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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
US CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES

FEBRUARY 29, 2000



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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

The national interests outlined in the National Security Strategy and the objectives articulated in our National Military Strategy form the basis for United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) objectives and strategy for our region. Primary among U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the promotion of regional stability and the insurance of uninterrupted, secure access to Arabian Gulf energy resources. That in turn requires freedom of navigation, access to commercial markets, protection of U.S. citizens and property abroad, and security of our regional friends and allies. Other interests include the support and attainment of a comprehensive and lasting Middle East peace, general stability in this volatile region, and the promotion of democratic values throughout the region. Enduring concerns include regional hegemonic states, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), religious extremism and terrorism, the production and transport of narcotics, environmental security issues, local disputes, and the danger of failed or incapable states.

Our region, or AOR, comprises 25 nations, extending from Egypt and the Horn of Africa through the Gulf States to the

Central Asian States in the north. It also includes the waters and maritime choke points of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.

Perhaps the word that best describes the Central Region is "diversity." Home to three of the world's major religions, the area contains no less than eighteen major ethnic groups who speak seven primary languages and hundreds of dialects. There is also incredible economic diversity with annual per capita income varying from just over one hundred dollars in some poorer African states to the tens of thousands of dollars in the richer Gulf states.

Conflict, instability, and uncertainty permeate many of the nations of the USCENTCOM AOR. These conditions will continue to challenge regional leaders and U.S. policymakers, demanding deliberate responses that could range from humanitarian assistance to major theater military operations. The growing proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems is a clear threat to stability. Population growth is also increasing dramatically putting pressure on natural resources, specifically water, and economic systems. This has resulted in instability, especially in countries experiencing this "youth bulge." Certain areas of this dynamic and volatile Central Region offer a fertile environment for extremists to recruit, train, and conduct terrorist operations. These extremists pose a significant and growing

threat to U.S. personnel around the world and to their own people and governments as well. Currently we are seeing some indications of a coalescing of what were disparate isolated extremist movements and causes.

Regional Trends

Overview

Our overall engagement strategy takes into consideration the diverse cultural aspects of the region and the varying capability of the region's militaries. Therefore, USCENTCOM organizes the region into four sub-regions (South and Central Asia, Africa, Gulf States, and Red Sea) to increase our understanding, identify areas for mutual cooperation, and leverage engagement with certain key states whose influence extends between sub-regions and between unified command areas of responsibility.

South and Central Asia

On October 1, 1999 USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The importance of these Central Asian States (CAS) will continue to grow as their economies develop and access to the sub-region's natural resources increases. For the CAS, USCENTCOM will build on the relationship and programs developed by U.S. European Command and U.S. Atlantic Command, now U.S. Joint Forces Command. Continued participation in the

Partnership for Peace, Marshall Center and International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs remains an invaluable means of enhancing stability. In Central Asia, establishing apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs is a priority.

Overall, the CAS can be generally characterized as struggling centralized governments searching for new economic alternatives. The economy of the CAS, as a whole, remains largely underdeveloped. While each country has implemented its own set of economic reforms, many difficulties remain. Because of their respective economic difficulties, instability is and will continue to be a challenge for the CAS.

Instability in the South Asia sub-region undermines the viability of the Central Region and presents implications for the entire AOR. A religious and ethnically motivated civil war and economic devastation continue to plague Afghanistan. The country has become a sanctuary for extremists and an exporter of violence, with an entire generation of Afghans socialized to a life of warfare. Additionally, the ruling Taliban have embraced the narcotics trade as a primary revenue source to fuel their war effort. This combination of radicalism, terrorism, gray-arms and narco-trafficking undermines the already fragile governments in the region. These governments already face a

host of their own internal and external problems: ethnic and religious tension, radical Islamic elements, poor or failing economies, corruption, disaffected youth, drug trafficking, expanding WMD capabilities and terrorism. Kashmir, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Chechnya are all touched by the instability radiating from Afghanistan. The historic animosity between Pakistan and India, an animosity further compounded by each country's growing nuclear capability, brings further instability to a region already under siege. The Pakistan-Indian crisis near Kargil last summer had the potential for escalation to general war, a potential that has not diminished over the last year. Confrontation between Pakistan and India continues daily along the line of control and rhetoric has risen to new levels. The October 1999 military coup that toppled the democratically elected government in Pakistan has only exacerbated the tension. Pakistan may hold the key to stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

In Tajikistan, the fragile peace arrangement following the end of the civil war continues; however, plans for an integrated, representative government have not been realized. The October 6, 1999 elections were held under the shadow of renewed controversy between the Tajik government and opposition members; prospects for long-term stability have not improved significantly. Elsewhere in the Central Asian region, recent

activities by radical Islamic groups, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) during the summer and fall of 1999, have heightened fears of the spread of extremism in the region. The result is new cooperative security initiatives between four (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) of the five states (excluding Turkmenistan). Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan possess a wealth of untapped natural resources. The Caspian Sea region energy (oil and gas) development has moved out of its early, formative stage and is poised for extensive development in the next several years. However, Caspian Sea development decisions are taking place within an environment of differing agendas on the part of the Central Asian states. The Caspian Sea oil-producing states face intense competition from the prospective pipeline and trans-shipment states. Because of the enormous energy riches at stake, the potential for instability exists as countries settle questions of ownership and acceptable export routes.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The proliferation of advanced weapons and associated technology is of increasing concern in the Central Region. Both India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998 and new, longer-range ballistic missiles in 1999. Continued missile flight testing and possibly additional nuclear tests are likely in 2000. Iran is making significant strides in development of

advanced ballistic missiles and chemical/biological weapons, and continues to assemble an indigenous nuclear infrastructure. Finally, despite damage inflicted by Operation DESERT FOX strikes, Iraq has not forgone its missile and WMD programs and continues to resist the reintroduction of United Nations arms inspectors. Nations such as China, North Korea and Russia exacerbate these problems by selling advanced weaponry and the means to indigenously produce them. This troubling trend is magnified by the ever-expanding inventory of off-the-shelf technology that reduces time lines for developing and fielding unconventional weapons.

Of perhaps most concern is the arms race on the sub-continent. Tensions between India and Pakistan again spiked in mid-1999, fueling concern of the possibility of another war between these, now nuclear capable, adversaries. Both countries are now developing even longer-range, more capable ballistic missiles and continued flight testing in 2000 is expected. Similar trends are developing across the Central Region.

Iran is aggressively pursuing all aspects of such weapons, to include platforms necessary for long-range delivery. Despite ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Tehran maintains the largest chemical weapons program in the region. We remain concerned that Iran will choose to circumvent the CWC by pursuing those technologies that are dual-use in nature,

enabling production of CW agents at facilities ostensibly built to manufacture legitimate chemical products. Iran also may have already produced and weaponized small quantities of biological agents. Its nuclear program, supported by a number of advanced suppliers, has tremendous potential for transferring critical technologies toward nuclear weapons.

Perhaps the greatest concern is Iran's rapidly expanding ballistic missile potential. It is developing a medium-range missile to augment existing SCUD-B and SCUD-C systems that already can reach many key Coalition targets along the eastern Arabian Peninsula. The Shahab-3 MRBM will bring more targets within range, allow launches from locations deeper inside Iran, and significantly complicate our theater missile defenses. This missile would also serve as an ideal delivery platform for an Iranian offensive nuclear capability. Other ballistic missiles under development will allow Iran to extend its reach even further, putting regions outside the AOR at risk.

While Iraq's WMD capabilities were degraded under UN supervision and set back by Coalition strikes, some capabilities remain and others could quickly be regenerated. Despite claims that WMD efforts have ceased, Iraq probably is continuing clandestine nuclear research, retains stocks of chemical and biological munitions, and is concealing extended-range SCUD missiles, possibly equipped with CBW payloads. Even if Baghdad

reversed its course and surrendered all WMD capabilities, it retains the scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure to replace agents and munitions within weeks or months. A special concern is the absence of a UN inspection and monitoring presence, which until December 1998 had been paramount to preventing large-scale resumption of prohibited weapons programs. A new disarmament regime must be reintroduced into Iraq as soon as possible and allowed to carry out the mandates dictated by the post-Gulf War UN resolutions. The Iraqi regime's high regard for WMD and long-range missiles is our best indicator that a peaceful regime under Saddam Hussein is unlikely.

Finally, a significant consequence of proliferation is that some regional allies will begin to shift their focus from a reliance on missile and WMD defenses to acquisition of their own offensive, long-range strike weapons to offset the growing capabilities of their neighbors. Clearly, the proliferation of advanced weapons and associated technology is reaching alarming proportions in the Central Region and impacting both our regional relationships and the execution of our mission.

Terrorism

The dynamic and volatile Central Region offers a fertile environment for terrorists to recruit, train, and conduct operations. The situation is exacerbated by religious conflict, ethnic and tribal divisions, economic challenges, and political

disenfranchisement. This, in turn, has led some factions in the region to champion extremism, frequently under the banner of religion, as their best hope for achieving political and social change.

The nature of the terrorist threat to U.S. interests has matured from individual groups backed by state-sponsors to transnational, loosely knit confederations. Such organizations are no longer solely dependent on state-sponsors for material support. Extremists like Usama bin Ladin and his World Islamic Front network benefit from the global nature of communications that permits recruitment, fund raising, and direct connections to sub-elements worldwide. Advances in computer technology and growth of the Internet pose significant challenges. Terrorists are seeking more lethal weaponry to include chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear components with which to perpetrate more sensational attacks. In sum, the threat we now face has become more subtle and complex.

The Central Region remains a primary focus of extremist activities. Three (Iraq, Iran and Sudan) of the seven recognized state-sponsors of terrorism are within this potentially volatile area, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council for its harboring of Usama bin Laden. Nearly one half of the 28 recognized terrorist organizations have operational sites within the region. Afghanistan has emerged as

a catalyst for regional instability offering sanctuary, support, and training facilities to a growing number of extremist elements. Further, the inclusion of the five Central Asian States within USCENTCOM's AOR has substantially increased the diversity of terrorist threats and the availability of WMD technology with which we have to cope.

We continue to demonstrate strong resolve to protect our forces and U.S. citizens abroad. Our efforts to safeguard overseas facilities have complicated terrorist planning. We remain fully prepared to take those offensive measures deemed necessary to defeat terrorism worldwide. As we continue to harden our military and diplomatic facilities, terrorists may focus on softer targets such as private Americans residing abroad.

I remain deeply concerned that extremists may turn to WMD in an effort to make more sensational political statements and overcome improved U.S. defenses against conventional attack. There is evidence that some elements in our region are exploring rudimentary chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Detecting plans for a specific WMD attack is extremely difficult, making it likely such an event would occur without warning.

Training, vigilance, and preparedness are key elements in our national strategy to combat terrorism. All of these come at

a price in terms of funding and resources. Even though our regional threats and mounting instability appear extremely challenging, a myriad of ongoing theater engagement activities are necessary to meet these threats and challenges.

Africa

The Horn of Africa continues to present unique challenges. Any number of diverse problems could precipitate some form of USCENTCOM reaction. The Sudanese government continues to provide support and safe haven to transnational terrorists and opposition groups. The civil war raging in southern Sudan has devastated the country's economy and exacerbated the famine. With little near-term prospect for an end to the civil war, the humanitarian situation in Sudan will remain bleak for years to come.

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea is particularly troubling. These two valuable U.S. partners have been a stabilizing influence on the Horn of Africa. The border dispute has led to renewed violence and conflict in Somalia and security challenges in northern Kenya. The regional implications of the dispute are profound.

Somalia is a failed state with no functioning national government and warlords controlling much of the country. Like Sudan, the humanitarian situation is bleak.

Kenya is an important friend in East Africa. The country provides valuable access to intermediate staging bases with facilities at Mombassa and Nairobi supporting U.S. operations throughout Eastern Africa. However, the Kenyan government is facing difficulties as it reaches for full and open democracy.

This sub-region may experience new instability and humanitarian crises. Encouraging and supporting emerging African countries and the development of apolitical militaries will enhance stability and encourage economic development. USCENTCOM's efforts to promote sub-regional and African cooperation will center on activities such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

The goal of ACRI is to enhance African peacekeeping capacity by engaging selected African militaries and helping them prepare to respond to UN Chapter VI and complex humanitarian emergencies through provision of training and non-lethal equipment.

The ACSS hopes eventually to be to the African continent what the Marshall Center is to Europe. I attended its first session in Dakar, Senegal, and believe it is off to a promising start.

Gulf States

This sub-region requires the containment of Iraq's hegemonic ambitions with an emphasis on forward presence, strengthening partner defense capabilities, and improving interoperability between USCENTCOM and GCC forces.

The security environment on the Arabian Peninsula shapes the nature of relationships, activities and threats, and consequently, the opportunities and constraints under which USCENTCOM operates in this sub-region. Here we have no formal bilateral or multilateral defense treaties; we rely instead on a range of executive agreements for military access, prepositioning, status of forces, and security assistance. Our principal security partners in the region are all member states of the GCC.

GCC contributions to maintain US military presence in the Arabian Gulf region totaled over \$511M in calendar year (CY) 1998 and \$319.5M in CY99. The decrease is largely because of the completion of facilities improvements by Saudi Arabia in CY98. Now that those facilities are complete, we do not expect the figures for CY00 or future expenditures from Saudi Arabia to continue an upward climb. Even as these numbers plateau and perhaps decline, Saudi Arabia's contributions to offset the cost of U.S. military operations in the region and continued access to their facilities have been and will continue to be vital.

Bahrain's contributions remained stable from CY98 to CY99. In addition to fuel, Bahrain provides port facilities for U.S. naval forces, hosts the headquarters for U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, furnishes facilities for prepositioned equipment, and has rapidly authorized access for U.S. military aircraft when needed.

Qatar's contributions also remained stable from CY98 to CY99, chiefly in the form of exercise and preposition equipment maintenance support. Since the end of the Gulf War, defense cooperation agreements permitting access and prepositioning have also been signed with Kuwait and the UAE. More than any other state in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Kuwait has significantly increased its contributions to U.S. prepositioning and exercise costs. Furthermore, in the past two years, Bahrain and Qatar have hosted an Air Expeditionary Force for two-month rotations in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW). Many nations in the region also provide support outside the AOR. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, UAE, and other countries have made financial and military commitments in support of US policy in Kosovo.

Red Sea

The strategic locations of the Northern Red Sea states of Egypt and Jordan give them a vital role in USCENTCOM's ability to project power into various locations in the region. Sitting

at the gateway to Africa and the rest of the region, Egypt is a key partner in the maintenance of the air and sea bridge from the U.S., through Europe and the Pacific, to the region. Both states serve as leaders and models for the region with strong, viable militaries functioning within the context of civilian control.

Egypt is an indispensable U.S. strategic partner in the region and our military-to-military cooperation is very important. Egypt's contributions to peace and stability both in and out of the region have been numerous and noteworthy, providing both personnel and materiel to operations that range from combat in Operation DESERT STORM to peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One vital component of this relationship is Exercise BRIGHT STAR, conducted in Egypt this year, involving over 16,700 U.S. troops and additional forces from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. This exercise cannot be replicated anywhere else in the region due to the unique training areas and infrastructure in Egypt. It will grow in the number of participants and sophistication in the future and is critical to our collective defense efforts in the AOR. This year's BRIGHT STAR was a tremendous success and a centerpiece of our exercise program.

U.S. support through foreign military financing (FMF) has allowed modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and will be a key in sustaining that force in the future. Cooperation between our militaries, along with continued support through FMF will secure Egypt as a capable Coalition partner and strategic ally.

Jordan remains a vital strategic ally of the U.S. and a valued supporter of the Middle East Peace Process. King Abdullah's transition from military leader to political ruler has been a smooth one, and his willingness to reach out to neighboring nations enhances regional stability. Several engagement activities with Jordan are producing huge payoffs. IMET funding for Jordan is tied with Poland and Thailand as the world's highest. Further, our robust exercise program with Jordan continues to advance USCENTCOM goals of enhanced proficiency levels, interoperability, access, and cooperative defense for this potential coalition partner. Continued U.S. support of FMS and humanitarian demining is vital to strengthening our relationship with Jordan.

Iraq

Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This is primarily due to its large conventional military force, pursuit of WMD, oppressive treatment of Iraqi citizens, refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), persistent

threats to enforcement of the No Fly Zones (NFZ), and continued efforts to violate UN Security Council sanctions through oil smuggling.

On December 17, 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1284. This resolution authorizes the replacement of the United Nations Special Commission on Monitoring with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Once fully established, UNMOVIC will enhance our ability to monitor Iraq's WMD program from inside Iraq. UNSCR 1284 also addresses disarmament, humanitarian, and Kuwait-related issues such as Iraq's failure to return military equipment seized during its 1990 occupation of Kuwait. A critical stipulation of UNSCR 1284 provides that the Security Council may suspend sanctions if Iraq fulfills key disarmament tasks and cooperates with weapons inspectors for a specified period.

Iraq's conventional military force continues to pose a threat to our regional partners who do not individually possess the capability to deter or stop an Iraqi invasion without U.S. assistance. Saddam's air and air defense forces have repeatedly attempted to challenge the Coalition's air patrols in the Northern and Southern NFZ during the past year. Iraqi conventional air defense forces have been degraded as a result of Coalition responses to Iraqi attacks, in addition to the slow

decline resulting from UN sanctions. Despite setbacks and problems, Iraq persists in its deliberate attempts to shoot down Coalition aircraft. Because of these attempts, we must continue to give our pilots the ability to respond effectively against these unprovoked attacks. Current Rules of Engagement are fully adequate to enable them to do that.

Iraq continues a pattern of selective compliance with UN sanctions. Past behavior indicates that Saddam Hussein abides by international obligations only when he perceives them to be in his personal best interest.

Among our GCC allies, sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people remains strong. These allies have repeatedly called world attention to their hardships. However, basic needs such as food and medicine are deliberately withheld from the Iraqi people by the Iraqi leadership, despite the efforts of the international community and the UN Oil-for-Food Program. Saddam's treatment of his own people is a poignant reminder of the callous nature of the current Iraqi government.

While the Iraqi opposition continues to work to organize a united force against the regime outside of Iraq, internal divisions continue to limit its effectiveness. I believe that Iraq is likely to remain a significant threat to the region for the foreseeable future.

Iran

Iran's ambitions to be the dominant regional power remain undiminished. Through a focused strategy, Iran seeks to widen its regional influence and dominance through diplomatic initiatives and military modernization. Iran's acquisition of sophisticated weapons-related technologies from Russia, China, and North Korea is particularly troublesome as it continues efforts to advance its WMD capabilities. Collectively, these activities contribute to regional instability and will affect both U.S. presence and influence within the Gulf region in the coming years.

In recent parliamentary elections, moderates associated with President Khatami have made a strong showing. Time will tell whether they can gain control of the principal levels of state power, which remains in the hands of hard-liners.

Iran continues to dedicate extensive funding to its military even as it wrestles with national issues that include internal political divisions, economic stagnation, fluctuating oil revenues, growing debt, massive unemployment, and a continuing surge in population growth.

Recognizing its conventional military limitations to compete with the West, Iran has also directed considerable effort toward building a broad spectrum of non-conventional and asymmetrical capabilities to include small boats, anti-ship

missiles, submarines, and buried command and control facilities. Iran has put in place a multi-layered framework composed of conventional and asymmetrical subsurface, surface, and airborne systems that can impact access to Arabian Gulf shipping lanes. Iran's 200,000-man army, backed by over a million militiamen and a 300-aircraft air force, is able to defend borders and occupy disputed Arabian Gulf islands. At the same time, the 125,000-man Revolutionary Guard provides Islamic regime security and training support to terrorist groups throughout the region and abroad. Although Iran is attempting to change its image as a state-sponsor of terrorism, terrorism is still viewed as a viable option, with U.S. forces in the region a probable target, should other means fail to advance or defend Iran's long-term policy objectives.

Pakistan

Following the October 12, 1999 military coup in Pakistan which toppled the government of former Prime Minister Sharif, the dynamics of our relations with Pakistan, traditionally a strong U.S. partner in both military and peacekeeping operations, have changed dramatically. While a return to a democratically elected government remains an important U.S. strategic interest, the reality of an interim period of military and technocratic rule in Pakistan seems inevitable. Because of the historic importance of the military

as a source of stability within the country, I believe that isolating Pakistan's influential military establishment is, and will continue to be, counter-productive to our long-term interests in the region. When the U.S. isolates the professional Pakistani military, we deny ourselves access to the most powerful institution in Pakistani society. This may hamper our nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. Furthermore, in the larger strategic sense, Pakistan can play a stabilizing role in the region.

It is important to note that because requirements in U.S. legislation have not been met, Pakistani participation in many programs has been limited or curtailed since 1990. As a result, we are rapidly losing contact with a generation of Pakistani military officers who are now serving in key leadership positions. Given the strong role played by the armed forces in Pakistani society, losing this contact weakens our influence with many of their key military leaders and government policy-makers. I know Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf well and have spoken to him on several occasions since his assumption of power. I believe that our strategic interests in South Asia and beyond will be best served by a policy of patient military-to-military engagement, as it effects difficult, internal reforms.

PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

USCENTCOM has responded to ongoing changes in the regional military, economic, and political situations by refining our theater engagement strategy. Our strategy seeks to integrate the efforts of U.S. Central Command with those of other U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations, and our friends in the region, to obtain the shared goal of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Central Region.

USCENTCOM's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) serves as the blueprint of the command's strategy to achieve U.S. goals and objectives. Theater Engagement Planning is a complex and dynamic process. The goal of TEP is to develop a comprehensive and integrated set of engagement activities that, when executed, shape the Central Region and lead to the accomplishment of our theater goals which are grouped into three key tenets: Warfighting, Engagement, and Development. Each of these tenets support the integrated approaches of Shape, Respond, and Prepare outlined in the National Security and National Military Strategies.

The TEP is formulated through a process linking ends, ways, and means, to create an integrated strategy allowing USCENTCOM to positively shape the environment and effectively respond to the demands of a dynamic theater. It is a broad, overarching

document that covers a seven-year period and describes specific goals and objectives, integrated programs, specific projects, engagement activities, and measures of effectiveness. The TEP provides clear direction and a common vision and also guides the way we do business every day.

This common direction and vision manifests itself in a myriad of engagement activities derived from a multitude of military programs, all working together to reach the desired end state. USCENTCOM engagement activities are categorized into three areas: Operational Activities, Exercises, and Other Foreign Military Interaction.

Operational Activities

The focal point of USCENTCOM operations in the Gulf region remains Iraq. Iraq's continued intransigence and non-compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) resulted in the initiation of Operation DESERT THUNDER in November 1998, Operation DESERT FOX in December 1998, and the continuation of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW)(USCENTCOM) and NORTHERN WATCH (ONW)(USEUCOM).

Although Iraq still maintains residual Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) capability, the assessed impact of Operation DESERT FOX, coupled with OSW and ONW, is that further development of Iraq's ballistic missile program has been delayed by several years. USCENTCOM, through Joint Task Force-Southwest

Asia (JTF-SWA), maintains the southern No-fly Zone (NFZ) to monitor Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 688. It also serves to deter enhancement of Iraq's military capabilities in violation of UNSCR 949. As of January 15, 2000, the men and women of JTF-SWA have flown almost 240,000 sorties enforcing the NFZ in southern Iraq.

The United States Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) headquartered in Bahrain, is one of the most visible demonstrations of our commitment to the region. NAVCENT is USCENTCOM's only Component headquarters in the AOR. Operating with other coalition members, the rotating Carrier Battle Groups, Amphibious Readiness Groups, ships, and submarines enforce UN sanctions against Iraq and protect our interests in the Gulf. Coinciding with the effort to contain Iraq and ensure freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf shipping lanes, critical to world commerce, NAVCENT operations serve as a constant reminder of U.S. presence to would-be Iranian hegemony in the Gulf region and Strait of Hormuz.

Since the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, multinational Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) have resulted in the search for contraband on more 12,320 ships bound for or departing from Iraq, with more than 700 diversions for sanctions violations. Allied support for MIO has been significant with ships from Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Italy,

Australia, and the Netherlands providing assistance. In addition to MIO tasking, the enforcement units ensure freedom of navigation for all vessels in the Arabian Gulf, execute maritime rescue missions as required, and conduct directed contingency operations.

The multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), acting in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions to prevent the illegal export of Iraqi gasoil and transport of other commodities by ship, continues to intercept and divert ships for sanctions violations. Since October 1, 1994, 191 ships have been diverted for sanctions violations. The participation of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Kuwait, UAE, and other coalition nations makes this operation a continuing success.

Operation DESERT SPRING (ODS) secures the commitment of U.S. ground forces and their support facilities to the defense of Kuwait. The United States Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT), the land component command for USCENTCOM is tasked to execute ODS.

In order to counter the threat posed by short and medium range ballistic missiles, we have deployed PATRIOT air defense missile units to key locations within the AOR. These units, which are rotated from the continental U.S. and bases in Europe, provide a critical measure of security for our deployed forces.

They also serve to enhance the capability of PATRIOT units fielded by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by conducting tactical level exercises and training.

Force protection efforts in the USCENTCOM AOR continue. While a robust force protection effort has been completed, vigilance remains one of the keys to deterring attacks. With the hardening of military facilities, this increases the chances of attacks against softer targets such as business interests and civilians.

Exercises

The USCENTCOM Joint and Combined Exercise Program is a vital peacetime engagement tool that supports the USCENTCOM TEP. The primary goals of the exercise program are to enhance USCENTCOM's warfighting readiness, to highlight U.S. access to and presence in the region, and to improve coalition warfighting capabilities while simultaneously strengthening military-to-military relationships. USCENTCOM's Exercise Campaign Plan seeks to maximize the use of in-theater forces; increase multi-lateral exercise opportunities; increase the use of simulation; and group/align/link exercises as practicable.

During fiscal year 1999, 82 exercises were scheduled in the USCENTCOM AOR. In spite of Kosovo contingency operations consuming much of the available strategic airlift assets, sixty-two percent of the scheduled exercises were successfully

completed. USCENTCOM Components expertly adapted exercises and adjusted operations to maintain U.S. commitments to our exercise partner nations. Utilizing an 18-month planning cycle, USCENTCOM exercise planners are in constant contact with host nations working bilateral and multinational exercises. Our exercise program is extremely successful and constitutes our most prolific engagement program. However, our exercise program and the resulting engagement cannot be sustained under current funding levels.

Exercise BRIGHT STAR 99/00 was USCENTCOM's largest military exercise, with eleven participating countries, 33 observer nations and 70,000 troops combining to form the BRIGHT STAR coalition. Exercise BRIGHT STAR trained U.S. forces, validated deployment procedures, and established coalition interoperability while supporting regional stability and cultural interaction.

The USCENTCOM combined exercise program has undergone a 36 percent reduction in the number of exercises since 1996. Additionally, Service incremental funding for FY00 has been further reduced 22 percent and Operational and Maintenance exercise funds for USCENTCOM and Components was reduced 40 percent. These reductions will cause exercise cancellations, create confusion among our regional partners, and cause us to forfeit engagement opportunities.

Exercise EAGLE RESOLVE is a recurring exercise that serves to validate Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) education and training. This exercise ensures that the political-military requirements associated with managing coalition cohesion in the face of threatened or actual chemical or biological weapon (CBW) use is met. Additionally, this exercise improves the ability of regional partners to protect their own forces, facilities, and population from CBW use.

Other Foreign Military Interaction

Other foreign military interaction engagement activities include Combined Education, Mil-to-Mil contacts, Security Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Demining, Host Nation Support and Prepositioning, and several other military programs. Combined education is one of our most notable engagement activities featuring our IMET programs. IMET seeks to expose the militaries of regional states to the U.S. military and our concept of a professional force respectful of human rights and civil authority. Since there are no regional U.S. military training centers within the USCENTCOM AOR, approximately 2500 students will attend U.S. military courses, schools, and colleges each year into the foreseeable future.

Through the State Department, our Ambassadors and country teams, we closely coordinate our security assistance programs to help the countries in our AOR improve their military

capabilities. At the present time, over one thousand military personnel are involved in our security assistance program in the Central Region.

In recent years, countries in the region have focused on modernization through the procurement of military hardware. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the Central Region have accounted for a large portion of America's worldwide defense industry sales - 38 percent from 1990 through 1999, with sales reaching \$2.0 billion in 1999.

Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program allows us to assist our AOR countries in meeting their legitimate self-defense needs along with enhancing systems and procedural interoperability with U.S. forces.

Humanitarian assistance (HA) activities must benefit the basic economic and social needs of the country's civilian populace. Additionally, HA is based on the need and status of political-military relations with the U.S. Projects include medical and dental screening, inoculations, and veterinary care; rudimentary construction and drilling water wells; disaster preparedness assessments; and transportation of DOD excess non-lethal property.

Humanitarian demining operations continue throughout the AOR. The purpose of this program is to train host nation military and civilian personnel in Humanitarian demining

operations, with the goal of establishing viable and sustainable programs within their respective nations. Humanitarian demining is recognized as an effort to protect the populace in regional nations, and not just an effort to extend U.S. influence. This program and similar training programs that enhance medical and security training are necessary complements to other U.S. operations.

Host nation support and prepositioning of equipment ashore and afloat in the region remains a top priority for USCENTCOM. Prepositioning accommodates rapid deployment of forces to the region during crisis response and their subsequent sustainment. It also cements the coalition to meet mutual security requirements, advances regional access, encourages peacetime engagement, and offers continuous deterrence.

As I stated earlier, the integration of all the programs into a comprehensive theater engagement plan is complex. In addition to orchestrating the myriad of programs that support engagement activities, there are other issues that we must contend with. First is the issue of geographic alignment. The regional boundaries defined by the Department of State do not align with the geographic boundaries defined by the Department of Defense. There is frequent tension between a general strategy of engagement and those who advocate the primacy of humanitarian

non-proliferation concerns. This sometimes results in a start-stop approach to our programs.

Theater engagement planning is a very complex process that takes significant time and resourcing to develop and execute. It requires a focused, balanced interagency process to maximize the return of the investment of scarce resources. It requires a theater strategy coordinated between multiple actors. It requires the integration of various programs managed by different agencies with sometimes differing opinions. Finally, it requires a common vision. No matter how well the strategy or plan is developed, its success will be limited unless all the resources, consistent policies, and detailed interagency coordination and cooperation are in place.

Key Requirements

Pivotal to USCENTCOM's ability to respond to regional threats and execute its theater strategy is continuing Congressional support for our most critical warfighting requirements: force deployment capability and sustainability; WMD, theater air, and missile defense; force application; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control; joint readiness; and engagement resources.

Force Deployment and Sustainability

With few forces stationed in the region, our vitally important power projection strategy is based on forward-deployed

forces, rapidly deployable forces from the continental U.S. and other theaters with associated strategic and theater lift, and robust land and sea-based prepositioning assets.

Our ability to deploy forces and equipment quickly remains the linchpin for conducting rapid response to contingencies in USCENTCOM's AOR. We must continue modernization and maintenance of our strategic deployment triad: airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. The accelerated retirement of the C-141 fleet and significant challenges of maintaining readiness levels of the C-5 fleet, make continued production of the C-17, progress of the C-5 Modernization Program, and support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program critical to meet major theater war (MTW) deployment timelines. The challenge in attaining flexibility of our strategic airlift fleet to respond to MTW engagement posture worldwide, along with intratheater requirements of the C-17 is under study in Mobility Requirements Study 05 and may require increasing the number of C-17s. Additionally, the procurement of Large, Medium Speed Roll-On Roll-Off (LMSR) ships significantly enhances our lift capability. The LMSRs and Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) assets are required to meet our force and sustainment deployment timelines.

Prepositioning in the region, the third leg of the strategic deployment triad, helps mitigate the time-distance dilemma (7,000 air miles and 12,000 sea miles from the

continental U.S.), ensures access, demonstrates our commitment to the region, and facilitates sustainment of forces until the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are established.

The Navy and Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Program, comprised of Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons (MPSRONS) 1, 2, and 3, maintains a high materiel readiness rate and supply attainment. It will become more robust when the MPF Enhancement (MPF (E)) Program comes on line, adding a fleet hospital, a navy mobile construction battalion, an expeditionary airfield, and additional warfighting equipment to each squadron.

The Army's prepositioning program, with a goal to place a heavy division of equipment in the region, is partially completed. The only brigade that is fully operational is the set located at Camp Doha, Kuwait. This prepositioned set maintains a high operational readiness rate and is exercised regularly. The preposition site in Qatar, which will house the second brigade set and a division base set, is still under construction with a completion date set for FY01. The combat brigade currently afloat that supports our AOR, APS-3, is complete and combat ready. A second combat brigade, also afloat, will augment the first one in FY02.

The Harvest Falcon bare-base materiel program is a vital Air Force prepositioned asset to support USCENTCOM requirements.

The Harvest Falcon assets support the generation of Air Force combat sorties in the early stages of contingencies. Failure to preposition these bare base sets in our AOR will result in using critical strategic lift assets at the start of a conflict to first transport Harvest Falcon sets into theater thus delaying the arrival of other warfighting elements.

Together, these power projection tools fulfill the requirements needed to meet forward presence visibility and limited deterrence options. If deterrence fails, they also provide a flexible and efficient way to close forces when required for contingency operations and exercises throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.

WMD/Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD)

The proliferation of advanced ballistic and cruise missile technologies within the Central Region mandates a continued emphasis on TAMD. We require an integrated missile defense of theater forces and critical assets against the full range and flight profile spectrum of enemy theater ballistic and cruise missiles. Integrated missile defense encompasses the TAMD Family of Systems approach that allows for layered defense against missile threats, and the means to share fused sensor and fire control data to optimize engagements. Coalition coordination is imperative in order to optimize combined and joint force capabilities in the earliest stages of a conflict,

reduce the number of assets required to flow into theater to effect defense of personnel and key assets, and prevent fratricide.

Improving the range and guidance capabilities of less-expensive, conventional offensive weapons will enhance our ability to disrupt or destroy an enemy's ballistic and cruise missile systems prior to launch. Collectively referred to as Attack Operations, this warfighting capability has the tremendous potential for decrementing an enemy's ballistic missile, cruise missile, air defense systems, and support infrastructure before employment. Notably, though, an effective Attack Operations effort doesn't mitigate the need for upper and lower tier missile defenses, it simply adds another layer of defense at relatively low cost, extending the battle into the enemy's territory.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

USCENTCOM's ability to continuously monitor and assess threat activities is an essential element of early warning of impending conflict and support to contingency operations. Meeting these needs requires a robust collection force structure, which can exploit the full range of intelligence capabilities to include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Maintaining a credible force structure requires increased

national collection support, continued modernization of airborne reconnaissance systems such as National Reconnaissance Office and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DISCOVERER II program, and the fielding of a family of dedicated unmanned aerial vehicles. It is important to highlight the well being of the personnel manning ISR assets. In general, the ISR force has been stressed to its limits, and maintaining this robust collection force has become a challenge for the military services.

On a positive note, support to military operations by the National Intelligence Community has been exemplary. Especially noteworthy examples include National Security Agency and National Imagery and Mapping Agency support to our strategic warning problem and daily force protection.

Command and Control

We must develop and field a Command and Control system that allows the joint force headquarters and each of the Service component headquarters to interoperate. This includes a common operational picture and situational awareness. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) remains our primary C2 system. The importance of continuing GCCS enhancements cannot be overstated. This year we added the Intelligence, Imagery, and Information (I3) module which made GCCS even better. Much work has been done on the ground portion of the Common Operational

Picture and once that work is completed, we will have a great capability for seeing both friendly and enemy formations. We are also following the progress being made on Combat Support applications, collectively called the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), and endorse these efforts.

Command and Control, Intelligence, and Logistical systems are dependent on a robust Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure. We have made significant improvements in our ability to pass critical information by increasing our access to commercial satellites through the activation of a second Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) terminal, but we have not been able to keep pace with the demands for greater bandwidth. A follow-on program to STEP, the Teleport program, will significantly improve support to the Joint Task Force Commander and has our strongest support.

Even though satellite communications have proven to be a reliable communications means within the AOR and between the AOR and CONUS, we need to move beyond our current total reliance on satellites as well as increase our surge capability through the use of fiber optic cable. Adding the fiber to our arsenal of information transfer capabilities would vastly improve our ability to process, distribute, display, and communicate C2, intelligence, and force administration information.

Access to the frequency spectrum to support radio communications, navigation aids, and radar emanations remains critical to combat operations in our AOR. We must maintain what frequencies we have and continue to resist commercial pressure to sell spectrums currently used by our military forces. A strong U.S. policy will go a long way in setting the example for other nations to follow.

Cooperative Defense Initiative

A significant consequence of proliferation is that some regional allies may begin to shift their focus from a reliance on missile defenses to acquisition of their own offensive, long-range strike assets to offset the growing capabilities of their neighbors. There is evidence that this is already occurring.

To assist our allies in the USCENTCOM AOR in dealing with this proliferation, the Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) against WMD in Southwest Asia has been and will continue to be implemented. The CDI is a DOD/USCENTCOM effort to enhance the ability of the GCC states along with Jordan and Egypt to prepare their forces to operate in chemical and biological (CBW) environments. Once our coalition partners in the region have been educated and trained regarding CBW threats and the available responses, that training is validated through bilateral and multilateral exercises such as the EAGLE RESOLVE series and DESERT BREEZE.

Joint Readiness

USCENTCOM has no permanently assigned forces; the Services provide forces for exercises and contingencies in our AOR. The forces transferred to USCENTCOM to conduct OSW, MIP, MIO, Operation DESERT THUNDER, and Operation DESERT FOX arrived in theater fully mission capable and combat ready with the required numbers of trained personnel and equipment.

CONCLUSION

As we consider our current and future activities in the Central Region, we should note the substantial progress we have made over the past decade. In a part of the world that is of vital importance to our Nation, we have confronted major threats to U.S. and coalition interests and have made great strides in achieving the broader strategic aims of engagement. Such achievements stem, in large part, from the selfless dedication and first-rate performance of our service men and women in a succession of challenging operations. We must remain fully committed to ensuring our military forces remain the best trained and equipped in the world. We in USCENTCOM look forward to working with the military Services, Department of Defense, and Congress toward achieving our Nation's goals in the Central Region.