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ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE
ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

APRIL 17, 2012

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important topic of our nuclear forces and the programs and policies that support them. I am pleased to join Administrator D'Agostino, General Kehler, and our other colleagues that are here today for this discussion.

The subcommittee gave us a number of issues to address: how the programs and priorities contained in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget request for the Department of Defense (DoD) reflects the Obama Administration's nuclear policy, posture, and modernization plans; an assessment of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and its supporting infrastructure; and our perspectives on U.S. nuclear force posture, implementation of the New START Treaty, status of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Implementation Study, nuclear modernization plans and budget requirements under the 1251/1043 report, current and future requirements for nuclear-weapon delivery systems, the decision-making process and strategic perspective of the Nuclear Weapons Council, status of delivery of the report required by section 1043 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, and stewardship, sustainment, and modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure. Further, you have asked for our perspectives on the management, governance, and oversight issues at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and for DoD's assessment of NNSA's effectiveness and ability to deliver what it has promised to the Defense Department, as its "customer" in nuclear weapons programs.

My statement addresses the policy issues listed above. General Kehler will give the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) operational perspective. Administrator D'Agostino will provide more detailed information on the nuclear stockpile and infrastructure.

Global Nuclear Balance

I would like to start by providing some context about U.S. nuclear forces and nuclear arsenals around the world. As of September 30, 2009 – the time of our last unclassified release – the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained 5,113 weapons. That figure has dropped since then as a result of managing the stockpile. In addition, there are several thousand retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. While the stockpile remains sizeable, it has shrunk significantly from a high point of approximately 31,000 warheads at the height of the Cold War in 1967.

According to unclassified estimates, Russia maintains a stockpile of 4,000 to 6,500 nuclear weapons, of which 2,000 to 4,000 are non-strategic, or "tactical," nuclear weapons. Reporting that is done under the New START Treaty has given us a strong understanding of the numbers of deployed Russian strategic nuclear weapons, but we have significantly less confidence in the numbers of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia also maintains a robust nuclear warhead production capability to regularly remanufacture warheads rather than conduct life-extension programs. Russia is modernizing its delivery systems, including a mobile variant of the Topol intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and new Borey-class missile submarines with Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Under the requirements of the New START Treaty, Russia is limited to 800 total and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems. The central limits of the treaty also call on both Russia and the United States to limit deployed strategic warheads to 1,550.

Our NATO allies, the United Kingdom and France, each have a few hundred weapons. France is upgrading its nuclear capabilities by replacing its legacy delivery aircraft with the Rafale and fielding the new M51 SLBM. The UK is replacing its Vanguard-class strategic ballistic missile submarines, collaborating closely with the United States on a new missile compartment to be used on both the Vanguard and the U.S. *Ohio*-class replacement submarine.

We estimate that China has only a few hundred nuclear weapons, but it is increasing the size of its arsenal. Further, China continues to invest in nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Its broad range of missile-development programs includes an effort to replace some liquid-fueled systems with more advanced solid-fueled systems, and it is pursuing a sea-based deterrent with the construction of the Jin-class submarine.

India and Pakistan are also increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals, but each is estimated to have fewer weapons than China. North Korea has tested a plutonium-based weapon design and appears to be trying to develop more advanced nuclear weapons that utilize highly enriched uranium. Iran continues to defy the calls of the international community for transparency into its nuclear activities. Its refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the IAEA's recent report on the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program continue to heighten U.S. and international concerns that Iran is pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon.

The array of nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons-pursuing states around the world certainly complicate the global security environment. The United States and Russia, however, together will account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, even after the New START Treaty is fully implemented. For this reason, our focus for the next stage of arms control remains bilateral efforts with Russia.

Implementation of the New START Treaty

Future arms control negotiations with Russia will build on the success of New START. Early in his first term, President Obama made the decision to expedite negotiations for the New START Treaty to reinvigorate nuclear arms control and to minimize the lapse in verification measures occasioned by expiration of the START Treaty. This decision was consistent with the recommendations of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States: to seek an initial agreement with Russia that would ensure continuation of verification measures, and then to use follow-on negotiations to explore the possibility of further reductions.

Expediting negotiations on New START led the Obama Administration to rely on existing nuclear guidance, from 2002, to determine the acceptable limits in the New START Treaty of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads. This, too, was consistent with the Posture Commission's recommendations. The world, however, has changed since 2002, and the Administration knew that future reductions – particularly if they will be more ambitious in scope, not just numbers – should be grounded in updated guidance. The analysis to support new guidance is underway and I will address it further later in my testimony.

I am pleased to report to the subcommittee that we are fully implementing the verification measures of New START. Since its ratification on February 5, 2011, the United States and Russia have each conducted 18 on-site inspections, fully meeting their respective quotas for the treaty's first year, for a total of 36 inspections. Each side is exchanging updates to our respective databases of strategic offensive arms, twice per year as agreed in the treaty, and delegations from the United States and Russia have met three times under the treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission to successfully address implementation issues.

In terms of reductions, we are on track to meet the 2018 deadline for the central limits of 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and accountable nuclear warheads for deployed heavy bombers; 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers.

U.S. Nuclear Forces and Future Arms Control Efforts with Russia

As the NPR stated, New START is the first step in lowering the numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. We intend to consider future mutual reductions with Russia in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, while ensuring that we maintain our commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance.

Because of improved relations with Russia, strict numerical parity in nuclear weapons is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. On the other hand, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, particularly at lower numbers. Therefore, as the NPR stated, we will place importance on Russia joining us as we pursue additional reductions in nuclear stockpiles.

The timing and framework of the next round of negotiations are not settled, but we are working now to establish the conditions for future discussions. The Administration has been clear that future discussions with Russia should include non-strategic – tactical – nuclear weapons, as directed in the resolution of ratification for the New START Treaty. We will also seek the relocation of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons away from the territory of NATO member states.

Transparency is critical to the arms control process. The United States took a dramatic step to improve transparency by releasing the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and we would welcome reciprocal declarations by Russia and China.

Maintaining strategic stability with Russia and China will be a key priority in the years ahead. We are committed to promoting more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships with both countries and are pursuing high-level, bilateral dialogues with each toward that end. As we make progress in these relationships and as U.S. arms control policy and strategy develop, we will keep Congress appropriately informed.

Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study

Earlier, I referred to the presidentially directed NPR follow-on analysis that is underway. This analysis will culminate in updated nuclear guidance, which will in turn inform the Administration's policy decisions regarding potential future nuclear weapons reductions while strengthening deterrence of regional adversaries, enhancing strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and continuing assurance of our allies and partners. The analysis will not revisit the principles or conclusions of the NPR; rather, it is a key component of the NPR's implementation.

In fact, in performing this analysis, we focused on achieving the five strategic objectives that the Nuclear Posture Review established:

- Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
- Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy;
- Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
- Strengthening deterrence and assuring U.S. allies and partners; and
- Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Last year, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller explained to the House Armed Services Committee that DoD has been assessing deterrence requirements against these metrics. We are also considering the critical question of what to do if deterrence fails. In effect, we are asking and evaluating the answers to the following questions: what are the guiding concepts for employing nuclear weapons to deter adversaries, and what are the guiding concepts for ending a nuclear conflict on the least catastrophic terms if one has already started?

The Defense Department is leading this process, in close coordination with the National Security Staff and senior officials from the Departments of Energy and State and the Intelligence Community. The process will inform the Presidential direction that guides the force structure, force posture, and stockpile requirements needed to protect the United States and our allies and partners, as well as to inform plans for the employment of nuclear weapons in the event that deterrence fails.

The first step, in a chain of events, will be new Presidential guidance. Based on the President's guidance, the Secretary of Defense will issue more detailed planning guidance to the military and, based on that, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue detailed implementation guidance. Finally, STRATCOM will revise its nuclear plans in accordance with the guidance. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will review STRATCOM's plans, which are ultimately approved by the Secretary of Defense.

FY2013 Budget Request

Underpinning credible U.S. nuclear deterrence is a healthy nuclear complex and a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. The President and the NPR have made clear that the United States will do what is needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and effective for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The current fiscal environment, the added challenges of the

Budget Control Act, and the specter of sequestration, however, are forcing DoD to make tough choices in order to see this commitment through.

Upon taking office, the President made reversing the declining budgets for the nuclear complex a priority. This long-term commitment to the modernization of our nuclear arsenal is reflected in the Administration's section 1251 report on nuclear force structure. We have not wavered in our commitment to the investments that are needed to recapitalize the complex and to ensure we have the highly skilled personnel needed to maintain our nuclear capabilities. As the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated last year, these are large investments, but essential to U.S. national security.

In FY 2012, the President's budget request included \$7.6 billion for Weapons Activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Unfortunately, as this subcommittee is well aware, the final amount appropriated was less than the President had requested. This overall decrease to NNSA's budget request impacted other nuclear-related accounts, such as Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors as well as Weapons Activities.

We have been working closely with NNSA to develop a plan that will ensure adequate modernization and investment in the stockpile and infrastructure recognizing the challenge that having fewer available resources will present. This plan will be set forth in the section 1043 report, the DoD portion of which will be submitted in the coming weeks.

For FY 2013, the President's budget request includes \$7.6 billion for NNSA Weapons Activities. This number reflects the fiscal austerity that is affecting the range of national security programs, but it also captures the Administration's unwavering commitment to modernizing our nuclear infrastructure, and maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

FY 2013 Budget Issues Related to Forces, Infrastructure, and Delivery Systems

This year, the DoD budget request reflects the hard, but careful, decisions we have made to protect high-priority programs while allowing some efforts to be delayed with acceptable or manageable risk. The budget request protects investments in homeland missile defense and funds continued development of our regional missile defense capabilities, although at a somewhat slower rate.

The budget also funds investments in conventional strike capabilities. Specifically, the DoD is requesting funding for a Defense-wide program in support of continued research to develop a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability. The objective of the program is to develop and demonstrate boost-glide CPGS technologies and test capabilities that could provide the President with a wider range of options for engaging targets at strategic ranges. The ability to engage global targets in less than an hour is a capability that has previously only been available with nuclear-armed strategic missiles. DoD has no plans to replace nuclear warheads on Minuteman ICBMs or Trident SLBMs with conventional warheads.

Force Modernization

As the President's Budget for FY 2013 makes clear, DoD has important work underway to modernize the delivery systems that underpin nuclear deterrence. The NPR concluded that the United States will retain a nuclear triad under the New START Treaty composed of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; the President's Budget keeps this commitment.

Sustaining the sea-based, and most survivable, leg of our nuclear deterrent is particularly vital as we move to lower numbers under New START. The service life for the Trident D-5 missile is being extended to 2042. Construction of the first of the *Ohio*-class replacement submarines is scheduled to begin in 2021. This represents a two-year slip compared with last year's plan, but the Navy believes it can manage the challenges resulting from the delay. Specifically, this includes the fact that the first *Ohio*-class SSBNs would reach end-of-life before replacement boats come on-line, and that the common-missile compartment would be installed first in the new British submarine. Twelve new boats are planned, with the first scheduled to begin patrol in 2031. All DoD sustainment and modernization efforts for the submarine-based deterrent are fully funded in the President's FY 2013-2017 request.

The Administration plans to sustain the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM system through 2030. Ongoing intensive flight test and surveillance efforts will, by 2015, help determine whether we can achieve that date through better estimates for component age-out and system end-of-life. A two-year Air Force study examining options and required capabilities for a follow-on system is nearly complete, and a new ICBM development program, or a follow-on MMIII life extension, could begin in the 2014-2017 timeframe. A small-scale program to maintain a "warm" production line for MMIII solid rocket motors concluded last year but engineering and development continues to be sustained. A key modernization issue is sustainment of the large-diameter solid rocket motor industrial base pending decisions to produce a follow-on system. The President's FY 2013 Budget Request includes an eight million dollar Air Force study to evaluate a path forward to sustain this key industrial capability.

The United States will maintain two B-52H strategic bomber wings and one B-2 wing. Both bombers, however, are aging. Sustained funding and support is required to ensure operational effectiveness through the remainder of their service lives. Funding has been allocated to upgrade these platforms; for example, providing the B-2 with survivable communications, a modern flight system, and radar. This year, the Department will begin a program for a new, long-range, nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber that is fully integrated with a family of supporting aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. In addition, as modern air defenses put the bomber standoff mission with the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) – the current nuclear cruise missile deployed with the B-52H bomber – increasingly at risk, DoD is carrying out an analysis of alternatives, to be completed this fall, for an ALCM follow-on system called the long-range standoff (LRSO) missile. We plan to sustain the ALCM and the W80 ALCM warhead until the LRSO can be fielded.

To support the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe in support of our extended deterrence and assurance commitments, DoD is planning to provide a nuclear capability to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to replace aging F-16 dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The original plan was to

deliver a dual-capable JSF in 2017. To allow for more maturity in the program, the Air Force now intends to deliver nuclear capability to all JSFs in Europe by 2020 via the Block IV upgrade. The Air Force will ensure no gap exists in our ability to meet extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners.

I also want to take note of an often underappreciated, but critical, component of strategic deterrence: the nuclear command and control (NC2) system that links the triad of nuclear forces. Independent of deployed delivery systems and warheads, we require robust, survivable, and effective systems for early warning, attack assessment, and force direction to support our existing nuclear employment plans as well as associated contingencies.

The United States must maintain control of nuclear forces in any conceivable scenario, even under the enormous stress of a nuclear attack. An effective NC2 system must clearly and unambiguously detect and characterize an attack; assemble key decision makers in a conference so an appropriate response can be chosen in a timely manner; disseminate emergency action messages to nuclear forces taking into account the survivability of the force elements involved; and provide enduring control of surviving forces.

In the future we plan to spend significant resources on NC2 system research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance to address a range of challenges, including but not limited to the need for survivable satellite communications; survivable communications to forces; early warning satellite modernization; improved secure senior leader conferencing; hardening of critical communications links to electromagnetic pulse; and airborne and ground mobile command post sustainment/modernization. The good news is that Deputy Secretary Carter “wrote the book,” so to speak, on NC2, which has the added bonus of ensuring very senior-level attention across the Department to addressing shortfalls, both today’s and into the future.

Conclusion

Upon taking office, President Obama made it a priority to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Implementing these commitments requires partnerships among Executive Branch agencies and with Congress. In the past, these priorities have enjoyed strong bipartisan support and, as President Obama continues to demonstrate the importance he places on them, we hope that Congress will match that commitment.

Our nuclear forces remain the foundation of deterrence. Our arsenal needs significant and immediate investment. Given the declining defense budget, some modernization efforts may proceed more slowly than desired, but to reiterate the President’s statements, the NPR, and DoD’s new strategic guidance, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter threats to our Homeland, our deployed forces around the world, and our allies and partners. The President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget ensures that this will remain a leading national-security priority.