of Defense is doing in countering the improvised explosive device threat. It's also a particular honor to be able to appear with LTG Metz, who has provided superb leadership for this effort over the past two years. Let me begin by thanking this Subcommittee and the full Committee for your unwavering support for protecting our men and women in harm's way. The wars of this past decade have challenged our military to both grow quickly and to rapidly adapt to deadly tactics from new enemies. Your unstinting support has been critical to meeting those challenges.

Clearly, one of the biggest challenges has been Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs. They remain, without question, the violent extremist's weapon of choice against U.S. forces. Over the past year we have seen an increase in the use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, not only as a stand-alone weapon but also, increasingly, as part of complex attacks involving more conventional direct-fire weapons. The IED is the weapon responsible for inflicting the most casualties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Although we have seen a decrease in the number of IED attacks in Iraq and IED's have become less effective against U.S. personnel there, the insurgents continue to use IEDs to attack and de-stabilize the Government of Iraq. Additionally, IEDs have become a major source of concern in parts of Africa, the Pacific Region, and South America. In this time of growing asymmetric threats, we believe the use of IEDs will remain the most likely weapon of choice for violent extremist groups because they are low-cost, high-yield weapons that inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk and expense.

Within the Defense Department, the Joint IED Defeat Organization has the responsibility to “lead, focus and advocate” all counter-IED efforts. Secretary Gates and his leadership team strongly support JIEDDO as an organization and the institutionalization of its value-added capabilities throughout our large and diverse defense community. The unique authorities and capabilities of JIEDDO enable us to rapidly experiment, develop, and field both materiel and non-material solutions to the grave and persistent threats posed by IEDs. Perhaps most important, JIEDDO is delivering for its customers. Our combatant commanders continue to confirm that JIEDDO provides a unique and vital capability to counter IEDs and the insurgent networks that employ them.

As this Committee knows, JIEDDO is a truly Joint organization and relies on inputs from across the Department. DoD’s Directive 2000.19E from February 14, 2006 established JIEDDO as an organization that “operates under the authority, direction and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.” To accomplish its responsibilities, JIEDDO has developed the Joint IED Capability Approval and Management Process (JAACAMP). This process consists of a three-tiered structure of advisory boards that review, evaluate and coordinate on specific initiatives prior to a final decision on funding. This governance structure, much like the IED threat itself, cuts across institutional lines to provide a broad and balanced look at JIEDDO initiatives. Let me summarize its key features:

- JIEDDO first presents initiatives to the joint resource and acquisition board (JRAB), an advisory board composed of O6/GS-15 members from across the Department, including representatives from the Services, various sections of the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. This board meets weekly to review initiatives and highlight any issues that need to be resolved.

- After JRAB analysis, an initiative is then briefed to the Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT). The JIPT is a board of military flag officers or civilian senior executive service members from the same organizations; it meets weekly. The members of this board provide written recommendations to the Director of JIEDDO. If the proposed initiative costs less than \$25 million, the JIEDDO Director can approve funding the initiative. If the total cost of the initiative is over \$25 million the initiative is staffed through the Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG).
- The SRSG is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consists of three and four star military officers (including the Vice Chief of Staff for each military service) and equivalent senior executive service personnel, again from the same organizations as the JRAB and JIPT. These high ranking defense officials provide written recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then makes the decision on whether to fund the proposed initiative.

Within DoD more broadly, there are, as you know, a number of key offices that provide essential expertise to the deliberations of the advisory boards. Within Secretary Gates' staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ensures that specific initiatives conform to intelligence policy and are closely coordinated with the intelligence community. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provide critical input on the technological feasibility of the initiative. Meanwhile, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation provides input on budget and programmatic issues. For their part, the Military Departments provide input on where a particular initiative might fit within their future capabilities planning. And the Joint Staff – within Chairman Mullen's J8 directorate -- provides input on where the initiative might fit within

Joint capabilities. I appreciate how complex this overall structure may appear; it is indeed a multi-faceted undertaking and it remains a work in progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised JAACAMP procedure by the end of November. And DOD Directive 2000.19E is also due for revision in 2010.

Let me provide a bit more detail regarding the distinctive role of the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy. Under Secretary Michele Flournoy acts as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense and provides an overall assessment of policy that affects IED defeat activities within DoD. She also serves as a principal advisor to JIEDDO regarding DoD policy and plans to ensure that JIEDDO activities are not in conflict with national security objectives. OSD Policy also provides advice, guidance, and oversight of the policy, technology, and operational realms in several areas linked to JIEDDO's mission -- Combating Terrorism, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and Special Operations Forces.

As a member of the various JIEDDO governance boards, OSD- Policy poses the following questions when reviewing a given initiative:

1. Has a combatant commander requested this specific counter-IED capability? This is usually evident if there is a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), but in cases where there is no JUONS we dig deeper to ensure that we are promoting needed capabilities and research within JIEDDO's specific purview.

2. Has the capability been appropriately tested for both operational field uses and to ensure that it will work as expected? We are acutely conscious of the imperative to ensure the fast fielding of specific systems while also keeping defective or non-performing items out of the field.

3. Does the initiative fit within other DoD or U.S government policies, and how do we resolve potential or actual conflicts?

4. Does the initiative provide a comprehensive approach that includes a plan for acquiring the equipment, training the users, and sustaining the equipment in the field to deliver a real capability to the warfighter? While JIEDDO initiatives rely on the Services to take on these tasks after the first two years of funding, it is essential that the basics for those first two-years be well-laid out. We try to avoid “drive-by” fielding situations that make it harder for commanders in the field to do their missions.

5. Is JIEDDO maintaining a balanced portfolio of initiatives? That is, are we balancing short-term acquisition and medium-term research and development investments? Are we balancing high-risk, big return efforts with lower-risk moderate return efforts? Are we providing both force protection and offensive abilities to attack IED networks?

6. Finally, what can we do to improve our coalition partners’ counter-IED efforts, including especially those who are operating alongside or in lieu of our service members in today’s irregular warfare environments?

Of all of those questions, I would lay special emphasis on the last. OSD-Policy works with JIEDDO to assist our partners, allies, and coalition forces in developing compatible counter-IED technology and training. We have worked to provide necessary authorizations and funding so that counter-IED equipment (like the SYMPHONY system) and tactics can be provided to our coalition partners.

As we look to the future, we have – regrettably – high confidence that the use of IEDs by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals across the globe will continue to increase. And while the need to have an organizational steward like JIEDDO that leads, focuses, and advocates for DoD’s efforts to counter IEDs may be affected by changes in the size of our expeditionary deployments over time, the requirement itself will not disappear. Mr. Chairman, we look forward to working closely with your committee and with Congress more generally to develop an enduring structure that will continue to deliver these critical capabilities to our forces.

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