

**Statement of Ron Broward before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on
Military Personnel**

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you.

The proposal I left with you last July is attached to this statement with the exception of the enclosures.

Turf wars, bureaucratic sabotage, and unethical behavior on the part of a few continue to exist in the POW/MIA mission.

To have a complete account of what the mission needs would require department managers of JPAC to testify under oath before your committee. They know the problems that exist and have excellent ideas to correct those problems.

For several years we have advocated for a strong central authority to manage the agencies involved in the USG POW/MIA Program. Ambassador Ray has worked very hard to make the mission more effective. With the backlog of thousands of remains yet to be recovered and identified, the present system must be streamlined to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness. Hopefully ideas presented at this hearing will lead to that goal.

The merging of JTFFA and the CIL in 2003 was a good move, but has led to some unanticipated consequences that need remediation. Please refer to a DPMO Draft Report in response to the Senate Armed Services Committee Report 109-254. This DPMO Draft Report was completely ignored by JPAC and PACOM when the final report was drafted and sent by DOD to the SASC. Both of these reports are attached to my statement. These two documents tell the problems that exist within the current structure. In fairness to Admiral Crisp, she was not the JPAC Commander in 2007 when the final report was sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Draft DPMO Report in just four pages addresses the problems that exist and ways DPMO was considering to correct those problems. The DPMO Report is an excellent blueprint for the worldwide mission DPMO is tasked with.

Since 2004 there have been 364 identifications or 73 per year. This means it takes seven staff members working full time for one year to make one identification. During this time 65% of recoveries and identifications were from World War II and Korea, yet 75 to 80% of resources were devoted to Southeast Asia.

In the CIL there are 1,433 Unknown remains. For several years we advocated for a more effective outreach program for obtaining Family Reference Samples (mtDNA). The Defense Science Board Report of 1995 recommended an aggressive outreach program which could be used today, but this report has not been accepted. Finally in June 2008 I went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for help. The JCS ~~set aside funding to accomplish a more effective outreach program~~ and directed that a plan be developed. As of this date, nine months later, no plan has been developed either by the Service Casualty Offices or DPMO.

In 2003 we presented a plan to JPAC for the possibility of associating MIA's to Unknowns interred in the Punchbowl. In 2004, Dr. Holland, the CIL Director, saw merit in the plan and hired a forensic anthropologist in early 2005 to work on the plan. A historian was to be hired but there were no funds to do so. Since that time there have been seven exhumations, five have been identified, one is pending, and one is pending DNA processing. By 2007 the anthropologist hired for the project finished an analysis of the 853 Unknowns interred in the Punchbowl with the result that 87 cases were rated with a very high potential of identification. Another 529 cases were rated with potential identification. Of these Unknowns, 457 are 76 to 100% complete. This rating of Unknowns was done prior to the new technology of Radiograph Matching being developed.

Twenty-five additional possible associations of MIA's to Unknowns have been presented to JPAC. Twenty-four of these cases have passed preliminary dental screening. One has been

exhumed which took place on 4 September 2008, and I believe will be identified shortly. The process from start to identification is lengthy, the last case has taken 13 months.

I want to strongly emphasize this is not the fault of the CIL, just a critical shortage of forensic anthropologists and professional historians. In 2005 there were 32 forensic anthropologists in the CIL. Today there are just 19.

The last item I want to address is a new technology developed at the CIL called Radiograph Matching. This new technology compares the antemortem chest x-rays of a MIA with the Unknown remains either in the CIL or after exhumation of an Unknown. Recently the CIL acquired over 6,000 chest x-rays from the Veterans Administration for U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force MIA's. With thanks to Admiral Crisp, Dr. Holland, and historian Heather Harris the chest x-rays for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps MIA's have just been located. This new technology has the potential to resolve numerous World War II and Korean War cases. For World War II there are 8,617 Unknowns interred in National Cemeteries, and for Korea there are 853 Unknowns interred.

To get this new technology implemented I respectfully request that the House Armed Services Committee request funding for the establishment of a Central Identification Laboratory near the Armed Forces Identification Laboratory located in Rockville, Maryland. Additional funding will also be needed for the recruitment of forensic anthropologists and professional historians.

Thanks very much for your time.

Respectfully,

Ron Broward

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REPORT TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND BUDGETING OF THE
JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

The Senate Armed Services Committee's Senate Report 109-254, directed the Secretary of Defense to review whether the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) is properly organized and funded to achieve the fullest possible accounting of personnel who remain missing as a result of hostile acts. The Committee identified three key questions to be addressed:

- Is the current alignment of JPAC under U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and funded through the Department of the Navy, as Executive Agent for USPACOM, still appropriate and efficient?
- Can JPAC achieve efficiencies in its organization, management, and budget?
- Is JPAC adequately funded to effectively accomplish its mission?

JPAC was established on October 1, 2003, under USPACOM Permanent Order 03-01, which merged USPACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) with the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (USACILHI). At the time of the merger, the Department sought to facilitate unity of command, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and strengthen command and control relationships.

Now that JPAC has been in existence for over three years, we have concluded that while the merger did achieve some efficiencies, it also had unanticipated consequences that merit remediation. Moreover, given the current and future operating environment, we are considering whether a single organization should continue to be responsible for all historical personnel accounting activities worldwide. Recent issues involving funding and operational efficiency are symptomatic of some of our concerns.

Background: Unintended Consequences of the Merger

Prior to the 2003 merger, JTF-FA, under USPACOM, focused exclusively on the Vietnam War. In contrast, as Army's only active Central Identification Laboratory, USACILHI not only supported JTF-FA's missions in Southeast Asia, but also worked on Korean War losses in Northeast Asia, Cold War losses in the former Soviet Union, and World War II losses worldwide. The new, combined organization thus inherited a worldwide mission.

USACILHI had exercised its worldwide mission based on the authority delegated to the Army, as the Department's Executive Agent for Mortuary Affairs. Although there was debate over the proper alignment of the new organization, JPAC was created as a USPACOM unit. This arrangement reflected the fact that the large majority of requirements for personnel accounting involve losses in the USPACOM theater; the USPACOM commander at the time agreed to accept responsibility for the new organization; and there was no desire to incur the costs of moving the organization out of Hawaii. Nonetheless, after a review of more than three years of JPAC's existence, the success of the command relationship, in which JPAC is a direct reporting unit under USPACOM, has proved equivocal, both in terms of oversight and funding, and in terms of providing the authority and capability to support the worldwide mission.

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Placing JPAC as a direct reporting unit under USPACOM:

- vested responsibility for oversight, advocacy, and funding of JPAC and its worldwide humanitarian mission in a war-fighting regional command.
- eliminated functional oversight of the remains recovery and identification process previously exercised by the Army as the Department's Executive Agent for Mortuary Affairs; and
- placed funding for JPAC's remains identification laboratory—currently the Department's only central identification laboratory (CIL) in existence—under the Navy, despite Departmental regulatory guidance that assigned the Army responsibility for CILs.

Moreover, the merger did not adequately address several key matters, to include:

- funding for operations and infrastructure requirements to support worldwide personnel accounting;
- opportunities to leverage government-wide scientific and technological capabilities; and
- command and control issues related to JPAC operations outside USPACOM.

Organization, Funding, and Efficiencies: Options the Department is Considering

The Committee asked whether the current alignment of JPAC is still appropriate and efficient and whether JPAC could achieve efficiencies in its organization, management, and budget. The Department is considering options to address these concerns.

Consolidate the Department's Remains Identification Capability

First, we are examining whether consolidating the Department's remains identification capability for both current-day and historical deaths could improve personnel accounting, while also enhancing surge capacity to support current-day operations and possible future mass casualty events. Under this option, JPAC's laboratory would be consolidated or collocated with organizations that perform similar forensic, scientific, and technical functions, such as the Armed Forces DNA Identification Lab—which already supports JPAC—and the Armed Forces Medical Examiner—which has responsibility for current-day deaths. This option would involve the eventual relocation of the remains identification capability and a small portion of the current JPAC staff back to the east coast where both these organizations are located.

JPAC's operational mission to investigate the cases of missing Americans and recover their remains, and the large majority of its personnel, would stay in USPACOM. JPAC would retain sufficient forensic archaeologists to support field activities and provide a limited preliminary identification capability, but the bulk of worldwide identifications would be performed on the mainland.

This option offers several synergies, added effectiveness, and potential efficiencies and cost savings.

Centralizing historical remains identification capabilities will facilitate the CIL's ability to leverage other government forensic laboratories.

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- Recruitment and retention of highly trained scientific personnel would be enhanced by increased proximity to national laboratories, archives and institutions of higher learning, as well as improved opportunities for professional development and collaboration.
- Dedicating a group of forensic anthropologists solely to identifying remains, uninterrupted by field deployments, could increase the rate of remains identifications without adding staff.
- Moving the remains identification capability to the mainland, particularly if it were collocated with another laboratory, could result in infrastructure and cost savings that might outweigh the costs of the move itself.

Col Ellis
DASD Army
Jim Costello
WCDM Coloma
US Pac Army
Adjutant X
Dr. Holland
LTC Smith
Henry Campbell
LTC Valeri
LTC Cross

afford

Moving the historical remains identification laboratory can be accomplished without affecting the scientific integrity of the identification process. Moreover, detaching the primary identification capability from JPAC follows the common practice in which centralized laboratories are separated geographically and organizationally from operational elements.

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interim
report

Enhance Personnel Accounting Capacity in Other Theaters and Refocus JPAC Operations on USPACOM

The other concept we are considering involves a theater-based capability, which is primarily exercised by the US Army as the Executive Agent for mortuary affairs, in all theaters. Under this model, JPAC will focus primarily on the PACOM theater, and be available to assist in training, consulting, and providing subject matter expertise for the other theaters. The CONUS-based lab would perform forensic identifications and help train all personnel in scientific remains recovery procedures. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) and other accounting community agencies would provide analytical support, and the Army geographic commanders would investigate cases and recover remains from past conflicts. This model allows regional commanders to be more responsive to short-notice requirements for remains recovery in their theaters, without the need to deploy a team, at greater expense, from Hawaii. Additionally, exploiting existing in-theater mortuary affairs capabilities for personnel accounting purposes enhances readiness for other contingencies.

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JPAC (DPA)

Regardless of the course of action ultimately selected, we are increasing the level of engagement between the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs (DASD(POW/MPA)) and the leadership of the regional combatant commands. We will also strengthen our relationship with the Army in its role as Executive Agent for mortuary affairs.

OTSG
information
COAS
VTC connection

Level of JPAC Funding

The Committee asked whether JPAC's current level of funding is appropriate. As the Committee noted, JPAC's funding baseline for FY06 was lower than the baseline for FY04, the first year of JPAC's existence following the merger. During FY05 and FY06 the Department supplemented JPAC funding through the unfunded requirements process and other means. Unfortunately, the timing of additional funding in FY06 came too late in the budget cycle to avoid a reduction in planned operations already negotiated with the relevant governments. In FY07, Congress directed the Department to allocate JPAC an additional \$4 million, which will allow for a full schedule of personnel accounting operations.

Markups
21 May

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Starting with FY08 the Department has requested additional funding for JPAC that should allow for sustained and robust support of the accounting mission across the future years defense program. This should cover operations at the current level in Southeast Asia, South Korea, China, and Russia, and a level of effort for worldwide World War II accounting that is far short of comprehensive and unlikely to keep up with increasing public demand. Restarting the effort in North Korea without degrading operations elsewhere will require significant additional resources. Currently, resuming a full year's operations in North Korea would consume a large majority of the portion of JPAC's budget that is available to fund operational missions and not tied up by required expenditures. ?

The increased visibility of the accounting community budget recently mandated by Congress will help ensure that JPAC's capabilities are being used to their fullest extent. DPMO, as the office responsible for policy, control, and oversight of the accounting mission, is in the best position to manage that visibility in order to advocate for JPAC and other accounting organizations in the programming and budgeting process. To that end, DPMO has established a new position filled by a specialist experienced in the defense programming and budgeting process. At the same time, DPMO will increase its visibility into JPAC's and other accounting community agencies' budgeting processes so as to better coordinate the efforts of the disparate organizations and ensure the accounting community is employing its capabilities most effectively.

Conclusions

The Department has examined the Committee's questions and is exploring options to enhance the personnel accounting mission. In particular, DPMO will evaluate the possibility of moving the remains identification function out of JPAC to the mainland, refocusing JPAC efforts on the Pacific region, and encouraging development of an organic personnel accounting capability in other regional commands, as appropriate for their unique requirements. ?
INCLUDE

On behalf of the Department, DPMO will work with the Joint Staff, USPACOM, JPAC, the Services, and other appropriate agencies to examine these options and their potential implementation, while also remaining open to other solutions that might emerge. We also will consider the views of nongovernmental personnel and organizations interested in the POW/MIA accounting mission. In this fashion, we will ensure that our personnel accounting mission is conducted as effectively and efficiently as possible, to support those who go into harm's way on behalf of our nation. S. KOREA

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

JUL 22 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Senate Report 109-254, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, requested the Secretary of Defense to review the organization of the command and funding relationship between the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), the U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of Defense to determine if the current alignment is appropriate and efficient considering JPAC's mission; and to report to the congressional defense committees on the Department's review of these matters and actions it considers appropriate to address.

Enclosed are the results of our initial review. We will continue to maintain the Department's effectiveness in the accounting mission with periodic evaluations of JPAC and the relevant issues. We will keep the Committee abreast of our results so you may provide informative answers to the public.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eric S. Edelman".

Eric S. Edelman

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member



REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES
REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND BUDGETING OF
THE JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

Senate Report 109-254, page 328, accompanying S. 2766, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, requested the Secretary of Defense to review whether the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) is properly organized and funded to achieve the fullest possible accounting of personnel who remain missing as a result of hostile acts. The Committee identified three key questions to be addressed:

- Is the current alignment of JPAC under U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and funded through the Department of the Navy (DoN), as Executive Agent for USPACOM, still appropriate and efficient?
 - The Department's assessment is that JPAC's alignment under USPACOM, with funding through the DoN, meets the needs and requirements of the current environment.
- Can JPAC achieve efficiencies in its organization, management, and budget?
 - The Department has implemented steps that resulted in improvements in organization, management, and budget. The Department, through the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) will continue to evaluate JPAC's mission and requirements to maintain the organization's effectiveness for future challenges.
- Is JPAC adequately funded to sustain a robust POW/MIA accounting effort?
 - JPAC is funded to meet its current mission, excluding operations in North Korea, if those should be resumed at some point. The Department will periodically review JPAC's budget and ensure effective use of other Department resources to ensure fulfillment of mission requirements.

Background

JPAC was established on October 1, 2003, under USPACOM Permanent Order 03-01, which merged USPACOM's Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) with the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (USACILHI). At the time of the merger, the Department sought to facilitate unity of command, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and strengthen command and control relationships.

Prior to the 2003 merger, JTF-FA, under USPACOM, focused exclusively on accounting for personnel from the Vietnam War. In contrast, as Army's only active Central Identification Laboratory, USACILHI, not only supported JTF-FA's missions in Southeast Asia, but also worked on Korean War losses in Northeast Asia, Cold War losses in the former Soviet Union, and World War II losses worldwide. The new, combined organization thus inherited a worldwide mission.

USACILHI had exercised its worldwide mission based on the authority delegated to the Secretary of the Army, as the Department's Executive Agent for Mortuary Affairs. Although there was debate over the proper alignment of the new organization, JPAC was created as a USPACOM unit. This arrangement reflected the following factors: the large majority of requirements for personnel accounting involve losses in the USPACOM theater; the USPACOM commander at the time agreed to accept responsibility for the new organization; and there would be significant costs associated with moving the organization out of Hawaii.

JPAC's Alignment and Efficiencies

The Committee asked whether the current alignment of JPAC is still appropriate and efficient, and whether JPAC could achieve efficiencies in its organization, management, and budget. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) conducted an initial review of these questions and identified options for addressing issues revealed. During the course of this review, DPMO conducted discussions with the stakeholders within the personnel accounting community, including military agencies and nongovernmental organizations with significant experience in this arena.

The initial review produced a better understanding of the complex issues underlying the evolving personnel accounting mission. The Department implemented steps that have resulted in improvements in JPAC mission analysis, execution, and financial accounting. These include the creation of an independent personnel accounting budget exhibit increasing visibility on JPAC's budget, and the development of communication avenues more responsive to budgetary requirements. JPAC has planned and executed more missions in the past year than in any previous year, not including missions conducted in the DPRK prior to suspension of operations in 2005.

The Department, through DPMO, will continue to conduct periodic reviews of the organization and efficiencies of the personnel accounting mission, as well as the relationships among the various agencies involved. The current review includes an evaluation of the identification process in order to decrease the time between accession and identification; the impact of expansion of the WWII accounting mission; and ways to optimize the Department's resources further. This constant evaluation process will allow the Department to maintain its mission effectiveness for future challenges.

JPAC Funding

The Committee asked whether JPAC's funding is appropriate and efficient. As the Committee noted, JPAC's funding baseline for FY06 was lower than the baseline for FY04, the first year of JPAC's existence following the merger, as a result of DoD-wide reductions. During FY05 and FY06, the Department supplemented JPAC funding through the unfunded requirements process and other means, which led to a \$48.2 million executed budget in FY06, as depicted in the attached budget exhibit. Unfortunately, the timing of additional funding in FY06 came too late in the budget cycle to avoid a reduction in planned operations already negotiated with the relevant governments. For FY07, Congress appropriated additional funding for JPAC, which will allow it to reach

its operational capacity, excluding any DPRK operations if resumed. Gained efficiencies have allowed JPAC to meet its operational commitments.

Starting with FY08, the Department has requested additional funding for JPAC that will allow for sustained and robust support of the accounting mission across the future years defense program. This would cover operations at the current level for the Vietnam Conflict and the Korean War, with the exception of any DPRK operations. It also provides for expanding the level of effort for World War II accounting in the Pacific and European theaters. JPAC will continue to monitor the operational environment and adapt operations to leverage opportunities for expansion or contract operations within each conflict where required, as more accounting information is gathered and host nations allow increased access.

Restarting the effort in North Korea without significantly degrading operations elsewhere would require additional fiscal resources. The gap between budgets and requirements in the attached budget exhibit represents the anticipated additional requirements if JPAC were to resume operations in North Korea.

DPMO, as the office responsible for policy, control, and oversight of the POW accounting mission, will manage budget matters and advocate for JPAC and other personnel accounting organizations in the programming and budgeting process, as well as review resource allocation by conflict. To that end, DPMO has established a new position filled by a specialist experienced in the defense programming and budgeting process. At the same time, DPMO will increase its visibility into JPAC's and other accounting community agencies' budgeting processes so as to coordinate the efforts of the disparate organizations more effectively and to ensure the POW/MIA accounting community is employing its capabilities in the best interests of the United States. The increased visibility into the budgets will help ensure that JPAC's capabilities are being used to their fullest extent.

Conclusions

Based upon DPMO's initial review of the Committee's questions, the Department believes JPAC is funded and staffed to meet its current mission, and notes the progress made in the organization and efficiency of JPAC over the past few years. DPMO will continue to review organization and efficiencies to enhance the effectiveness of the personnel accounting mission. The Department will continue to evaluate issues of concern, options for addressing identified problems, potential implementation of those options, and opportunities to continue the significant progress JPAC has made. As part of this process, DPMO will continue to consider the views of nongovernmental personnel and organizations interested in the POW/MIA accounting mission. In this fashion, the Department will ensure that the personnel accounting mission is conducted as effectively and efficiently as possible, to support those who go into harm's way on behalf of our nation.

**PROPOSALS CONCERNING POW/MIA
ISSUES FROM ANCIENT WARS
VIETNAM-KOREA-WORLD WAR II**

This report has the support of:

World War II Families for the Return of the Missing

National Alliance of Families

Korea War Families

Korean War Veterans Association

Prepared by Ron Broward

March 2009

SUMMARY

The object of this report is to enlist support for new ideas and establish goals for the purpose of expediting the recovery and identification of deceased military Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Servicemen from ancient wars. The report presents a historical perspective and background information upon which these goals were formulated.

This report is the result of nine years of working as a volunteer at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), Hickam AFB, Hawaii. In 1999 and 2001 I was fortunate to be able to accompany Search and Recovery Teams to Korea in search of MIA Marines I served with.

After returning from Korea in 2001 I had some ideas that I thought might help to improve our governments POW/MIA Programs. In 2001 Congressman Doug Ose formed a MIA Task Force charged with reviewing the recovery and identification efforts of these agencies to determine how they can be improved, and if they would be more efficient if they were consolidated. As a task force member, I traveled to DPMO and JPAC several times at my own expense to meet with staff members. Suggestions for improvement were presented in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

The National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl) has 857 Unknowns interred from the Korean War. Six of the Unknowns have been identified. Recent research has twenty-three additional Unknowns as possible association to MIA's. A shortage of forensic anthropologists at JPAC has delayed the process. To put this in perspective, there have been 126 identifications of Korean War MIA's in the last 56 years.

It is recognized that each of the goals presents a challenge, but with a backlog of thousands of remains yet to be recovered and identified, the present system must be streamlined to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness.

SUMMARY

The biggest obstacle encountered so far is the policy decision set forth by the Defense POW/MIA Personnel Office (DPMO) known as the Most Recent War First Policy. This policy, which has neither been endorsed nor proposed by Congress or the Department of Defense, allocates 75% - 80% of available resources into SEA.

1. Re-organize DPMO by appointing a career government employee, familiar with the POW/MIA Mission, as Director of DPMO with authority to establish centralized management for all agencies in recovery and identification efforts for ancient wars.
2. Department of Defense prepare a Recent Needs Assessment for DPMO and JPAC requested by Government Accountability Office in August 2005.
3. Re-locate the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) from Hickam AFB, Hawaii, to the Mainland. JPAC forensic anthropologists would be more effective located near other government forensic assets. Current plans are to build a new JPAC facility in Hawaii at an estimated cost of 111 million.
4. Achieve parity in Team Assignments for recovery operations for ancient wars in place of the current policy which places 75% of effort and funding to Southeast Asia.
5. Establish a centralized Outreach Program for Family Reference Samples (mtDNA) within DPMO or JPAC. The Service Casualty Offices do not have the resources to effectively perform this task.
6. Develop a Specific Plan for archival research for ancient wars by a professional historian. Locate historians and analysts for DPMO and JPAC at a location close to the National Archives under one roof for closer working relationships.
7. Establish JPAC detachments in Europe and South Korea to work with foreign governments in the recovery and identification of America's MIA's.

SUMMARY

8. Provide Direct Funding by the Department of Defense to DPMO for all organizations working to recover and identify America's Missing from ancient wars.

When negotiations resume with North Korea, the United States should insist that JPAC Teams be allowed to investigate former United Nations Cemeteries. For example, known burial grounds in North Korea that have not been adequately explored include:

<u>U.N. Military Cemetery</u>	<u>Men Not Returned</u>	
Pyongyang	59	(Several rows not completely excavated)
Yudam-ni	17	(Mass burial site)
Hungnam # 1	2	(Last row in cemetery not excavated)
Hungnam # 2	40	(No remains returned)
Koto-ri # 2	11	(Mass burial site)
Wonsan	3	(Last row in cemetery not excavated)
POW Camps	2464	
Total	2596	

I am convinced recoveries and identifications can be increased significantly by adopting all or some the recommendations in this report.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE POW/MIA PERSONNEL OFFICE

(DPMO)

Since its inception, DPMO's mission has expanded from initially accounting primarily for missing personnel from the Vietnam War to missing personnel from ancient wars World War II and Korea.

Recoveries and identifications have not kept pace with advances in technology and scientific discoveries. The organization that exists is not capable of assuming this larger mission.

Policy developed in the early years of DMPO for the most part has not changed. Since 2004, 65% of recoveries and identifications are from World War II and Korea, yet 75% of mission scheduling and funding is devoted to Southeast Asia


Increased need for forensic anthropologists, historians, and odontologists has not been met. As a consequence, forensic anthropologists on staff can only spend 17% of their time in the laboratory on identifications. **(Time Allocation graph attached.)**

PROPOSED SOLUTION

1. Establish DPMO as the single authority for all matters relating to recovery and identification of our missing American Servicemen for ancient wars.
2. Appoint a career government employee, familiar with the POW/MIA Mission, as Director of DPMO.
3. The location of DPMO should remain in the D.C. for Department of Defense and Congressional oversight.

It is my belief that the Secretary of Defense can make the needed changes in organization which will help make our government's POW/MIA Programs more effective and less costly.

Time Allocation of Forensic Anthropologists



MAINLAND LOCATION FOR THE JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

JPAC is located at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The Air Force needs the space occupied by JPAC. The new building planned for construction will cost 111 million dollars. Locating JPAC on the Mainland has many long term benefits and will lower needed funding for MIA programs.

1. The Central Identification Laboratory at JPAC should be a first responder to national disasters.
2. Archival research for ancient wars will be more productive close to the National Archives and researchers for both DPMO and JPAC could be housed under one roof for closer cooperation.
3. **Retention and recruitment of forensic anthropologists and professional historians would be enhanced. The turnover of scientific personnel at JPAC is high which lengthens the identification process.**
4. Staff time lost to travel, costs of travel, and expenses related to travel would be reduced.
5. There would be better access by family members of MIA's to JPAC personnel. When an identification is made at JPAC, a family member is flown to JPAC to escort the identified serviceman back to the Mainland.
6. JPAC could be merged with DPMO so there is a single Department of Defense representative and point of contact for all organizations involved in our government's POW/MIA Programs. The fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act required that the United States Accountability Office review the missions, staffing, and funding of DPMO. DPMO's strategic plan, issued in

MAINLAND LOCATION FOR THE JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

January 2005, specified a goal of implementing an organizational structure that would unify government missing personnel accounting efforts.

7. DPMO's original mission was to provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in action affairs throughout the Department of Defense. With JPAC located 5,000 miles distant under the control of the Pacific Command, it makes it very difficult for DPMO to provide centralized management for POW/MIA Affairs.
8. Existing vacant government facilities closer to DPMO, the National Archives, and the Armed Forces Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) would reduce needed funding.
9. Recently a meeting was held in Atlanta, Georgia to consider combining Department of Defense forensic assets to a single location. Sites considered are Atlanta, Georgia, Quantico, Virginia, and Rockville, Maryland.
10. During fiscal year 2007, JPAC obtained a building from the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor Naval Base. The building is being remodeled and currently houses the J-1 Section of JPAC. The only cost to JPAC is for the remodel and use of utilities. This 20,000 square foot building could be used to house a JPAC Operational Detachment for recoveries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The 111 million allocated for a new JPAC structure in Hawaii could be used to house the Central Identification Laboratory close to the Armed Forces Identification Laboratories in Rockville, Maryland.

Building acquired by JPAC from U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor Naval Station



NEW PLAN FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Current DPMO policy for the Mission Scheduling is called the 10-5-10 Plan.

Southeast Asia:	10 Missions	
Worldwide Missions:	10 Missions	(Includes South Korea)
North Korea:	5 Missions	(When allowed in North Korea)

Theoretically this would mean 40% of Mission budgeting would be for Southeast Asia, 40% for Worldwide Mission, and 20% for North Korea. Mission allotment for research and mission scheduling ***has never followed the 10-5-10 Plan.***

Team assignments for Southeast Asia is approximately 75% of teams in the field. Team assignments for Worldwide Missions is approximately 20% of teams in the field. Team assignments for North Korea is approximately 5% of teams in the field, when teams are allowed in North Korea.

There is a need to develop a plan to increase recoveries and identifications. A starting point would be to allocate resources as follows:

Southeast Asia:	33%
Worldwide Missions:	34%
Korea:	33%

Re-assignment of personnel to meet this goal will take time which may result in less team missions in the field for the short term.

The current practice of bringing in new personnel, both military and civilian with little or no training in archival research is ineffective and a waste of human resources.

The 2008 JPAC Operation Plan places the majority of Team Assignments in Southeast Asia regardless of the fact that 65% of recoveries and identifications are from World War II and Korea since 2004.

NEW PLAN FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

<u>Identifications 2004 through 2008</u>	<u>375</u>	
Southeast Asia	132	35%
World War II	161	43%
Korea	82	22%

<u>JPAC Mission Schedule 2008</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>69</u>	
Southeast Asia	44	64%	
World War II*	20	29%	
Korea	5	7%	

*The 2008 JPAC Operation plan mentions 22 missions to World War II sites, but 6 of those missions are tentative.

<u>JPAC Mission Schedule 2008 Team Days</u>	<u>1944</u>	
Southeast Asia	1391	71%
World War II	463	24%
Korea	90	5%

Of the total 375 Identifications 2004 through 2008, **58 or 16% were from World War II site Papua New Guinea, yet the 2008 JPAC Operation Plan sent only 1 Recovery Team to Papua New Guinea.**

TEAMS DEPLOYED AND IDENTIFICATIONS SINCE 2004

Please refer to following tables for Team Assignments and Identifications:

<u>Teams Deployed 2004</u>		<u>72</u>		<u>Identifications 2004</u>		<u>60</u>
Southeast Asia	51	71%	Southeast Asia	29	48%	
Worldwide	11	15%	World War II	21	36%	
North Korea	10	14%	Korea	10	16%	

<u>Teams Deployed 2005</u>		<u>67</u>		<u>Identifications 2005</u>		<u>88</u>
Southeast Asia	54	81%	Southeast Asia	31	35%	
Worldwide	11	16%	World War II	47	54%	
North Korea	2	3%	Korea	10	11%	

<u>Teams Deployed 2006</u>		<u>59</u>		<u>Identifications 2006</u>		<u>92</u>
Southeast Asia	45	76%	Southeast Asia	29	32%	
Worldwide	8	14%	World War II	43	47%	
Korea	6	10%	Korea	20	21%	

<u>Teams Deployed 2007</u>		<u>46</u>		<u>Identifications 2007</u>		<u>67</u>
Southeast Asia	35	76%	Southeast Asia	20	30%	
Worldwide	8	17%	World War II	24	36%	
Korea	3	7%	Korea	23	34%	

<u>Teams Deployed 2008</u>		<u>69</u>		<u>Identifications 2008</u>		<u>68</u>
Southeast Asia	44	64%	Southeast Asia	23	34%	
Worldwide	20	29%	World War II	26	38%	
South Korea	5	7%	Korea	19	28%	

OUTREACH FOR FAMILY REFERENCE SAMPLES (FRS)

1. *The Defense Science Board Report of 1995 recommended that outreach for FRS for ancient wars be conducted within the DPMO structure.* The recommendation was not accepted.
2. Currently outreach for FRS is conducted by the Service Casualty Offices. The peak year for obtaining FRS was 2001 and has been declining each year. The Service Casualty Offices do not have the resources to conduct an effective outreach program. The average time it takes for the Services to respond to a request from JPAC is 490 days and growing.

When a family of a MIA declines to give a FRS, the Services will not pursue additional family members. On many occasions JPAC has found a family member which resulted in identifications. The position of the Services is understandable for they want to remain in good graces with the family. However OUR DUTY IS TO THE MIA, and an organization within JPAC or DPMO to conduct the Outreach Program would be able to find other family members for a FRS.

3. Family Reference Samples are used for both identification and exclusion of remains now at JPAC.
4. Currently there are 1433 Unknown remains at JPAC.
5. The forensic anthropologists at JPAC know the most urgent FRS's needed for cases they are working on. The new Outreach Program Office would be tasked to put those requests as a priority.

ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR ARCHIVAL RESEARCH FOR ANCIENT WARS

Archival research is the most important function to support teams in the field and in the identification of Unknowns interred in our National Cemeteries.

1. Archival research is done at both DPMO and JPAC. The absence of a Specific Plan for archival research and the separation of 5,000 miles between agencies provides for duplication of effort and a waste of valuable resources.

Researchers at both agencies total approximately 100 staff members. The majority of staff members are analysts with little or no training in archival research.

A Specific Plan for archival research by a professional historian would ensure that historians and analysts are working together.

2. Our military kept excellent records, but finding those records can be very difficult without the knowledge of professional historians who know the process at the National Archives.
3. Research for MIA's from ancient wars should be located at one location, preferably near the National Archives.

For several years the need for professional historians was mentioned to JPAC. In the military organizational structure research is assigned to the J-2 Section. (Intelligence) If research is to remain in the military structure, the J-2 Commander should come from the Military History Department of one of our military academies.

JPAC did hire three professional historians. One of those historians is now in charge of World War II research. The results have been very good; the majority of identifications now come from WW II. A second professional historian was tasked to organize and catalog the Korean War archives at JPAC. When I first went to CILHI (now JPAC) in

**ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR ARCHIVAL RESEARCH FOR ANCIENT
WARS**

1998, there was minimal organization of the Korean War Archives. In fact most were in boxes.

The professional historian who organized and cataloged the Korean War Archives at JPAC is now a historian in the World Wide Section. The majority of research for the Korean War was done at DPMO, 5,000 miles distant, and seldom used by the previous Korea War Section. Today under the guidance of a professional historian, the DPMO research is now being used on a daily basis.

Previously, very little work had been completed for American losses in South Korea, a friendly country, where estimates for American MIA's range from 1,200 to 2,061. Research for losses in South Korea has started. The majority of men missing in South Korea were from hill battles which are not farmed or built on. American MIA's in North Korea exceed 6,000.

The interviews of former POW's for Korea need to be declassified. Fifty-six years have elapsed since the war ended.

The point here is that both organizations need a Specific Plan for research developed and administered by professional historians.

All archival research should be located under one roof at a location near the National Archives. There is a need for additional professional historians. ***If JPAC were re-located to the Mainland, recruitment and retention of historians would be improved.***

DPMO DETACHMENTS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND EUROPE

Currently there are three foreign detachments, all in Southeast Asia. They are located in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Detachment 1, in Thailand, should be closed with a savings of approximately \$894,000 plus the salaries of five military personnel. The resources saved would allow DPMO to staff a forensic anthropologist and needed staff in both South Korea and Europe.

From 2000 through 2008, there have been 661 identifications of American military from Southeast Asia, World War II locations, and Korea.

<u>Identifications: Years 2000 through 2008</u>		<u>685</u>
Southeast Asia	310	45%
World War II	274	40%
Korea	101	15%

<u>Identifications: Years 2005 through May 2008</u>		<u>315</u>
Southeast Asia	103	33%
World War II	140	44%
Korea	72	23%

World War II losses in Europe and Korea losses are in need of DPMO Detachments to provide logistical support and on-site personnel to work with foreign governments when JPAC teams are in these countries and to do forensic reviews of remains found in these areas by foreign governments.

The government of South Korea set up a program recently to recover and identify missing people from the Korean War which number close to 100,000. The ROK Program is very active and remains found are cremated when they can not be identified. *In 2006, 66 sets of remains were cremated before JPAC could do a forensic review.*

DPMO DETACHMENTS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND EUROPE

Please refer to **Enclosure 6**, a study by JPAC anthropologists regarding the need for JPAC to have a presence in South Korea.

Three years ago, an idea was presented to JPAC to consider placing a small detachment at the Yongsan U.S. Army Base in Seoul, Korea. During the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Korean War, the General Dean Center was constructed at Yongsan. The 8th Army Archives were transferred to this center.

At this time the General Dean Center is staffed by two historians for the United States Forces Korea. *A small JPAC Detachment here could work with the ROK Recovery Program for a forensic review of remains found, provide logistical support for JPAC teams, and be able to visit sites where we have American losses.*

The argument against finding American MIA remains in South Korea is that the country has had too many infrastructure improvements. This is a bogus argument given that most of the losses were in hill battles where American Units were over run or POW's that died or were executed on POW marches in South Korea. *One JPAC Investigative Team in 2007 resulted in 2 recoveries and 11 sites to be excavated in 2008.*

U.S. Army Mortuary Affairs is located close to the General Dean Center and wants to be involved in the United States recovery efforts. In addition, American military in Korea want to be involved in trying to locate our MIA's, but JPAC does not have a presence there to organize and use these valuable American assets.

On 14 May 2007, I met with the Chief Historian for United States Forces Korea, located in the General Dean Center. He said he would welcome a JPAC detachment in Korea. This facility has several vacant offices and is used for storage of kitchen equipment except for their archives library and two offices he occupies. He would have to obtain permission from the Commanding General, U.S. Forces Korea, but felt confident approval for a JPAC office would be approved.

**DIRECT FUNDING BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO THE DEFENSE
POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE (DPMO)**

Current policy to fund the organizations working to Recover and Identify America's Prisoners of War and Missing in Action come from several sources. The U.S. Army funds the Armed Forces Identification Laboratory (AFDIL). The U.S. Navy funds the Joint Personnel Accounting Command (JPAC). The U.S. Air Force funds the Life Science Equipment Laboratory (LSEL).

1. Direct funding would ensure that DPMO and its supporting organizations would be fully funded each year.
2. Funding shortages that happened at AFDIL in 2003, 2006, and 2007 resulted in the loss of scientific personnel that had been trained over a period of 18 months. In 2003, new DNA laboratories were closed for lack of personnel.
3. When the funds are provided by a warfighting command, it is natural that the Military Commander will use those funds to support the military under their command. The program to find and identify America's POW's and MIA's is a Humanitarian Government Program.
4. All funds to conduct the operations to find and identify America's Missing In Action from Ancient Wars should be to the Defense POW/Missing personnel Office (DPMO). Programs and activities shall be designed and managed to improve standards of performance, economy, and efficiency".
5. *Direct funding by DOD to DMPO would be less complicated, more effective, and ensure that planned missions for Search and Recovery Teams are on schedule.*