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COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

JUL 22 2002

Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. House of Representative
Washington DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is the First Interim Report on the status of the Intelligence Reserve Component Test Program directed by Public Law 106-398, Section 576, "Secretary of Defense Reserve Component Intelligence Program". The Department of Defense is conducting a three-year test program to evaluate the ability of the Reserve Component (RC) intelligence elements to meet current and emerging defense intelligence needs. As the Chairman of the Oversight Panel for this program, along with the assistance and participation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, I am pleased to forward the first annual status report to Congress.

Reserve Intelligence is being directly tested by the partial mobilization of Intelligence Reserves fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Intelligence Reserves continue to perform on the "front line" of our response to the September 11th attacks, integrated as part of the total force.

Resources for conducting the test program, administering surveys and reporting results have been contributed by each of the services, DIA, OASD(C3I) and OASD Reserve Affairs. Substantive test program results and recommendations will be developed and carried out as either new DoD policy or as requests to change federal statute as we proceed.

Copies of this report have also been furnished to the House Committee on Armed Services, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the House Appropriations Committee/Defense Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

John P Stenbit

John P. Stenbit

Enclosure
As stated

cc:
Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PUBLIC LAW 106-398 SECTION 576 TEST PROGRAM:

RESERVE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE

FIRST INTERIM REPORT

(U) TRANSFORMING AN ENGAGED FORCE

1 JULY 2002

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Executive Summary

Section 576 of Public Law 106-398 (the National Defense Authorization Act of FY01) directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a three-year test program to determine the most effective peacetime structure(s) and operational employment of the Reserve Component (RC) Intelligence Elements (RCIE; "intelligence reservists") in meeting current and future Department of Defense (DoD) peacetime operational intelligence requirements and to establish a means to coordinate and transition that peacetime intelligence operational support network into use for meeting wartime requirements.

Although this test program was mandated prior to September 11, 2001, the events of that day and the subsequent mobilization of the RCIE have dramatically underscored the importance and shaped the implementation of the test program. The mobilization of more than 3,000 RC intelligence personnel has demonstrated the reliance on RC intelligence in providing critical, immediate support to the warfighter. The process has also highlighted some gaps in preparedness that may have been minimized by direct peacetime engagement of intelligence reservists.

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency is the Test Program Director. Guided by an Oversight Panel of general and flag officers, the Project Team (staffed by intelligence reservists and DoD contractors) initiated the test program. The Project Team capitalized on the opportunity to collect information about and conduct preliminary analyses of the partial mobilization of intelligence reservists in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE.

This first status report not only summarizes test program activities for the period June 2001 through April 2002 and outlines future plans – it also highlights observations related to intelligence reservists in the Global War on Terrorism, which include:

- The Secretary of Defense's 1995 Plan concerning peacetime use of the RCIE catalyzed the transformation of the RCIE to a 21st Century force. The Plan directed Defense Intelligence to prepare reservists for mobilization by engaging them in "real-world" missions during peacetime. Automation, connectivity, secure spaces, access to current computer systems and applications, and better integration with active forces - results of initiatives related to that Plan – have improved the skills and capabilities of the RCIE and have enabled RC intelligence personnel to respond effectively to critical national, theater, and Service requirements.
- Overlap between peacetime and wartime utilization of intelligence reservists at many commands is significant. As intelligence priorities and resources continue to evolve, new roles and missions are emerging and are being assigned to both intelligence reservists and the active forces.
- RCIE accessibility – the ability to identify and appropriately use the military and civilian skills of intelligence reservists – can be improved. The post-September

11, 2001 mobilization provided the Project Team with data that will be critical to the examination of transitioning a peacetime force to meet wartime requirements.

- Streamlining and standardizing mobilization processes and entitlements will facilitate integration of the RCIE into wartime needs and is likely to improve morale and increase retention of quality intelligence personnel.
- Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) have proven to be effective training and production sites, but only recently have they been used as mobilization sites. JRICs (and other types of remote intelligence centers) can be cost-effective remote intelligence production and training centers that may also serve as continuity-of-operations alternate work sites.
- As the J2/Joint Staff construct of federated intelligence support to crises evolves, alternatives for assigning forces should include both active and reserve intelligence personnel. RCIE support and involvement may be needed not only to provide federated support, but also to backfill or provide reachback support to commands not in crisis.

Despite the fact that the legislation directing this test was written prior to September 11, 2001, the importance of this examination at this time could not be more relevant. Preliminary research has revealed a wealth of information and, more importantly, ideas regarding opportunities to improve reserve intelligence support to the warfighter. A Project Team has been assembled and equipped. A way forward has been developed and approved by the Action Officers, members of the Oversight Panel, the Test Director and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. If implemented, findings from this test program could significantly improve the capabilities and contributions of RC intelligence.

Chapter 1. Introduction

A. Background

Section 576 of Public Law 106-398 (the National Defense Authorization Act of FY01) directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a three-year test program to:

(a) Determine the most effective peacetime structure(s) and operational employment of Reserve Component (RC) intelligence units and personnel (together, the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements – RCIE) in meeting current and future Department of Defense peacetime operational intelligence requirements; and

(b) Establish a means to coordinate and transition that peacetime intelligence operational support network into use for meeting wartime requirements.

In addition to providing Congress with interim status reports to be submitted on 1 July 2002 and 1 July 2003, the law requires that the final report (December, 2004) include recommendations that the Secretary of Defense considers necessary to eliminate statutory prohibitions and barriers to fully and effectively using the RCIE to carry out peacetime operational requirements.

Although this test program was mandated prior to September 11, 2001, the events of that day and the subsequent mobilization of members of the RC – including intelligence personnel – have dramatically underscored the importance and shaped the implementation of the test program. Mobilization of RC intelligence personnel has demonstrated the reliance on RC intelligence in providing critical, immediate support to the warfighter. The process has also highlighted some gaps in preparedness that may have been minimized by direct peacetime engagement of intelligence reservists.

B. Intelligence

From peacetime through crises and contingencies to time of war, intelligence is always engaged. As noted by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the first ***Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis***, over the next decade the challenges that will confront the Intelligence Community (IC) will outpace the resources available to meet them. Among other things, the events of September 11, 2001 underscored the importance of having an adequate number of skilled intelligence analysts. However, the numbers of skilled, expert people – a fundamental resource of the intelligence business – are in short and declining supply. As intelligence requirements increase and key personnel retire, these shortfalls will be exacerbated. Optimal use of existing analytical manpower is critical to national security.[1]

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[1] Director of Central Intelligence: "Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis" [2000].

Defense Intelligence is critical across the range of military operations and is always engaged in support of the warfighter. Like other functions, Defense Intelligence is resource constrained and must optimize its resources, including its personnel resources. Defense Intelligence is examining ways to ensure that its future workforce has the right skills to meet the challenges.[2] In moving forward, Defense Intelligence is optimizing and transforming the way it does business to include optimal utilization of allocated manpower. Reserve intelligence units and personnel are considered as part of the allocated manpower, and the optimization and transformation efforts include examinations of how the RCIE can and should be most effectively used to augment or assume responsibility for specific missions.

The Section 576 test program is not strictly a new initiative; rather it is one that builds upon ongoing Defense/Reserve Intelligence transformation initiatives. This test program provides Defense Intelligence with opportunities to reshape the reserve force to meet peacetime and emerging requirements and to ensure that a large pool of RC intelligence personnel, capable of providing tactical through strategic intelligence and national security support to a broad range of roles and missions, are effectively engaged within the capabilities and constraints of the RCIE. Optimal use of the RCIE would be of great benefit to Defense Intelligence; in addition, optimal use of reservists has tangible and intangible benefits to the reservists themselves.

A Key Initiative: Peacetime Use of the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements

In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) to develop an implementation plan to shift the focus of the RCIE from exclusively training for mobilization to that of wartime readiness achieved through operational engagement. In January 1995, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) published a revolutionary plan[3] ("SECDEF Plan") that directed Defense Intelligence to train reservists for mobilization by engaging them in "real-world" missions during peacetime. The SECDEF Plan was based on three guiding principles:

- Improve and sustain the readiness posture of intelligence-trained reservists via thorough peacetime training in order to respond effectively to critical national, theater, and Service requirements.
- Increase the capabilities of intelligence reservists to reduce risks associated with a diminishing Active Intelligence Force and to maintain sufficient overall

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[2] Director, Defense Intelligence Agency *Communiqué* "Revitalizing and Reshaping the Work Force [July-August, 2000].

[3] Secretary of Defense, Memorandum; Subject: "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, Implementation Plan for Improving Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force" [January 5, 1995].

qualitative and quantitative collection, production and dissemination capabilities within Defense Intelligence as a whole.

- Increase significantly the visibility, accessibility, and utility of the Reserve Intelligence Force.

The SECDEF Plan identified responsibilities across the components of Defense Intelligence and directed that implementation actions should be in concert with, and not supercede command and control relationships, including those that become effective upon individual or unit mobilization.

C. Reserve Component Forces

During the Cold War, the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces numbered more than one million personnel but contributed support to the Active Components (AC) of military at a rate of fewer than one million man-days per year.[4] Serving in the RC meant being kept ready in reserve – training in peacetime for mobilization in wartime. The end of the Cold War led to a new national military strategy. The military forces were restructured into a "total force" – a smaller force and one in which the RC is integrated into the AC. Today's 866,000 RC forces provide nearly 13 million man-days annually in direct support of the AC[5]. This dramatic increase is in sharp contrast to contributions made by the RC during the Cold War and is evidence of a RC that is more engaged in DoD missions.

Each RC has an intelligence force. Prior to 1995, most RC intelligence units and personnel primarily trained to mobilize. Mobilization exercises were conducted routinely, but in general, peacetime contributory support during inactive duty for training (IDT; or "drill") periods was not part of the routine training process of RC intelligence forces. In response to the SECDEF Plan, each RC revitalized its intelligence force. Highlights of those revitalization efforts are presented below.

1. Service Initiatives

a. Army Reserve

In conjunction with the SECDEF Plan, the U. S. Army Reserve (USAR) established the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element (ARMISE) as an integral part of the USAR Command (USARC) G2 Staff. The ARMISE is a clearing-house for peacetime USAR intelligence requirements and is the single point of entry for all USAR intelligence contributory support (ICS) requests made to the USAR military

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[4] The Reserve Components (RC) of the Armed Forces are the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve when operating as a Service in the Department of the Navy. A more detailed description of the Reserve Components is available online at www.defenselink.mil/ra/.

[5] Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2001.

intelligence force. The ARMISE maintains broad oversight and control of the ICS process and provides general coordination for USAR intelligence support, which includes matching facilities and personnel to peacetime intelligence project requirements and managing associated funding.

The Army Reserve is upgrading the facility and staffing capabilities of its eight multi-service RC intelligence training and intelligence operations facilities (five Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC) and their three subordinate detachments) that host multi-Service units and individuals as well as Army RC soldiers. ARISC facilities have been equipped with additional systems and connectivity to support both information assurance and information operations programs. ARISCs provide intelligence reservists the opportunity to train and develop skills from the lowest tactical level through the strategic level and are the most critical military intelligence training and readiness asset in the Army's RC structure.

b. Army National Guard

The Army National Guard (ARNG) established a management function at the National Guard Bureau to control the intelligence requirements and funded reimbursable authority programs. States and unit commanders encourage their units and soldiers to participate in "real world" intelligence support. Most support to Gaining Commands takes place at the AC unit's location, but an increasing amount occurs at ARNG secure facilities, ARISCs, and Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC). Several units, particularly linguist battalions and some divisional Military Intelligence (MI) Battalions, have embraced virtual production during drill weekends, annual training and manday tours. Virtual support includes time-sensitive collection and reporting, language processing and document exploitation, and single-source and all-source term analytic projects. The production addresses high priority requirements for each of the Combatant Commands.

One service initiative involves the efforts of the 629th MI Battalion, Maryland Army National Guard, Laurel, Maryland. This divisional tactical unit, part of the 29th Infantry Division (Light), is conducting a real-world intelligence production mission and has provided "Reach" operations in support of their division's deployment to Bosnia – all within the secure facilities of their home-station armory. These efforts integrate several intelligence disciplines and are conducted in collaboration with the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) – Special Research Division (SRD). Several intelligence products focused at the operational and tactical levels have been completed by the battalion and received high praise from NGIC-SRD. This unique training/readiness model effectively integrates the salient aspects of the SECDEF Plan to include completion of training and readiness requirements through production of validated intelligence requirements.

c. Navy Reserve

The Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (NRIC) has implemented a variety of strategies to enhance peacetime contributory support as it contributes directly to wartime mobilization training. Unit size has been increased to minimize administrative overhead and increase production efficiencies. Connectivity and the use of virtual collaborative tools – particularly at JRIC sites – has enabled real-time integration with the Gaining Command Directorate that they are assigned to support, including "cradle-to-grave" responsibilities for some mission areas. Usually, the Gaining Command Directorate has assigned individuals to integrate missions and active duty periods of reserve personnel into Directorate planning. Care is being exercised to ensure that training required for mobilization is not lost in the effort to maximize peacetime contributory support.

d. Air Force Reserve

Based upon the SECDEF Plan, the drill tempo for the AF intelligence Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program increased from 24 to 48 periods, with the increase phased in during FY 1996-97. Additionally, the AF intelligence IMA program uses individual participation reporting to highlight specifically what each reservist does with respect to intelligence mission training, production, and other participation. The SECDEF Plan did not affect significantly the Air Force Reserve Command's unit-based program in terms of wartime mission tasking and utilization.

e. Air National Guard

The Air National Guard (ANG) established JRIC sites at Birmingham, Alabama (117th Intelligence Squadron) and Little Rock, Arkansas (123rd Intelligence Squadron). In addition to providing Special Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) workspace and communications to nearby Reserve intelligence personnel, the units have actively supported USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) requirements for peacetime production, counterdrug operations, and the Global War on Terrorism.

f. Marine Corps Reserve

In conjunction with the SECDEF Plan, the Marine Corps has established JRIC sites at Quantico, Virginia (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity) and Camp Pendleton, California (I Marine Expeditionary Force G-2). Major commands supported from these sites include PACOM, SOCOM, USCENTCOM, and USFK. Additionally, these sites host and provide mission support to all Services.

Currently, the Marine Corps reserve force intelligence is being restructured to better support joint staffs, Combatant Commands and Service intelligence requirements. Force intelligence, currently IMA detachments, will be reorganized into functional Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units and many will be relocated to JRICs. Through use of demographic studies, JRICs that are located near large groups of potential

drilling reservists were selected as force intelligence unit drill sites. The concept for employment will entail reservists drilling at local JRICs, with many providing virtual intelligence support to their Gaining Commands. During crises and war, individuals from these units will be task organized into detachments and mobilized to support their Gaining Command or fulfill emerging requirements. Many of these detachments will provide virtual intelligence from the JRIC site, alleviating the requirement to deploy.

2. Joint Reserve Intelligence Program

a. Vision/Mission

As part of the shift to wartime readiness through operational engagement, the SECDEF Plan also established the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP). The JRIP vision is that of establishing and using the RCIE as effective total force partners, operationally integrated, peacetime through wartime, supporting both Component and Joint Intelligence (Unified Commands and Combat Support Agencies) for full spectrum dominance by U. S. forces. One mission of the JRIP is to facilitate the integration of the RCIE throughout Defense Intelligence. To do so, the JRIP promotes engagement of the RCIE during periods of inactive and active duty to support validated Defense Intelligence requirements during peacetime, coincident with wartime readiness training.

b. JRIP Management

Responsibility for implementation of the JRIP is community-wide. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the JRIP Program Manager. Day-to-day implementation and management of the JRIP resides with the JRIP Program Management Office (DIA/DM-2; also known as the Reserve Intelligence Integration Division).

c. Funding and Mandays

The JRIP Program Management Office provides funded reimbursable dollars for intelligence operations, training, and support that are allocated to meet the most crucial shortfalls in Defense Intelligence to include reserve manday support for operational missions, crisis support, and contingency operations. Separately, the joint and unified commands, Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) and the Services are permitted to transfer Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds directly to the RC to support additional mandays to satisfy unexpected intelligence requirements.

d. Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers

The JRIP Program Manager has established Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC)[6] throughout the continental United States; currently there are 27 JRICs. The JRIC

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[6] A JRIC is an identified SCIF -- which may include areas of lesser classification -- located, owned and managed by a DoD Component (Active or Reserve).

concept is that of a remote intelligence center that uses information systems technology to bridge or mitigate geographical distance. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP) provides the information systems technology (communications, computer hardware, and intelligence application systems) that links the JRICs to the rest of the Intelligence Community. JRIC sites and JRICP technology operate at multiple classification levels. JRICP-funded technology enables intelligence personnel (primarily, but not exclusively, RC intelligence personnel) located at JRIC sites to fulfill intelligence requirements for National, Joint or Service customers as well as to obtain appropriate skills enhancement training.

3. Evolution and Transformation of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements

The JRIP is a dynamic and evolving program. It has proven to be very effective in ensuring that RC intelligence personnel support intelligence missions during peacetime and that they are also engaged as valued contributors during periods of crisis and mobilization. This was especially true during the events in the Balkans during the late 1990's supporting USEUCOM requirements. During the Kosovo crisis, more than 150 reserve intelligence personnel played critical roles in providing immediate augmentation (some within 72 hours) to the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth, UK and locations in the Balkans theater. In addition, more than 80 reservists provided augmentation at two JRICs to meet intelligence production requirements that the JAC Commander decided not to postpone. Additionally, five Reservists augmented the Middle East/Northern Africa (MENA) Branch—which "resided" for 90 days at a JRIC under the supervision of a Branch Chief who was temporarily relocated to a JRIC.

Expanded use of the RCIE is clearly evident today as intelligence reservists from every service directly support USCENTCOM's intelligence requirements for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from its headquarters in Tampa, downrange in theater, and remotely from a number of JRICs. For example, NSA uses its assigned reservists to provide as much as 30% of the its cryptologic support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. JRIP implementation has provided expanded visibility and utility of the RCIE, but more progress is needed to truly optimize utilization of the RCIE from home station.

Post-September 11, 2001, the JRIP must continue to evolve and transform itself to provide critical support to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Homeland Security (HLS). Reservists have both military and civilian skills that are well suited to supporting these missions. Financial expertise, information management, biological-chemical-radiological experts and criminal investigative experience are but four areas where reservists can be effectively utilized. Other "hard-to-find" skills include native speaker linguistic support particularly within lower-tier languages, trained interrogators and cryptologic linguists. This "contingency pool" may be called upon as needed. This Reserve Component Intelligence Test Program, in addition to focusing on traditional military missions, will examine roles and missions within a new security environment that use the skills and abilities resident in the RCIE.

Chapter 2. Section 576 Test Program

A. Purpose

The overall objective of the three-year test program is to further optimize, transform or integrate the structure and operation of the RCIE in support of Defense Intelligence. The purposes of the test program are to:

1. Determine the most effective peacetime structure and operational employment of the RCIE to meet current DoD peacetime operational intelligence requirements;
2. Determine the most effective peacetime structure and operational employment of the RCIE to meet future DoD peacetime operational intelligence requirements; and
3. Establish a means to coordinate and transition the peacetime intelligence operational support network into use for meeting wartime requirements.

In addition to providing two interim status reports (1 July 2002 and 1 July 2003), the Law requires a final report (December 2004) that includes recommendations for improving the use of intelligence reservists. Impediments to effective and efficient use of the RCIE will be addressed in these reports and, when possible, actionable recommendations will be presented. At this point, many worthwhile recommendations have been received, especially with respect to significant disconnects in the post-September 11, 2001 mobilization processes. These recommendations will be vetted in the near term for either interim or formal action by leaders in Defense Intelligence.

B. Staffing and Organization

The ASD/C3I designated the Director, DIA as Test Director. Responsibility for test program management was delegated to the Chief, DIA/DM-2, who established a Project Team comprised of military personnel and contractors. The Project Team began operations in late July 2001 after the Oversight Panel approved the Initial Test Plan. In August and September 2001, the Project Team designed and initiated the Initial Test Plan on a limited basis due to staffing shortfalls. Full implementation of the Initial Test Plan was delayed for several months to perform analyses related to September 11, 2001 (see below).

The ASD/C3I also established an Oversight Panel. Chaired by the Director, Intelligence Policy for ASD/C3I, the Oversight Panel consists of representatives from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA), Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, the Combat Support Agencies, and the J2/Joint Staff. The J2/Joint Staff also represents the Combatant Commands. In addition, each Oversight Panel member designated an Action Officer (each experienced

in intelligence program management) to assist the Project Team on matters such as implementation of the Test Plan and analysis of interim findings. Special attention was paid to trying to ensure that all Services were represented.

As required by Section 576, the Oversight Panel's three main functions are as follows:

- Ensure the structure of the Test Program achieves the objectives outlined in the legislation;
- Ensure proper funding of the Test Program, and
- Oversee the conduct and evaluation of the Test Program.

The Oversight Panel met three times during its first year of operations. Action Officers met four times as a group and also provided frequent direct support to Project Team members and test program activities.

C. Test Plan

1. Design and Methodology

The following congressionally mandated test objectives were used as the building blocks of the Initial Test Plan:

Objective 1. Identify the range of peacetime roles and missions that are appropriate for RC intelligence units and personnel, including the following missions: counter drug, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, information operations, information warfare, and other emerging threats;

Objective 2. Recommend a process for justifying and validating RC force structure and manpower to support the peacetime roles and missions identified under paragraph (1) above, and to establish a means to coordinate and transition that peacetime operational support network and structure into wartime requirements;

Objective 3. Provide the basis for new or revised intelligence and RC policy guidelines for the peacetime use, organization, management, infrastructure, and funding of the RCIE;

Objective 4. Determine the most effective structure, organization, manning, and management of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) to enable them to be both reserve training facilities and virtual collaborative production facilities in support of DoD peacetime operational intelligence requirements;

Objective 5. Determine the most effective uses of technology for virtual collaborative intelligence operational support during peacetime and wartime;

Objective 6. Determine personnel and career management initiatives or modifications that are required to improve the recruiting and retention of personnel in the RC intelligence specialties and occupational skills; and

Objective 7. Identify and make recommendations for the elimination of statutory prohibitions and barriers to using the RCIE to carry out peacetime operational requirements.

These Test Objectives were analyzed using a problem statement, an intended outcome(s), and methodology format. A variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to include literature searches, interviews with subject matter experts, site visits to JRICs and Gaining Commands, database queries, surveys, and reviews of "lessons learned" are in use by the Project Team. Subjective and objective data are being collected and analyzed. Because the Test Plan is both sequential in structure and iterative in its findings, results and findings are being used to refine and further focus the Test Plan.

One of the most robust research tools used was a structured questionnaire entitled "***Survey 2: Baselining the Seven Test Objectives.***" Survey 2 was distributed via multiple channels to a wide audience (personnel located at the Combatant Commands, CSAs and Services) in February and March 2002. Some recipients further disseminated the survey. The analysis of ***Survey 2: Baselining the Seven Objectives*** is ongoing and will be used to shape and implement subsequent test program activity. Selected highlights derived from a preliminary review of responses are presented in this status report.

2. Impact of September 11, 2001

During its first year, the Project Team planned to collect information and data on all seven Test Objectives, and specifically to focus on Test Objectives 1, 2, and 4. However, the events following September 11, 2001 changed the course of the Project Team's efforts.

On September 14, 2001, the President issued a partial mobilization order of the Reserves and the Secretary of Defense promulgated specific guidance to the Services on September 19, 2001. Recognizing that the partial mobilization was a "living laboratory," the Project Team developed and conducted ***Survey 1: Crisis Management and Partial Mobilization.*** Survey 1 used an open-ended question format, with question content modeled on the seven test objectives. The survey – which was not intended to be comprehensive in outreach nor a substitute for further study or organizational lessons learned – was sent to 29 reserve managers at the Combatant Commands, CSAs, and Service Intelligence Centers. The target audience was selected based upon Reserve Intelligence policy position or management involvement with September 11, 2001 crisis management or subsequent partial mobilization. Responses were analyzed qualitatively, and, to a limited extent, quantitatively. The full text of the ***Survey 1: Crisis Management and Partial Mobilization*** report is available separately; selected highlights are included in this report.

3. Presentation of Preliminary Observations and Findings

Initial observations, some of which are directly related to the post-September 11, 2001 partial mobilization of intelligence reservists, are highlighted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this report. The observations are organized around the purposes of the test program stated in Section 576 of Public Law 106-398.

Chapter 3. Meeting *current* Defense Intelligence Requirements – Observations

One purpose of the test program is to determine the most effective peacetime structure and operational employment of the RCIE to meet current DoD peacetime operational intelligence requirements. In the first phase of the test program, information related to the current organization, force structure and manpower of each Service's reserve intelligence force and observations related to the partial mobilization on those forces was gathered; highlights are presented here.

A. Organization and Demographics

Reserve and Guard manpower is assigned to one of three categories – the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. Ready Reserve personnel are liable for recall to active duty to augment the AC. The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING). The Selected Reserve consists of three subcategories: Selected Reserve Units; Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs); and Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. Selected Reserve Units and IMAs are those "drilling reservists" who support a wartrace organization or augment a Gaining Command for a specific mission or individual assignment. For the most part, operational units train, mobilize and serve as units. Augmentation units train together, but when mobilized, lose their unit identity, and are subsumed into an AC unit or activity. Depending upon the Service and billet, IMAs either train individually or, may be organized into administrative units that train together. IMAs mobilize individually to wartime billets.

Approximately 20,000 members of the Ready Reserve are intelligence reservists. Similar to the Ready Reserve as a whole, intelligence reservists form a diverse population. The RC intelligence force differs from the AC intelligence force in a number of ways. Compared to the AC intelligence force, the RC intelligence population is older and more experienced. For the most part, the RC intelligence force understands the needs of the warfighter through previous active duty experience (although a small – but growing – number of intelligence reservists have never served on extended active duty). As a result of their civilian employment, many intelligence reservists have unique skills and capabilities that are not readily available in the active force. Although many reserve personnel live relatively close to active duty sites, a large number of them reside in locations that are remote from military or intelligence facilities. With respect to residency, the RC intelligence force is less transient than the AC intelligence force.

The diversity of the reserve intelligence population is both a strength and a limitation, and should be considered when engaging reservists. The RC is a part-time force: as a general rule, its Selected Reserve members are required to perform a minimum of 36 duty days per fiscal year (12 days of annual training and 24 days of inactive duty for training – IDT or "drills") while IRR personnel are not required to perform any

training. A strength of the RC force is that RC intelligence personnel are often assigned to Gaining Commands or Combatant Commands for long periods of time, thus providing continuity of operations. A limitation is that geographic locations or civilian obligations may limit the ability of some reservists to meet some time-sensitive mission requirements. However, because of their unique skill sets, dispersal throughout the U.S., and flexibility, reserve intelligence personnel have evolved into a true force multiplier that Gaining Commands rely upon to meet intelligence requirements.

B. Service Force Structure and Manpower

1. Army Reserve

The Army Reserve's intelligence force is comprised of approximately 10,000 soldiers: 4,500 soldiers are in Troop Program Units (TPU), 1,000 IMAs and 4,500 IRRs. TPUs are controlled by the USARC-G2 while IMAs and IRR soldiers are controlled by ARPERSCOM. Army Reserve intelligence structure is designed to support operations at Corps level and above. Soldiers assigned to TPUs train as members of units. Currently, the Army Reserve's tactical intelligence units (5 battalions, 2 imagery companies, and 9 language companies) support Army Corps and Theater-level commands. Non-tactical (operational and strategic) level intelligence units support s and most major army commands, joint organizations, and national agencies. Army Reserve intelligence has approximately 1,000 IMAs who are assigned to Combatant Commands, major Army commands, and national and defense organizations. IMAs are trained and organized to primarily provide strategic intelligence support, including defense intelligence production activities. IRR soldiers are in a control group and are not assigned to any unit or command. Participation and readiness levels vary; but these soldiers can provide unique surge capabilities to the Army.

Army Reserve intelligence soldiers routinely use Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) Service systems and JRICs to support their AC / wartime higher headquarters in a reachback mode, virtually, and remotely. Currently, most TPU intelligence training and support is provided at the AC / wartime higher headquarters locations; planning for more TPU support from ARISCs and JRICs is underway. The philosophy and guidance for the entire Army Reserve intelligence force is to maximize training opportunities through direct support to associated active commands. This relationship exists in peacetime, as well as mobilization periods and other forms of active duty.

The Army has approved additional Army Reserve MI force structure of approximately 1,000 more soldiers, who will be formed into four new battalions and various additional command augmentation units. This new structure includes multi-component units that integrate both AC and RC personnel and units.

Since September 11, 2001, personnel from every USAR MI battalion have been mobilized to support the AC.

2. Army National Guard

The Army National Guard's (ARNG) intelligence force is comprised of approximately 6,000 soldiers. It is designed to be employed entirely as units. There is no single ARNG intelligence command. Until federalized, the units are under state control.

The ARNG intelligence inventory includes:

- Six linguist battalions (organized under the 300th MI Brigade, but under the peacetime command and control of eight states),
- Two corps-level tactical exploitation battalions,
- One fully organized divisional MI battalion,
- Seven additional cadre-level divisional MI battalions,
- 17 MI companies (direct support to their parent ARNG brigades) and
- One CI detachment.

With the exception of the linguist battalions and the CI Detachment (which are designed for modular employment as 5-member teams at virtually any echelon), ARNG MI units are designed for unit employment in support of Army tactical commands.

The ARNG performs a significant amount of peacetime intelligence support, primarily involving the linguist units, but with some involvement from each of the divisional units as well. In 2001, more than 150 ARNG soldiers performed virtually teamed intelligence mission operations at nine CONUS RC sites (five of which were JRICs) in support of NSA, DIA, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and some wartrace Gaining Commands. Numerous intelligence soldiers provided in-country support to wartrace commands and other Army and joint customers.

Approximately 100 ARNG intelligence unit soldiers have been mobilized in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. These personnel have been mobilized to support cryptologic operations, interrogator and language requirements. Mobilized personnel are supporting USCENTCOM from in-theater as well as from remote sites to include operations at two JRICs. Seven of the eight divisional MI battalions have or will within the next three years be activated for Stabilization Force (SFOR) service. Each of the linguist battalions will also mobilize for SFOR and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM missions over the next 3-4 years.

3. Navy Reserve

The intelligence forces of the Naval Reserve are organized under the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (NRIC) and Naval Reserve Security Group Command (NRSGC).

The NRIC contains 3,689 SELRES IMA billets (1,701 officer and 1,988 enlisted) that are located in 70 augmentation units. Additionally, 346 non-paid personnel drill in Intelligence Voluntary Training Units (IVTU). All NRIC augment units and IVTUs are structured under 13 Reserve Intelligence Areas (RIA). Commander, Naval Reserve

Intelligence Command, a SELRES flag officer, commands the NRIC; its day-to-day administration is managed by a small FTS staff is comprised of military, civilian, and contractor personnel.

The 70 NRIC augmentation units support all of the Combatant Commands, ONI, NCIS, and DIA. NRIC units are tasked operationally by their Gaining Commands, in concert with each command's Reserve Management Office (RMO)/Reserve Liaison Officer (RLO). Almost all NRIC IDT periods are performed at a Gaining Command or at a JRIC site in support of a Gaining Command. In addition, approximately 30-40 percent of SELRES annual training (AT) is performed at JRIC sites in direct support to a Gaining Command. Tasking includes production support, exercise support, imagery analyses, country studies, targeting, counter-terrorism support, expeditionary warfare analyses, watch standing and current intelligence briefings.

Approximately 460 of the intelligence billets are located in aviation squadrons and fleet units as part of the Naval Reserve Command Intelligence Support (NRCIS) program. NRIC personnel assigned to NRCIS billets provide intelligence support to squadrons and various deployable units.

Through March, 2002, approximately 1,060 intelligence personnel located in NRIC units and NRCIS billets have been mobilized in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. They have been deployed worldwide both ashore and afloat.

The Naval Reserve Security Group Command (NRSGC) is comprised of 905 IMA billets organized into 20 administrative units; personnel assigned to five cryptologic Voluntary Training Units (VTU); and billets that are embedded in other naval activities such as Naval Space Command. Eighty NRSGC cryptologists support the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, MD, and 300 more reservists support NSA requirements nationwide at various drill sites, including JRICs. The NRSG supports diverse operational missions such as High Frequency (HF) collection, Information Assurance (IA), Information Operations (IO) and support to the Regional Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Operations Centers (RSOC). The NRSG supports counter-terrorism efforts, counterdrug operations, maritime interdiction operations, and production and analysis support for SIGINT Support Packages (SSP) both within and outside the United States.

4. Air Force Reserve

Air Force Reserve Component intelligence capability resides in two distinct facets, a unit-based program under the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and the IMA program under AFRC, managed by AF/XOI-RE. There are approximately 700 AFRC unit intelligence personnel embedded in organic flying units, joint reserve units, and a combat operations squadron. There are two intelligence-specific flights that support the communications security mission. Gaining Commands include AMC, ACC, AFSOC, and AFSPACE. Approximately 2,000 intelligence IMAs are gained by AF component commands, Combatant Commands, CSAs, and other DoD/joint organizations.

IMAs are organized into Gaining Command-aligned teams (Reserve Support Teams), usually headed by the senior IMA at that command/organization. ARC intelligence personnel perform their IDTs and annual tours with their units or at locations identified by their Gaining Commands, which includes JRICs. Mission training and tasking is determined by the unit or Gaining Command. All intelligence disciplines are supported by ARC intelligence personnel.

Utilization of JRICs is dependent on Gaining Command tasking and co-location of the JRIC. AF intelligence IMAs drill at most of the 27 JRICs, based upon Gaining Command direction. ARC intelligence personnel leverage JRICs during peacetime voluntary man-day tours, as the tasking organization permits/directs. Of note, care has been taken to maximize geographic co-location for assignment purposes with the Gaining Command as much as possible for AF intelligence and intelligence support IMAs.

AF intelligence also benefits from its teaming and integration with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). AFOSI is the Air Force's major investigative service with primary responsibility for criminal investigations and counterintelligence (CI) services, including countering global security threats to information systems. AFOSI reserves are comprised of over 400 members, all IMAs, who are integrated into the active force and bring CI support to force protection missions around the globe. AFOSI also serves as the focal point for the collection, analysis and production of terrorist threat information and provides a full range of counterintelligence support to Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (through their Antiterrorism Specialty teams) and also works with FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

5. Air National Guard

There are approximately 1,080 intelligence personnel in the Air National Guard (ANG). Of these 1,080 personnel, 460 (total) are assigned to four intelligence squadrons and 620 are assigned to the 88 ANG flying units, air operations groups, air defense sectors, air control squadrons, or 1st Air Force. Currently, there are four ANG intelligence squadrons: one signals intelligence (SIGINT) squadron and three imagery intelligence (IMINT) squadrons.

The four intelligence squadrons are wartraced to Air Combat Command units. Each squadron actively supports peacetime and crisis requirements of the Combatant Commands and defense agencies. As examples, the 117th Imagery Squadron has provided second and third phase imagery analysis support to JAC Molesworth; and two squadrons support tactical SIGINT and other cryptologic missions. Personnel from the intelligence squadrons have been mobilized to support imagery and cryptologic missions of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

In addition to the four existing ANG intelligence squadrons, efforts are underway to standup an imagery squadron in Kansas and additional imagery squadrons may follow. Efforts also are underway to establish four information warfare (IW) squadrons in the Air National Guard.

ANG units remain under state control until mobilized in accordance with Air Force Policy Document 10-3. In the aftermath of September 11, all four intelligence squadrons – including approximately 350 ANG intelligence specialists – were mobilized for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM.

6. Marine Corps Reserve

Marine Corps Reserve intelligence professionals support both real-world contingencies and exercises. The Marine Corps Intelligence capability is comprised of more than 700 personnel organized as Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units and IMAs. The primary mission of SMCR units is to provide tactical and expeditionary intelligence support to Marine Corps units as specified in current operation plans. These personnel are either imbedded in tactical reserve units or comprise part of force intelligence units. The force intelligence units can be tasked to provide general intelligence support or may be attached to Marine Corps Commands, as required. Marine Corps Reserve intelligence IMAs primarily augment Headquarters Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Combatant Commands, CSAs, and other national and DoD-level organizations in support of joint and combined intelligence activities. IRR Marines are in a standby, non-drilling status, and comprise a force of approximately 1,000 members. These Marines act as individual augmentees rounding out commands during mobilization or as members of the active duty for special work (ADSW) program. Marine Corps Intelligence personnel provide dedicated, integrated, total force intelligence production at JRICs.

C. Intelligence Reservists "in action" – Post-September 11, 2001 Mobilization

As a force that is always engaged, intelligence reservists perform a wide variety and increasing number of roles and missions. The RC intelligence forces described above responded rapidly to the events of September 11, 2001. Highlights of that response are presented below.

1. Roles and Missions

Gaining Commands are assigning additional roles to reservists. Numerous survey responders indicated that civilian skills were immediately capitalized upon after mobilization, most often in areas such as homeland security (as that concept was used by responders), information warfare and information operations, and computer technology-related missions.



Figure 1 – Perceived Missions of Reserve Component Intelligence

DoD and Intelligence Community personnel in responses to surveys and interviews identified more than 50 different roles and missions. The identified roles and missions ranged from tactical to operational and strategic roles and missions. Figure 1 shows the "top 15" missions Pre- and Post-September 11, 2001 as perceived by Survey 2 respondents. Interestingly, the reported range of missions did not change Pre- and Post-September 11, 2001.

The "top ten" roles being performed by the RCIE, as reported by more than 100 reserve intelligence personnel, are shown in Figure 2 (below). Although Figure 2 emphasizes several strategic roles, RC intelligence personnel are also performing a wide variety of tactical missions to include current intelligence briefing support to aerial and ground reconnaissance missions as well as near real-time imagery exploitation and targeting.



Figure 2 – Examples of Peacetime Roles

2. Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers

RC intelligence personnel perform their roles and missions at a variety of locations to include Gaining Command facilities and Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs). Current JRIC sites are shown in Figure 3 (below).

Approximately 5,200 intelligence reservists are assigned to perform inactive or active duty at the JRICs. As of December 2001, approximately 1,370 of those 5,200 intelligence reservists had been mobilized. Although most of the mobilized reservists reported to their Gaining Commands, eleven organizations (Combatant Commands, CSAs and Service Intelligence Centers) mobilized more than 200 RC intelligence personnel to 17 JRIC sites. Mobilization of more intelligence reservists to JRICs (including seven additional JRICs) is planned, though some Gaining Commands stated that they had no current plans to use JRICs.



Figure 3 – Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers

Previous studies have shown that three factors are critical to achieving successful integration of reservists at sites geographically distant from their customer(s).[7] These factors include:

(1) A Gaining Command or supported organization that integrates its reservists into routine operations by providing appropriate tasking, investing in required training and providing timely feedback;

(2) JRICs that are structured, managed and resourced to support the intelligence requirements of the military commander – that is, a JRIC that has sufficient full-time support (FTS), robust IT connectivity and appropriate organization and tasking of the reservists themselves; and,

(3) Commitment by the Services and Reservists to "operational training," that is training by doing real-world mission.

The current mobilization confirms and augments these observations. Previous successful use of a JRIC, or good experience with a "trusted" reservist who was assigned

[7] One study is DIA/DM-2 Final Report: "Towards More Effective Reserve Intelligence Utilization, Fort Sheridan Prototype Joint Reserve Intelligence Center Final Report" [April 9, 1999].

to a JRIC, was associated with the decisions to use a JRIC as a mobilization site. More robust connectivity to include increased bandwidth, improved systems reliability, and enhanced technical support of JRICP systems were also associated with the decision to use a JRIC.

Successful methods of facilitating JRIC-based intelligence support include the placement of a RC team member with the AC customer as a liaison and forward mission manager; or the placement of an AC team member at the JRIC site. This gives the customer a physically available point of contact that shows that the JRIC-based force understands his requirements and "battle rhythm." It also removes from the customer the (perceived) burden of managing the technical processes of data transfer to the JRIC-based force.

Operations managers as well as intelligence reservists repeatedly mentioned the potential cost savings and efficiencies associated with using JRICs for intelligence support to the warfighter. Examples of possible savings included the expenses associated with deployment (flights, housing, per diem, etc.) and capital equipment (utilization of existing computers, office space, etc.). In addition, both program managers and intelligence reservists commented that by assigning mobilized Reservists to a "local" JRIC – assuming that the "local" JRIC is "closer to home" than the Gaining Command – many of the personal hardships associated with mobilization could be minimized or eliminated.

Lack of familiarity or prior negative experiences with remote intelligence centers (including JRICs) was associated with "non-use" of JRICs for the mobilization. Negative experiences included inadequate JRIC management and staffing; lack of adequate host support; and problems related to IT systems support and connectivity. Cultural aversion to remote (virtual) intelligence production was also mentioned as contributing to "non-use" of JRICs for mobilization.

3. Virtual Collaborative Technology

Virtual Collaborative Technology (VCT) is information management technology that enables live, real-time or near-real time data and information sharing through multiple channels such as voice, text, video and remote sensing. Examples of VCT tools are File Transfer Protocol (FTP), video teleconferencing (VTC), NetMeeting and Joint Collaborative Tools. VCT tools enable multiple users to use the same information simultaneously, thus expediting mission accomplishment. These collaborative tools enable analysts to meet, discuss, and share raw data, imagery, briefs and products virtually, in real-time over long distances. Users perceive VCT tools as being extremely cost-effective. As noted by Lt. Gen. James Sherrard, Chief of the Air Force Reserve, "*Virtual Collaborative Technology allows the reservists to use their availability to the maximum extent possible.*"

Reservists at Gaining Commands and JRIC sites are using all available VCT tools in their intelligence missions. At JRIC sites, FTP is the primary method used to transfer products between JRIC sites and Gaining Commands. The Joint Reserve Concentrator

System is being used to facilitate imagery exploitation. Video teleconferencing and e-mail are used to coordinate a myriad of issues related to virtual intelligence production. Top Secret and Secret connectivity at JRICs was generally rated as being very effective, with some comments suggesting a need or desire for improved unclassified connectivity.

Some respondents indicated that there is some cultural resistance to the use of VCT between Gaining Commands and remotely-located (to include JRIC-based) intelligence reservists. Amplifying comments indicated that some users were not comfortable with the concept of virtual production while others lacked confidence in reserve personnel.

4. Recruiting and Retaining the RCIE

Survey responses, interviews, and reviews of published articles provided several comments related to the recruiting and retention of RC intelligence personnel. Some of those comments are presented below.

Factors reported as having a positive effect on recruitment include:

- Geographic location of reserve drill sites;
- Improved esprit-de-corps through meaningful tasking and being productive during periods of inactive and active duty;
- Benefits to include pay and access to commissaries; professional and educational opportunities; and Reserve retirement.

Suggested recruiting initiatives included:

- Offering sign-on bonuses and better incentive pay for hard-to-fill skills;
- Eliminating restrictions on/difficulties related to recruiting retired active duty members for the reserve intelligence program. Many are still relatively young and bring over 20 years of experience to the reserve intelligence program;
- Providing incentives to recruit USAR IMAs; and
- Modifying training requirements to include better utilization of virtual training and modular training to include imagery training.

Factors reported as affecting rates of retention include:

- Job satisfaction. Involvement in "real-world" production assignments increases retention. One striking example involved the 629th Military Intelligence Battalion, Maryland Army National Guard in the aftermath of the battalion's completion of a nine-month tour of duty in Bosnia. The Battalion Commander said:

"*These MI soldiers had been mobilized to support operations in Bosnia and participated in hundreds of intelligence collection missions, and produced thousands of intelligence reports and products during their tour of duty. Now they were demobilized and going back to one drill weekend a month with the prospect*

of no real-world intelligence operations to keep their interest. This posed a true retention problem – the equivalent of "How do you keep them on the farm when they've seen the lights of Paris?" The answer was to develop an intelligence production capability within the unit to support the National Ground Intelligence Center. Retention soared when [these demobilized] soldiers saw that their talents and skills continued to be used to support real-world intelligence missions."

- In another example, three different ARNG units experienced more than 20% increases in assigned soldiers within the first year after implementing and prioritizing production programs at JRIC sites. Retention losses dropped to near zero. Unit soldiers, now excited to go to drill, recruited their friends. AC soldiers leaving the service who had heard about what the units were doing joined so they could continue to work their specialties. In each case, the unit commander indicated that the focus on real world mission was the key factor behind the success.
- Convenient geographic location – i.e., when personnel are assigned to a JRIC or Gaining Command that is located near home, retention rates are higher.
- Ongoing involvement (increased participation) and increased pay. Shortly after the USAFR IMA program increased its IDT requirement from 24 paid IDT/year to 48 paid IDT/year, its rates of retention increased.

Suggested retention initiatives included:

- Standardizing pay, benefits, etc. (i.e., mobilization entitlements, quality of housing, etc.) across the Services;
- Authorizing full Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) for RC linguists. Currently, RC linguists receive 1/30 of the active duty monthly FLPP amount for each drill period, which averages to 4/30 of the active duty rate per month, while being required to maintain the same proficiency as the active force;
- Increasing IDT flexibility;
- Revising or eliminating the current government credit card program;
- Extending education benefits beyond the first 10 years;
- Revising or eliminating time-in-service, time-in-rate, and age policies;
- Reducing the number and frequency of military operations that personnel are being called upon to perform; and
- Improving Reserve retirement.

5. Policy Issues

Many policy documents ranging from the U.S. Codes to DoD, Service, and unit-level policies, directives, instructions and regulations control the use of reserve forces.

Three laws were highlighted as having problematic sections. They are:

- Title 10 (with respondents suggesting that its Cold War focus be revised in light of modern challenges);
- Title 18 (Posse Comitatus); and
- Executive Order 12333 (Intelligence Oversight).

Comments related to Title 18 and E. O. 12333 centered on issues related to the use of military forces for counterdrug, homeland security, counterterrorism, force protection, counterintelligence, and information operations. Issues related to the impact of "the color of money" (GDIP, TIARA, etc.) on mission accomplishment were also mentioned as being problematic.

Chapter 4. Meeting *future* Defense Intelligence Requirements – Observations

A second purpose of the test program is to determine the most effective peacetime structure and operational employment of the RCIE to meeting future DoD peacetime operational intelligence requirements. Responses to the survey tools and interviews provided valuable insights related to this topic.

A. Emerging Roles and Missions

Both Survey 1 and Survey 2 provided "snapshots" of emerging and evolving roles and missions. Missions such as counterterrorism and chemical and biological warfare support were highlighted by joint intelligence commands as opportunities for expanding the roles of intelligence reservists.

The majority of respondents stated that there were no roles or missions that were inappropriate for the RCIE. Some respondents stated that reservists should perform all active duty roles and missions – but others expressed concern that some roles and missions should not be assigned routinely to the RCIE, either because these missions required extensive training or because of their time-sensitivity. Clearly, this concern needs further investigation because it is central to the scope of the test program.

As shown in Figure 4, survey respondents identified a wide variety of emerging roles and missions being assigned to the RCIE, with counterterrorism and homeland security being the two most frequently mentioned.



Figure 4 – Examples of Emerging Roles & Missions

Several respondents noted that the long-term use of RC intelligence personnel to perform non-intelligence functions (administrative tasks, computer support, etc.) was poor use of the intelligence training investment and had a negative impact on the morale of these reservists. Several personnel suggested that civilian personnel should perform these tasks. Other respondents suggested that the long-term use of reservists masked the "real" problem of inadequate active duty endstrength and suggested a significant increase in active duty manning.

B. Use of Civilian Skills

Survey respondents recommended that the civilian skills possessed by intelligence reservists add breadth to the capabilities of the Intelligence Community and should continue to be leveraged. To better leverage these skills, this information should be collected and maintained in a dynamic relational database.

Using civilian skills was often mentioned in connection with homeland security, information warfare, and computer technology-related missions. The use of intelligence reservists with civilian information technology skills increased the capabilities of Defense Intelligence. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) and Air National Guard have collaborated to establish a signals intelligence squadron staffed with personnel having civilian skills in computers and languages to support Information Operations (IO) and defensive IO missions. In another example, Naval Reserve cryptologic professionals with knowledge of civilian merchant shipping business practices were able to bring both

military intelligence skills and civilian expertise to analyzing post September 11, 2001 terrorism risks.

There were also concerns related to the use of the civilian skills of the RCIE. The concerns centered on the need to compare the impact of the military gain to the civilian community loss when mobilizing a reservist. Points for consideration included whether an employee was designated as a "key employee," and whether mobilization of a government civilian IC analyst was a net gain to the IC. The issue of "key employee" status created concerns within the IC because there were government civilian intelligence analysts who had not been designated as a "key employee," but whose employers treated their contributions as "key" or essential to operations. As a result, mobilizing these analysts created employer angst over the loss of such employees during a mobilization action and resulted in the need for considerable dialog between government civilian employers and military services to determine the "best" course of action for all concerned.

Other areas of concern included Intelligence Oversight and Posse Comitatus, particularly where THE RCIE are assigned to counterdrug, and homeland security missions. Clearly, these topics will require further study.

C. Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers

Many respondents stated that the JRIC concept – remote intelligence centers that use information systems technology to bridge or mitigate geographical distance – has been overwhelmingly successful. JRICs and JRICP-provided technology have enabled intelligence personnel (both RC and AC) to provide essential intelligence support to the warfighter in a timely and cost-effective manner. The sites and technology have also enhanced skills training, thereby improving personnel readiness.

The most common recommendations related to "the future of JRICs" include the following:

- Establish a standard JRIC operational management structure incorporating the "best practices" of existing JRICs.
- Increase (or establish) full-time support at JRICs to include a Requirements Manager and IT support staffing.
- Establish JRICs as continuity-of-operations (COOP) sites, operating full-time as remote departments/divisions of intelligence agencies.
- Redesignate "Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers" as "Remote Intelligence Centers"; some of these should be "Joint" and others should be assigned to Services/Combatant Commands.
- Increase the number of sites.
- Increase utilization of sites by Coast Guard and Homeland Security personnel.

- Upgrade and enhance existing technology (Note: With the support of DIA, JRICP is executing an aggressive capital equipment replacement program, replacing aging systems, upgrading software, and installing larger bandwidth circuits to facilitate growing intelligence requirements at the JRIC sites. It is also providing secure video teleconferencing capabilities at JRICs).

D. Reserve Role in Federated Intelligence Support to the Warfighter

As the J2/Joint Staff construct of federated intelligence support in crisis situations evolves, support from the RCIE might appear to be out-of-sync with traditional mobilization responses. Intelligence Federation is designed to provide the best intelligence support possible from Defense Intelligence, and non-intelligence Defense organizations, to a Unified Command during planning or crisis operations. The process identifies intelligence functions that will be performed in-theater and intelligence support that may be ***federated*** to intelligence and appropriate non-intelligence Defense organizations operating from their home stations. Federation brings a pre-planned approach to intelligence support using the ***supported/supporting command*** concept. Federation implies that Combatant Commands missions may be reassigned to another active command – and that the RCIE may be needed to support the supporting organization(s) to ensure that federated support may be given to the crisis. As such, extensive support and involvement of the RCIE may be needed not only to provide federated support, but also to backfill or provide reachback support to commands not in crisis.

Chapter 5. Transitioning to Wartime – Observations

A third purpose of the test program is to establish a means to coordinate and transition the peacetime intelligence operational support network into use for meeting wartime requirements. The post-September 11, 2001 partial mobilization of the RCIE was used to gain familiarity with the transitioning process. Beginning with this mobilization and for the foreseeable future, the RCIE will operate in continuous counterterrorism-based wartime environment.

A. Existing Force Structure

A number of respondents stated that the Reserve Intelligence Force Structure is not organized or manned to meet emerging requirements, specifically counterintelligence, force protection, and counter-terrorism. Suggestions for improving the force structure included deliberate planning to align force structure with manpower strengths, and skills-based expertise for employment of reservists during both peacetime and wartime. Another recommendation was to develop a series of "alternative" manpower documents that reflect manpower requirements associated with different threats. The elimination of redundant documentation and appropriate upgrades to a variety of computer systems was suggested repeatedly.

B. Mobilizing the Force – Post-September 11, 2001 Mobilization

Mobilization is a process by which the Armed Forces or some part thereof are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergencies. This includes activating all or part of the RC, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to, selective mobilization, partial mobilization and full mobilization. Mobilization of Ready Reservists involves a number of steps, including activation and mobilization. The activation process is primarily driven by the RC and is a process that is somewhat familiar to Selected Reserve personnel. In contrast, the mobilization process is primarily driven by the AC, and is a process that is less familiar to Selected Reserve personnel.

The partial mobilization of more than 3,000 intelligence reservists highlighted several issues related to existing force structure as well as current mobilization policies and procedures.

1. Factors that facilitated mobilization

Several respondents stated that when specific individuals were needed, it was easier to mobilize those individuals when they were IMAs rather than a member of a unit. In some situations where a specific individual with needed skills was part of a unit, either the entire unit had to be mobilized or the individual had to be transferred out of the unit to an IMA billet or to the IRR, prior to mobilization of the individual.

The following facilitated mobilization of RC intelligence personnel:

- Gaining Command exercising the "right of first refusal" minimized potential manpower shortages problems caused by external commands submitting "by-name" requests for host command personnel;
- Initial mobilization of reservists to their drill site combined with the use by Gaining Commands of mobilization centers to support the transition process facilitated in-processing and rapid work force integration;
- Suspension of the PERSTEMPO policy (which requires tracking of the rate at which individual personnel are used) was mentioned positively by reserve managers. However, several mobilized reservists – as well as a number of active duty personnel – viewed this decision, which eliminated additional payments to eligible personnel, as negative;
- The availability of flexible funding sources was critical to bridge both the fiscal year crossover and the lag time required before mobilization funding and mobilized personnel were available; and
- Assignment of mobilized reservists to the Gaining Command or an associated remote facility (JRIC or other secure site), whichever was geographically closer to the reservist's home, was mentioned positively. However, this option has not been optimized yet.

2. Factors that inhibited mobilization

A number of survey respondents indicated that problems associated with the partial mobilization of intelligence reservists appeared to be a result of unfamiliarity with AC and RC operations/procedures and vice versa. Some stated that mobilization processes were inefficient and inconsistent across the Services. Comments included:

- A perceived lack of clear and concise mobilization policies and procedures, combined with deviations from standard recall procedures, caused confusion;
- Inconsistent fiscal policies across the Services resulted in reservists receiving differing entitlements (per diem, housing, access to TRICARE, etc.). This caused financial and morale problems for reservists. In some cases, reserve managers elected to mobilize reservists based primarily upon entitlements;
- There was confusion regarding the impact of "Stop Loss" policies and the partial mobilization order; (As background, "Stop-Loss" policies allow the Services to retain members beyond established dates of separation or retirement in order to support national security needs. The length of service associated with Stop-Loss is tied to the mission assigned to the Combatant Commander); and,
- The lack of effective administrative and logistical support to mobilization, delayed in-processing. Examples of delays included inconsistent, inflexible or inaccessible medical and dental records and facilities; problems with

forwarding security clearances; issues related to payment of per diem and housing requirements.

3. Suggestions for Improvement

Suggestions for improvement of the mobilization process include:

- Establish simplified mobilization procedures that are standardized across Gaining Commands and Services, to include standardization of Reserve benefits and entitlements;
- Develop alternative mobilization processes, varying by the nature of the requirement and including establishment of mobilizations to JRIC sites;
- Evaluate Unit vs. IMA vs. Collective IMA structures for mobilization purposes;
- Establish a small military planning and liaison staff (perhaps placed at JCS J2) to coordinate mobilization of defense intelligence and serve as a clearinghouse for tasking; and,
- Shift assessments of training of the RCIE from a project-based approach to a knowledge-based capability.

There were some suggestions to eliminate or modify the distinction between peacetime and wartime for purposes of assigning missions to the RCIE. These suggestions appear to be based on the existing integration of RC and AC intelligence personnel, as well as the fact that Defense Intelligence is always engaged.

4. Policy Issues

Multiple or seemingly contradictory interpretations of DoD policy and other documents have created barriers to optimal use of the RCIE. Specific examples include:

- Variations in long-term tour policies among the Services and variations in interpretation of the Joint Travel Regulations (which often create impediments to operational mission support and imbalances in member entitlements);
- Variations among the Services as to methods of completing personnel and administrative requirements (such as physical fitness testing, mandatory annual briefings, weekend drill reporting, etc.), which affected the overall availability of the RCIE for mobilization; and,
- Disagreements as to whether the RCIE may perform contributory support during IDT periods or annual training (despite the SECDEF Plan and the subsequent formal directives and instruction guidance from OSD).

Chapter 6. The Way Ahead – Future Research Plans

During its first year, the Project Team collected a great deal of information related to the current structure and employment of the RCIE, with particular attention directed to the ability of that force to mobilize in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. Not only has this information provided a glimpse into the peacetime-to-wartime transition of the RCIE, it has enabled the Project Team to better define the test program and test methodology. Using the Initial Test Plan as a guide, a thorough assessment of the information is in progress. Data shortfalls and themes that warrant additional study have been identified. Test and research techniques have been outlined. At this juncture, the Test Director is actively seeking funds to purchase additional contractor support – specifically to provide enhanced statistical and modeling capabilities.

The second year test program schedule will be more robust than the first year's schedule. In order to accomplish the second year's schedule, Test Program Action Officers will be more actively involved with test design and execution, as well as leadership of and participation in expert working groups

As a working construct, a proposed end state has been identified for the future RC intelligence organization and capabilities. That future RC intelligence force must be a capabilities-based, flexible force that is better aligned to support Defense Intelligence requirements. Action Officers assigned by the Oversight Panel members to support this test program have collectively recommended areas for the Test Plan's future research and direction, including:

- **Current and Future Test Plan/CONOPs:** Propose a revised, comprehensive plan or Concept of Operations that specifies detailed milestones for the end state of the Test Plan. Review the 1995 SECDEF Plan results.
- **RC Mobilization in Support of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT):** Fully document the RCIE mobilization that occurred post-September 11, 2001, to include active duty and reserve requirements, processes, outcomes and lessons learned. Continue review of activation/mobilization processes and policies to include demobilization. Compare, evaluate and, if possible, test the IMA and Unit force structures. Facilitate the development of streamlined mobilization checklists. Determine the basis of the Services' differing interpretations of regulations related to per diem, housing allowances, etc.
- **RC Intelligence Requirements Issues:** Work with AC planners to gain a better understanding of the Defense Intelligence requirements process and determine how capabilities of the RCIE (e. g., manpower, structure and funding) factor into the requirements process. Examine how the RCIE

intelligence capability is structured, trained and resourced. Ultimately, identify, review and improve the RCIE requirements process. Evaluate roles and missions from multiple perspectives with a view towards identifying criteria that may be used to task the RCIE appropriately.

- **Test Options and Metrics**: Develop a series of test activities to evaluate and measure the progress of the current utilization the RCIE to include JRIC utilization, as well as assignment of new requirements to the RCIE.
- **Force Structure**: Develop a model for a joint reserve intelligence unit (JRIU), to include joint funding, such as Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) or other NFIP resources.
- **Policy Issues**: Conduct a comprehensive review of DoD, joint and service-level policies and procedures (mobilization, funding, mandays, waivers, personnel policies, etc.) to help streamline and remove unnecessary barriers. Review funding structure to ensure adequate flexibility for meeting current and emerging requirements.
- **Relevant DoD, Joint and Service Intelligence Business Processes**: Map, analyze and share relevant business practices for improvement, such as validation and prioritization of requirements, force structure development, training, retention, resourcing, management, etc.

The number and scope of test program techniques will expand during the second year of this test program. Interviews and focus groups will be conducted with technology experts, human resources experts, "future thinkers" and war college faculty. Working Groups comprised of subject matter experts (such as virtual collaborative technology and remote intelligence center operations) will be established. Site visits to Gaining Commands and JRICs will be used to capture – and share – "best practices" related to federated intelligence support and optimal use of RC intelligence personnel. The progress of working groups and task forces working on related topics such as the CJCS Top RC issues and initiatives, as well as DoD/IC efforts concerning Posse Comitatus and intelligence oversight will be monitored, with team members participating as appropriate.

While a significantly higher level of Action Officer involvement and interaction has been identified as a critical factor in the successful completion of this test program, another important element of success or failure needs to be addressed – Active Duty Participation. The involvement, interest, participation and "buy-in" of the AC in this test program are a must. The members of the Oversight Panel and their Action Officers, together with the Test Program staff, will seek to engage the AC at every level within every discipline. Together, the Project Team will be able to focus methodically on actionable results and continue to ensure that the final report on 1 December 2004 meets the full intent of Congress, and more importantly, creates an environment where the Active Component effectively and efficiently employs Reserve Component Intelligence Elements to provide direct support to critical National Defense roles and missions.

Figures

Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AC	Active Component(s)
ACC	Air Component Command
ADSW	Active Duty for Special Work
AF	Air Force
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Command
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSPACE	Air Force Space Command
AGR	Active Guard/Reserve
AMC	Air Mobility Command
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Air Reserve Component
ARISC	Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers
ARMISE	Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARPERSCOM	Army Personnel Command
ASD/C3I	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
ASD/RA	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
AT	Annual Training
CI	Counterintelligence
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONUS	Continental United States
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CSA	Combat Support Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
FLPP	Foreign Language Proficiency Pay

Acronym	Meaning
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
FTS	Full-Time Support
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HF	High Frequency
HLS	Homeland Security
IA	Information Assurance
IC	Intelligence Community
ICS	Intelligence Contributory Support
IDT	Inactive Duty for Training
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ING	Inactive National Guard
IO	Information Operations
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
IVTU	Intelligence Voluntary Training Unit
IW	Information warfare
JAC	Joint Analysis Center
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JMIP	Joint Military Intelligence Program
JRIC	Joint Reserve Intelligence Center
JRICP	Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program
JRIP	Joint Reserve Intelligence Program
JRIU	Joint Reserve Intelligence Unit
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MENA	Middle East/Northern Africa
MI	Military Intelligence
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NFIP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NRCIS	Naval Reserve Command Intelligence Support
NRIC	Naval Reserve Intelligence Command
NRSGC	Naval Reserve Security Group Command
NSA	National Security Agency

Acronym	Meaning
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
PACOM	Pacific Command
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
RC	Reserve Component
RCIE	Reserve Component Intelligence Element
RIA	Reserve Intelligence Area
RLO	Reserve Liaison Officer
RMO	Reserve Management Office
RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Centers
SCIF	Special Compartmented Information Facility
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SELRES	Selected Reserve
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SMCR	Selected Marine Corps Reserve
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SRD	Special Research Division
SSP	SIGINT Support Packages
TPU	Troop Program Units
USARC	USAR Command
USCENTCOM	U. S. Central Command
USEUCOM	U. S. European Command
USFK	U. S. Forces Korea
VCT	Virtual Collaborative Technology
VTC	Video Teleconferencing
VTU	Voluntary Training Unit