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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT

OF

**BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL M. BROGAN
COMMANDER
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ACQUISITION REFORM PANEL**

ON

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE RAPID ACQUISITION

8 OCTOBER 2009

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Brigadier General Michael M. Brogan **Commander, Marine Corps Systems** **Command**



Brigadier General Brogan is a native of Orrville, Ohio. In May 1980, he graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant. Following graduation from the Basic School, he completed Assault Amphibian Officers' Course as the Honor Graduate and was assigned as an Assault Amphibious Platoon Commander, Company D, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn), 3d Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. After returning from deployment to the Western Pacific in support of Battalion Landing Team 1/3, he was reassigned in August 1982 as the Maintenance Management Officer and Assistant Logistics Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and completed a second Western Pacific deployment.

In January 1984, Brigadier General Brogan reported to Marine Barracks, Naval Weapons Station, Yorktown, Virginia where he served consecutively as a Guard Platoon Commander, Operations Officer, Guard Officer, and Executive Officer. He transferred to Quantico, Virginia in July 1987 and attended the Advanced Communications Officer Course. Following graduation as an Honor Graduate in June 1988, General Brogan reported to 3d AABn, 1st Marine Division and became the Assistant Logistics Officer. In March 1989, he assumed command of Company A, 3d AABn. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the company supported 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and was a part of Task Force Ripper.

In June 1991, Brigadier General Brogan assumed duties as the Logistics Officer at the Amphibious Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB), Camp Pendleton, California. While at AVTB, he completed work on a Master of Arts Degree in Business and graduated with Distinction from Webster University. He also attended the 20-week Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. General Brogan returned to Quantico, Virginia in July 1994 as a student. A Distinguished Graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he reported to the Office of the Direct Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA) in June 1995, to serve as the Survivability Project Officer. In June 1998, he became the Program Manager for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Survivability Program.

Brigadier General Brogan reported to 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California in June 1999 and assumed command of 3d AABn. In July 2001, he transferred to the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC as a student in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). General Brogan graduated from ICAF in June 2002 with a Master of Science Degree in National Resource Strategy. He reported to the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia and was assigned as the Product Group Director, Infantry Weapons Systems. In February 2004, General Brogan reported to the Office of DRPM AAA for duty as the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Program Manager. In September 2006, Brigadier General Brogan became the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Brigadier General Brogan's personal decorations include: the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Star, the Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Chairman Andrews, Representative Conaway, and distinguished members, I am honored to appear before you and for this opportunity to discuss how the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program can be used as an example of rapid acquisition. But first, on behalf of all Marines and their families, I want to thank you for your continued support for our Marines and all the Joint warfighters as they remain engaged in combat operations in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and other contingencies.

INTRODUCTION

Every day we work to provide our warfighters the best equipment to meet their needs and requirements. Our adversaries rapidly change their tactics, techniques, and procedures. Fielding new or updated systems in response to these new threats has been the goal of the Department of Defense (DoD). The acquisition of the MRAP family of vehicles demonstrates that our current organizations and current regulations are flexible enough to accomplish rapid acquisition as long as there is the will to get it done and a mindset to support the troops engaged in combat.

ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

One of the hallmarks of the MRAP program was the willingness to accept reasonable risk in order to accomplish the mission. We positioned ourselves to execute an innovative acquisition strategy to meet the evolving threat by taking a rapid, development and fielding approach. The competitive prototyping that Secretary Young wrote into the most recent version DoD 5000 codifies much of the acquisition strategy we employed. We used this strategy to fully explore the marketplace, to reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with development, and to

provide a variety of available options to meet our military requirements. Dr. Delores Etter, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (RDA), shouldered much of the early burden and made decisions based on recommendations provided by the MRAP Joint Program Office. Secretary Kenneth Krieg, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, gave us autonomy early in the process, and allowed the Program to proceed without burdensome Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight even though he clearly articulated his intent to eventually elevate this to an Acquisition Category 1D Program. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed that "the MRAP program should be considered the highest priority Department of Defense acquisition program." He established the MRAP Task Force to speed production and fielding of MRAPs and assigned Secretary Young as the Chairman of the MRAP Task Force.

One of the keys to our success was that the velocity of the Program was directly proportional to the decision speed executed throughout the Enterprise. Key leaders translated their "sense of urgency" and exploited every decision opportunity. They assumed risk and made decisions without always having perfect information.

Secretary Gates also assigned the MRAP program a DX priority, the highest priority in the Defense Priority Allocation System, to assure access to material from all manufacturers (prime contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and vendors). In this case, we used established policies and processes that strengthened our partnership with industry and built a culture of speed and agility into the program. In short, we have had and continue to have support from the highest levels of the Department. That support flowed to the lowest levels of the program office, Congress, our sister Services and our industry

partners. It allowed us to produce vehicles at a pace not seen since World War II.

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Congressional support for the MRAP program has been timely and overwhelming. We thank you and are confident that Congress will continue their life-saving support in the coming years. From Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2009, incremental Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) increases to the MRAP vehicle acquisition objective required an iterative budget request/appropriation process to ensure the Program's financial success (see attached slides). The Department submitted multiple Supplemental Budget requests and amendments to Congress. To meet the Program's rapidly changing needs, each Fiscal Year the Congress either fully supported, or added additional funding above and beyond Department budget request. To date, a total of \$28.6 Billion has been appropriated by Congress. This includes plus-ups of \$3.0 Billion more than originally requested. The Joint Program Office, the Department and Congress maintain full and open communications regarding program status and funding requirements. The MRAP Vehicle Program has always had the funding it needed to fully perform its mission and support our joint warfighters.

OTHER PARTNERS

All members of the team mobilized to get these life-saving vehicles fielded as quickly as possible. This began with the joint community who wrote the capabilities production documents and staffed it in an astounding 45 days. It extended to those in the test community: Marine Corps Operational Test Evaluation Activity, Army Test Center, Yuma Proving Ground, Army Test and Evaluation Command, the Director of Operational Test and

Evaluation, and Live Fire Test and Evaluation. These organizations engaged and approved test strategies and ultimately the test plans, then conducted and reported on the tests. Then, within the sustainment community, the Defense Logistics Agency put in place modifications to the Omnibus tire contract. This helped to facilitate Michelin and Goodyear with molds to increase tire production for the size we needed. The professionals at Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio put in place the sustainment contracts to buy the repair parts and Defense Logistics Information Services in Battle Creek, Michigan assigned national stock numbers. Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas became our warehouse for repair parts and the MRAP University where we train field support representatives. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Industrial Policy surveyed the landscape for pinch points in raw materials and production. They interacted with steel mills and manufacturers of alternators and other components of the vehicles to ensure our ability to meet production and delivery schedules.

Our industry partners were outstanding. They mobilized the industrial base to deliver the components as well as the end products. A lot of people sacrificed for this program. They came to work for these companies knowing it was a short term employment that would end when these vehicles were delivered. But they did it for the Nation and the warfighters.

We built on the speed and agility of our industry partners and from lessons learned on the HMMWV armoring effort. The Program Office established a Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Integration Facility at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR), Charleston, South Carolina. The members of the SPAWAR Charleston team have remained determined, professional, and flexible. From the steep learning curve in 2007 to the "re-tooling" for MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) they are living

today, they met the integration schedule to continue the flow of vehicles to theater. Defense Contract Management Agency mobilized teams of quality assurance inspectors at multiple Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) facilities to ensure that the product being delivered was ready to go to SPAWAR and then be delivered into theater.

The professionals at the United States Transportation Command managed the movement of thousands of vehicles from the United States to Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan and other locations.

In parallel with all of the rapid acquisition actions taken here in the United States, extraordinary speed and support of the fielding and sustainment functions were made possible through effective partnerships with the user community. Our Joint Program Office extended its reach with a significant Joint Program Office Forward component that was critical to rapid responsiveness and flexibility with the Combatant Commanders and Sustainment Brigades in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Effective and persistent communication was a critical factor in the successful deployment of the MRAP vehicle fleet. The trust and credibility afforded to our teams by those in the fight cannot be overstated. The capacity and willingness to work through hard issues was enabled by this support.

Certainly yeoman's work was done by the Joint Program Office. And I mean Joint Program Office in the largest sense of the word. The team here at Marine Corps Systems Command as well as the extended team at United States Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) keeps collaboration and teamwork as a trusted method for achievement. Everyone recognizes and demonstrates a constant sense of urgency associated with delivery and readiness of these life-saving vehicles to the warfighters.

MARINE CORPS RAPID ACQUISITION - MINDSET

Marine Corps Systems Command fulfilled 316 number of urgent universal needs submitted by Marine units as well as additional number of joint urgent operational needs submitted by sister Services or joint warfighters. We did create some additional cells and program offices within the Command, but we did not need a new organization. The organizational structure that existed pre-9/11 is the organization that filled the bulk of these urgent requirements. We created a Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) cell and it was, in fact, that organization that bought the MRAP predecessors, the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV) and the Heavy Engineer Vehicles (HEV). When we received the mission to buy MRAPs, we stood up a Joint MRAP Program Office. This was not a new command; it was a program office within our existing Command. It was initially staffed from within Marine Corps Systems Command. We later ramped up and hired additional people and added contractor support. For MRAP, we also reached out to our Department of the Navy Systems Commands to get additional contracting officers detailed to the Program for periods ranging from 30 to 120 days. For logistics and sustainment, we teamed with Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany, Georgia and the United States Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, Michigan and received assistance from their very formidable Life Cycle Management Command personnel.

The MRAP family of vehicles has grown from an initial program requirement of 1,185 in November 2006 to over 22,000 vehicles today. As of 30 September, over 16,500 have been accepted by the government and over 14,000 fielded in theater. This could not have been done without the comprehensive, collaborative, communicative, and coordination efforts of every entity in the Enterprise.

TRANSFER FUND

The ability to provide any capability, rapid or deliberate, involves three main components: identify the capability need; assess the need and develop a solution; and provide adequate and timely resources to execute and field that solution. I wholeheartedly agree with the recommendation made by Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force, Dr. Jacques Gansler, to establish a fund for rapid acquisition and fielding. As stated in the report, "Congress established the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund to address stability and reconstruction costs incurred as a result of military operations. A similar approach is proposed to respond to urgent needs from any combatant command as a result of on-going action or an imminent threat."¹ The MRAP Transfer Fund proved to be a huge component of the Program's financial success. The flexibility it afforded allowed the Joint Program Office to transfer funds in the amounts and into the required funding appropriation accounts which provided flexibility to support constantly changing priorities and requirements. Since the exhaustion of the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF) the Department has had no appropriation dedicated to support unanticipated rapid acquisition efforts in the year of execution. A Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)-like "purple" execution account would have provided a greater amount of flexibility and would have avoided a huge amount of administrative work. However, the MRAP Transfer Fund enabled our success.

BOTTOM LINE

The MRAP program was able to respond effectively using available processes and Department authority. But the

¹ Defense Science Board Task Force. "Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force*, July 2009.


uniqueness of the requirement, exceptional high level support, attention and Congressional priority provided it advantages. We started with a mature (from a technology viewpoint) baseline vehicle and emphasized the use of proven solutions at the vehicle and component levels. The system requirement was set at the outset by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and not permitted to change. We focused on getting a survivable vehicle to the field as quickly as possible.

CLOSING

We know the future will be challenging—not only in the immediate conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in subsequent campaigns and Overseas Contingencies Operations. In this environment, the Marine Corps has been able to adapt to broad strategic conditions and wide-ranging threats. We have and will continue to rapidly acquire and field quality equipment for those in harm's way without new regulations or organizations. Current acquisition policy allows documents and processes to be tailored or omitted, as long as there's rationale to do so. Our current organization is agile, flexible, and responsive enough to provide what is required for warfighters. All that's needed is the mindset that the safety of the warfighters is our top priority and the willingness to accomplish the mission. We are confident that with your continued support, your Corps of Marines will remain the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness and continue to fulfill our national security imperative of *being the most ready when the Nation is least ready*.



Evolving Acquisition Objective & Budget Appropriation



Incremental increases in AO required real time communication and an interactive Funding Requirement/Budget Request/Appropriation process among Congress, OSD, and JPO personnel



MRAP Funding Appropriation Overview

(RDT&E, Procurement and O&M through FY09)

As of 2 Oct 09

SM	Request	Appropriated	
FY06	\$173	\$173	Full request appropriated
FY07 Bridge	\$652	\$652	Full request appropriated
FY07 Full Supp	\$1,355	\$3,055	\$1.2B more than request appropriated
FY07 Full Supp Amd- increase	\$500		
FY08 Bridge Request	\$441	\$16,831	Full request appropriated
FY08 Bridge Request Amd 1- increase	\$5,342		
FY08 Bridge Request Amd 2- increase	\$11,048		
FY09 Bridge	\$2,300	\$1,700	\$600M less than request appropriated (Q4 Sustainment pushed to OCO)
FY09 OCO	\$2,700	\$4,543	\$1.8B more than request appropriated
Total Requested	\$24,511	\$26,954	
Plus FY07 DoD BTR/ATRs		\$1,705	
Grand Total Appropriated to Date		\$28,659	

Multiple Supplemental Budget Requests, Amendments, ATRs, BTRs, Congressional Adds and Cash Flowing were necessary for Program Financial Success