

TESTIMONY OF  
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AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BEFORE  
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES CONGRESS  
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McHugh, and Distinguished Members of the  
Committee:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. As I'm sure you can imagine, no other policy priority has consumed more of my attention over the past few years than how the United States can best support the Government of Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism and build a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights and the rule of law.

Last month, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing on the strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security, governance and development assistance to this strategy. After 9/11, the core al-Qaeda leadership was ousted from Afghanistan only to find a new refuge along Afghanistan's shared border with Pakistan. These al-Qaeda terrorists, foreign insurgents and Pakistani militants have taken advantage of the hospitality of the local tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and expanded and secured their safe havens in this border area. They now use this space as a base from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan, facilitate the movement of weapons and narcotics, plan operations worldwide, train and recruit followers, and disseminate propaganda. We must work with the Government of Pakistan to close these safe havens to win in Afghanistan.

As al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies creep from the Tribal Areas into the provinces of Pakistan, as we have seen them do in Swat and Buner in the Northwest Frontier Province, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Government of Pakistan is at war with a violent minority. Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud and other al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists have spread north from North and South Waziristan throughout the Tribal Areas and have built a presence

in Bajaur and Khyber Agencies. Mehsud formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan in December 2007 as a loose alliance of militants, and by 2008, the Tehrik-i-Taliban had become the most public signal of broad local militant coordination aimed at attacking Pakistani security forces. Other extremists use the area as a safe haven and share short-term goals of eliminating the Coalition presence in Afghanistan. They exploit those locals who are sympathetic and coerce other groups to recruit, train, and conduct cross-border raids and bombings in Afghanistan.

The core objective of the President's strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To do so, it is clear that we must focus on economic development and strengthening both Pakistan and Afghanistan's nascent democracies. The United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all understand that there is no military-only solution. However, our success in building institutions, strengthening governance, and ensuring economic growth, hinges on securing Pakistan from the dangers of the spreading al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgency.

Successfully shutting down the safe havens in Pakistan will require consistent and intensive engagement with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. The Pakistani Army has traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east, against India. We must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources and training to recalibrate from its current conventional threat posture to one that addresses the threat emanating from Pakistan's Western frontier. It is vital to strengthen our efforts both to develop and operationally enable Pakistani security forces so they are capable of succeeding in sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the West.

We anticipate that our cooperation with Pakistan on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs will proceed on two tracks: first, improving the ability of Pakistani security forces to defeat and dismantle terrorist groups; and second, extending the reach and legitimacy of the Pakistani government to areas that have essentially become ungoverned spaces, the hold and build portion of the clear, hold, build strategy. On the first track, we will seek to sustain and expand the current training programs for Pakistani military forces, including the Special Service Group, and for the paramilitary Frontier Corps. We will also broaden our assistance to the regular Army to eliminate the sanctuary enjoyed by al-Qaeda and other extremists.

Pakistan currently does not have sufficient capacity to undertake counterinsurgency operations effectively or implement the clear, hold, build strategy that will be required to address the insurgent threat. Given this critical gap and the need to address it, the Administration is requesting a new train and equip authority, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, that will empower the Combatant Commander, General Petraeus, to address the operational needs in the integrated Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, similar to authority he already has in Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This new authority will complement Foreign Military Financing, the foundation of our security assistance relationship with Pakistan. We believe this new authority is necessary because of the unique and extraordinary nature of the situation in Pakistan, where neither war-time nor peace-time authorities are sufficiently adequate. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund would be dual-key, requiring Secretary of State concurrence, time-limited to address immediate needs, and is in no way precedent-setting for additional Department of Defense authorities.

We are currently in the last year of a five-year, \$3 billion assistance pledge (FY 2005-2009) to Pakistan, which includes \$300 million annually in Foreign Military Financing assistance. Our assistance has been used to maintain and modernize Pakistan's AH-1F Cobra helicopter fleet, which the Pakistan Army uses to provide persistent close air support to Army troops engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas; procure tactical radios to allow the Pakistan Army to conduct counterinsurgency operations more effectively; provide mid-life updates to enhance Pakistan's F-16 fleet to make it a more valuable counterterrorism and counterinsurgency asset for missions along the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border; procure TOW-2A missiles, which are used extensively in the tribal areas in support of Operation Enduring Freedom; and to update and refurbish P-3Cs, which enable Pakistan to participate in Maritime Intercept Operations, which are U.S.- led and supported. A continued robust Foreign Military Financing program is a long-term investment serving as the lynchpin for fostering Pakistan's institutional capacity so that Pakistan may eventually become fully responsible for its own security and enhanced regional security.

At the request of the Government of Pakistan, we are providing training to Pakistan's Special Service Group and the paramilitary Frontier Corps operating in the frontier region. Since FY 2006, Pakistan has received approximately \$90 million in funding under Section 1206, as amended, of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006. In Fiscal Year 2008, Pakistan received approximately \$53 million and was the largest recipient of Section 1206 funding. Through 1206 money, the United States engaged in projects focused on enhancing

the Pakistan Army Special Services Group's capability to conduct counterterrorism operations; helicopter maintenance, which would improve the combat readiness of Pakistan's AH-1F Cobras and Bell 412s in order to conduct and sustain counterterrorism strikes more effectively; and Mi-17 support to the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron.

There is also a separate authorization under Section 1206 , as amended, of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, to provide up to \$25 million in Fiscal Year 2009 to enhance Frontier Corps counterterrorism capabilities through the provision of equipment such as personal soldier equipment, vehicles to help provide medical attention to those wounded in action, and communications equipment to help improve the Frontier Corps command, control, intelligence and surveillance capabilities. In Fiscal Year 2008, \$75 million was provided to the Frontier Corps through this same authority to help establish Frontier Corps training centers, raise 12 new Frontier Corps wings (battalion equivalent), and support Border Coordination Centers, which will allow Pakistan's regular Army to share intelligence and coordinate engagement of enemy targets with the Frontier Corps.

Additionally, we are seeking to expand military-to-military engagement (exchanges and education, offers of training and equipment, exposure to modern counterinsurgency doctrine) with the intent to modernize the Pakistani military's ability to fight an insurgency and enhance the professionalism and leadership of Pakistan's current and future military leaders. We must continue to increase Pakistan's International Military Education Training funding to help build relationships, linkages and understanding between our two militaries. To this end, we anticipate providing Pakistan with more than \$2.3 million in Fiscal Year 2009 International Military Education Training funds and hope to continue to expand this program in Fiscal Year 2010. Admiral Mullen is a staunch supporter of IMET and is working with us to gain more spots for Pakistan officers in military staff colleges, as is Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani. In fact, General Kayani was a recent inductee into the International Hall of Fame at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an institution he attended in the 1980s through the International Military Education and Training program. At his induction, General Kayani stated that his time at the Staff College helped him learn a great deal about how the U.S. Army and Armed Forces operate. We must continue to focus on these types of programs which expose Pakistani military officers to the United States and seek to build long-lasting, personal relationships.

Pakistan's military and paramilitary organizations must bear the brunt of the hard fighting needed to clear areas of local and foreign militants and extremists

who have established safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation on Pakistani territory. But the long-term solution for holding these areas rests with civilian law enforcement agencies. Current funding is aimed at enhancing the mobility and capacity of Pakistani law enforcement and border security forces operating in the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal areas. We are currently working to finance a \$65 million police training program through the 2009 supplemental, including purchase of additional U.S. Government-owned helicopters, and hope to continue to expand this program in 2010.

We propose to step up our assistance to strengthen police in the most vulnerable areas around Pakistan. The areas of most urgent concern are along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. U.S. programs will include basic law enforcement training; advanced courses for special units; equipment to improve police survivability; construction of modern police posts capable of withstanding attacks by militants; improved communications; investigative and intelligence-gathering skills; and incident management, for example, during post-blast investigations and to learn bomb disposal techniques.

All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the vibrant, modern, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and development in a key region of the world. One tool that we are using to achieve this goal is security assistance. However, as the President noted, "We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists." As the President has stated, "we will not and cannot provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders." Tools to measure the progress made with our assistance may be appropriate, and we look forward to discussing those with Congress.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today. I look forward to taking your questions.