

Statement of
Lynn O'Shea – Director of Research
National Alliance of Families
For the Return of America's Missing Servicemen
World War II – Cold War – Korea – Vietnam – Gulf Wars

I would like to thank the Committee for providing the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen the opportunity to address our concerns on Improving Recovery and Full Accounting of our POWs and MIAs from all past conflicts.

Some addressing the committee today will speak of the need for additional resources including an increase in qualified personnel to speed the recovery and identification process for World War II, Korea and Cold War losses. We echo their request and call for an increase in funding to speed the recovery and identification of remains recovered from all Wars.

Today, we would like to address a specific aspect of the accounting effort. **In far too many cases fate determinations have been made in spite of evidence of wartime survival. These premature and often erroneous determinations of fate were reached by dismissing evidence once deemed creditable, result in JPAC, with DPMO concurrence, searching for individuals at their loss location in spite of evidence the individuals were moved or being moved to another location.** The accounting community should objectively investigate, not ignore or summarily dismiss evidence that is contrary to its long-held, but clearly tenuous conclusions.

Now, we are hearing another method of accounting may be considered. This new method would allow the removal of a serviceman from the list of unaccounted for based on an analytical review, rather than the physical recovery of the individual, alive or dead. It was these same types of analytical reviews allowed an individual with evidence of capture and survival, to be considered lost at his incident site, thus resulting in searches with little chance of success.

We would object to this new method of accounting most strenuously. More importantly it sends the wrong message to the governments of Southeast Asia, China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union. Why would they provide information on men the U.S. government no longer considers unaccounted for? It also sends a similar message to our present day enemies that U.S. service men and women lost in a combat situation would have their fate decided by an analyst thousands of miles away and not by someone in the field with real time knowledge.

As part of the accounting effort the National Alliance of Families, fully supports H.Res 111 calling for a formation of a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in the House of Representatives. We are aware of concerns expressed by some that the previous Senate committee took resources away from recovery and identification efforts. The white paper submitted with our testimony clear shows that recovery and identification efforts were ongoing and robust and in no way affected by the workings of the Senate Committee.

When the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs issued its final report, in 1993, they recommended their work be ongoing. That recommendation was not carried out. Unfortunately, this committee simply does not have the investigative staff or resources to continue and expand the work begun by the Senate Committee.

Among the leads yet to be fully examined are the numerous sightings of U.S. servicemen in the camps and prisons of the former Soviet Union. No less a figure than the commanding general of Soviet forces operating on the Korean Peninsula during the war years (Georgi Lobov) spoke of the transfer of U.S. POWs from North Korea to Moscow. Acknowledgements of such transfers have come from former U.S. and Soviet officials and defectors as well. Added to all of this are reports that a USAF pilot, Major Samuel Busch, a Cold War loss whose sister resides in Congressman Murphy's district, was seen alive on Soviet soil after his aircraft was shot down in June 1952. All of this suggests that much more effort --genuine and unrelenting -- needs to be made before we can say that we have accounted for our missing servicemen.

As recently as 2005 the Joint Commission Support Directorate, the investigative arm of the U.S. Russian Joint POW/MIA Commission concluded in the 5th Edition of their Gulag Study; "Americans, including American servicemen, were imprisoned in the former Soviet Union."

Past administrations have failed to apply the investigative and diplomatic resources needed to obtain answers to basic questions such as the following:

- 1) **What happened to the Americans, many listed by name, who were known to be alive and in North Korean prisoner camps but never returned?**
- 2) What does North Korea know about the men whose identification cards, and other information about them, have been displayed in Pyongyang's Korean War Museum?
- 3) Did North Korea receive U.S. prisoners, or information about U.S. prisoners, from Vietnam during or after the Vietnam War?
- 4) Who are the imprisoned "U.S. POWs" reported by North Korean escapees and other sources years after the war and who are the living "war criminals" or "survivors from the war" referenced by North Korean officials in recent years?
- 5) What does North Korea know about reported shipments of U.S. POWs from Korea to China and the Soviet Union?

Two examples are quite telling. In 2003, the People's Republic of China-- following 50 years of North Korean and Chinese denials-- conceded to DoD representatives that it had secretly shipped an American serviceman to China during the Korean War and lied about his fate afterwards. Beijing now claimed it had buried Army Sgt. Richard Desautels in Shenyang in 1953 but "lost" his body. The Chinese also admitted possessing a 9-10 page "classified" report on Sgt. Desautels. Despite this startling information, there is no public evidence that in the years since the Pentagon obtained the "classified" Chinese report, verified the potentially-questionable claim of Sgt. Desautels' death in 1953, or used the Chinese admission to develop information on other Americans who were reported by U.S. intelligence in China during the war but never returned.

The "Green Dragon Rescue Operation" presents another chilling example. On May 24th, 1953, the U.S. military attempted to rescue an American bomber crew downed in January. Radio contact was established with 1LT Gilbert Ashley. The rescuers had also obtained evidence that Ashley's fellow crewmen Airman 2nd Class Hidemaro Ishida, 1LT Arthur R. Olsen, 2LT John P. Shaddick and 1LT Harold P. Turner were alive in enemy hands. The rescue turned out to be an ambush and the crewmen could not be recovered, but U.S. intelligence maintained contact with the crew through their captors and received detailed reports on their captivity from a defector.

“Ashley and four crew members, (Turner, Olsen, Shaddick, and Ishida) were known to be alive in Communist hands as of the close of the Korean conflict, Jul 53,” reported a previously classified U.S. Air Intelligence Report. Despite this clear and detailed information, the U.S. Government has failed to make accounting for this crew a priority with the North Korean government.

A new House Select Committee, as part of the accounting process, must include the POWs who survived their loss incident, were in some form of captivity for an undetermined period of time, and might possibly be alive today. As we see with the number of South Korean soldier, captured during the Korean War, escaping North Korea, survival for American’s is not beyond the realm of possibility. Differentiating between the known defectors in North Korea one former analyst with the Defense POW Missing Personnel Office wrote in 1996 “A second, larger group of Americans is comprised of US service members, most likely POWs from the Korean War and possibly Vietnam War era. There have been numerous reports of both American and British POWs in North Korea.”

We recognize the difficulty in getting access and answers from North Korea. However, we believe a through review of contemporaneous U.S. documents relating to Korean and Cold War losses, under the direction of a House Select Committee will provide valuable information and new leads on the fate of many unaccounted for servicemen. Unfortunately, the Senate Committee on POW/MIA Affairs limited by its charter and time was unable to accomplish such a review for Korea and Cold War losses. This is yet another reason we need H.Res 111.

Search, recovery and identification efforts are important, but searching for men at loss locations when contemporaneous documents indicate the men were captured, will not lead to their recovery. When these recovery operations fail as they will, remains are then declared unrecoverable. This is not accounting it is fiction.

DPMO, in one case involving four soldiers, maintains the four were ambushed and killed. They cite a report of “20 – 30 rounds of small arms fire” to support their conclusion.

The facts, however, do not support the DPMO analytical review. Multiple documents including the unit’s duty log, statements of witnesses before a Board of Inquiry, and letters from the U.S. Army to the families of the missing men, all state the gunshots heard involved another squad and did not relate to this incident. In a letter to the wife of one of the men, Col. C.A. Stanfiel, acting Adjutant General of the Army stated:

"Weapons fire was heard in the area; however, the firing involved a squad of men in an area other than where the second sampan was last seen."

These documents have not swayed DPMO from their determination that the four were ambushed and killed.

Additionally, a CIA report citing information from two sources reported the 4 men as captured. DPMO dismissed the report as “hearsay.”

This brings us to the “Tourison Memos,” discovered during archival research in March of 2006. These memos were written by Sedgwick D. Tourison during his tenure as an investigator with the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. In one memo dated August 1, 1992, **Tourison, a former senior analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote;**

“My review of POW/MIA case files disclosed DIA/JTFFA message traffic referring to individuals DoD now has information survived into captivity.”

“Survived into captivity”, there is no ambiguity in those words. Among the servicemen named are the four soldiers previously mentioned, soldiers DPMO continues to insist were ambushed and immediately killed. If JPAC continues to look for these men at their loss location, they will never be found, unless the Vietnamese choose to return their remains to the site for recovery.

In an earlier memo dated July 22nd, with the subject **“Vietnamese reports about U.S. POWs not previously known by the Defense Department”** Tourison reported **“My review of JCRC [Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the forerunner of JPAC] casualty files has surfaced several messages which list a total of nine American servicemen Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive....”** The memo went on to say **“This information has come from Vietnamese officials a piece at a time over the past two years. I suspect we will learn about more such cases as time goes on. While the precise fate of the nine is not clear, it appears likely they died in captivity in southern Vietnam and this is the first admission from Vietnam that these nine were captured alive.”**

Named among the nine is Marine Cpl. Gregory J. Harris. In spite of the Vietnamese admission of capture, JPAC, with DPMO concurrence continues to look for Cpl. Harris at his loss location. He is considered “fate determined” and after several investigations at the loss location the chances for remains recovery is now rated as low. Of course they are low, the Vietnamese admitted capturing Harris. As with the previous case cited, his remains are not at the loss location and will only be found there if the Vietnamese choose to return them to the site.

Unfortunately, none of the information contained in the Tourison Memos was ever provided to the families of the men name. Nor was this information mentioned in the final report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs or included in the individuals’ case files.

DPMO has dismissed Tourison’s memos, referring to them as his opinion. Yet one memo clearly states there were “a total of nine American servicemen Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive.” That is not opinion. It is a statement of fact. Tourison saw something in the files that allowed him to write the words “Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive” and “survived into captivity.”

With so many questions left unanswered or not addressed by the Senate Select Committee the families of our POWs and MIA have been forced to do their own research.

In another case, involving 8 individuals, three of whom were known to have perished in the loss incident, but with evidence of survival for as many as four others a family was forced to independently research Search and Rescue logs because the accounting community long denied the existence of any transmission evidence following the crash. After the family presented Search and Rescue logs, which detailed and attributed survival radio beacon signals to Baron-52 in the days following the crash, DPMO acknowledged knowing of the logs yet dismissed them as not relevant – despite the fact that the logs show conclusive evidence of communications which further supports the data and expert analysis strongly suggesting that some crew members survived, and that the decision to change their status from MIA to KIA was made against protocol and the contemporaneous evidence.

“Today, Defense Department files contain evidence that at least 59 Americans were -- or may have been -- taken prisoner and their precise fate is still unclear. This includes the 20-30 not officially acknowledged by Vietnam in 1973. This represents the minimum number of possible live POWs today.”

Those are not my words. They are the words contained in an August 17th 1992 memo again written by Sedgwick Tourison based on a consensus of investigators assigned to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Found with the memo was a list naming the 59 Americans. Among those named are three of the four individuals DPMO continues to insist were ambushed and killed.

Another very experienced intelligence analyst working for the Senate Committee described the results of his review of material held at the Defense Intelligence Agency saying: “There are over 40 guys who were/are POWs based on the evidence.”

Since the Senate committee closed its doors, much new information has surfaced, including a report referred to within DPMO as the **“185 Report.”** In 1993 DPMO received a report that 185 American POWs had been held in Southeast Asia after 1973, possibly as late as 1976. The report was recognized as possibly credible. During the mid-1990's a Russian geologist was interviewed and reported that he was told in 1976 by Vietnamese counterparts that the Vietnamese Government at that time was holding live American POWs. The families of our unaccounted for servicemen have yet to be told what has been done to investigate that report.

The Senate Committee in its final report concluded; “There is evidence; moreover, that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number, after Operation Homecoming.”

In 1996, an analyst with DPMO wrote; "There are too many live sighting reports, specifically observations of several Caucasians in a collective farm by Romanians and the North Korean defectors' eyewitness of Americans in DPRK to dismiss that there are no American POW's in North Korea."

Isn't it time we find out what happened to these men, not by searching at their loss locations, or creative accounting methods but with an open congressional review of new information coupled with a review of information previous committees were unable to fully address due to time constraints.

Lynn O'Shea – serves as a volunteer with the National Alliance of Families as editor of the Alliance newsletter “Bits N Pieces,” conducting both general and case specific research. On a number of occasions, this research has provided POW/MIA family members with new information on their cases. Ms. O'Shea has been with the Alliance since its inception, in 1990.

National Alliance of Families
For the Return of America's Missing Servicemen
World War II – Cold War – Korea – Vietnam – Gulf Wars

Exhibit List

Exhibit 1.

Battling the Misinformation Campaign Against H. Res 111

Exhibit 2.

Tourison Memo dated August 1, 1992 – Subject: “Vietnamese reports about U.S. POWs not previously known by the Defense Department”

Exhibit 3.

Tourison Memo dated July 22, 1992 – Subject: “Individuals Reported Died in Captivity and not listed on current DoD/Vessey/SSC priority lists.”

Exhibit 4.

Seven Reasons Why We Need H.Res 111

Exhibit 5.

What the Documents Say -- Why We Need H.Res 111

Exhibit 6.

- A. Statement of Christine LaFrate & Mary Ann Reitano, family of Cpl. Gregory J. Harris
USMC POW 6/12/66
- B. Statement of Ann Holland, wife of T/Sgt. Melvin A. Holland
USAF POW/MIA 3/11/68

Exhibit 7.

White Paper - American POW/MIAs in North Korean Hands & Questions
Pyongyang Must Answer

Exhibit 8.

White Paper - DPMO A Timeline of Failure

Exhibit 1

National Alliance of Families
For the Return of America's Missing Servicemen
World War II – Cold War – Korea – Vietnam – Gulf Wars

Battling the Misinformation Against H.Res 111

During the last session of Congress as we worked toward passage of H.Res 111, others worked toward its defeat. Using scare tactics and misinformation, they tried to convince members of congress that a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs would slowdown or halt ongoing remains recovery operations. The email below is one example of the misinformation that circulated. According to the email;

"WHEN THESE COMMITTEES CONVENE, THE ENTIRE SEARCH PROCESS GRINDS TO A HALT. All time is lost in the field and pushes the return to the issue as far back as two years. In the meantime, family members and fellow veterans continue to die, waiting for answers....."

This is simply untrue!

Anticipating another misinformation campaign, we submit the following, letting the documents speak for themselves.

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs existed from August 2, 1991 - January 13, 1993. These dates represent the date the legislation was passed to the date the Committee's final report was published. Actual hearings began in November 1991.

A quick count reveals that remains associated to 22 servicemen were returned and remains identified as 11 servicemen occurred within the life of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Of these cases three were recovered and identified within the life of the Senate Committee. Eliminating the duplication of three cases appearing on both the remains returned and remains identified lists, this represents overall activity on 30 cases, during the life of the Senate Select Committee. This figure DOES NOT include cases investigated during Field Activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Field Activities continued in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all during the life of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. But don't take our word for it.

Let the documents speak for themselves.

What follows is a sampling of reports. The dates say it all. While this report is dated March 1993, it describes a Joint US/SRV teams crash site survey conducted "15 May 1992"

*PAGE 02 RUHQSGG0643 UNCLAS
AMPN/ FIELD INVESTIGATION REPORT OF CASE 1761 (ASTON)//
RMKS/1. ON 15 MAY 92, A JOINT US/SRV TEAM SURVEYED A SUSPECTED
UH-1 CRASH SITE AT GRID COORDINATES YV69505585, IN QUANG NAM DANANG
PROVINCE, VIETNAM.*

SitRep dated November 7, 1992, states first archival research team began work in Hanoi, and 20th Joint Field Activity continues and Lao JFA continues....

INQUIRE=DOC19D
ITEM NO=00568240
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX431 MCN = 92312/16310 TOR = 923121323
OTTUZYUW RUEKJCS3117 3121320-UUUU--RUEALGX.
ZNR UUUUU
HEADER
O 071320Z NOV 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
O P 070101Z NOV 92
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
TO AIG 960
ZEN/CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS //NO3460//
SECTION 01 OF 03
DIA PASS TO DOD POW/MIA CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION OFFICE//

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

OPER/FULL ACCOUNTING//

MSGID/SITREP/JTF-FA/92-041//

PERIOD/292000Z0CT92 TO 052000ZNOV92//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/FIRST ARCHIVAL RESEARCH TEAM (ART ONE) BEGAN WORK IN HANOI. JTF-FA PERSONNEL CONTINUE OPERATIONS DURING 20TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY (JFA). LAO JFA INVESTIGATIONS/SURVEYS CONTINUE TO PRODUCE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. FIELD TEAM RETURNS TO HAWAII AFTER COMPLETION OF JFA 93-1C.//

Dated 10 December 1992, this poor quality document discusses the 18th Joint Field Activity from 19 June - 18 July 1992

PAGE 02 RUHQHQA2966 UNCLAS
REFNO 2044. DURING THE 18TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY FROM 19 JUNE TO 18 JULY 1992, A JOINT US/SRV TEAM CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF

Another poor quality document discusses the nineteenth JFA to be completed September 16, 1992, the in Laos that began August 24, 1992 and a Joint Field Activity in Cambodia scheduled for October 1992.

PAGE 01
HQ PACIFIC AIR FORCES
ACTION: DO (01) DP (02)
026944 29/0649Z
UNIT TOTAL: 005

ACTION: USA CENTRAL ID LABORATORY (01)

INFO: REVIEW (01)

----- 29/0731Z AT 820 (TOTAL COPIES: 007)

OTTUZYUW RUHQSGC2506 2420634-UUUU--RUHVAAA RUHVAPAC
ZNR UUUUU
RUEABNU I DEA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBT I CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH
RUEHHR I USDAO HONG KONG HK
~~SECRET~~
~~OTUZYUW RUEKJCS3117 3121320-UUUU--RUEALGX.~~
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
TO AIG 960
ZEN/CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI
RUHQHQA/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI
BT
UNCLAS//NO3460//
SECTION 01 OF 02
DIA PASS TO DOD POW/MIA CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION OFFICE//
OPER/FULL ACCOUNTING//
MSGID/SITREP/JTF-FA/92-031//
PERIOD/202000Z0AUG92 TO 272000Z0AUG92//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/NINETEENTH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY ONGOING IN VIETNAM. CONCLUDES 16 SEP 92. INVESTIGATION/RECOVERY TEAM BEGAN OPERATIONS IN SAVANNAKHET, LAOS 24 AUG 92. NEXT JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA SCHEDULED OCT 92.//
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/

This document dated 13 June 1992 discusses planning for the 18th JFA in Vietnam, ongoing recovery operations in Laos and deployment of a JFA Team to Cambodia on June 7th 1992, with field operations starting June 12th.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE:0002

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
BODY
OPER/FULL ACCOUNTING//
MSGID/SITREP/JTF-FA/92-020//
PERIOD/042000ZJUN92 TO 112000ZJUN92//
REF/A/RMG/JOINT STAFF WASH/091142ZJUN92//
AMPN/SUBJ: PLAN FOR POW/MIA OPS IN VIETNAM//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/PLANNING FOR 18TH PERIOD OF JOINT FIELD
ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM IN FINAL STAGES. INTERVIEWED COL Y AND
OTHERS IN HANOI. RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN LAOS PROCEED DESPITE
RAINY WEATHER. CAMBODIA INVESTIGATION TEAM DEPARTED HI 7 JUN,
DEPLOYED TO PHNOM PENH 10 JUN; FIELD OPERATIONS STARTED 12 JUN.//
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/

There are many more documents, but this certainly proves field operations including recoveries continued all during the life of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

They will continue with passage of H.Res 111.

Exhibit 2

M E M O R A N D U M

To: FAZ

From: Sedgwick D. Tourison, Jr.

Date: August 1, 1992

Subject: Individuals Reported Died in Captivity and not listed on current DoD/Vessey/SSC priority lists.

My review of POW/MIA case files disclosed DIA/JTFFA message traffic referring to individuals DoD now has information survived into captivity. All are individuals in a missing category after Homecoming and all were later declared dead while missing. A list of the 13 case files involving these 19 individuals declared dead without the recovery of remains is attached (Tab A.) The remains of two of these individuals were repatriated in 1990 and identified. I do not recommend that any of the 17 other individuals be placed in a category of suspected live POWs as of today although one case, Lance Corporal Carlos Ashloch, must be of priority interest.

In my judgment, these cases get to the very heart of the complexity and nature of the war itself; that the Vietnam war, like many other conflicts, was not a tidy arrangement where the precise circumstances of death can always be established. These cases provide official Vietnamese acknowledgement for the first time that some American servicemen were taken captive and then died. Due to the nature of these situations, it may never be possible to establish precisely how death occurred although there is evidence that death occurred in captivity and during the war. The majority are South Vietnam cases which occurred in an area and at a time that survivors would have been moved to one of several well camps in the western portion of Central Vietnam. None were seen there and none were seen in North Vietnam, supporting the hypothesis that they did not survive for long in captivity.

I do not recommend that any of these be added as a compelling live POW case as of today and all are cases of active investigation in Vietnam; however, it appears they are not priority cases. The emergence of such cases raises questions regarding the JTF's flexibility in aggressively dealing with such cases in light of Washington level priorities for the Vessey/ISA cases.

A categorization of these cases is attached at Tab B and a synopsis of each case is attached at Tab C. I recommend the Defense Department be requested to explain how it intends to deal with such cases. I have a draft letter attached at Tab D.

APPENDIX 3

List of 19 new POW case.

<u>Case Number</u>	<u>Name</u>
0031	Richard L. Greer/Fred T. Schreckengost (Remains Returned)
0108	Richard C. Bram/John F. Dingwall
0124	Fredric M. Mellor
0158	Charles J. Scharf/Martin J. Massucci
0235	James T. Egan
0258	Donald S. Newton
0358	Gregory J. Harris
0641	John F. O'Grady
0646	Thomas A. Mangino, Paul A. Hasenbeck David M. Winters/Daniel R. Nidds
0647	Roger D. Hamilton
0678	Carlos Ashlock
0728	Robert L. Platt, Jr.
1402	John T. McDonnell

M E M O R A N D U M

To: FAZ
From: Sedgwick D. Tourison, Jr.
Date: July 22, 1992
Subject: Vietnamese reports about U.S. POWs not previously known by the Defense Department.

My review of JCRC casualty files has surfaced several messages which list a total of nine American servicemen Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive, all of whom are listed by DoD as having been declared dead while missing. None are officially listed as ever having been a POW. This information has come from Vietnamese officials a piece at a time over the past two years. I suspect we will learn about more such cases as time goes on. While the precise fate of the nine is not clear, it appears likely they died in captivity in southern Vietnam and this is the first admission from Vietnam that these nine were captured alive. None was listed as having died in captivity at Operation Homecoming.

From my perspective, DIA/JTF/General Vessey had an ample opportunity during the hearings on 24-25 June to discuss these revelations and they did not. While the reasons for their avoiding the subject are unclear, two obvious explanation could be that (a) it would be irresponsible to discuss such information prior to investigating it fully, (b) they do not want to publically discuss active cases still under investigation, and (c) they may not believe Vietnamese assertions.

A fourth explanation is that the Administration is too embarrassed at this point to even want to have this information be made public. After all, it must be clear to the Administration that the Vessey/DOD-ISA "lists" have led to a relatively inflexible investigation schedule which is being directly controlled from Washington and with little seeming flexibility on the part of those on the ground to react to changing conditions. This is a direct repeat of the criticism levied at DoD/JCS/White House in its inept prosecution of the war two plus decades ago and it is evident that Viet Nam is well aware of these modalities and these new "POW" reports could well represent Viet Nam's own effort to tie up the Administration.

Attached is a list of those individuals I have been able to identify. I have not had the time to review their individual case files.

Fred T. Schreckengost/Robert L. Greer (Case 0031)

Both individuals were declared missing on June 7, 1964. Schreckengost was declared killed in action while missing, body not recovered, in August 1974. During the recovery of their remains in 1990 Vietnamese officials acknowledged they had been captured alive and killed in captivity. The U.S. Marine Corps still does not list them as having died in captivity but to have died while in an MIA status.

Donald S. Newton (Case 0258)

Sergeant Newton and PFC Francis D. Wills were both declared missing on February 6, 1966 while on patrol. Sergeant Newton was declared to have been killed in action while missing, body not recovered, in August 1974. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Sergeant Newton was captured alive and was taken to Hospital 102 of Military Region 5. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

Carlos Ashlock (Case 0678)

Corporal Ashlock was reported missing on May 12, 1967 and in September 1976 declared to have been killed in action while missing, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Corporal Ashlock was captured alive in Quang Ngai Province. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

Madison A. Strohlein (Case 1756)

Sergeant Strohlein was reported missing on June 22, 1971 and in October 1974 declared him to have been killed in action while missing, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Sergeant Strohlein was captured alive on June 22, 1971 in Quang Nam Province. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

James T. Egan, Jr. (Case 0235)

First Lieutenant Egan was reported missing on January 21, 1966 and in March 1978 was declared to have been killed in action while missing, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Lieutenant Egan was captured alive and has reported that he died in captivity in December 1968.

Roger D. Hamilton (0647)

Lance Corporal Hamilton was reported missing on April 21, 1967 and in April 1978 was declared to have been killed in action while missing, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Lance Corporal Hamilton was captured alive in Military Region 5. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

Gregory J. Harris (0358)

Corporal Harris was reported missing on June 12, 1966 and in March 1980 was declared to have been killed in action, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Corporal Harris was captured alive. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

Robert L. Platt, Jr. (0728)

Private First Class Platt was reported missing on June 10, 1967 and in March 1978 was declared to have been killed in action, body not recovered. Vietnam has now acknowledged that Private First Class Platt was captured alive on June 10, 1967. His eventual fate has not yet been determined.

Exhibit 4

The Top Seven Reasons We Need H. Res 111 calling for the formation of a House Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

"To conduct a full investigation of all unresolved matters relating to any United States personnel unaccounted for from the Vietnam era, the Korean conflict, World War II, Cold War Missions, or Gulf War, including MIA's and POW's...." Among the "unresolved matters:"

- 1. The Gulag Study 5th Edition issued Feb. 11, 2005** - compiled by the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD), the investigative arm of the U.S/Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, concluded; **"Americans, including American servicemen, were imprisoned in the former Soviet Union...."**
- 2. Failure to Investigate the "185 Report"** - In 1993, the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) received a report that 185 American POWs had been held in Southeast Asia after 1973, possibly as late as 1976. The report was recognized as possibly credible. During the mid-1990's a Russian geologist was interviewed and reported that he was told in 1976 by Vietnamese counterparts that the Vietnamese Government at that time was holding live American POWs. Neither report has been properly investigated.
- 3. Failure to Authorize Live Sighting Investigations** and the attempt to limit Stony Beach activity. Reports of live POWs in Southeast Asia are not investigated.
- 4. Failure to Properly Investigate Reports of POWs in North Korea** - A Background Paper prepared, in 1996, by I.O. Lee, analyst Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) stated: **"There are too many live sighting reports, specifically observations of several Caucasians in a collective farm by Romanians and the North Korean defectors' eyewitness of Americans in DPRK to dismiss that there are no American POW's in North Korea."**
- 5. Failure to Properly Investigate the case of Capt. Michael Scott Speicher** - A well place source provided the following information to the National Alliance of Families in the summer of 2003; "The one source that claimed to have been held with Speicher and fed him on a daily basis stated they had been held for 10 years in the underground prison; that individual was released and left Iraq. The individual that reported feeding the pilot was talking to an individual outside Iraq when he made the claim, and the U.S. side never interviewed him.... Don't be misled by those who would pooh pooh the Speicher reporting."
- 6. Failure to follow-up on the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, January 1993** - "There is evidence, moreover, that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number, after Operation Homecoming...."

"Today, Defense Department files contain evidence that at least 59 Americans were -- or may have been -- taken prisoner and their precise fate is still unclear. This includes the 20-30 not officially acknowledged by Vietnam in 1973. This represents the minimum number of possible live POWs today.... U.S. field teams in Vietnam since 1989 have uncovered evidence that more Americans were in fact taken captive than officially recorded." (Memo dated August 17, 1992, "The Universe of Possible POWs: 1973 versus 1992" by Sedgwick D. Tourison, investigator, for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs 1991 - 93.)

Isn't it time we ask the next question -- What happened to that "small number"?

Exhibit 5

Why We Need H. Res 111 calling for the formation of a House Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

What the Documents Have to Say:

1. **Report from the Escape and Evasion Section of the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, Oct. 19, 1955** - "Ashley and four crew members, (Turner, Olsen, Shaddick, and Ishida) were **known to be alive in Communist hands as of the close of the Korean conflict, Jul 53.**" What happened to these men?
2. "I am not certain that we have fully clarified everything. I know that quite a few documents were destroyed. However, one document, probably sensational, is still in storage. I have a copy of it. **Its content is as follows: at the end of the 1960s the KGB (external foreign intelligence) was given the task of "delivering informed Americans to the USSR for intelligence gathering purposes.** General Dmitri Volkogonov, Chairman Russian side of the U.S./Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. **Would General Volkogonov made such a statement without.... evidence?**
3. **Testimony of Avraham Shifrin before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, February 1, 1973** - "First I must ask you to excuse my English, because I cannot speak like you. **I learned my English in concentration camps and my first teachers were kidnapped American officers."**
4. **Dispatch No. 947 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic from American Embassy Moscow April 5, 1954** (note: on the document April is crossed out and May is handwritten in) - "The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that **American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody."**
5. **Joint Casualty Resolution Center Message Traffic 282114Z Jan 92** - "The fact is an anthropologist with many years of experience rendered a professional opinion that **based on the condition of Lt. Mc Kinnies (sic) remains, he was alive subsequent to Operation Homecoming...."**
6. **Today, Defense Department files contain evidence that at least 59 Americans were -- or may have been -- taken prisoner and their precise fate is still unclear.** This includes the 20-30 not officially acknowledged by Vietnam in 1973. **This represents the minimum number of possible live POWs today.... U.S. field teams in Vietnam since 1989 have uncovered evidence that more Americans were in fact taken captive than officially recorded."** (Memo dated August 17, 1992, "The Universe of Possible POWs: 1973 versus 1992" by Sedgwick D. Tourison for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs 1991 - 93)
7. **"As of now, I can come to no other conclusion..." Former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director James Schlesinger** before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, **when asked directly if the United States left men behind in Southeast Asia.**

Support H.Res 111 -- It's time for another look at the POW/MIA Issue!

Exhibit 6 A

Statement to the Military Personnel Subcommittee Hearings on POW/MIA Affairs, April 2, 2009 – Gregory J. Harris, USMC By Christine LaFrate and Mary Ann Reitano Primary and Secondary Next of Kin

On behalf of the family of Marine Cpl. Gregory J. Harris, we submit this statement to the official record of said hearings and thank both the Subcommittee and the National Alliance of Families for the opportunity to share Greg's story with you. To quickly summarize the case of Cpl. Harris, in addition to the specifics included in this statement, it is imperative that the Subcommittee members be aware that, of the initial 2500+ listed as unaccounted for, Greg is part of the following very exclusive reported groups;

► **Project X (1975)** – *Greg is part of this list of 57 men.* “Project X is a study...to evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for still being alive...There is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive...”

► **The 119 Discrepancy List (Vessey I - 1989 and Vessey II – 1991)** – *Greg was added to this list of 119 men in 1991.* Kenneth Quinn, the Chairman of the POW/MIA Interagency Group, testified before a Senate subcommittee in April, 1991 that this list, “...represent the greatest possibility that the men involved may still be alive...We had evidence that they were alive after the incident.”

► **The Tourison Memos (I and II, 1992)** – *Greg is part of this total list of 19 men.* “This is the first admission from the Vietnamese that these men were captured alive...Vietnam has now acknowledged that Corporal Harris was captured alive...These cases provide official Vietnam acknowledgement for the first time that some American service men were taken captive...”

While on a South Vietnamese operation, Greg and three other USMC advisors were caught in an ambush which resulted in Greg being reportedly dragged into the jungle by two Viet Cong soldiers on June 12, 1966. DPMO's own attorney stated during the 2005 Annual Meetings that, “Any American serviceman known to be, even for a second, in the hands of the enemy is considered a POW.” Yet, for decades we have argued endlessly with the DoD over this simple fact. While others here today focus solely on the operational and structural sides of the POW/MIA Issue, you will see a sidestepping of the internal DPMO policies toward the families on a case level. The sheer duplicity that hangs over this issue will, with few exceptions, go ignored. The individual stories of the families are what you all should be entitled to hear today.

Greg's case, as we have often said, is sadly, on the DPMO side, rout with convenience and no concern for the facts, logic or new findings. The path of least resistance reigns supreme. Two South Vietnamese Marines reported seeing Greg being dragged into the jungle but because they died before they could be questioned further their statements are glossed over and DPMO does not consider Greg a POW. Instead, they would like us to believe that Greg was only separated from his fellow advisors, made it from behind enemy lines to well behind friendly lines where he was killed behind friendly lines near a river by a lone Viet Cong soldier and the next morning floated down the river through narrow diversion dams and was buried on a sandbar all while US and South Vietnamese troops controlled the area. DPMO insists that, overtime, his remains have simply washed away and are unrecoverable. Yet the litany of uninvestigated leads, the testimony of highly incredible witnesses and our family's unrelenting research which has lead to numerous previously undiscovered reports tell a much different tale. It would be of value to also mention that we have found other US officers who took part in the battle in June of 1966 and who insist that DPMO's tale of Greg being killed by the river was tactically impossible considering the troop movement that day. DPMO adamantly and repeatedly refuses to interview these men.

DPMO has attempted to discredit each and every piece of evidence that supports the capture of Gregory J. Harris. In fact, due to our own due diligence and research and investigation, we have added many relevant documents to Greg's case file. DPMO never felt it important to find the After Action Report from the operation in which Greg was captured nor the communication logs that give an exact timeline to events of that day. When these new reports are shared with DPMO, only the manipulation of information supporting their version of the incident is gleaned and included in the case summary which is then disseminated among other government agencies. Here, in chronological order, are some of the oddities of Greg's case in recent years.

In 1993 US researchers found one of Greg's dog tags on display in a Military Museum in DaNang. Along with the dog tag was a Vietnamese investigative report stating that the tag was taken off Greg's body 25 kilometers from his loss site. This finding has *never* been investigated. In December 2005 we submitted a FOIA request to JPAC that dealt with ancillary details of this dog tag. To date, that FOIA request has not been answered or fulfilled. Additionally, DPMO insists on only investigating Greg's case in the loss area, even though the enemy themselves have indicated otherwise both in the museum's report and in the Tourison Memos.

The 1992 Tourison Memos, discovered by the National Alliance of Families in 2006, specifically and unequivocally state that "Vietnam has know acknowledged Cpl. Harris was captured alive." Greg and a total of 18 others are also reported in such a fashion yet DPMO refuses to even consider these findings, instead they attempt to throw a veil of deception over the findings of a then senior DIA analyst.

In October, 2006 a new report was received by DPMO which, again, gave credence to Greg's capture. The commanding officer of the enemy unit that Greg and the South Vietnamese were fighting that day admitted in his 1996 memoirs that he and his men had captured an American that day. Greg being the only unaccounted for soldier from both the US and South Vietnamese sides, made the logical correlation of this captured American to Greg. The report considered these findings to be a firsthand report of Greg's capture. Thankfully, we do our own research and found this very report in the Library of Congress in March, 2007.

When provided with the opportunity to confront DPMO over this withheld document the case analyst referred to the information as hearsay there in person and in Greg's case summary report. When she realized that we had an actual copy of the firsthand report, she stated, "Well, it says firsthand, but it doesn't really mean firsthand" and even attempted to blame another DoD civilian employee for the fact that we never received this report through regular channels as stated by Law. She made this firsthand vs. hearsay analytical conclusion and when we asked if there were plans to interview this former Viet Cong officer we were told no with the rationale that he doesn't know anything. Yes, she, without any investigative supporting evidence, by reading the same report that we did, concluded that interviewing this man would not be worth the effort because it was her opinion that he knew nothing. When asked what it was going to take to get Greg's case off this sandbar theory, she adamantly said, "You're not!" This from the individual our nation has tasked with the responsibility for the full and accurate accounting of our loved one. This entire unpleasant meeting was in the presence of a Congressional aide from Congressman John M. McHugh's office which certainly embodies the demeanor of those in DPMO who consider themselves to be judge, jury and executioner. Following this meeting with our case analyst and several unannounced members of USMC Casualty and two DPMO liaisons, we filed a formal complaint with our analyst's superior only to find out that the analyst herself was tasked with responding to our complaint.

In closing, even with all that we have been through these past 43 years, we remain committed to finding the truth and returning Greg the soil he gave his life for. With the recent Presidential Orders regarding document release signed by President Obama, we are hopefully that the duplicity that we have known for far too long will transition into the transparency that President Obama seeks. We look forward to a day when DPMO can be seen as an ally rather than an obstacle. It is through this Subcommittee and the establishment of a House Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, with the passing of H. Res 111, that this transparency can become a reality.

Exhibit 6 B

March 16, 2009

**STATEMENT BY:
ANN HOLLAND
wife of T/Sgt Melvin A. Holland – POW/MIA 3/11/68**

As the wife of T/Sgt. Melvin A. Holland, missing 11 Mar 68 at Site 85, Phou Pha Thi, Laos, I fully support passage of H.Res 111.

When my husband was selected to volunteer for a secret assignment in September of 1967 I attended a briefing for the men and spouses at the Pentagon. Promises were made at that time by the men conducting the briefing: Col. Brojer, Col. Cornetti and Maj. Moore. First: We were assured the assignment was 100% safe, “we wouldn’t be sending the men over there if we thought anything would happen to them.” Second: If anything did happen to them we would be kept fully informed of any information that was acquired. Third: Every effort would be made to bring them home.

On March 11, 1968, the unthinkable happened. The hill was overrun by enemy forces, five of the technicians were rescued (one died on the helicopter), and 11 men were left behind. Two CIA operatives, one radio FAC and numerous indigenous personnel were also rescued. I was notified by telephone that my husband was missing and to not tell anyone. If it got out to the press, I could be causing my husbands’ death. Lie # 1. The lies are continuing to this day. The cover-up is continuing to this day.

Since the last Senate Select Committee investigation more information has been discovered that the present task force in Wash. DC (DPMO) has failed to act on. Specifically, a report from 20 Jan 04 of “a very old man standing and walking in a bent over position” being held in a prison camp in the Sam Neua area of Laos. The sub-source offered to take photos of the prisoner. The report was discounted because it was “fourth hand information.”

I offered to supply the camera for the photos. There has been no follow up on the information even though the location of the prison camp is very specific.

DPMO has withheld information from me regarding reports of possible prisoners. They withheld the decision to remove Refno 2052 from the Last Known Alive list from me. I learned of it by accident six months after the fact. They determined 40 years after the fact that all 11 men left behind in 1968 had died on that mountain during the attack. Yet, two years after the attack, three families were told that no one could account for their loved ones.

I was kept in limbo for two years and told to keep my mouth shut. Those men were never on any list until 1982 ! I was never assigned a “Casualty Officer”. I had to depend on a voice in the Office of Special Plans for any information about my husband. I was never given any reports that may have surfaced...specifically a report from 1972 telling of a male Caucasian being taken prisoner to Ban Nakay. He was wearing glasses and had come from the radar base at Phou Pha Thi. My husband was the only man wearing glasses. No follow up was ever done on that report because there was no knowledge of anyone missing in that area.

That was first hand information. I never received a copy of that report until 1985 and only then through the Freedom of Information Act.

Fast forward to 2006. DPMO received a “transcript” from an individual that very graphically described the “death” of my husband. It was passed through four sets of hands before being sent to DPMO. I only learned of it by attending a family update meeting in Seattle in 2006. I asked that DPMO follow up on that transcript and locate the original source and verify by obtaining the tape of the survivor relating the incident. They have refused to do so. I have asked that they contact Cols. Brojer and Cornetti and ask them why I was lied to for two years about the fate of my husband. (I was told he could have survived and to keep my mouth shut.) They have refused. They have relied on reports that are 40 years old, dismissed facts that indicate survivors and capture of the missing men, and accept as truth anything that says they all died on March 11, 1968.

In 1968 the Air Force was so afraid of the loss of those men in Laos becoming public knowledge that they had to do damage control. They thought that by declaring the men dead that no one would learn of the incident. But they didn’t tell the families the men were dead! They told us they were missing and to keep our mouths shut because we would be hurting our husbands if it became public knowledge!

The cover-up is continuing to this day. Reports of captured men are discounted as “unreliable” or “fourth hand information.” I was 28 years old when told my husband was missing. I am now 69 years old. My husband would be 73 if still alive. He has sisters in their 80’s and one 90 years old. It is time for the truth and time to bring him home.

Exhibit 7

American POW/MIAs in North Korean Hands & Questions Pyongyang Must Answer

June 30, 2008

This White Paper demonstrates Pyongyang's extensive knowledge of the fates of U.S. POW/MIAs, along with the possibility that American prisoners may still be alive in North Korea. It is intended as an overview and not a definitive source. During the war, North Korean, Chinese and Soviet officials all handled U.S. prisoners-of-war and information concerning them. This White Paper is focused on North Korea and the Americans captured and processed on its territory; it touches only briefly upon the reported shipments of U.S. prisoners from North Korea to China and the Soviet Union. However, evidence suggests North Korea can shed considerable light on those shipments.

This document is based on declassified U.S. government intelligence reports; other government records; testimonies; interviews; and research trips to North Korea and Russia. Source documentation and supporting information, including video of four persons claiming live sightings of suspected American prisoners in North Korea years after the war, are available to qualified requestors. This White Paper has been prepared on behalf of the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen (NAF).

NAF believes North Korea must be required to answer the following questions, among others:

- 1) Who are the imprisoned "U.S. POWs" reported by North Korean escapees and other sources years after the war and who are the living "war criminals" or "survivors from the war" referenced by North Korean officials in recent years?¹
- 2) What happened to the Americans who were known to be alive and in North Korean prisoner camps but never returned?
- 3) What does North Korea know about reported shipments of U.S. POWs from Korea to China and the Soviet Union? [including Sgt. Richard Desautels – in June 2008 the Pentagon admitted that Beijing, following 50 years of North Korean and Chinese denials, had in 2003 admitted removing him from Korea. As of today, China claims Desautels died in Shenyang in 1953 but his remains cannot be found and additional information about him is "classified." There is no public indication the U.S. government has asked North Korea for information on Sgt. Desautels following these revelations. Please see more below.]²
- 4) What does North Korea know about the men whose identification cards, and other information about them, have been displayed in Pyongyang's Korean War Museum?
- 5) Did North Korea receive U.S. prisoners, or information about U.S. prisoners, from Vietnam during or after the Vietnam War?
- 6) According to a Pentagon report, North Korea has stored the remains of 100 American servicemen – many, many more are known to be buried in North Korea. When will North Korea provide the U.S. with the remains it is holding and allow full recovery operations to return the rest?

Ashley, Gilbert Lamour, Jr.



Lt. Gilbert Ashley and 4 Crewmen Were "Known to Be Alive in Communist Hands As of the Close of the Korean Conflict," According to U.S. Intelligence in 1955

Numbers

The updated numbers below are from a briefing by the Pentagon's Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to NAF on June 20, 2008.

Total POW/MIA: 8,056 U.S. servicemen plus seven U.S. civilians

Of the Total, Seen Killed on the Battlefield and Body Not Recovered: 1,783

Of the Total, Died as POWs or Prisoners Last Seen Mortally Ill: 2,036

Of the Total, Non-Battle Deaths and Body Not Recovered: 98

Of the Total, "MIAs" -- Men Not Reported Dead But Never Returned: 4, 139 [NAF comment: This includes many men seen being captured or reported in communist captivity; men who were undoubtedly killed on the battlefield and whose remains are in North Korea; others killed whose remains were destroyed or not recoverable; and those who simply "disappeared."]

History

The Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953) was fought between the United Nations, represented predominantly by the United States and Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the communist side, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and People's Republic of China (communist China), with substantial logistical and air combat support from the Soviet Union.

During the war, POW camps were initially run by the North Koreans and then taken over in large part by the Chinese; the Soviets also remained involved with the POWs throughout the conflict. American officials tracked those captured by the communists via radio broadcasts made from POW camps, letters and petitions, intelligence reports and eyewitness accounts from fellow troops who saw their colleagues captured. Numerous U.S. intelligence reports also indicated U.S. POWs were being moved from North Korea into camps in China and that some were also being shipped to the Soviet Union. In 1952, Soviet leader Josef Stalin and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai discussed retaining 20 percent of the U.N. prisoners.³ Intelligence reports during and after the war reported that hundreds of Americans had been held in Chinese and Soviet camps from which no POW ever returned. (In June 2008, DPMO stated: "We have also been unable to verify definitively the reports we have received regarding possible transfers or the ultimate fate of any possible candidates for transfer to other countries such as the former Soviet Union.")

The final period of the Korean War was fought largely over the POW issue. Many prisoners captured by the U.S. had been forced to fight for the communists and did not want to be sent back. The communist side wanted them and demanded an "all-for-all" exchange. The U.N. insisted that prisoners have the right to decide where they wanted to go, a position that ultimately triumphed. However, when the war ended in an armistice (there is no peace treaty to this day) and the prisoners were exchanged, both sides claimed the other had withheld POWs. Many U.S. officials – from senior commanders to intelligence analysts -- believed U.S. prisoners had been held back for their technical skills, espionage purposes or use as political bargaining chips. "We learned the Chinese and North Koreans... had refused to return all the prisoners they captured. Why the Reds refused to return all our captured personnel we could only guess. I think one reason was that they wanted to hold the prisoners as hostages for future bargaining with us," said General Mark Clark, commander of U.N. forces. Especially frustrating were the cases of Americans known by name to have been held by the communists but never returned. In September 1953, the U.N. demanded an accounting for 3,404 troops, including 944 Americans (a list later reduced by subsequent intelligence and graves registration work to 389) believed to have been in communist hands but never returned. According to the U.N., these men: "(1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts by your radio stations. (2) Were listed by you as being captives. (3) Wrote letters from your camps. (4) Were seen in your prisons." Despite pressure from the U.N., the communists refused to provide any information on most of these men. The scant data provided was in most cases clearly bogus – in 1956, the communists stated Sgt. Desautels (see below) had "escaped." They made the same claim about Capt. Harry Moreland, a double amputee when he was last seen in communist captivity.

By 1955, the U.S. government, at least in private, had concluded that existing policy options would prove unable to force a full accounting. The Chinese had revealed they had been holding secretly a small group of Korean War aviators as "war criminals." They, and two CIA officers captured in China, were eventually released. But as for a full accounting, a (then) classified Pentagon memo concluded: "The problem becomes almost a philosophical one. If we are 'at war,' cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this sort of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral 'fire fights' we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this (the POWs) for the political reasons."⁴

Intelligence efforts wound down during the mid-and-late 1950s and much of the information on missing Americans was sent to the vaults, where it remained classified into the 1990s and beyond.

However, for the public at least, Korean War POW/MIAs remained a major issue. In 1957, a “Sense of the Congress” resolution stated that an accounting and/or return of U.S. POW/MIAs from Korea should be “a primary objective of the foreign policy of the United States.” From time-to-time, the issue received renewed attention: in the early 1990s, (then) Senator Bob Smith pushed for answers and was told by the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister: “The Chinese manned the American POW camps in Korea and the Chinese guards took them across the border into China during and at the end of the war;” in 1993, Pentagon investigators concluded U.S. prisoners were shipped from North Korea to the Soviet Union; in 1996, a Pentagon analyst reported “there are too many live sighting reports...to dismiss that there are no American POWs in North Korea” (see the “DPMO Analyst I.O.Lee report” at www.nationalalliance.org);⁵ and in 1997 the Associated Press reported a North Korean official had acknowledged “survivors of the war” in his country but the Clinton Administration declined to follow up.⁶ The escape of ROK (South Korean) POWs, America’s brothers-in-arms during the Korean War, from the North in recent years has also raised the issue. As with the Americans, U.S. intelligence officials believed many ROK troops had been held back, yet they were ultimately declared dead. But as security levels in North Korea have deteriorated in recent years, these men have started to escape and return to their homeland very much alive and South Korea now estimates as many as 500 may still be imprisoned in North Korea.

Despite all this, in recent years the Pentagon and State Department have downplayed the Korean POW/MIA issue, especially regarding Americans captured alive but never returned. Instead they have focused the issue on U.S. remains in North Korea, launching limited trips from 1996-2005 to recover remains -- trips for which the North Koreans have reportedly demanded substantial payment. Reports of Americans still alive in North Korea have been classified, “analyzed” for years, and eventually dismissed because they “could not be corroborated” or the witness’ story was inconsistent. NAF believes these dead-ends occur in many cases because there is no way for U.S. investigators to follow up effectively without North Korean cooperation. For example, North Korean escapees have told NAF they have the names of officials and prisoners who have POW information, but as far as NAF can tell, the U.S. government cannot or will not follow up in North Korea.

The Bush Administration also elected not to make POW/MIA accounting an issue in the “Six-Party Talks” which have led to the most recent concessions to North Korea. In contrast, Japan did focus its efforts on uncovering the truth about its citizens believed to have been abducted by North Korea for intelligence purposes. After years of stonewalling, starting in 2002 North Korea admitted it had indeed abducted Japanese citizens and eventually returned five of them. Japan continues to press for additional information. Tragically, this has created a situation in which the U.S. government has made accounting for Japanese civilians a higher priority than resolving the fates of American GIs. On June 26, President Bush announced he was dropping North Korea from “Trading with the Enemy” status and moving to remove Pyongyang from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The President declared: “The other thing I want to assure our friends in Japan is that this process will not leave behind -- leave them behind on the abduction issue. The United States takes the abduction issue very seriously. We expect the North Koreans to solve this issue in a positive way for the Japanese... And it is important for the Japanese people to know that the United States will not abandon our strong ally and friend when it comes to helping resolve that issue.” The President made no mention of the U.S. POW/MIAs.

American Prisoners For Whom North Korea Should Account

There are literally scores of Americans who are believed to have been in enemy hands during the Korean War, were not known to have died in captivity and never returned – and this does not count the much larger number of men who simply “disappeared” in the North (and may have been candidates for the shipments to China and the Soviet Union discussed above). Here are just a few of the cases for which North Korea should be pressed for answers:

1) Crew of the B-29 in the “Green Dragon Rescue Operation”

This crew’s bomber was downed on Jan. 29, 1953. On May 24th, the U.S. military attempted a rescue operation in North Korea, during which radio contact was established with 1LT Gilbert Ashley. The rescuers had also obtained evidence that Ashley’s fellow crewmen Airman 2nd Class Hidemaro Ishida, 1LT Arthur R. Olsen, 2LT John P. Shaddick and 1LT Harold P. Turner were alive in enemy hands. The rescue turned out to be an ambush and the crewmen could not be recovered. “Ashley and four crew members, (Turner, Olsen, Shaddick, and Ishida) were known to be alive in Communist hands as of the close of the Korean conflict, Jul 53,” reported a previously classified U.S. Air Intelligence Report from Oct. 19, 1955.

(It is unclear what information the U.S. possessed indicating their survival in enemy hands from the attempted rescue in May to the end of the war in July.)

- 2) Other Americans Reported Held But Never Returned (selected cases from declassified U.S. military records; does not include cases where pilots were last seen alive on the ground; quoted sections below are from declassified U.S. documents)

ALLEN, Jack V.: On the "Nielsen-Henderson" (sometimes spelled: Nielsen-Hendersen) list maintained by U.S. intelligence of U.S. Air Force personnel reported to be in Kaesong (North Korea) awaiting repatriation but not returned at the end of the war; multiple other names on this list.

ANDERSON, Robert E.: "Information received from USAF repatriate indicates that Lt. Anderson is a PW."

BRENNAN, John C. "He was listed as awaiting repatriation in Kaesong (Sep 53), on the Nielsen-Henderson list." The repatriated pilot of his aircraft believed some of his crewmen, who did not return, had been captured due to E&E equipment he saw and questions he was asked by communist interrogators.

GLASSER, Gerald W.: "Sixty-six returnees reported the subject was a prisoner. The statements indicated that he was in Prison Camp No. 1...In the Spring of 1953 he was taken away in a jeep by Chinese officers," according to declassified U.S. military records.

HAWKINS, Luther R.: Reported held in POW Camp #2. On the Nielsen-Henderson list.

KEENE, Kassel M.: "The Source stated subject was sentenced to 21 1/2 years for assaulting a fellow prisoner. He was sentenced in July 53. According to the sentence he was not to be effected by repatriation." (note sentence for this offense is 2 Y2 years in Patton case below; "21 Y2" in this file may be a typo in the intelligence report)

LOGAN, Sam: Pilot of a B-29, he was held in Pyongyang in 1950. A Soviet news agency published a picture of him and stated he was a prisoner.

MARTIN, Robert L.: "He was last seen in Apr 53 at Pyoktong Camp #2 Hq. His condition was fair." "He was sentenced to one year for hitting an interrogator." "Listed as not likely to return." (from U.S. intelligence reports)

MOORE, John G.: "The subject was witnessed alive as POW by repatriated personnel."

MORELAND, Harry D.: Captured in 1952 and seen by other U.S. prisoners. By November 1952, both his legs had been amputated. The North Koreans and Chinese later claimed he had "escaped."

PATTON, George W.: "The pilot was sentenced to two and one-half years for assaulting a fellow prisoner. The sentence was in Jul 53. This sentence was not to be affected by repatriation."

SPATH, Charles R.: U.S. Intelligence reported this fighter pilot had been captured. He is believed to have been the focus of a rescue attempt similar to "Green Dragon" in which he was confirmed alive on the ground and under enemy control in May 1952.

WALKER, Archie: Captured in August 1950. In 1951, the communists broadcast messages to the mothers of U.S. POWs being held; PVT Walker's mother, Vergie Walker, received a message. The communists later said they had "no data" on Walker.

The War Museum

In late 1996, the author of this report visited the "Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum" in Pyongyang, North Korea. At the museum, the North Koreans displayed the identification cards of the following MIAs for whom they have never accounted

- 1) Air Force 2LT. Richard Rosenvall
- 2) Air Force 2LT. Gerard Cyr
- 3) Army PFC Elmer V. Wing
- 4) Air Force 2LT Dewey Stopa (on the "Green Dragon" crew -- see above; apparently captured separately from those involved in the rescue attempt and reported to have died in a North Korean prison)

Selected Cases Where Family Members Demand an Accounting



Sgt. Lewis W. Sowles: Wounded during fierce fighting between the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and Chinese forces on Nov. 30, 1950. He went missing near Kunu-ri, North Korea. Many other Americans, included Sgt. Desautels, disappeared from this area.

Sgt. Philip Mandra: Awarded Silver Star for bravery in battle in July 1952, disappeared on Bronco Hill with four other Marines on August 7, 1952. The men were wounded due to concussion grenades thrown by Chinese forces. When U.S. forces retook the position minutes later, the men were gone. A Russian colonel later reported seeing Sgt. Mandra in the Soviet Union. Irene Mandra, Sgt. Mandra's sister, has never given up the effort to determine his fate.



The Desautels Case



For more than a decade, NAF pressed the U.S. government to demand an accounting for Sgt. Richard G. Desautels, captured December 1, 1950 and reported in communist captivity by 19 fellow American prisoners who returned at the end of the war. According to these reports, Desautels had been taken into Manchuria (China) after his capture, contrary to claims by North Korea and China that no American prisoners were taken from North Korea. While in Manchuria, he worked on trucks and learned the Chinese language. Months later he was placed back in a POW camp in North Korea, where he angered the Chinese guards by interpreting for the other Americans.

In 1953, shortly before the end of the war, Desautels told his fellow GIs that he was going to be taken back to Manchuria. "When we were repatriated, I saw him. He was taken away 'cause he could speak Chinese, so they took him out of the camp. They said he was a rumor spreader and blamed everything that went on in camp on him," said one of his fellow Americans. Another returned American said: "The above mentioned POW was taken into China... He returned to Camp No. 5 in March 1952, at that time he mentioned if he should disappear to make inquiries concerning his whereabouts with the proper military authorities."

In 1956, pressed on the cases of Sgt. Desautels and many other missing Americans, the North Korean/Chinese negotiators claimed Desautels had "escaped."


But in June 2008, NAF learned that five years earlier, in 2003, China had admitted to the Pentagon that Desautels had indeed been taken from North Korea. Beijing claimed had died in April 1953 after becoming "mentally ill," and was buried in Shenyang. The Chinese also claimed they no longer knew the location of Desautels remains and that it possessed a 9-10 page report on the lost American, but it was classified.

As far as NAF can tell, the Pentagon never obtained the classified Chinese report, never followed up with analysis of the plausibility of the Chinese story, and never made public that the communists had in 2003 quietly dropped more than 50 years of North Korean and Chinese denials that U.S. prisoners were shipped out of North Korea (one of the few other official cracks in this communist stonewall, this by the North Koreans, was the comment, discussed earlier, by North Korean officials to Sen. Smith in the 1990s). There is no indication the U.S. government followed up on the fact that Shengyang was at the time of the war known as Mukden, the site of multiple U.S. intelligence reports concerning secret prison camps from which Americans would not return and a stop on the reported transfer line of U.S. prisoners to the Soviet Union. Finally, there is no indication the U.S. government pressed North Korea for details on this case and other information it might have on Americans shipped from North Korea to other nations.

Vietnam

During the Vietnam War, ROK troops fought on the U.S. side. Open-source information and U.S. intelligence reports declassified in recent years indicate North Korean troops fought on the communist side in anti-aircraft and fighter pilot roles in direct combat against American forces.

There are reports that some ROK troops captured by the communists in Vietnam were sent to North Korea. The CIA report at left at least raises at least the possibility that a similar fate may have occurred to some U.S. prisoners in Vietnam. In June 2008, DPMO officials stated they were unaware of this report. While it is impossible to judge the reliability of this report and the potential transfer of U.S. prisoners from North Vietnam to North Korea, North Korea's advisors in Vietnam might well have collected information on the fate of U.S. servicemen missing from the Vietnam conflict and NAF believes they should be requested to share this information with the U.S. (as have former Soviet Bloc nations that had advisors in North Vietnam).



Live Sightings

Much U.S. government intelligence on the potential presence of U.S. POWs in North Korea apparently remains classified. In addition, NAF believes the POW issue has been far from a top collection priority for the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, "live sightings" of U.S. prisoners in North Korea years after the war continue to be reported. NAF is aware of reports until at least 2000 and a list of classified sightings held by the Pentagon as of 2006 (see chart below) indicates more recent reports

Here are brief summaries of selected reports NAF has followed:

Oh Young Nam: This former North Korean secret police official says he repeatedly saw 20-30 elderly Caucasians and blacks in a highly-secure area north of Pyongyang from 1982 to 1993. Mr. Oh says his comrades told him the men were American POWs.

"I asked: 'Who are those people?' I was told that they were American POWs. I was surprised that there were still American POWs alive. They all seemed to have families and their wives were North Korean," Mr. Oh stated.

In June 2008, DPMO claimed this was “second-hand information” (because the Caucasians and blacks did not personally tell him they were POWs) and says this sighting “could not be corroborated.” Mr. Oh continues to assert that he saw American POWs and provided a video statement, with the help of the North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC), to NAF in June 2008.

Kim Yong: A former North Korean security official imprisoned after Pyongyang claimed his father had assisted the CIA (Mr. Kim states his father and other family members were publicly executed). Mr. Kim says he saw several Caucasians in one of North Korea’s most notorious prisoner camps in 1996. According to a fellow inmate who knew them, the prisoners were U.S. and British prisoners-of-war; the inmate noted the specific location of their capture. Mr. Kim understood they were imprisoned because they refused to accept communism. DPMO in June 2008 stated that Mr. Kim’s story has changed over time enough “to question the veracity of his claim.” Mr. Kim now lives in the United States and recounted his sighting in detail at a meeting with NAF in June 2008.

Choi Jung Hyun: Mr. Choi, in a June 2008 interview arranged by the NKFC, stated that while a soldier in April of 2000, he visited Aplok River College and saw a Caucasian man wearing a North Korean uniform. “My first thought was that he may be Russian, as many Russian army personnel came through army bases. But, I was told that he was a US POW and that he was to be an English professor at the Aplok River College and that he was currently working as a specialist in US TV media research,” Mr. Choi stated. Mr. Choi was shown a picture of James Dresnok, an American Army defector known to be alive in North Korea who has taught English in the past. Mr. Choi stated the man he saw was not Dresnok. To our knowledge, Mr. Choi has not been interviewed about this sighting by the U.S. government.

Kim Yong Hwa: Mr. Kim, according to a 1996 published report, said he had spent 40 days with an American POW called “John Smith” at a North Korean airfield in 1971. Smith spent time doing translations and menial labor, Mr. Kim said, and he talked about wanting to marry although he had given up hope of ever returning to the United States. Regarding this report, DPMO in June 2008 stated that because the two John Smith’s unaccounted for in the Korean War are believed to have died in 1950, “we are unsure who Mr. Kim is referring to.” It appears DPMO may not have debriefed Mr. Kim.

Serban Oprica: Mr. Oprica, then a Romanian engineer and now a U.S. citizen, said he saw field workers who appeared Caucasian during a 1979 bus trip in North Korea. He reported that others in his group claimed they were American POWs. After a delay of many years, DPMO tracked down two others who were on the bus with Mr. Oprica. “They all agreed that some of those sighted appeared to be Caucasian,” DPMO reported in June 2008. However, because the men did not appear to be under armed guard, DPMO suggests they may have been Eastern Europeans providing “symbolic field labor.” In June 2008, Mr. Oprica vigorously rejected this explanation.

Classified Generic Case Files*/Korea
(DPMO list as of May 2008; last updated October 2006; existence/status of later cases unknown)

INDEX NUMBER	DATE OF REPORT	TOPIC	REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION
000602	080947ZJUN00	Possible American POW in NK.	Ongoing
020402	22060 1ZAPR02	U.S. Servicemember in North Korea	Ongoing
020804	070655ZAUG02	U.S. Defectors in North Korea	Ongoing
021005	04053 1ZOCT02	U.S. POWs in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info
031101	1 80136ZNOV03	American POW in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info
040401	271714ZAPR04	Rumors of American POWs in North Korea	Ongoing
#040501	201550ZMAY04	Caucasian prisoner sighted	Ongoing
#040601	220023ZJUN04	American POW in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info
#040901	130017ZSEP04	UN POW in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info
#041201	19223 0ZDEC04	American POWs in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info
#061001	130613ZOCT06	American defectors in North Korea	Foreign Govt Info

LAST UPDATED: OCTOBER 2006

About the Author

Mark Sauter has been investigating the fate of Korean War POW/MIAs since 1989. His research has included extensive work forcing the declassification of decades-old U.S. intelligence documents held by the National Archives and government agencies; he has also conducted research in North Korea and Russia. Mr. Sauter served in the Korean DMZ during the 1980s while an Army officer and is a graduate of Harvard University and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. He serves as a volunteer researcher for the National Alliance of Families and is by profession an investment banker.

1

Five soldiers defected to North Korea after the war. We have eliminated reports concerning their presence in North Korea.

²Neither China nor North Korea has provided information on numerous other reports of shipments from North Korea to China and the Soviet Union. For information on Sgt. Desautels, see: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25272607/> Earlier this year, China agreed to open some of its POW archives, but to our knowledge no documents have yet been released. Following numerous reports of American prisoners shipped to the Soviet Union during Korea, the Cold War and other conflicts (see more below; additional information available upon request), Russia and the U.S. established the United States-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, but it was quietly shut down by Moscow in 2004. <http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/sovietunion/jcsd.htm>

³Shipments to China: numerous declassified documents obtained by NAF and available for review. Shipment to Russia and the Stalin/Chou En-lai meeting: "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union." 1993 Pentagon Study <http://www.nationalalliance.org/korea/korea01.htm>. After 1993, Pentagon investigators obtained substantial additional evidence on the shipment of U.S. POWs to Russia. Many of these reports are available from the Library of Congress and the Pentagon also updates a study, including several reports of prisoners from Korea, concerning Americans held in the Soviet Union but never returned: http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/sovietunion/gulag_study.htm

⁴"Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," June 17, 1955, Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense

⁵"North Korea May Still Hold P.O.W.'s, Inquiry Suggests," New York Times, June 15, 1996

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E1D71739F936A25755C0A960958260>

⁶Associated Press, Sep. 30, 1997

Exhibit 8

Timeline of Failure Defense Prisoner and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) Failures on the POW/MIA Issue

April 2, 2009

This White Paper details the pattern of failure that exists today with regard to the Defense Prisoner and Missing Personnel Office's mishandling of matters relating to Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIAs).

Historically, intelligence matters relating to POW/MIAs from Southeast Asia have been handled by two entities within the Executive Branch. They are the Defense Intelligence Agency (war years – 1993) and the Defense Prisoner and Missing Personnel Office (1993 – present.) When DPMO was formed in 1993, many of the DIA employees working the POW/MIA issue were simply moved from DIA to DPMO. In effect, all that changed was the name of the office. The mindset to debunk that permeated DIA, took root in the new DPMO.

Through out the years, DIA, and DPMO have been the targets of both formal Inspector General and in house investigations for their failures and mishandling of the POW/MIA issue. Each investigation found the respective agencies deficient. While corrective action was recommended, it was rarely implemented. When implemented it rarely lasted as the office slipped back into familiar patterns. Indeed subsequent investigations found many of the same deficiencies. Beyond the official investigation are the memos and comments from analysts within the DPMO.

Deficiencies are also found within the merged Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) (formerly Joint Task Force – Full Accounting and Central Identification Laboratory – Hawaii.) We will confine our comments to DPMO as we believe correcting the deficiencies within that office will have a “trickle down” effect, sending the message that it is time for everyone to clean up their acts.

The timeline presented here evidences a clear pattern of failure, first on the part of the POW/MIA section at DIA and then within DPMO.

In order to get a clear picture of today's systemic and ongoing failures one must go back in time to review early evaluations of DIA/DPMO's handling of the POW/MIA issue. This review will prove the old adage; “the more things change, the more they stay the same.”

DIA/DPMO

1985

As our starting point we cite a memorandum written by then Commodore Thomas Brooks, at the conclusion of his four-month stint as DIA's Assistant Deputy Director of Collection Management handling POW/MIA matters. Addressed to Brig. General Shufelt, head of DIA, the September 25 1985 memorandum states;

1. (C) I was not at all pleased with the situation I found when I took over responsibility for the POW/MIA issue. The deeper I looked, the less professional the operation appeared. It appeared to be particularly sloppy in the late seventies, but it is by no means a squared-away operation today. As a professional intelligence officer with a significant portion of my career spent as an analyst, I found the following to be particular problems:

a. Case files were incomplete, sloppy (all mixed-up, loose papers, undated scribbled analyst notes, misfiled papers, etc.) and generally unprofessional.

b. There were no action logs in the cases or where there were logs; entries had not been made in long time.

c. Follow-up actions had not been pursued. In some cases, obvious follow-up actions were called for but were never taken and years had passed.

d. There was no tickler system to ensure that we followed up on our own tasking. Thus, we might have tasked imagery or tasked JCRC¹ years ago, never got a response, and never followed up.

e. Efforts to re-contact sources in the U.S. were perfunctory at best and normally amounted to merely trying to contact them by telephone rather than using local DoD or law enforcement agencies to track them down and then calling on them in person.

f. We had never employed some of the most basic analytic tools such as plotting all sightings on a map to look for patterns, concentrations, etc.

2. (C) Thus, there is a great element of truth in General Tighe's statements that we have done a sloppy job. I come to the same conclusion after having looked into the issue probably in somewhat more detail than General Tighe, but not for as long a period of time.

3. (C) With regard to the allegation of "a mindset to debunk", I must conclude that there is an element of truth to this as well, although probably not as much as has been publicly stated. In fairness to DC-2, a good measure of this is attributable simply to human nature. The analysts have seen so many fabrications for so long that their first subconscious reaction is "this is just more of the same garbage". And most of it is. But some may not be. Frustrating as it all is, they have got to run all the leads to the ground. They have not been doing this as faithfully as they should. Thus, the "mindset to debunk" charge and the "sloppy analysis" charge are closely related. The former causes the latter. The leadership of DC-2 (the O-6, Deputy, and senior analyst) must be the conscience of the organization to preclude this mindset taking hold and to closely monitor the work. This they definitely have not done well over the years.

4. (C) I am not persuaded that enough assets are being dedicated to this problem if it is the top priority problem we claim it is. In particular, I wonder if JCRC is adequately manned, whether we have enough polygraph operators available, etc. I would not be able to make a judgment on this without actually having visited JCRC and the camps, which I have not had an opportunity to do. I would encourage you to do this early in your time here so you can draw conclusions regarding the adequacy of our level of effort in the field. Without firsthand exposure, my observations in this area fall into the category of gut....feelings rather than researched opinions.

5. (C) A key area which requires attention is DIA's image...how we are perceived to be doing our job rather than (or in addition to) how we really are doing it. We need to portray an image of open-minded, objective professionals who take this business very seriously and are willing to talk to anyone who might be able to provide us information. This includes the Baileys, Garwoods, and the lunatic fringe.

6. (C) I see the most important thing we must do right now is to be cementing relationships on the HILL. We have not done as well there as we should. It is clear that Congressman Hendon will be using our files to discredit us (and he will have lots of ammunition there). We need to ensure that we have formed the necessary alliances with HPSCI and the Asian-Pacific Affairs committees, their staffers, and THEIR CHAIRMEN.... that we receive support in our efforts to damage limit Congressman Hendon.

7. (C) I am afraid we are in for some troubled times. We have not done our job as well as we should have in days passed and we will not withstand scrutiny very well. Yet we will receive plenty of scrutiny in days to come. We must make all preparations to minimize the criticism this scrutiny will bring. I have attached a list of action items which I believe are required to accomplish this. I have already tasked DC-2 in these areas, but close monitoring and some personal involvement will be called for. I stand by to help in any way I can.

1991

On February 12, 1991 Col. Millard “Mike” Peck submitted his letter of resignation as DIA’s Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. The four page missive paints quite a dismal picture. The critical portion echoing the charges of Commodore Brooks more than five years earlier states:

“The Mindset to Debunk. The mindset to “debunk” is alive and well. **It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office, which is not necessarily the fault of DIA. Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the Source.** [Emphasis added] Rarely has there been any effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a responsive “action arm” to routinely and aggressively pursue leads. The latter was a moot point, anyway, since the Office was continuously buried in an avalanche of “ad hoc” taskings from every quarter, all of which required an immediate response. It was impossible to plan ahead or prioritize course of action. Any real effort to pursue live sighting reports or exercise initiative was diminished by the plethora of “busy work” projects, directed by high authority outside of DIA. A number of these grandiose endeavors bordered on the ridiculous, and – quite significantly – there was never an audit trail. None of these taskings was ever requested formally. There was, and still is refusal by any of the players to follow normal intelligence channels in dealing with the POW-MIA Office.”

1995

In August 1995, the Inspector General, Department of Defense completed its investigation of the two year old Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office. The reports conclusion reads –

“Like building a ship while under sail it is not easy to meld disparate organizational entities together while faced with multiple operational demands. However, that is the challenge faced by the DPMO. Our initial research at DPMO led us to conclude that the organization lacked; (1) Well defined missions and tasks, (2) A planning system to see that major goals were accomplished, and (3) A stable organizational structure that supported effective Management.”

"To assist the office in tackling these areas, we outlined methods that we believe will help the organizations define its mission, establish a planning system, and structure its organization. We recognize the difficulty in setting aside time for such process building. However, without the strong leadership that such actions require, the organization will continue to experience difficulty in justifying its resources requirements and completing the assigned mission.”

1997

On April 28, 1997, Dr. Timothy Castle, the Chief of DPMO's Southeast Asia Archival Research, addressed a detailed twelve page memo to Lt. Col Man, of DPMO's Plans and Policy chronicling the mishandling of Case 2052 within DPMO. Case 2052 involves eleven men missing from a then top secret radar base located on a mountain top in Laos.

While Dr. Castle never uses the term "mindset to debunk" the following clearly paints the picture and illustrates similar points made six years earlier by Col. Peck and twelve years earlier by Commodore Brooks. In his memo Dr. Castle wrote:

"As a two-tour combat veteran of the Vietnam war, school-trained intelligence officer with a doctorate in Southeast Asian history, over two decades of unique travel throughout Southeast Asia (including the location of REFNO 2052), and the author of numerous book reviews, articles, and an internationally recognized book on the war in Laos, I will frame this case within its correct political/military historical setting. Why is this necessary? Because DPMO needs to produce unimpeachable analytical recommendations based on the very best available information. While we would never accept less than state-of-the-art computers to perform our work, LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte continue to base their conclusions regarding REFNO 2052 on outdated information. **In an effort to protect their faulty conclusions, they have concealed and misrepresented any information which does not fit their perspective.** Moreover, they are predisposed to give greater credence to the "recollections" of communist officials than to contemporaneous U.S. records and the memory of American witnesses. The result - a corrupt analytical determination which is factually, intellectually, and morally indefensible."

Dr. Castle went on to say:

"More trouble is the lack of intellectual honesty and integrity shown by LtCol. Schiff and Mr. Destatte. Apparently unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the importance of rigorous oral argument and proper documentation, LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte regularly justify their "analysis" with misrepresentations and falsehoods. Briefly, as additional illustrations will be provided below, are two examples of their loose ethics. When asked by Mr. Rosenau and I (the analysts assigned to REFNO 2052) about the filming of the 1994 witness interview at Pha Thi mountain, Mr. Destatte consistently denied any such record. When shown evidence in a JTF-FA report that the interview was video-taped, he continued to deny any knowledge. Interestingly enough, when a copy of the tape was obtained from CILHI it showed the witness, Mr. Muc, Mr. Destatte, and LTC Pham Teo, a senior cadre and intelligence officer with the VNOSMP. The presence of LTC Pham Teo was never revealed in Mr. Destatte's report, despite the fact that Pham Teo is seen and heard to be coaching Mr. Muc on his recollections. It is instructive that Destatte felt it unnecessary at the time of the interview to inform the case analysts of the presence of LTC Pham Teo and then attempted to hide this important fact. As the initial collector, Mr. Destatte had the important responsibility of providing the assigned analysts with all available information. Surely the presence of this important cadre and his pervasive involvement in the interview would need to be considered by the analysts in their judgment of Mr. Muc's credibility? Mr. Destatte, for reasons best known to himself and the Vietnamese, concealed this information and then lied to cover-up his omission."

Dr. Castle ended his memo saying;

“REFNO 2052 must be assigned to a qualified analyst and all of the information developed over the past three years must be included in the comprehensive review. LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte, lacking the ethics and analytical capabilities to perform work in DPMO, should show the good grace to resign. Since this is unlikely to occur, however, DPMO leadership should strongly consider their continuing impact on case resolution. How many other cases will suffer, and never be correctly resolved, due to their actions? Strongly recommend that this memo, along with those prepared by Mr. Rosenau, LtCol Schiff, and Mr. Destatte be provided to the families; they deserve to know the full story.”

It should be noted that Mr. Robert Destatte was among the staff that transitioned from DIA’s POW/MIA branch to DPMO.

2004

The note, reproduced below, in its entirety, was written by former intelligence analyst Warren Gray, who during his approximately 20 years of service worked for both the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO.) The note written just prior to Mr. Gray’s retirement is a stinging indictment of the failures within DPMO. Although the note is dated, now almost 4 years old, we believe the problems cited, including the lack of will to follow-up on investigative leads continues to this day.

Gentlemen: This being my last day in DPMO, I wanted to say so long to each of you since you are truly representative of the few good people left in DPMO. As of today I have 19 years and 8 months as a civilian. Since I was denied access to work the POW issue (regarding Southeast Asia) by Joe Harvey when I returned on 2 February 2002 from the position of Collection Manager with the DIA POW/MIA Analytic Cell, and since I have done essentially little or nothing since then, I figured it was time to go of my own free will.

I remain extremely disappointed regarding many aspects of the POW issue, but this is neither the time nor place to go into detail about these many issues. I do plan to sit at home and write and may publish details of the listing later. I anticipate it will include at a minimum the fact that the military personnel in DPMO have effectively been “reorganized” out of this military issue; failure of this organization to respond to a report of live Americans in SEA; the 185 report; POWs moved from Laos to Vietnam; the Schederov report about Hrdlicka; why I feel the Lao have not and never will cooperate in the issue; Lao retention of a file cabinet containing POW information that we never requested; my proposal to approach Lao doctors in Beijing who worked previously with American POWs in NE Laos; the DPMO attitude towards Stony Beach; my position on the Spelcher case, my position on the Deferred and No Further Pursuit cases, and as you can see, this would be a long listing since these few topics are but the tip of the iceberg. I was never introduced to the DASD during the two year back which was probably a good thing, since I would have taken him through several of the topics listed above.

Although my plans were to go into full retirement and help my wife with our seven grandchildren, after I decided I would retire, and announced my plans, I was offered two jobs with security firms that specialize in conducting background investigations. I have 20-years experience as a counterintelligence special agent in the Army conducting those type investigations, so I have accepted the position of Consultant / Investigator with the ManTech Corporation, and will conduct background investigations from home.

My hat is off to each of you; good luck in this issue. I am sure I left off a few names above that I wanted to say good-bye to and if I remember later, will call them.

Warren

When Mr. Gray’s letter came into our possession, we contacted him and he expanded on the points made in his letter. Mr. Gray provided detailed information on each of his points and that information is available upon request.

Due to space constraints we will focus on two significant items from Mr. Gray’s laundry list.

[Begin] Mr. Gray: DPMO has no interest in using Stony Beach personnel for collection purposes, debriefings, investigations or any other type activity, and has shown that inclination time and again. In 2001, when the DIA POW/MIA Analytic Cell proposed Stony Beach operations to pursue information relative to Phou Pha Thi (Note: Phou Pha Thi is also known as Lima Site 85 REFNO 2052. See Dr. Castle's memo above) and other areas of high interest, DPMO stated it was not interested, and would not issue the collection requirements.....

In February 1993 during hearings before Congressman Dornan's committee, Dana Rohrabacher from California opined that it was his opinion that the Vietnamese kept about 200 American POWs behind as bargaining chips. That may have happened.

In November 1993 DPMO received a report that American POWs had been held in SEA after Homecoming, possibly as late as 1976, and that the number was 185. An immediate effort was made to go back to the original source to obtain further information, without success. **The report was deemed to be so important and possibly credible that the collection representative was directed to follow the situation and to conduct frequent follow-ups which did not happen.**

In January 1998 members of the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) within DPMO decided to investigate the report and asked the collection representative for access. **The collection representative stated that she had no idea which report they were talking about, therefore could not furnish it.**

Only after JCSD personnel threatened to demand an Inspector General investigation into the loss was the report "found." Later in 1998 JCSD did what it could with limited resources to investigate the report; that was the last action to check out the possible credible information. Details of the report have never been taken to any country within SEA to demand an explanation, perhaps because the implications of the report were that the country in question could never have been deemed to be cooperating in the POW issue if the report was true.

The same collection representative that received the report in 1993, that lost the report in 1998 and who would have been responsible for any follow-up since its receipt, remains in place, and the report remains unresolved. During the mid 1990's a Russian geologist was interviewed and reported that he was told in 1976 by Vietnamese counterparts that the Vietnamese Government at that time was holding live American POWs.

Does this report substantiate the earlier reporting? No one knows since **neither report has been investigated further or in-depth.**

2005 – Present

To illustrate the ongoing deficiencies within DPMO, we choose to cite one representative case. This case is by no means the exception. Many families have encountered the same difficulties.

Case 0646 – With regard to the case of Sp4 Thomas A. Mangino and PFC's Paul A. Hasenbeck, Daniel R. Nidds and David Winters, the DPMO's case summary of this incident states;

“Four soldiers were returning from patrol on the second of two sampans on the river next to Thuong Hoa hamlet, Binh Giang Village, Quang Ngai Province. The first sampan returned to base, and the second was last seen 200 meters behind.... **A short while later, 20 – 30 rounds of small arms fire were heard from Thuong Hoa.**

Certainly, the report of small arms fire from the location the men were last seen supports DPMO's version that the men were ambushed and immediately killed.

The facts that multiple documents, of the day, from various U.S. entities state that the gunshots heard did not relate to the incident involving Case 0646. These documents include the unit's duty log, statements of witnesses before the April 23, 1967 Board of Inquiry, and letters from the U.S. Army to the families of the missing men.

The Board of Inquiry established the shots came from a location other than where the men were last seen. During question and answers the patrol leader was asked "did you hear any firing?"

A: "Yes sir."

Q: "What time."

A: "about 1630."

Q: "What direction?"

A: "The firing came from the south and I think it originated 623983."

Q: "How many rounds do you guess were fired and what type weapon?"

A: "I approximate 2 or 3 clips or about 25 to 30 rounds all of which originated from the vicinity of coordinates above. I do not think there were any return rounds."

Q: "What did you think then?"

A: "Gun jeep in bunker position #1 called and stated there was a squad from Delta Company pinned down, but the pinned down (sic). I then went up to the top of the hill to see if I could see the sampan."

Ignored were the statements of platoon members given during the Board of Inquiry. The question "did you hear gun fire" or "did you hear any small arms fire on the way back to camp" was asked of seven (7) men testifying before the board. All seven (7) answered no. An eighth man was asked "would you have been able to hear any firing?" His answer was "oh yes sir."

The duty log supports the involvement of Delta Squad in an encounter with the enemy. A letter to the wife of Sp4 Thomas Mangino stated; "The first boat succeeded in reaching the shore at approximately 4:15 P.M.... Shortly thereafter, **weapons fire was heard in the area; however, the firing involved a squad of men in an area other than where the second sampan was last seen.**"ⁱⁱ

Clearly, no one attributed the shot heard to the incident involving the four missing men.

In a March 23 2006 letter to acting DASD Newberry the sister of Paul Hasenbeck once again challenged the reference to shot heard and associated to her brother's incident. One year later, she received her response, in the form of a memorandum stating;

“Concerning the case summary information that Ms. Hasenbeck believes is in error none of the statements she questions are in the DPMO Case Summary.”

That is patently untrue as the cited excerpt from the DPMO case summary shows.

A second letter rebutting the information contained in the memo cited above was sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Ray, in June 2007. The response from DPMO was less than satisfactory and once again demonstrates the “mindset to debunk.”

In a letter dated September 28th 2007, DASD Ray stated:

“We stand by the circumstances of loss described in the narrative. We believe the small arms fire heard from Thuong Hoa relates to this incident.”

DPMO continues to ignore the contemporaneous documentation that confirms the shots came from another area involving another squad, designated Delta. The facts show that the shots heard did not involve the 0646 incident. **Without these shots, there is no support for DPMO’s version that the men were killed in the ambush.**

This brings us to what we refer to as the “Tourison Memos,” discovered during archival research in March of 2006. These memos were written by Sedgwick D. Tourison during his tenure as an investigator with the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

In the first memo dated July 22, 1992 Tourison wrote:

“My review of JCRC casualty files has surfaced several messages which list **a total of nine American servicemen Vietnam has acknowledged were captured alive**, all of whom are listed by DOD as having been declared dead while missing. None are officially listed as ever having been a POW. **This information has come from Vietnamese officials a piece at a time over the past two years.** I suspect we will learn about more such cases as time goes on. While the precise fate of the nine is not clear, **it appears likely they died in captivity in southern Vietnam and this is the first admission from Vietnam that these nine were captured alive.**”

Named in the July 22nd 1992 memo as “captured alive” by Vietnamese admission were:

Carlos Ashlock	Donald S. Newton
James T. Egan	Madison A. Strohlein
Robert L. Greer	Robert L. Platt
Roger D. Hamilton	Fred Schreckengost
Gregory J. Harris	

Of the nine, only Greer and Schreckengost are considered accounted for with remains recovered. Their captivity is now well documented.

On August 1, 1992, Tourison issued a second memo increasing from nine to nineteen the number of servicemen who survived into captivity. In this memo, Tourison wrote;

“My review of POW/MIA case files disclosed DIA/JTFFA message traffic referring to individuals DoD now has information survived into captivity. All are individuals in a missing category after Homecoming and all were later declared dead while missing. A list of the 13 case files involving these 19 individuals declared dead without the recovery of remains is attached”

Tourison went on to state;

“These cases provide official Vietnamese acknowledgement for the first time that some American servicemen were taken captive and then died. Due to the nature of these situations, it may never be possible to establish precisely how death occurred although there is evidence that death occurred in captivity and during the war.”

The additional servicemen added to the list of men who “**survived into captivity**” are:

Richard C. Bram	Fredric M. Mellor
John F. Dingwall	Daniel Nidds
Paul A. Hasenbeck	John F. O’Grady
Thomas A. Mangino	Charles Scharf/ Martin Massucci 1 of 2
John T. McDonnell.	David M. Winters

Understandably, the families of the men involved in Case 0646 were quite interested in Tourison’s memo which confirmed their long-held belief that the four were captured. When queried by the 0646 families and others the Tourison memos were dismissed. One family member provided DPMO with Mr. Tourison’s contact information and suggested he be contacted to determine how he came to the conclusion outlined in his memos. That suggestion was dismissed. To this day no analyst in DPMO has contacted Mr. Tourison.

Intelligence supporting the capture of the men involved in Case 0646 has long been ignored, explained away, or dismissed. Among that intelligence;

- A CIA report describing the capture, from two sources, giving exact location, date and number of men involved, with one stating the men were to be moved to a “western area.”
- An Intelligence Information Report describing the movement of 4 POWs correlated to Case 0646, based on their date of loss.
- Two possible photo identifications of Daniel Nidds.
- One possible report of David Winters in captivity and the associated photo identification.
- Vietnamese admission as described by Senate Investigator Sedgwick Tourison, that the four men involved in Case 0646 “survived into captivity”

Summing up the families’ frustrations with DPMO and their handling of the 0646 Case, Paul Hasenbeck’s sister Jeanie wrote;

“... I simply cannot comprehend how the rule of "credibility" is applied. Without confirmation, it sometimes is creditable and it sometimes is hearsay. Just how does that work? When it doesn't confirm their determination of fate, it becomes hearsay, when it does confirm their determination it is creditable. This is truly an ART as any rule of SCIENCE is thrown out the window.... It truly is an amazing logic they apply - most unique and never experienced anywhere else in my world.”

Problems documented in 1985 are clearly ongoing today. Files are sloppy and documents are missing from them. Information is not provided to the families. When it is, it is misrepresented. Above all, information contradicting DPMO's conclusions on a case continues to be ignored. Analysts continue the "mindset to debunk."

Commodore Brooks wrote in 1985, "I am afraid we are in for some troubled times. We have not done our job as well as we should have in days passed and we will not withstand scrutiny very well."

As it was in 1985, in 2009 those charged with POW/MIA matters do not "withstand scrutiny very well."

ⁱ Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) began during the war as Joint Personnel Recovery Center. At wars end it became the JCRC. Eventually, JCRC became Joint Task Force – Full Accounting and is now part of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC)

ⁱⁱ Dept. of Army letter dated 9 June 1967, to Connie Mangino, signed by Col. C.A. Stanfiel, acting Adjutant General the Army