House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Open Hearing, "The Current Status and Future Direction for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture"

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Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building

Prepared Statement by Ellen O. Tauscher
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
"The State Department's Role in NATO DDPR and Future Arms Control"

Good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to share my perspective on the State Department's role in the future direction of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and posture. I will focus my initial remarks on two areas where State is playing a major role: the ongoing Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) in NATO, and the preparations, process, and expectations for future arms control efforts with Russia and other countries.

The Administration is committed to continuing a step-by-step process, as outlined by President Obama in Prague in 2009, to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

President Obama is committed to seeking to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation to address the disparity between the non-strategic nuclear stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States and to secure and reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.

Our approach will be guided by the key principles that Secretary Clinton outlined at the 2010 NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting in Tallinn. We aim to both show strong Allied support for the President's Prague vision and underscore our common view, as the Alliance agreed at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.

At Lisbon, the Alliance reaffirmed that the strategic nuclear forces of NATO's nuclear-armed member states are the "supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies" and agreed that NATO should maintain the broadest possible level of burden sharing on nuclear matters. NATO Allies agreed to seek to create the

conditions for future nuclear reductions, and noted that the Alliance should seek Russia's agreement to increase the transparency of its nuclear weapons in Europe and to relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. We are committed to consulting closely with Allies and making decisions by consensus on NATO's nuclear deterrent.

The DDPR is examining NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance. Its mission is to identify the "appropriate mix" of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities NATO needs in order to respond to 21st century security challenges, strengthening deterrence as part of our commitment to allied security. We aim to complete it for the NATO Summit that President Obama will host in Chicago in May 2012.

The DDPR also provides us an important opportunity to consult with Allies about nuclear deterrence and future U.S.-Russia nuclear talks. Its results will inform our consideration of next steps with Russia on nuclear reductions.

As a next step in our bilateral dialogue with Russia, we seek to conduct a broad policy discussion on the various considerations that affect strategic stability. We also hope to deepen this engagement to discuss key concepts and terminology which will become relevant as we prepare to discuss further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including both deployed and non-deployed weapons.

We also would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia. We are thinking through how such transparency measures might be implemented, and are consulting with our NATO allies on that subject through the DDPR.

The New START Treaty with Russia has been in force since February 5, and its implementation is proceeding smoothly. The New START Treaty places equal limits on both sides, limits that are significantly lower than the levels provided for in the earlier START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty. The Treaty provides us confidence that as Russia modernizes its strategic forces, Russian force levels will not exceed the Treaty limits seven years after entry into force and continuing for the remainder of the Treaty's duration.

The New START Treaty contributes to our security not only through its limits, but also through its strong verification regime. The Treaty provides us greater certainty about the composition of Russia's forces and provides information and access that we would otherwise lack. Without the New START Treaty, our

inspectors would not be able to visit Russian strategic weapons bases. New START's verification regime enhances predictability and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, reducing the risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and mistrust.

Beyond the U.S.-Russia relationship, the P5 nuclear weapons states are engaging in a dialogue on issues relating to nuclear weapons verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, as called for at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. In late June, France hosted a P5 conference on these topics. The P5 discussed a range of issues, including nonproliferation, verification and reporting, and exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities. The UK offered to host discussions on verification at an expert-level meeting in London. To ensure a continuing process, the P5 agreed to establish a working group to develop an agreed glossary of key nuclear terms, which will be very helpful to reaching mutual understanding in future multilateral discussions of limitations on nuclear weapons. The P5 also agreed to hold a third P5 conference next year in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. These deepening P-5 engagements are important to our broader nonproliferation objectives, and help underscore P-5 commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.