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**PRESS RELEASE**

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## **Opening Statement of Chairman Duncan Hunter** ***Markup of H.R. 10: 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act***

The committee meets today to mark up the Armed Services Committee portion of H.R. 10, the "9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act."

Title I of HR 10, "the National Security and Intelligence Improvement Act of 2004," will be our primary focus this afternoon. The measure before the committee would amend the National Security Act of 1947, the body of law that establishes the organization and authorities for the conduct of our nation's intelligence activities, and defines the careful relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.

Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report, there has been considerable confusion and debate over exactly how our intelligence community operates and who controls what. The committee held two days of extensive hearings in August which I hope helped clarify those issues and helped inform us as to the judgments we are about to make.

While this is probably one of the most complicated areas of government to explain, the basic principles that guide how we carry out the intelligence function is fairly straightforward. The Director of Central Intelligence or "DCI" for short, is entrusted with the job of both running the CIA but also serving as the central policymaker and manager of national intelligence operations. However, other than CIA, he does not own any of the assets that collect and distribute intelligence. Those assets reside in operating agencies and departments such as Defense, State, Energy, Treasury and Homeland Security.

The Department of Defense, in particular, operates the significant majority of our national intelligence capability, and under the guidance of the DCI, makes those assets available to support troops engaged in combat and the Director of Central Intelligence and other national customers.

The reason for this complicated arrangement is that our nation's intelligence assets are a unique and valuable instrument of national security policy that must serve multiple purposes. Contrary to popular belief, we do not have two separate intelligence systems. Today, the same national capability and the same satellites that inform the White House and senior policymakers are also used by front line military forces to carry out their mission.

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This integration of national and tactical intelligence and the sharing of this information to users up and down the command chain is exactly what Congress and others have been encouraging for well over a decade to leverage this incredible strategic capability for maximum effect. Therefore, those who suggest you can simply pull out a knife and surgically divide national and tactical intelligence operations and assets into separate organizations and budgets, fail to understand the negative impact such a step would have on how we operate and perform on today's modern battlefield.

At the end of the day, the system works today because of the delicately balanced partnership that exists between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. Thus, as we move toward a new organizational concept that creates a National Intelligence Director or "NID" to manage the community, we must ensure that this critical partnership is maintained to ensure that in the rush to reform, we don't break those parts of the intelligence system that work well and are critical to the life and death of our men and women in uniform.

With this goal firmly in mind, I have been working with Pete Hoekstra, the new chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and other committee chairman, to capture the good ideas suggested by the 9/11 Commission, yet ensure that the national-military balance that has served us well is preserved.

I believe we have achieved such a balance and our recommendations are contained in this legislation. The most important changes, which support recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, are:

- The bill creates a National Intelligence Director, or NID, separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Running all the aspects of national intelligence and advising the President on intelligence is a full time job, just as running the CIA is a full time job. I personally believe that this simple step will by itself result in a dramatic improvement in the management of the intelligence community.
- Second, the bill creates a National Counterterrorism Center within the office of the NID to integrate all federal government activities related to counterterrorism. The Director will be the person in charge of connecting the dots, or assessing the inputs of the various elements of the US intelligence apparatus in order to prevent terrorist attacks.
- Third, the bill provides the NID with the authority and responsibility to develop common information technology standards and to ensure maximum access to intelligence across the intelligence community.

Like any legislative product, the bill before this committee is a carefully negotiated compromise that supports the legitimate requirements of both the combatant commanders and the National Intelligence Director. As members of the Armed Services Committee, we are charged with the welfare and needs of the troops. Later this afternoon, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will be marking up the same title. Their emphasis is rightly on the intelligence community. It is important to remember that we share jurisdiction over these matters with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, with whom we worked closely in crafting this bill.

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