

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11

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What threats to our homeland can we anticipate as we look forward?

As we attempt to anticipate future threats it's important to remember our track record on successful predictions. Any objective assessment must begin with the fact that we are lousy predictors. Before the first Gulf war (Desert Shield, Desert Storm) we had no idea how the likes of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden, would perpetrate aggressions and atrocities that dominated US policy and shaped military actions for the next 20 years.

We are safe in assuming two things.

1. The terrorist threat will continue to pose the greatest threat inside our borders and to US forces and interests overseas. This danger becomes more serious as we consider that nuclear weapons get ever closer to the hands of irresponsible, rogue leaders throughout the world.
2. We must be prepared for more than counterinsurgencies. As nations gain the power to resist US policy in ways that could include aggressive action, our ability to deter and then react rapidly with substantive capabilities is as important as ever.

The argument is not whether aggressive foreign nations harbor ambitions of invading the US. I believe it's more a matter of reacting to, or being dragged into, conflicts perpetrated by frictions or atrocities that compel us to react. In Bosnia and Kosovo we led a NATO force that reacted to ongoing genocide. What should we be prepared for if frictions arise that involve allies in Asia or South America?

We have been able to react to the spectrum of conventional warfare (Iraq, Serbia) as well as counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan because the US military forces were equipped with needed capabilities, were able to modify or adapt existing technology, or were able to rapidly field necessary capabilities quickly. All the while we have maintained a nuclear deterrent and kept a watchful eye on nuclear proliferation and must continue to do so with focused attention on nuclear safety, reliability and security.

What are appropriate roles and missions for the US Military?

The roles and missions carved out for the military are time tested and well understood. I believe that a certain amount of overlap and redundancy is necessary for absolutely critical functions. In the field, you find the military services falling all over themselves to do what it takes to get the mission accomplished. Joint-minded operations are being carried out every

day. Behind the scenes of any major military operation you will find that very little is done by one service alone.

We could do much more to allow the services to better define the limits of necessary overlap and to further interdependence on one another's capabilities. There is absolutely no doubt that this could best be done by development of Joint Concepts of Operation that requires services to think through how we plan to deploy and fight in various situations, and to define and limit the areas of necessary overlap. This process would force new ways of deriving requirements and reshape the acquisition process by demanding that we describe how we are going to fight before we decide what we will buy to fight with.

The lessons we are learning in this new age of warfare must be applied with due respect for lessons of the past. The key word is balance. As we build capabilities in counterinsurgency we must be respectful of the very traditional and conventional capabilities that are emerging from potential adversaries who have watched and learned from US military successes over the past 20 years. The common understanding of asymmetrical advantage is the use of low technology to defeat high technology. We easily forget that the asymmetrical advantage of the United States is our technology multiplied many-fold by the ingenuity of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to rapidly shape our technological advantage in the course of battle.

The military also has a role as responsible stewards of nuclear weapons. As we reduce our nuclear posture it must be with the full support of Congress to maintain funding for the safety, reliability and security of the weapons that remain; to include relentless attention to counter proliferation.

As we enter the cyber age it will be necessary to do much more than to defend networks and data sources. We will need to develop the necessary weapons to fight back in a cyber-engagement. As the services and agencies develop the doctrine of cyber intelligence preparation; forensic and predictive analysis; and, doctrine of defense and offense, Congressional support for the weapons and tools of this new type of warfare will be critical.

What are the consequences of further cuts to the military over the next decade and what choices do we have to make?

It will be extremely difficult for the services to implement even the currently projected cuts. If the Joint Select Committee fails to reach consensus the resulting additional cuts to the defense budget would lead to dramatic loss of capability and the adverse impact on morale of a force that has served the nation so well for the decade of the war on terror.

It is unfortunate that when the services are faced with large budget cuts the easiest targets are, in many ways, the most damaging. We tend to hit training, readiness and research & development first as we attempt to save force structure. If all of the projected cuts are implemented, all of these budget categories will be impacted. Thus, our ability to repair and reset the force; to recapitalize the force; to recover lost training; to have the spare parts to

keep current systems operating; and, to retain our technology advantage through Research and Development would be simultaneously and severely impacted.

Indeed there is much that can be done to realize greater efficiency with current resources. If significant force reductions eventuate, they must be done with proper balance between Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve forces. All must share in eventual drawdowns and all must share responsibility for all assigned missions and the operational tempo demanded by these missions. This cannot be done without the support of the Congress as our military leadership makes difficult recommendations.

I also believe that enormous savings are available in the logistics functions if the full power of best business practices and competition can be brought to bear. Again, the Congress must stand behind our military leaders as they struggle to find solutions.

In any case our Nation's Military Leadership will be asked to recommend reductions more severe than any I have seen in my career. They cannot do so alone.

What are the impacts of reducing force structure and end strength?

Reductions in end strength and force structure must be tied to a realistic strategy and deliberate policy decisions that can still be supported in the face of cuts. Our current policies of support to alliances, forward presence and stationing, rapid global response, credible deterrence and the ability to sustain operations will all be called into question.

In many cases a proper balance for the United States may call for the redefinition of our alliances and reconsideration of our fair share of defense relationships. These decisions may permit prudent reductions in permanent commitments overseas. However, as an American and a former member of the world's greatest military I believe it is our obligation to maintain a force able to react with authority to instabilities and atrocities in the world when so directed, and to be able to do so rapidly and effectively.

What are the Implications of changes in global force posture/increasing US isolationism?

In a world that is on a slippery slope of instability, ungoverned pockets of terrorist growth, rogue leaders in control of nuclear weapons and growing disparity between the world's richest and poorest, it is unreasonable that the world's only great benign superpower should drift into isolationism.

As stated earlier, the time is appropriate to reassess our alliances and our commitments to them, however, it does not seem reasonable to back away from nations who struggle to implement political structures that support self-determination and the liberties promoted by our own policies.

There is no doubt that U.S. military basing and presence has been a force for stability in the world. Even if redefined and deliberately reduced our forward partnerships are important pillars of our credibility and visible signs of our commitment and should not be abandoned.