

Statement of Mr. Andrew Weber  
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On

Counterproliferation Strategy and the Fiscal  
Year 2012 National Defense Authorization  
Budget Request for the Defense Threat  
Reduction Agency and Chemical and  
Biological Defense Program

Before

Emerging Threats and Capabilities  
Subcommittee  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives

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## **Introduction**

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss with you several Department of Defense efforts to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). I serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for matters concerning Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

I oversee the implementation of the Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program and manage the Department's treaty implementation activities to ensure compliance with nuclear nonproliferation agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I provide programmatic advice and recommendations on the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, and am also responsible for oversight, integration, and coordination of the Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This program delivers systems for the detection and identification of chemical and biological agents and provides protection and decontamination capabilities for personnel and equipment. These activities combine requirements, science and technology execution, and acquisition efforts.

In addition, I oversee the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), headed by Mr. Ken Myers, who is here with me today. The DTRA mission is to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from WMD by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter these threats and mitigate their effects. The agency is the Department of Defense's

Combat Support Agency for the countering-WMD mission that includes nonproliferation, counterproliferation, consequence management, and the development of improved countering-WMD capabilities for the Warfighter.

Also appearing before you is Brigadier General Jess Scarbrough, who supports me as the Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense. General Scarbrough is responsible for the advanced development and acquisition of equipment and capabilities for the Warfighter to counter chemical and biological threats.

### **Countering WMD Vision and Mission**

The vision for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs is to ensure the Department of Defense is postured to counter 21<sup>st</sup> century WMD threats to our Warfighters and citizens here and abroad. Our mission is to lead the Department in the development and integration of defense capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to WMD threats. The overarching goal is to prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with WMDs. It is imperative that we provide the capabilities to enable the Department to accomplish the countering-WMD military strategic objectives to: prevent, dissuade, or deny WMD proliferation or possession; reduce, destroy, or reverse WMD possession; defeat and deter WMD use and subsequent use; and defend, respond, and recover from WMD use.

DTRA's Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) Strategic Plan, released last November, builds on these objectives. The goals of the plan provide for: a synchronized effort among the Department of Defense, the other executive agencies and departments, and our international

partners; facilitate a swift adaptation to the evolving trends and future security threats; and serve as a foundation for the proposed DTRA funding in the President's FY12 budget request.

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program is a key part of a comprehensive national strategy to prevent, protect against, and respond to the constantly evolving spectrum of chemical and biological threats. The President's FY12 budget request for this program includes \$254 million for procurement, \$771 million for advanced development, and \$502 million for science and technology efforts, for a total of \$1.526 billion.

This year's efforts have been hindered due to the constraints of operating under a Continuing Resolution. As Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted, "Each and every program manager in the Department is having to upset carefully calibrated plans, stop or slow activities only to restart them later, defer the commencement of important new programs, and so on... It is not only inefficient, it is anti-efficient."

In light of these current restraints, I ask that you strongly support a responsible FY11 appropriations bill and the President's FY12 budget request so that we can move forward with these programs to provide the Warfighters and the nation with the capabilities we need to counter WMD.

### **Chemical and Biological Defense Program**

As stated in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, "...fanatics have expressed interest in developing and using biological

weapons against us and our allies.” Rapid advancements in biotechnology and manufacturing capabilities are making it easier for an adversary, whether state or non-state, to develop biological or chemical weapons. The challenge posed by biological threats is the hardest to address and the most daunting.

There are no simple solutions to countering biological threats. One of the complicating factors is that they lie at the nexus of security and health, and regardless of man-made or natural origin, threaten our Warfighters and citizens. The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic showed us that our efforts must account for the full spectrum of biological threats, including emerging infectious diseases.

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program provides the capabilities needed for a layered set of defensive measures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. It also aids rapid restoration of affected areas with less impact on essential operations. These integrated capabilities improve our ability to sense chemical and biological warfare agents, shield our service members, shape our operations, and sustain our forces. Our programs enable the Warfighter to identify threats and continue operations in a WMD environment.

One capability that is fielded now with our forces in over 300 locations worldwide is the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS). This is a portable instrument capable of identifying multiple biological agents. Currently, Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia, and Avian Influenza tests are cleared by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use on the JBAIDS. Furthermore, the Department has

submitted to FDA over 70 requests for consideration of emergency use authorizations for assays to be used with the instrument.

This system is part of a unified set of capabilities built to respond swiftly and effectively to the threats facing the Warfighter. Our primary goal is to prevent a biological or chemical attack. Should a crisis occur, we must be prepared to protect and respond.

Our ability to obtain early warning about the emergence and progression of new and particularly dangerous biological agents hinges upon the development of a global biosurveillance network and next generation detection and diagnostics systems. These enablers will provide the capability for quick and reliable early warning, identification, and notification. To achieve these goals, we have increased the focus on science and technology; an emphasis reflected within the FY12 Chemical and Biological Defense Program budget.

Biosurveillance is critically important to the Department. We need an early warning capability to identify a biological attack within hours, not days, by using simple, affordable diagnostic devices linked up with a comprehensive global surveillance network.

The Department of Defense has been coordinating with the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services to improve our biological threat detection capability as well as strengthening our international ties by integrating reporting laboratories and other networks.

We are also investing in a detection and diagnostics program that is a critical component to protect our Warfighters and nation against a biological attack or outbreak. We are working with our partners at Health and Human Services, in particular the FDA, to develop a clear, efficient, and safe regulatory pathway to clearance or approval. Again, the overarching goal of our efforts is the reliable and timely fielding of affordable medical diagnostic and agent detection equipment capable of supporting military operations in a WMD environment.

In the 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama directed the enhancement of the nation's capability to develop, license, and procure countermeasures against both bioterrorist attacks and naturally-occurring infectious disease. In response, we are preparing to execute a Medical Countermeasures Initiative that will provide agile and flexible advanced development and manufacturing capabilities. This will enhance the Department's ability to protect against known agents and emerging threats for which countermeasures do not yet exist.

The 2009 H1N1 pandemic, along with the ongoing challenges with development of WMD medical countermeasures, revealed major gaps in advanced development and domestic manufacturing capacity. One gap was particularly evident; the lack of partnership between the United States Government and large pharmaceutical companies. This initiative will work to strengthen the government's relationship with those companies, who are the foremost leaders in advanced development of medical countermeasures.

We are leveraging work from several sources, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Transformational Medical Technologies program, which focuses on the rapid discovery and refinement of medical countermeasures. In 2009 these efforts culminated in a successful test in which a hemorrhagic fever virus therapeutic platform showed flexibility when it was adapted for the H1N1 virus.

The ability to scale-up production when needed or switch manufacturing from one product to another is critical. To achieve this ability and to evaluate new manufacturing methods, a strong partnership with the FDA is essential. The ongoing efforts to reach our goals include the FDA and other interagency partners.

### **Countering Nuclear Threats**

President Obama has made it clear that one of today's greatest dangers is nuclear terrorism. We believe Al-Qaeda and their associated forces are seeking nuclear weapons. They would have no compunction at using such weapons if they managed to obtain them.

In 2009, the President gave a speech in Prague where he presented his vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This is, of course, a long-term goal, and one that he has said may not be achieved in his lifetime. The President also stated that unilateral disarmament will not result in improved security and that we must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Just last month, I visited the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. I witnessed first-hand the execution of this

critical deterrence mission and thanked the extraordinary men and women responsible for providing the United States with this essential capability.

My office is a focal point within the Department of Defense for maintaining the nuclear deterrent and countering nuclear threats. The expertise needed to maintain the nuclear stockpile is also relevant and necessary to address nuclear threats to the nation. As such, the mission to counter threats may be affected by any reduction in support or funding for stockpile-related work.

In order to reduce the risk of emerging nuclear-armed adversaries, the Department of Defense is working with the Departments of Energy and State to implement the President's Global Nuclear Lockdown initiative to secure vulnerable fissile material worldwide. This effort is supported by the DTRA-executed Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has recently expanded in scope and geographical reach.

We are also working to improve the nation's capabilities in nuclear forensics, which is the thorough analysis and characterization of pre- and post-detonation radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris, as well as effects from a nuclear detonation. In an interception or post-detonation event, nuclear forensics will help determine material type and origin, potential pathways, and design information. It is an integral component of the broader goal of attribution, which merges forensics results with traditional law enforcement and intelligence information to identify those responsible for the planned or actual attack.

To keep Congress fully informed on the development and fielding of countering-WMD capabilities, the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) will provide an updated report to Congress in May 2011. On Sept. 28, 2010, the Government Accountability Office recommended that the CPRC include additional financial information besides the President's Budget. One of the findings was that information on the programs detailed in the CPRC report should include appropriations and expenditures. We have requested this information for the upcoming report. Another recommendation was to more clearly relate prioritized capability gaps to programs and resources. We are gathering information to be able to address this in the May 2011 CPRC report as well.

### **Conclusion**

The threat of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack on our troops or the homeland is very real and constantly evolving. This means the Department of Defense must develop nimble, agile programs to respond. In support of the vision of President Obama and Secretary Gates, the Department is working to strengthen our capabilities to effectively prevent, deter, defeat, and respond to these threats. I ask for your support of a responsible FY11 appropriations bill and the President's FY12 budget request so that we can achieve these goals. I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to testify today and would be pleased to answer your questions.