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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

MR. KENNETH HANDELMAN
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense's countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts. The Department is working hard to build upon our legacy of counterproliferation and threat reduction work, and to adjust our programs to meet today's proliferation challenges and emerging threats.

It is a special honor to appear before you with three colleagues with whom I work very closely. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense (NCB), the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO) and the office I am currently privileged to be heading – Global Strategic Affairs – serve complementary roles in the development, execution, and oversight of the Department's CWMD mission. In general terms, my organization provides policy guidance, develops strategies, manages bilateral and multilateral relationships, and sets Department CWMD priorities. NCB is responsible for translating that guidance into programs and overseeing implementation. DTRA is the implementing agent responsible for all the work done on the ground and the JPEO manages oversight and execution of the Chem-Bio Defense Program. As a practical matter, we execute all of these responsibilities in close coordination with each other. This is a team effort.

Global Environment and DoD's Strategy

The threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains complex, and affects our counterproliferation and nonproliferation-related thinking. The intent of both state and non-state actors to acquire WMD, combined with cross-cutting global trends of the 21st century – create conditions for development of dual-use technology, sensitive materials, and personnel with scientific expertise to become increasingly accessible to potential state and non-state adversaries.

President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. Recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have increased broad

awareness and expectations for the United States, the Department of Defense, and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and counter WMD threats. These include:

- The 2010 National Security Strategy, which outlines a comprehensive nonproliferation and security agenda, including reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, promoting regional stability, and ensuring the effectiveness of our deterrent and defensive capabilities.
- The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is a comprehensive approach to prevent or respond to the proliferation and use of biological weapons by states or non-state actors. A signature element of this strategy is a broad effort to increase capability worldwide to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance and to improve capacity to counter both naturally occurring and deliberately-caused disease outbreaks through the application of targeted and proven tools for biological risk management.
- The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which devotes more attention to this challenge than any prior defense review, establishes “Preventing Proliferation and Countering WMD” and “Defending the United States and Supporting Civil Authorities at Home” among the top six priority mission areas.
- And the Nuclear Posture Review, which seeks to better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities –preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

In support of these efforts, the Department of Defense is aligning programs to become more flexible, agile, and responsive. Here our approach is three-fold: First, we aim to help rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats. Finally, we continue our

work to ensure our troops can fight and win, along with coalition partners, in an environment containing chemical, biological, and other hazards.

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regimes

For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a global nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers some important tools for advancing this critical agenda – but much more remains to be done. Today, we are accelerating efforts to work with other government agencies, and with our allies and partners to rejuvenate the nonproliferation regime, starting with a renewed commitment to strengthen the international legal frameworks that serve as the foundation for our efforts. The administration’s efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to increasing the barriers to proliferation of WMD.

We are actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Last May’s NPT Review Conference reaffirmed parties’ commitment to the Treaty and significantly achieved consensus on an Action Plan for future progress. This Action Plan endorsed a balanced approach to advance the three pillars of the regime: nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. DoD will continue to actively participate with State and our interagency colleagues in international activities to implement this Plan.

In addition, President Obama has committed his Administration to pursue the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is important to the nonproliferation effort because it would limit the ability of countries without nuclear weapons from confidently deploying or using such weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers to develop new types of nuclear warheads. As a sign of our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons-testing, and will remain fully engaged in the development of the Treaty’s

verification regime. At the same time, we remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for our security and that of our allies.

We will also seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. DoD will continue to support discussions by technical experts regarding this Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. These discussions are not a substitute for actual negotiations, but hopefully they will allow participants a greater understanding of the technical issues involved.

Despite these efforts, we recognize that this nuclear nonproliferation regime is under serious strain, in large part because of countries that choose to violate both the letter and the spirit of their commitments and because some countries choose to live outside this regime altogether. North Korea's recent revelation of a uranium enrichment facility and Iran's continued obfuscation about its nuclear activities directly challenge international norms and UN Security Council mandates. The Administration has led international efforts to respond to these challenges, resulting in unprecedented international agreement and support for strict sanctions regimes. In addition, our "negative security assurance" as stated by our Nuclear Posture Review is clear: the U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Finally, we are actively engaged in efforts to ensure that the upcoming Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference strengthens the global norm against possession and use of biological weapons, including by expanding membership in the Convention and strengthening its implementation to meet the bioweapons challenges of the 21st century. As part of this effort, DoD has taken steps to increase the transparency of our biological defense activities; the United States is encouraging other treaty parties to do the same.

Reducing and Eliminating Threats

The second element of the Department's approach involves engaging in active international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers both at their source and in transit, so that vulnerable materials cannot be exploited by terrorists or other hostile actors against the homeland, our allies or our forces.

As this committee is aware, since its inception in 1992 the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has worked in the former Soviet Union to reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. We are evolving the CTR Program to match a changing global security environment. In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense – with the concurrence of the Secretary of State – determined that CTR partnerships with Iraq, India, China, and the countries of Africa will assist the United States in achieving long-standing nonproliferation goals, as well as sustain long-term partnerships that enhance security. This step builds on a 2009 decision to pursue cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are moving forward to build those partnerships and to identify collaborative activities that support our shared security objectives. With the U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, this expansion of CTR program can help support security of U.S. military and interagency personnel.

My colleagues will go into further details of the President's \$508.2 million budget request for CTR in fiscal year 2012, but I'd like to highlight some key areas in which the Program will be supporting Administration and international nonproliferation and threat reduction priorities in FY12 and beyond.

It has been almost two decades since Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the hallmark legislation that established the Nunn-Lugar Program. Although elimination work has largely been concluded in the other states of the former Soviet Union, it goes on to this day in Russia as ballistic missiles, launchers, and ballistic missile submarines continue to be dismantled. Now, with the entry into force of the New START Treaty, CTR anticipates that the Russian Federation will continue to partner with the US to ensure strategic systems are properly disposed and no

residual proliferation-sensitive components remain. This site-specific threat reduction work will continue to be a prominent element of the CTR program. CTR is also working with the Department of Energy to transition to the Russian government responsibility for sustaining U.S.-provided physical protection systems at nuclear weapons storage sites. The Department continues to assist Russia in transporting nuclear warheads from operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites. Furthermore, we are assisting Russia with the secure transport of spent naval fuel, which is a potentially vulnerable nuclear hazard. I'm pleased to report that CTR cooperation with Russia continues to be a steady component of the US-Russian relationship that has remained largely insulated from the broader peaks and troughs.

We are also leveraging our nuclear security experience in the former Soviet Union with CTR's new international partners. Alongside Department of Energy and other Interagency stakeholders, CTR is supporting Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security with key partner countries, through which we will be able to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate equipment, contribute towards national and regional training programs, and collaborate on the research and development of nuclear security technologies. As these efforts mature, we will have a real opportunity with both countries to improve the overall culture of security and material responsibility.

The Department is similarly expanding our biological threat reduction programs to meet our new global health security requirements in support of the President's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. Today, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) focuses on four areas of partnership with host governments: consolidating and securing collections of especially dangerous pathogens; preventing release of especially dangerous pathogens, technology, and expertise by improving safety and security standards; strengthening detection, diagnosis and reporting systems in order to recognize and respond to outbreaks; and, promoting collaborative research projects to increase our collective ability to understand and recognize the most dangerous pathogens.

CTR continues to partner with former Soviet countries on biosecurity, and in coordination with our DoD and U.S. interagency colleagues, we are beginning to build relationships with new partner countries. Earlier I mentioned the Secretary's approval of CTR expansion to Africa, and I'd like to say a bit more about why DoD views Africa as a priority for this kind of engagement. Africa is a continent that is rich in indigenous, naturally-occurring especially dangerous pathogens, which indigenous scientists and health professionals must work with on a routine basis. Limited funding for training, infrastructure and other needs means that this work is all too often performed with less than ideal safety and security standards in place. These factors make Africa a tempting destination for both state and non-state organizations that seek to acquire biological weapons and might wish capitalize on Africa's pathogenic diversity. Working with partners in the region provides the US the opportunity to strengthen biosafety and security and to promote stronger oversight, furthering long-standing objectives codified in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the G8 Global Partnership.

The United States and its allies have had a long-standing public-health presence in Africa, a base of experience and familiarity that facilitates CTR's activities on the continent. Potential African partner governments are both enthusiastic and creative about the opportunities for Nunn-Lugar CTR program activities, and we are working with them to pursue a regional approach for our cooperative engagement program that would have a lasting impact beyond traditional bilateral relationships. The U.S. military has important relationships in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, so we view our activities as directly supporting U.S. troops' security, in addition to furthering larger non-proliferation goals.

While securing WMD materials at the source is an important component of the CTR program, our strategy requires a layered defense against WMD proliferation threats. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) is CTR's means to enhance our partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD "on the move" through the provision of detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities. Although not an element of CTR,

DTRA's International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive investments of the WMD-PPP program through its modest yet effective "train and equip" efforts. The ICP is unique in its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Customs in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic states, and in Eastern Europe. We are currently working to determine how best to expand both border security programs to new partners.

Detecting and Responding to Emerging Threats

The third element of the Department's approach involves improving our ability to deter, detect, defeat, and respond to emerging WMD dangers. Here the Department has a particular responsibility to our nation, as well as to our allies and partners. For instance, instability resulting from the collapse of a nuclear-armed state would risk the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat to our homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must be prepared to detect threats and defend ourselves against WMD dangers. This includes enhancements to interdiction and elimination capabilities as well as preparations to respond quickly to an attack should our preventive and deterrence efforts fail.

As President Obama said in his Prague speech, "the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons.... Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal" a nuclear weapon. With this threat in mind, DoD is working with other government agencies on an expanded whole-of-government response should we suspect a terrorist organization has obtained one or more nuclear devices. Faced with such a threat, we will potentially need a globally synchronized response to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of nuclear weapons. This would include activities such as securing material at the source, intercepting material on the move and increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is also closely intertwined with state challenges. For instance, the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed state could quickly lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involving multiple state and non-state actors as it moves across the globe.

Within DoD, we seek to build and maintain a layered defense against these threats, including: enhancing the protective posture of the homeland; working with the Intelligence Community to analyze and track terrorist networks and identify likely paths to proliferation; and, characterizing the source and nature of the threat. We can be certain that in a nuclear or other WMD crisis, all these activities would be occurring simultaneously – our work at DoD has focused on how departmental actions would be coordinated and synchronized globally.

We must additionally enhance our ability to respond quickly to an attack should these efforts fail. Notably, the President's budget request includes additional resources to improve capabilities for technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities, including funding for ground and air collection, in order to more quickly attribute the source of a terrorist attack.

Although a nuclear armed terrorist may be the gravest threat we face, we are also concerned with novel or emerging threats. Biological threats pose a unique problem from a countering WMD perspective, because these threats span public health concerns and force protection. The President's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats outlines many of these challenges and articulates a framework for addressing the risks from states or non-state actors who seek to deliberately misuse biological materials for harm while at the same time, working to meet global health requirements.

A signature element of the National Strategy is a broad effort to increase capability worldwide to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance, setting the foundation for successfully responding to both naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks. A 2009 National Research Council report noted that countries which lack the public health infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and report naturally occurring

disease outbreaks are substantially less able to effectively deal with a bio-terror attack. To that end, we have dedicated funding beginning in FY12 to support our overseas laboratories, which are DoD's primary means to discover novel pathogens or characterize pathogens that are not generally found in the United States. The DoD overseas labs' work continues to expand DoD support to basic and applied research for both emerging infectious disease surveillance and detection of biological threats. We are additionally working with partners and allies to establish protocols and procedures to facilitate cooperation between governments and private industry so that in a crisis, disaster can be averted or at least mitigated to save as many lives as possible. In addition, these programs enhance national security by precluding the potential utility of biological weapons through the provision of public health and medical interventions, and may help deter their use through the enhancement of our forensics capabilities.

The Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI) is a new endeavor to address the threats posed by biological agents. The goal of MCMI is to enhance advanced pharmaceutical development, manufacturing, and regulatory science to enable the rapid delivery of new medical countermeasures. This will fill a capability gap underscored by the inability to rapidly produce vaccine for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza in a timely manner. The U.S. government is working with private industry to build agreements to increase manufacturing capacity, conduct research to develop new manufacturing platforms, and to advance regulatory approval.

Although this initiative may seem like a public health issue, military populations are especially at risk for disease outbreaks that are uncommon among the general population of the United States. Examples include adenovirus infections among basic trainees, and tropical diseases such as dengue during overseas deployments. The civilian market demand for medical countermeasures for these diseases is limited as there are inadequate commercial incentives for private industry to develop, mass produce, and obtain regulatory approval for these relatively low-market demand products.

Consequently, medical countermeasures for these diseases are unavailable in the commercial marketplace.

Similar challenges have been encountered in efforts to provide countermeasures for biological warfare threats. The infrequent, naturally-occurring cases of especially dangerous pathogens are poor “market drivers” for development of remedies, but these same pathogens could devastate military operations if used as biological weapons by adversaries on the battlefield. DoD has an equity in the rapid development of countermeasures for select emerging diseases that may severely impact both the general population and military readiness and operations (e.g., pandemic influenza). The DoD has a major stake in MCMI, because military force health protection remains a DoD responsibility in addition to the general public health responsibilities of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).

The revolution in biotechnology – as well as advances in the chemical industry – challenges our ability to anticipate and prepare for future threats. As the commercial pharmaceutical and chemical fields continue to expand throughout the world, they may provide nefarious actors – either state or non-state – with easier access to the dual use equipment and precursor materials needed to produce chemical or biological weapons. However, it is not only the proliferation of conventional chemical and biological capabilities that is troublesome. The growth of these industries could further lead to the development of new or novel agents, which could potentially defeat our current defenses. This is one reason we have advocated in both our FY11 and FY12 President’s Budget Requests to include more RDT&E funding to develop more effective countermeasures and reliable personal protection to operate in the midst of an attack and research new decontamination techniques to more quickly mitigate the effects of new or novel chemical and biological agents.

To further enhance our ability to contain nuclear, chemical and biological threats emanating from failed or fragile states, the 2010 QDR called for the establishment of a standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination. The Secretary designated U.S.

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the lead, and the command is currently completing its mission analysis. The standing headquarters will greatly increase the capability of the Department to plan, train, and execute WMD elimination operations, which include the ability to locate, characterize, secure, disable or destroy hostile WMD programs or capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. The Headquarters will have the ability to deploy rapidly to the affected Combatant Command in order to address a variety of WMD scenarios, especially during peacetime or early in a crisis.

In addition to elimination, we are strengthening the capabilities of our warfighters to address a range of proliferation threats. My office is working with AT&L, DTRA and the Services to develop a long-term science and technology strategy that will prioritize our investment in CWMD capabilities. We also work closely with Joint Staff to ensure the chem-bio defense program has the resources it needs to develop the equipment required by warfighters to fight in and through a WMD environment. We are also working with U.S. Strategic Command as the advocate for WMD capabilities, to address the Department's needs to effectively counter nuclear threats of all shapes and sizes.

Additionally, given the global implications of a WMD attack, we must engage partner nations, allies, and the broader international community to improve our ability to detect and respond to such dangers and reduce the risk of WMD terrorism. In this fiscally constrained environment, we must strengthen ties with allies and partners to shoulder part of this burden and engage collectively to meet these challenges. This includes promotion of efforts to increase the capacity of our partners and allies to defend themselves and operate alongside U.S. forces in the event of a WMD attack. For FY12, my office has requested dedicated funding for “counter-WMD Cooperative Defense Initiatives” for each Geographic Combatant Command that would increase their resources for interoperability among U.S. forces and regional partners, and ensure partner nations can survive an attack, eliminate further threats, and manage the humanitarian consequences of a WMD attack. Within NATO, the Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 reaffirmed the

Alliance's commitment to further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. To that end, my office is working to support NATO's efforts to assess how it can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Conclusion

Congress has provided authorities and resources which allow DoD to address the WMD threat to our troops and our people. It is a threat which spans traditional counter-proliferation and non-proliferation responses, and it is a threat which is evolving. Our mission is to ensure that DoD's responses evolve at an equal pace in order that our troops and those of our coalition partners can fight and win in a WMD environment, and that our people are protected from WMD threats. We are committed to working closely with our interagency and international partners, and with the Congress in this endeavor.