

**STATEMENT BY**

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UNITED STATES ARMY**

**BEFORE THE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES  
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**ON**

**INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE**

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Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, and the more than one million Soldiers who serve on active duty, in the National Guard, and Army Reserve, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the Army's institutionalization of irregular warfare. I pledge to provide forthright and honest assessments. Thank you for your steadfast support and commitment to our men and women in uniform. The American people's support, through you, sustains us in the current fight and allows us to reset returning Soldiers and equipment for the next mission, wherever that may be.

Over the last decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has dramatically improved its capability and capacity for a range of military operations, including those under the operational theme of irregular warfare. The Army must prevail in these current fights while ensuring that we retain depth and versatility as the Nation's force of decisive action across the spectrum of conflict. In recognition of these imperatives, the Army is determined to advance the gains made in irregular warfare capability over the last decade as a part of the flexibility we must provide to national decision makers in a complex operating environment.

In 2002, the Nation effectively went to war with two armies. One, comprised of general purpose forces, was prepared to excel against traditional adversaries in direct combat. The second, comprised largely of Special Operations Forces, was prepared to prevail in an irregular environment. The

Army quickly learned that success on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq required adaptation in both general purpose and Special Operations Forces. In the past decade, the Army has captured that adaptation by institutionalizing irregular warfare capability and capacity across the force. We now possess a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and equipment capable of decisive action in a range of missions, including regular and irregular warfare against conventional and hybrid threats.

Our work is not done. The Army continues to assess its capabilities, train its leaders, and adapt its doctrine to ensure that we secure the gains from a decade of active operations. We will apply these gains to missions required to prevent conflict as well as prevail in war, and will continue to work closely with interagency and coalition partners to improve unity of action in all operations.

The following answers to your questions reflect a candid assessment of the Army's efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare and identify specific areas for continued work across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel solutions, leader developments, personnel assignments and facilities (DOTMLPF).

**Question 1: *Have the Services fully recognized that "irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare," and are current Service directives, doctrine, and frameworks developed, in place and aligned?***

Institutionalization of irregular warfare is evident in the Army's foundational doctrine which identifies irregular warfare as critical to the Army's ability to prevent conflict, shape the operating environment, prevail in war, and consolidate

gains. *The Army Capstone Concept*, which articulates how we think about future conflict, establishes the premise that the Army must be prepared to operate in a dynamic operational environment rife with irregular and hybrid threats. *The Army Operating Concept*, which drives changes in DOTMLPF, identifies two core competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. Both of require the Army to maintain an ability to perform the activities and missions of irregular warfare in order to defeat our enemies, consolidate gains, stabilize environments and ensure freedom of movement and action for the Joint force.

The activities and operations of irregular warfare as defined in Defense Directive 3000.07 (counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations) are reflected in Army doctrine. The Army's lead doctrinal publication, ADP 3-0, elevates stability tasks as co-equal with combat tasks, in line with Defense Instruction 3000.05. ADP 3-0 also designates Inform and Influence activities, and cyber/electromagnetic activities as key tasks within mission command. Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, details tasks of stability operations and how they fit within a whole-of-government approach. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, lays out a new and innovative approach to the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns. Field Manual 3-05.2, *Foreign Internal Defense Operations*, update this fall, captures lessons learned from recent operations. Field Manual 3-13, *Information Operations*, is being updated to reflect lessons learned in current conflicts. Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* details the guidelines and specific tasks for operations that build partner capacity. This manual is also being

updated to reflect lessons learned, and addresses an array of activities required to work with partners to prevent conflict and prevail in war.

The Army created specific proponents responsible for advancing the institutionalization of irregular warfare. The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell at Fort Leavenworth coordinates irregular warfare activities within Training and Doctrine Command. The Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks maintains doctrine on stability operations and coordinates with other government agencies to facilitate interagency cooperation. The U.S. Army Information Operations proponent at Fort Leavenworth maintains doctrine on Inform and Influence activities and leads courses to train officers on information operations. The Army's Security Force Assistance proponent, co-located with the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, drives doctrinal change for working by, with and through host nation security forces to increase our partners' capability and capacity.

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg leads the recruiting and training of civil affairs, military information support operations, and Special Operation Forces Soldiers. By providing education, informing doctrine, and integrating irregular warfare force-development capability, the JFK Special Warfare Center is a leader in identifying gaps and developing solutions for irregular related challenges. Additionally, the Army is developing improved proponency for civil affairs to support manning, training, and equipping required for growth in both active and reserve component civil affairs capacity.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort Leavenworth, rapidly integrates lessons learned from current operations. Major works include the *Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines* handbook, which distills best practices and lessons learned from Special Operations Forces assisting Philippine Military and Police forces; and *The Army Security Force Assistance Handbook*, which collates best practices from Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Trans Sahel, and the Philippines. The information gathered by the Center for Army Lessons Learned informs new doctrine and tactics manuals.

To drive these advances in doctrine through our formations, our training must replicate the threats and conditions Soldiers are likely to face in their next mission. Scenarios at our collective training centers include stability operations, security force assistance, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; testing our formations in realistic and challenging environments that replicate both current and future battlefields.

The most important thing the Army can do to advance the institutionalization of irregular warfare is to continue the professional military education of our leadership. By developing adaptive and creative leaders, the Army ensures its ability to respond to a wide range of future tasks. Maintaining a highly professional education system is crucial to institutionalizing the lessons of the past decade and ensuring that we do not repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam by thinking that these kinds of operations are behind us.

**Question 2: *What institutional and policy challenges remain given future operating environments and fiscal constraints?***

The biggest institutional challenge, given fiscal constraints, will be ensuring the right mix of capability to support our mission and requirements. The Army must maintain the full capability to conduct Unified Land Operations to seize, retain and exploit the initiative through the decisive action of offensive, defense or stability operations. Our nation demands we be prepared to operate successfully across this expansive mission set.

Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army must assess which capabilities to emphasize, how many of each, and at what level; finding the right mix will be a challenge.

To address this challenge, the Army developed numerous service wide initiatives that guide institutional adaptation in support of irregular warfare operations. Inside *The Army Campaign Plan*, the Army identified a major objective designed to adapt institutions for building partner capacity. This ongoing process enables Army leaders to continuously monitor and direct progress that supports working by, with and through partner nations to improve their capability and capacity. The *Army Campaign Support Plan* identifies activities, resources and levels-of-effort that support ongoing operations, security

cooperation, and other shaping or preventive activities. *The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations* is the Army's foundational document for stability operations and informs the Army's efforts to identify progress and gaps in our ability to execute stability operations across all phases of operation.

An additional challenge will be refining the Army's ability to deliver a wide array of *prevent* activities using general purpose forces in support of national security objectives to develop the security capacity of partner nations. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the flexibility of modular brigades in allowing the Army to organize, train and equip for security force assistance activities. As requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, these brigades may be used to meet ongoing requirements for *prevent* activities across all combatant commands. Engagement in *prevent* activities is a cost effective way to increase the capability and capacity partner nations, enhance regional stability, and counter anti-access activities by potential adversaries. The Army will continue to assess these requirements, and work with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure the resources and flexibility required to accomplish these missions are in place.

As we have learned from the last ten years, the military cannot succeed in today's operating environment alone. Full integration of U.S. Government capability in planning, training, and conduct of irregular operations is critical to success. The Army continues to partner with the U.S. State Department to formalize enduring civil-military integration across a range of steady state activities that support irregular warfare. One example is the partnership between

the Army, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and the DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to establish the Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center which provides training to over 20 government, public and private organizations. The Army will work through the Department of Defense and the interagency to develop a policy framework that enables a whole-of-government approach for operations that support irregular warfare. Likewise, the Army will continue to improve its ability to team with partners in support of coalition operations in an irregular warfare context.

***Question 3: Are our forces properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare challenges?***

The Army is properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare challenges provided adequate time and resources to reset and refit at the conclusion of current operations. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate flexibility of modular brigades for a wide array of security force assistance, stability operations, and other irregular warfare activities. In our brigades, the Army has embedded a host of irregular warfare specialties, including information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, military information support operations, electronic warfare, and human terrain teams. Critical to the Army's capability to advance our capability for irregular warfare operations is ready access to the Reserve Component as an operational reserve, where a significant portion of civil affairs and other combat enablers reside.

To support the necessary flexibility, the Army rebalanced its force structure across all components to support irregular warfare, dramatically increasing specialties such as Special Forces, civil affairs, medical, and military police. The Army created a Combat Advisor Academy at Fort Polk, Louisiana run by the 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade. This academy trains Army, joint and coalition partners for advise and assist missions and can be expanded to support missions beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Included in the cadre of trainers are coalition partners, drawing on a broad, multi-national base of experience in security force assistance.

Our division, corps and theater army headquarters have been given additional staff structure specifically to address inform and influence activities, support increased civil affairs capability, and enable engineer support infrastructure development and restoration of essential services. The Army also created the 1st Information Operations Brigade to assist units in the conduct of Inform and Influence activities, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group to support rapid adaptation to the activities of hybrid threats, and U.S. Army Cyber Command to execute cyber/electromagnetic activities for the Army.

To capture the experience resident in the Army from the last decade, we created mechanisms to identify, track, and manage those with experience in training teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and those who serve as mentors in brigades that partnered with Iraqi and Afghan security forces. The Army expanded its translator and recruiting programs, instituted a retiree recall program for those with high demand, low density skills, and grew its Foreign Area

Officer corps, providing expanded regional and cultural expertise. The Army continues to work with the Department of Defense to identify those irregular warfare related capabilities that need to be captured in order to improve our ability to meet future requirements.

The key to advancing the Army's ability to respond to irregular threats will be to ensure the necessary force structure to support a versatile mix of capabilities in an uncertain future. As stated before, this will be challenge. The Army can maintain our doctrine and lessons learned databases fairly easily, but the Army will require continued Congressional support to secure the resources necessary to retain capability and readiness for a wide array of contingencies. The Army is committed to getting this right and we look forward to working with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure that we continue to provide depth and versatility to the Joint Force.

With the continued support of the American people, expressed through the will of the Congress, the Army will maintain balance in the force, build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict, and remain prepared for the challenges of today and tomorrow. Again, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of the Army and our American Soldiers.