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Nonproliferation and Disarmament: What's the Connection and What does it  
Mean for U.S. Security and Obama Administration Policy?

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces  
Committee on Armed Services  
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Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez and Members of the  
Subcommittee.

It is as always an honor to appear before a distinguished Congressional  
Committee. Many of our important national debates are played out before  
committees of the Congress. In my personal judgment nuclear policy has  
received too little attention in open public hearings by the Congress. Thus I  
commend the Subcommittee for this hearing.

I am a substitute witness for Professor Scott Sagan so my testimony is  
additive to his. Scott has submitted an excellent paper to the Committee and I  
endorse it in its entirety. My objective will not be to repeat what Dr. Sagan has  
already said but to introduce some other thoughts.

First I have noticed that there is an impression among some that it was  
President Obama that first adopted the policy of seeking a nuclear weapon free

world. That is not the case. All during the Cold War and for years afterward one could not mention the concept of the elimination of nuclear weapons without being laughed out of the room. However, President Ronald Reagan made no secret of his passionate commitment to it. Perhaps no one believed that he really meant it yet he and General Secretary Gorbachev nearly negotiated such an agreement at the Reykjavik summit meeting in 1986.

As the years after the failure to achieve such an agreement at Reykjavik passed and world disorder and access to dangerous technologies became more threatening, concern about the mere existence of nuclear weapons began to increase. Finally, four senior American statesmen: former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz; former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry; and former Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services committee Sam Nunn decided to do something about this on the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting. This so called Gang of Four vigorously advocated/reviewing President Reagan's dream of nuclear disarmament in op-ed articles published in the Wall Street Journal in January, 2007 and January, 2008. In the 2007 Article the four authors said the following "Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a measure of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet - American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard

to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for the purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

....Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.

....Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which he considered to be 'totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization'...The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons....What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages....Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with American's moral heritage....We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal...."

The American president subsequently endorsed this policy. The Russian president also has endorsed this policy. A number of other world leaders have done the same. The entry into force of the New START Treaty and the two successful Nuclear Security Summits are significant, practical, concrete steps toward achieving the goal of the world-wide elimination of nuclear weapons of the type envisioned by the four authors.

President John F. Kennedy truly believed that there was a serious risk that nuclear weapons were destined to sweep all over the world. In March of 1963 in response to a reporter's question at a news conference, he said, "Personally, I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970 . . . there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4 and by 1975, 15 or 20. . . . I would regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard." He spent much of his presidency pursuing the cause of nonproliferation. President Kennedy had been told by the outgoing Secretary of State, Christian Herter, in December of 1960 that nuclear weapons would spread to additional countries and that the most likely next nuclear weapon states were India and Israel. He took this very seriously.

If such anticipated proliferation had in fact happened, there could be significantly more than two dozen nuclear weapon states in the world today, with nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals. Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, the distinguished former Director General of the International Atomic

Energy Agency was quoted in 2004 in a speech in Washington DC, as follows, “The danger is so imminent...not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear weapons but also terrorists getting their hands on some of these nuclear materials- uranium or plutonium.” Director General El Baradei also stated in a presentation that year to the IAEA General Conference that more than 40 countries perhaps now have the capability to build nuclear weapons. Thus, if such proliferation had taken place, under the circumstances with that many nuclear weapon states in existence, potentially every significant conflict could have brought with it the risk of going nuclear, and it might have become extremely difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations.

However, in 1965 the UN General Assembly took up the subject of nonproliferation. A Resolution was passed which over the next few years proved to be the blueprint of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, The NPT. Among other things this Resolution called for “balanced obligations” between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states in the treaty to be negotiated. The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, and came to be recognized as the principal reason- along with the parallel extended deterrence policies of the United States and the Soviet Union- that President Kennedy’s darkest nightmares have thus far not been realized. Beyond the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, to date, only four nations have acquired nuclear

weapons – two of them – India and Israel, were virtually there in 1970 – the date of entry into force of the NPT. This is far from what President Kennedy feared.

But the success of the NPT was no accident. It was based on a carefully crafted central bargain which incorporated the “balanced obligations” concept. In exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapon states (today more than 180 nations, most of the world) not to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards to verify compliance with this commitment, the NPT nuclear weapon states pledged unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies and undertook to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It is this central bargain that for the last four decades has formed the central underpinnings of the international nonproliferation regime.

However, one of the principal problems with all this has been that the NPT nuclear weapon states have never fully delivered on the disarmament part of this bargain. The essence of the disarmament commitment in 1970 and thereafter was that pending the eventual elimination of nuclear weapon arsenals the nuclear weapon states would: agree to a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, that is a comprehensive nuclear test ban; negotiate an agreement prohibiting the further production of nuclear bomb explosive material;

undertake obligations to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals; and give legally binding commitments that they would never use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear weapon states. However much of these disarmament elements of the NPT basic bargain have not been accomplished forty years later.

But the NPT is essentially a strategic international political bargain which should be observed, it is not a gift from the non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, few deny that today the NPT is in crisis. The question is how long can it remain viable as an unbalanced treaty with an important part of its basic bargain unrealized and a significant part unraveling as North Korea and Iran pursue the bomb. It is true that the norm of nonproliferation runs deep after forty years. It may be that the NPT can limp along for some years with only limited further proliferation or maybe not. But if the NPT ever fails today's security situation will seem like paradise by contrast.

Recognizing this vulnerability of the NPT, and with the end of the Cold War accompanied by the potential spread of nuclear weapon technology to failed and failing states and international terrorist organizations, serious efforts have begun to attempt to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for in the NPT, led by the four authors as outlined above.

Since the mid-twentieth century almost all American presidents have placed arms control and nonproliferation policy high on their agendas. President Eisenhower considered his failure to achieve a nuclear test ban his greatest disappointment. The NPT, was signed on President Johnson's watch. President Nixon oversaw the negotiation of the SALT I Agreements and the beginning of the SALT II Treaty process. The SALT II process was continued under President Ford and concluded under President Carter. President Carter also attempted to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban which was finally concluded under President Clinton's leadership. President Reagan advocated the abolition of all nuclear weapons and completed the medium range nuclear missile Treaty. The most successful arms control President was President George H.W. Bush. His Administration concluded four major arms control treaties during his four years as president: the START I Treaty, the START II Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. No other president completed more than one. Thus, nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament negotiations have been at the center of U.S. foreign policy for much of the last 50 years.

But explicitly prompted by the four authors, who met with him in 2009, no president has spoken out more eloquently and in such a comprehensive way as did President Obama in Prague last April. He declared his strong support for

a replacement START Treaty to be followed by deeper cuts in nuclear weapons leading to a multilateral nuclear weapon reduction negotiation involving all of the nuclear weapon states. He reiterated his support for U.S. ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and confirmed his support for a process leading to a nuclear weapon free world. He underscored his commitment to the strengthening of the NPT, along with measures to do more to safeguard fissile material around the world. And he urged the prompt negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

But of very great importance is the CTBT as an essential part of the basic bargain of the NPT. The NPT, the central international agreement underlying international peace and security in today's world, again is a strategic bargain built on a fundamental arrangement, nuclear nonproliferation for most of the world in exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapon disarmament to be undertaken by the five NPT recognized nuclear weapon states, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The principal quid for the quo of most nations of the world to never acquire nuclear weapons is the test ban. It is the only arms control agreement explicitly mentioned in the NPT, in preambular clause ten, and it is the most significant commitment made by the nuclear weapon states to bring the necessary political balance to the NPT. Such balance for the NPT was first called for by the General

Assembly Resolution in 1965, which was introduced by Sweden and India and, which led to the negotiation of the NPT. Thus, in 1968, at the time of NPT signature (Treaty entry into force was in 1970) as well as in 1995 when the NPT was made a permanent treaty, the undertaking of the nuclear weapon states to conclude a CTBT in the near future was essential to close the deal. Indeed without the commitment to the CTBT, permanent extension would not have been possible in 1995 and without it we could be faced with a possible NPT expiration in a few years. The non-nuclear weapon states understood in 1968, as well as in 1995, that, whereas nuclear weapon reductions are important and achievable, nuclear weapon elimination is a longer-term goal. But in exchange for their commitment never to have nuclear weapons, in their view at least, the NPT nuclear weapon states at least could stop the testing of nuclear weapons. The 1995 Statement of Principles which accompanied NPT indefinite extension and which the political price for NPT permanent extension explicitly called for the negotiation of a CTBT in one year, that is, by the end of 1996.

This deadline was met and the CTBT was signed in September 1996 with the United States as the first signatory. The Treaty provides by its terms that it will enter into force upon ratification by the 44 states that had nuclear facilities on their territory and were members of the Conference on Disarmament in 1996. Thirty-seven of those states have now ratified the CTBT and most of the rest are

waiting upon ratification by the United States. However, the U.S. Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999 and there has been no progress in the U.S. since. Yet this Treaty is essential to the long-term viability of the NPT, the existence of which is the principal reason that President Kennedy's nightmares of nuclear weapon proliferation have not happened. The NPT may not be able to survive as a viable regime without CTBT entry into force in the reasonably near future.

However, the debate today is to a large degree focused on the threats to the NPT and international security posed by nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. They are both very serious. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, built in the range of 10-12 nuclear weapons, established programs of both plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment to achieve further nuclear weapon capability, conducted ballistic missile tests and carried out two nuclear weapon tests - one a failure and one partly successful. In the process of doing all this North Korea threatens both the viability of the NPT and its neighbors in Northeast Asia. Iran appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapon capability from within the NPT. This program has created a major security problem for the world community. Should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile likely the result would be the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East thereby destroying the NPT and creating a truly grave and long-lasting international security crisis. It is important to exert a major effort to resolve these two problems.

The North Korean program stretches far back into history but by 2000 this problem was largely solved. The Agreed Framework, which had stopped the DPRK plutonium bomb program, was in place. North Korea had done virtually nothing with the uranium bomb technology acquired clandestinely from Pakistan's Great Proliferator, A.Q. Khan. The DPRK had offered to permanently halt its missile program and had suggested that a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War was possible. But the following year this progress was not pursued by the United States. The Agreed Framework was abandoned. North Korea began developing its uranium bomb capability. The missile deal was terminated. Soon, in 2003, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT, conducted two reprocessing campaigns for plutonium, and built 10-12 nuclear weapons and carried out two tests. In 2010 North Korea unveiled a brand new uranium enrichment plant, perhaps superior to anything Iran has. After the second test the DPRK declared it was a nuclear weapon state. Missile tests continued. After all of this it may be difficult for North Korea to give up its now acquired, in their eyes, nuclear weapon status.

The Iranian program also goes back many decades to the time of the Shah. But the West had its chances to bring it under control. First in 1997, after the liberal President Mohammad Khatami was elected there was a window when negotiations might have been possible. Three years later, the Clinton Administration did try by offering major trade concessions but apparently it was too little, too late.

The second chance came in the fall of 2001. On September 12, 2001 the whole world was with the U.S. It was a unique historic moment and opportunity. Iran believed it must respond to this, the Supreme Leader, Iran's President and others made statements to the effect that was no reason the U.S. and Iran could not work together and encouraged American investment in Iran. That fall Iran urged its Shia allies in Afghanistan to work with the Northern Alliance and the U.S.; Iran gave the U.S. a land supply route into Afghanistan across Iranian territory; it offered to return downed U.S. fliers; it helped greatly with the establishment of the Karzai government at the conference in Bonn and pledged \$350 million to the new government. But this came to naught.

The third and last chance came in April, 2003. After U.S. forces swept into Baghdad, Iran feared it might be next and decided to offer the U.S. a grand bargain, reportedly explicitly agreed to by the Supreme Leader. Iran offered to cease support of Islamic Jihad and Hamas and disarm Hezbollah, support the Saudi Palestine peace plan in the course of recognizing Israel and supporting the two state solution. Iran offered to open up its nuclear program to round the clock inspection and to permit direct U.S. involvement; there would be a united front against all terrorist organizations, especially Al-Qaeda. Iran would work with the U.S. to create a stable, democratic, secular government in Iraq. In return Iran wanted sanctions lifted, the right to claim war reparations from Iraq from the 1980-88 war, a recognition of their right to nuclear, chemical and biological technology consistent with existing treaties, and

acknowledgement of Iran's "legitimate security interests", all, as they said, in a "dialogue of mutual respect." It is not certain that this was a serious proposal but the U.S. never answered it to find out.

Iran's actions in negotiations, with various combinations of states, e.g., the EU Three (the U.K., France and Germany); the P-5 plus 1 (the U.N. Security Council permanent five with the addition of Germany), ever since probably has been tactical, not strategic. However, the negotiations presently going on between the P-5 plus 1 and Iran may hold promise only time will tell.

As the four authors indicated, the U.S. soon may enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. As Paul Nitze indicated in his 1999 op-ed nuclear weapons would become a threat even to their possessors. The authors noted that President Ronald Reagan called for the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and they endorsed "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal..." But no one anticipates that this policy, called for by the four authors, however desirable, can succeed rapidly. The elimination of nuclear weapons is not a policy for the short-term; it is a policy for the long-term. In the interim it is of the utmost importance that the NPT be restored to viability and that it hold the line for the many years ahead. The North Korean and

Iranian threats must be effectively addressed and the NPT basic bargain set right in the eyes of the world community, thereby restoring the political balance of the NPT.