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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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COMMANDER

US CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

COMMAND POSTURE

3 MARCH 2004

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am honored to appear before you today and report on the state of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the situation and our actions in our Area of Responsibility (AOR), and discuss ways we can continue to increase our effectiveness. The Command remains engaged on three principal fronts; the disruption of transnational terrorist networks working within and from our AOR, and countering insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These activities are interconnected. CENTCOM operates within the geographical and ideological heart of the Global War on Terror. Success in Afghanistan and Iraq will result in stable states that do not harbor terrorists and provide a visible alternative to the terrorists' vision of chaos and conflict.

Over 200,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and Department of Defense Civilians, alongside over 30,000 of our Coalition partners, are serving today in USCENTCOM. The Total Force is represented by over 47,000 Guard and Reserve troops that are completely integrated into the effort. The Coalition is engaged in a wide range of activities that contribute to the stability of the region and the security of our nation. These include counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, stability, civil-affairs, reconstruction, and theater security cooperation activities. Over 870 aircraft and 30 ships are sustaining and supporting our land forces, simultaneously deterring our adversaries and gathering vital intelligence, while Marine forces embarked in Expeditionary Strike Groups serve as the region's strategic reserve. Every day our servicemen and women are operating alongside our Coalition partners with courage, dedication, and professionalism.

Our operating environment is always dangerous and we both appreciate and honor the sacrifices made by our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and their families over the past twenty-eight months.

We have had many successes, but there is much yet to be done. Our enemies continue to seek to inflict casualties upon those who oppose them in an attempt to hinder our progress and break our will. Our commanders in the field recognize these risks, adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures and aggressively take the fight to the enemy. I thank you all on their behalf for the tremendous support we have received from the Congress. We must stay the course, which will require continued sacrifice both at home and abroad.

The demands associated with our combat missions have resulted in a force that possesses unprecedented operational and tactical savvy. Our leaders have developed an extremely high degree of professionalism in the conduct of one of the toughest missions any military faces. We are waging a counterinsurgency against an enemy hiding within the population and operating without rules. Our troops are proving every day that they are adaptive, imaginative, professional, competent and most of all courageous. I visit our troops and commanders frequently and they are confident we are winning the war on terror, winning the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq, and contributing to stability in volatile regions such as the Horn of Africa. They are also realistic, however, and understand that success will not come overnight or without further sacrifice. The young troops are setting a modern standard for the "Greatest Generation."

MISSION

U.S. Central Command conducts joint and combined operations in the area of responsibility (AOR) to defeat our adversaries, promote regional stability, support our allies and friends, and protect our interests.

VISION

As a Unified Command, U.S. Central Command may operate as a Combined Command, synchronizing joint and combined forces to decisively defeat enemies within the assigned area of responsibility. Central Command promotes regional stability through a robust program of military cooperation, exercises, and frequent contact. We support our allies' and friends' efforts to build and sustain the individual and collective defense capabilities required to allow them to prosper free from terrorism, war, or oppression. American and Coalition presence will deter adversaries through demonstrated resolve to protect our national interest.

NATURE OF THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

The USCENTCOM AOR spans 6.4 million square miles including Egypt, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It is intersected by critical transportation and trade routes and includes the waters of the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and the key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The Arabian Gulf region alone accounts for two-thirds of the world's crude oil reserves, 25% of the world's oil production, and 36% of the world's natural gas reserves. The region is home to more than 500 million people including at least 18 major ethnic groups and adherents of all the world's major religions.

Economic, social, and political conditions vary greatly from one nation to another. However, despite the riches of its natural resources and human potential the region faces significant security challenges ranging from international terrorism to state-to-state conflict. Some regional governments are hard pressed to satisfy

growing populations' demands for a better quality of life. A tide of social and economic discontent makes many populations vulnerable to extremist ideology and anti-American sentiment.

Extremist organizations prey on disenfranchised youth and those without hope. They attempt to indoctrinate the youth to violent Jihad as the principal means of advancing their cause. States in our AOR most vulnerable to extremism include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen although no nation in our region is free from this risk. In addition, we keep a keen eye on flashpoints between Pakistan and India, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and civil war in Sudan.

We operate in a region that has a low tolerance for a major foreign military presence—no matter how well-intentioned. Our longer term presence in the region must therefore be tailored to be effective but not overbearing. Our vision in this region must be to help nations help themselves. As Iraq and Afghanistan move towards stability we must integrate them into our long term strategy for peace and look for ways to include them in the group of nations fighting terrorism and extremism locally, regionally, and globally. Ultimately, our partnerships throughout the region aim to foster strong and stable states fully capable of helping themselves and regional communities of nations willing and able to help each other.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

The USCENTCOM region lies at the geographic and ideological heart of the Global War on Terror. Partnered as we are with many Islamic nations, we recognize that the War on Terror is not a war against Islam. We are cognizant of an ongoing struggle within our region between extremism and moderation. Al Qaida is attempting to exploit and amplify regional tensions to the point they can cause global

effects. Their strategy is to create footholds of sympathy and support within populations from which to attack supporters of moderation and tolerance. They seek to drive the U.S. from the region and then champion an insurrection against moderation. Their strategic timeline is measured in decades and generations.

Pursuit of this enemy is our highest priority and we know that while the military can and will continue to disrupt and defeat Al Qaida on the battlefield, the root causes of terrorism have inherently non-military solutions. It is important to isolate the Al Qaida network and other transnational terrorist organizations from their sources of ideological, financial, and material strength. We have put significant pressure on the Al Qaida terrorist network throughout the region. Together with our coalition, interagency and host nation partners, we have killed and captured terrorists, attacked their infrastructure, restricted their movement, disrupted their financial support, and depleted their leadership. We have gained experience and perspective on the nature of the threat and their tactics. We are using that experience to become even more effective, especially in the area of intelligence and counter-insurgency.

Close cooperation with our interagency and international partners is an important element of success. Only by fully synchronizing our military efforts with those focused on diplomacy, intelligence collection and analysis, economic development, law enforcement, and strategic communications will we put pressure on the threat while at the same time win the confidence of the moderates. We continue to develop interagency ties at all levels of command to facilitate cross agency information and activity. Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) within the headquarters is an example of this new wave of integration. So too are we synchronizing Coalition activity for the

Global War on Terror. Sixty-five countries have military representatives at the CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa sharing information and integrating plans. Because the enemy is borderless and his strategy is broad, we cannot afford to permit gaps in our effort that terrorists can exploit. The solidarity and collective will of the Coalition is our strength against an enemy that preys on weakness.

Regardless, the terrorist enemy is agile, patient and deadly. They have adapted their methods to counter our successes. In recent months, the suicide bombings that killed or wounded thousands of innocent Muslims in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate that terrorists' claims that they are solely at war with America are false. Al Qaida organizers, operatives, and other cadres have dispersed, establishing clandestine bases of operation in inaccessible to the United States and its allies or ungoverned spaces. The enemy's ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain partially intact and functional. The demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists continue to concern us.

We remain concerned that modern technology could give terrorists access to destructive power, which, in the past, has been limited to nation states. Indeed, we know that terrorist organizations have been pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Effective offensive operations against Al Qaida and its associated organizations prevent these terrorists from establishing deliberate programs to make these destructive weapons. Measures to effectively control borders and detect proliferation of WMD related materials and technology need to be strengthened within regional nation states.

Success in this war depends greatly upon collective action and international cooperation. While U.S. and Coalition forces will remain on the offensive, indigenous forces are best suited to develop human

intelligence and act on that intelligence to defeat the enemy. Our headquarters, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A), CJTF - 7 in Iraq, and CJTF Horn of Africa headquartered in Djibouti, along with our Component Commands, conduct theater security cooperation with other nations to help build indigenous counterterrorism capabilities. NAVCENT directs seventeen countries in a sustained effort to curtail trafficking of terrorists, as well as narcotics, and other prohibited items. Carrier battle groups and strike groups are apportioned to support CENTCOM operations using the Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP).

While we must remain alert to the danger that transnational terrorism poses, we must also recognize the terrorists' vulnerabilities and the opportunities they present. The war against terrorism is a war largely of intelligence and perceptions. While we are constantly improving our intelligence picture of the enemy, we must also become more adept at public diplomacy and strategic communications. The terrorist vision is not inherently appealing given its foundation of intolerance, restricted freedoms and forced compliance. Moderates will only move in the extremist direction if they see it as the only way to achieve sustenance, personal security and a sense of community. It is important to make every effort to help the host nations improve essential services, enhance security and provide venues for political participation. It is also important to tailor and temper our combat activities to cultural sensitivities and personal security concerns of the moderates as we pursue the terrorists.

IRAQ

There are currently over 184,000 coalition personnel supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq and Kuwait. Over 114,000 U.S.

personnel and over 23,000 coalition personnel from 35 nations are currently fighting to achieve security and stability in Iraq. The force is commanded and controlled by a Combined Joint Task Force, Headquarters (CJTF-7) centrally located in Baghdad and is composed of five divisions; three U.S. Army divisions, two multinational divisions, and one multinational brigade. Special operations forces under SOCCENT's leadership work in close collaboration with CJTF-7 and Coalition partners throughout Iraq to enhance information sharing and planning efforts.

Multinational forces are currently responsible for northern and southern portions of Iraq while U.S. Army units are deployed in Baghdad, central, northern and western Iraq. Over 26,000 U.S. and Coalition personnel are deployed in Kuwait, providing logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Today, we are engaged in a major force rotation that will be complete by early May. While force numbers will remain relatively stable, incoming forces will be task organized with more infantry and greater mobility to fight the counter-insurgency. We have reduced our numbers in those sectors where the security environment permits, and increased our presence in others. For example, in the north where enemy activity has been low, an Army Stryker Brigade has replaced elements of the larger 101st Air Assault Division. In the west where enemy activity is high, the Marines will bring in a larger Marine Expeditionary Force to replace the 82nd Airborne Division. In all cases, the replacement forces are tailored for the mission, trained in the tactics, techniques and procedures developed by the departing unit, and spend time in their sector with the outgoing unit before its departure.

The three major elements fighting Coalition forces in Iraq are Former Regime Elements (FREs), transnational terrorists and religious

extremists or jihadists. The Former Regime Elements seek to expel the Coalition and return themselves to power. They are waging a tactical campaign against Coalition forces and attempting to intimidate the Iraqi police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps security forces while terrorizing both Iraqi citizens and anyone cooperating with Coalition forces. These Former Regime Elements operate primarily in north-central and western Iraq, the traditional strongholds of the Ba'athist regime. Former Regime Elements predominately use standoff weapons such as rockets, mortars and small surface-to-air missiles to engage coalition forces. Since last summer they have become extremely adept and adaptive with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the point that the majority of American casualties are now caused by IEDs.

USCENTCOM is working with the services and numerous DoD agencies, civilian research laboratories, and private businesses to develop and deploy technologies to defeat and mitigate the effects of the improvised explosive devices. We are focused on those technologies that can deny bomb-makers access to materials to make IEDs, provide persistent surveillance to our likely routes of travel, allow us to detect the presence of IEDs well outside the IED blast zone, neutralize or defeat those IEDs that remain hidden from us, and as a last resort, protect our troops from the effects of an IED blast.

Transnational terrorists such as the Zargawi network, Ansar al Islam, and Al Qaida are attempting to destabilize Iraq by increasing both ethnic and sectarian strife with the intention of inciting chaos and a civil war. Their intent is to drive international institutions such as the United Nations and Red Cross from Iraq. Ultimately they desire to create a new extremist base of operations following their losses in Afghanistan. These terrorists are operating in the same areas as the Former Regime Elements, which are largely former Ba'athist

strongholds. They also have a presence in northern Iraq and are launching attacks into southern Iraq targeting the Shi'a population, the international community, and security forces. While many of their tactics are similar to those employed by the FRE, they are more likely to employ suicide attacks, including car bombs.

The third group is religious extremists or jihadists. This group is widely diverse and made up of foreign fighters, adventurists who have responded to the extremists' false call for Jihad, and dissatisfied Iraqi Sunni Arabs. They are committed to driving westerners from the Middle East, deposing the current regional regimes and establishing an Islamic state or greater Caliphate. Some foreign fighters come to Iraq completely untrained with little money and no contacts, while others are veterans of previous jihad campaigns having spent years operating within Mujihadin networks.

Our response to the enemy in Iraq is framed in terms of counterinsurgency principles. We are developing a clear picture of the enemy through the combined efforts of our conventional forces, special operations forces and the intelligence community. The cornerstone of our counterinsurgency operations is HUMINT collected through a multitude of initiatives. Our conventional units cultivate personal relationships with civic leaders and the local populace on patrol and during humanitarian assistance, medical, dental, veterinarian, and reconstruction initiatives that provide important opportunities for gaining insight about local conditions.

Special operations forces and other government agencies are developing intelligence through a growing number of sources supportive of a new Iraq. Analysis at every echelon of command is fused together to create an understanding of the terrorist networks in Iraq. These efforts have resulted in more than 140 raids a week. Simultaneously,

we are working to isolate the enemy from their sources of strength and leadership within the country. By doing so, we intend to separate them from their popular support base and deny them funding, arms, and freedom of movement. Improved security, in conjunction with an improving economic and political environment will dry up their recruiting base.

The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) has been a contributor to our counterinsurgency efforts. Although their primary mission has been to unravel the former Iraqi regime's involvement and production of WMD, the nationwide network of case officers and sources have developed timely reporting of threats against coalition forces. As their investigators, analysts, and interpreters sifted through hundreds of thousands of documents, and made relevant documents to CENTCOM analysts to build databases of former Iraqi military organizations and intelligence services. Thousands of names, addresses and pictures now populate these databases enabling coalition forces to understand, target, and raid cells of the Special Republican Guards and the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

We continue to focus our efforts in specific areas: improving intelligence fusion and analysis; developing Iraqi security forces; internationalizing our security effort; protecting the infrastructure and aiding reconstruction; and helping to communicate our intentions, plans, and successes to the Iraqi people.

Improvements in our intelligence system are paying off and we continue to enhance our ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in a timely manner. Upgrades in automation networks, data basing capabilities, and bandwidth have given coalition forces the ability to strike quickly against enemy forces. Our intelligence picture will improve further as nascent Iraqi security and intelligence

capabilities mature. We are also establishing mechanisms to ensure that Iraqi forces have adequate intelligence capabilities as they assume more responsibility.

One of the fundamental elements of successful counter-insurgency operations is building an effective indigenous security force. Coalition forces are supporting the development of Iraqi police, border police, Civil Defense Corps, and Iraqi Armed Forces. In May 2003 there were no Iraqi security forces; there are now over two hundred thousand.

Our forces are recruiting, training, and conducting joint operations with the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). We are imbedding our Special Operations Forces inside the ICDC battalion to train and mentor these units as they gain both proficiency and confidence.

The Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) is recruiting, equipping, and training the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). We have fielded three battalions of the IAF and one more is in training, and within a year there will be three divisions of the NIA. We are also expanding Iraqi maritime capabilities, assisting the maritime components of the NIA, the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force and the Iraqi Riverine Patrol service to ensure they possess the capability to control Iraq's territorial and internal waters. We must ensure these forces are well led, well trained, well equipped, and are subordinated to legitimate civil authority.

We are coordinating with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to accelerate the formation of the Iraqi Police Services, the Department of Border Enforcement, and the Facilities Protection Services. These forces are essential in establishing Iraqi rule of law prior to transitioning to a sovereign Iraqi government. The arrival of civilian police advisors will greatly improve our efforts to increase the number and effectiveness of security force personnel.

As Iraqi forces become capable of autonomous operations, we will continue to reduce Coalition military presence in dense urban areas and position forces in order to provide quick reaction and facilitate effective joint patrol operations with Iraqi security forces. In many parts of Northern and Southern Iraq, Iraqi security forces have already taken responsibility for day-to-day security operations, asserting control over their own neighborhoods.

We are dedicated to a true partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces during this critical period in the battle. Knowing that Iraqi forces and leaders will take time to mature and they will be likely targets for the enemy, we are integrating training and liaison teams into their formations. The ICDC in particular is becoming more confident as our joint patrols and raids demonstrate the effectiveness of new equipment and tactics. ICDC units are taking the lead during more operations and gaining respect from the Iraqi people and enemy. We are also developing Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) to better coordinate the efforts of the local police, the ICDC and the Coalition. Over time, we will support the development of the Iraqi Defense and Interior Ministries and their staffs while building a Joint Force Headquarters. Iraqi officers will be integrated into the command structure of the multi-national force that will provide stability following the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. It is important to remember that this strategy will not only depend on our actions, but on enemy reactions and initiatives that are often difficult to predict with any degree of certainty.

This is also an international effort; over 23,000 Coalition troops from thirty-five nations have joined our forces in Iraq. These forces control two large sectors in southern Iraq. Poland leads a twenty-four nation effort in Multi-National Division Center-South, and

the United Kingdom leads an eleven nation effort in the South East. These nations have been subject to attack as you know and we are truly grateful for their continued contribution and sacrifice. Financial support for many of these nations has been critical to their participation.

Additionally, we also have international support for developing Iraqi security forces. We are grateful for the assistance of those nations training Iraqi police, including Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and the Federal Republic of Germany. We are committed to broadening the international effort and welcome the assistance of other nations and international organizations.

Security and reconstruction are interdependent. Unemployment and the lack of basic services is causing disaffection among the population which helps to provide fertile ground and an available recruiting pool for those who seek to incite attacks against other Iraqis, the infrastructure and Coalition forces.

Our Coalition troops have contributed to reconstruction and building a foundation for Iraqi prosperity. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be very effective in facilitating the reconstruction effort and also provides commanders with an effective means to fight the insurgency. Coalition forces have completed over 13,000 construction projects including schools, hospitals, businesses, transportation networks, wells, water treatment plants, and irrigation systems. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently established a Gulf Region Division in Baghdad to further accelerate our progress in restoring Iraqi infrastructure and the important oil and electricity sectors.

U.S. and Coalition military commanders are working with local townspeople to prioritize small reconstruction projects, thousands of

which are already completed and benefiting the local populace.

Coalition and Iraqi forces will continue to secure the infrastructure and expedite reconstruction. Opening the major airports in Iraq to commercial aviation will be an important step in returning to normalcy and bolstering economic activity.

As we transfer responsibilities to the Iraqis, it is important to continue to assist CPA's efforts to communicate effectively with the Iraqi people and others in the region to clarify our intentions, expose the brutality and hypocrisy of the enemy, publicize Iraq's successes, and generate hope. The establishment of media platforms, such as the Iraqi Media Network in Iraq and Al Hurra in the region are particularly promising because they provide alternatives to the often hostile regional media. We will continue to tell the story of our successes as well as report our setbacks.

We will continue to work closely with the U.S. diplomatic presence as we approach the Transfer of Authority (TOA) in Iraq. A new military headquarters in Iraq will focus on coordinating the counterinsurgency campaign, effecting close civil-military coordination, building Iraqi security capability, assisting with reconstruction efforts, and mentoring the nascent Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters and armed forces.

CENTCOM expects that violence will increase as Iraq moves to sovereignty. Mus'ab al-Zarqawi explains in his letter to Bin Laden that he thinks "zero hour must be at least four months before the new government gets into place. We are racing time." It is clear Zarqawi and others see this milestone as a major danger and intend to surge against it. The enemy fears a network of credible security forces deployed against them and has stepped up their targeting of police stations, recruiting centers, and key security leaders. The enemy will

certainly target critical infrastructure in its bid to undermine Iraqi legitimacy. Some of our adversaries will attempt to exacerbate ethnic tensions with the intent of sparking civil war by attacking important ethnic and religious leaders with a goal of causing mass casualties and media events to highlight their carnage.

The political process is moving with increased participation by Iraqis and the international community. The Security Forces continue to build at a brisk pace with no drop off in recruiting following recent terrorist attacks. Essential services are improving and in most cases exceed pre-war levels. Ethnic violence has been limited with major groups participating in the political process. While there is a possibility that civil war could break out, we currently believe the probability of such a conflict is low. We believe there are many more people working to keep Iraq together than to break it apart.

As those of you who have visited Iraq know, the performance of our Coalition servicemen and women is outstanding. They are accomplishing complex tasks under difficult and dangerous conditions. We now face a transitional period in Iraq as we prepare to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people. Key actions include defeating the insurgency, restructuring command and control to facilitate reconstruction and stabilization; building Iraqi security institutions; and completing one of the largest rotation of forces in recent times. While we remain optimistic about the road ahead, we cannot predict future force sizing and composition until the political situation concerning Iraqi sovereignty clarifies itself.

AFGHANISTAN

We currently have close to 13,800 coalition personnel deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. These forces, that

include nearly 12,000 U.S. personnel and 1,800 coalition personnel from eighteen nations, are commanded and controlled by the Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A). Every branch of the U.S. Armed Services is represented in this command. National Guard and Reserve components make up approximately 26% of our forces deployed there. Part of the CFC-A mission is to assure unity of effort with the U.S. Ambassador and country team in Kabul and manage the military-to-military relationship with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Combined Joint Task Force - 180 (CJTF-180) is a division level organization that exercises command over 11 separate task forces; including two coalition battalions and other support, medical, engineering, and training units. It also has special operations capabilities assigned from U.S. and Coalition nations.

The threat situation in Afghanistan remains relatively stable, although Al Qaida and Taliban elements continue to target President Karzai's government, Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), Coalition forces, ISAF, and International Organizations. This threat is composed of three groups. In the northeast and the Kabul regions, Al Qaida affiliated groups such as Hizb i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar pose a continued threat. In the southeast, tribal elements and Al Qaida continue their resistance to Afghan and Coalition forces. In the south, remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaida continue to operate out of the old Taliban strongholds in the Qandahar area. These groups make effective use of propaganda, maintaining just enough support to continue operating in Afghanistan. The enemy uses hit and run tactics inflicting casualties with small arms, grenades, IEDs, rockets, and suicide attacks.

We continue to share lessons learned between operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and apply counter-insurgency principles found effective in Iraq against Al Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. Once again we find the key to counterterrorism operations is the development of actionable intelligence and tying it to a flexible lethal response. In Afghanistan we are in the process of building similar HUMINT networks and communications architectures that have proved effective in Iraq. The construction of a Joint World Wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) network and a voice over internet protocol (VOIP) phone system will improve targeting capabilities. In many cases, intelligence is enabled by successful civilian and military operations that convince the local populations that the Karzai Government and the Coalition provide the best opportunity for a prosperous future. The key is visible reconstruction progress which gives people a hope for a better future. These critical shaping operations set the conditions to isolate our enemies from their base of support.

While our military operations over the past year have inflicted losses on Al Qaida and anti-coalition opposition forces, attacks such as the recent suicide bombings in Kabul remind us that our enemy is resilient and determined to disrupt upcoming elections as well as reconstruction efforts. Coalition and Afghan forces will continue to target and attack remaining pockets of Al Qaida and Afghan opposition fighters to remove them as a threat and promote stability throughout the country. Pakistan's cooperation has contributed to our success in this regard and our continued support to them will further improve their ability to disrupt the enemy's efforts to reorganize and conduct operations.

CFC-A continues to integrate U.S. and Coalition conventional, Special Operations Forces, Air Forces, Afghan National Army and Afghan Militia Forces into effective operations throughout the country. This year, NATO took an important role in Afghanistan by providing command and control for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF.) The 6,300 troops of the NATO-led ISAF are vital to establishing security in Kabul. NATO has recently taken charge of the Konduz Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and four adjacent provinces in the northeast. NATO is also preparing to further expand its reach across the north.

Coalition forces continue working closely with our Afghan allies and ISAF to maintain stability and strengthen the writ of the Kabul Government. The Afghan National Army (ANA), whose units continue to develop professionalism and gain operational experience, will support these efforts. Where deployed, the ANA has earned the trust and confidence of Afghan citizens. The growth of the ANA, along with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Afghan militias and the establishment of police forces, will ensure viable security sector reform.

There are approximately 8,900 Afghan National Army soldiers currently enlisted. The last battalion of the Central Corps is in training now and should complete training in mid-March, establishing three five-battalion brigades within the Central Corps. While fielded forces are the mainstay of any defense establishment, the headquarters and support organizations to organize, train, equip, and employ those forces must also be established.

A key to long term Afghan security self-sufficiency is to reform the Ministry of Defense and the Afghan General Staff from a Soviet-style bureaucracy to a modern professional armed force. By linking the

Ministry of Defense and General Staff structure to that of the Regional Commands, we will have the framework required to expand the reach of the central government throughout the country. This is an important element of our strategy to bring political reform to the regions outside Kabul that remain dominated by warlords.

Reconstruction remains vital to isolating our enemies and depriving them of their support base. Both NATO nations and nations in the OEF Coalition are sponsoring Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The purpose of the PRTs is to create enclaves where representatives from the Afghan Government, the international community and aid organizations can bring capability to the outlying regions. An extremely successful program, the number of PRTs recently jumped from eight to twelve with four more planned by summer. Additionally, twenty-nine nations are providing reconstruction support through financial and humanitarian assistance efforts. Central Command welcomes and will facilitate NATO's offer to expand its role in security and reconstruction. While NATO's focus is on manning PRTs and stabilizing large portions of the country, the U.S. led OEF Coalition conducts operations to assist the Afghan authorities in building a safe and secure environment to support reconstruction while continuing, as necessary, combat operations to defeat Al Qaida, the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces in Afghanistan.

With the recent success of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the Bonn process continues towards elections later this summer. We are preparing however, for a likely increase in violence during the final phase of this process as Al Qaida and Taliban work to prevent further gains by the legitimate government. There is evidence that the threat will step up attacks on key leadership, the Afghan Security Sector and interagency civilians supporting the mission. We are currently

focusing our intelligence on these threats and are fully prepared to preempt, prevent or respond to these events as we can. We expect force levels to remain relatively stable in the months ahead.

Horn of Africa

CENTCOM has steadily increased operational focus in the Horn of Africa and the surrounding maritime environment to identify the methods and means employed by international terrorist organizations and networks. There are currently over 1,200 Coalition personnel deployed in the Horn of Africa. Our operations there are commanded and controlled by Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which is located in Djibouti and supported at sea by Commander Task Force 150 (CTF-150), a Royal Navy Flag officer with 7 ships from 6 countries. The current emphasis of forces in this area is intelligence collection, developing interagency and international structures, conducting civil-military operations, and helping nations in the region build collective security structures. SOCCENT assets also provide important help in increasing regional counter-terrorist capabilities.

The Horn of Africa (HOA) sits astride the southern portion of one of the major sea-lines of communication that USCENTCOM must use to operate in the Arabian Gulf region. Threats to the stability of the region include: internal conflicts, border disputes, extreme poverty, and transnational terrorists. The consequences of war are easily magnified in this region because well over seventeen million people are at risk of starvation. People are being forced to leave their homes due to violence, the search for food, medical care, and safety. Many sub-Saharan African states have limited or unreliable internal security capabilities and this weakness makes them attractive venues for terrorist cells and criminal organizations. Terrorist organizations

seek to exploit the Horn's ungoverned areas to train recruits as well as plan and conduct operations against U.S. interests and those of our allies.

Nonetheless, we have partners in the region who are willing to fully cooperate in pursuit of a common goal. Djibouti has given extraordinary support for U.S. military basing, training, and counterterrorism operations including combined maritime interdiction of several terrorist associated dhows. Kenya, a leader in East African regional affairs, has also been a key ally in the War on Terror and has been instrumental in promoting and facilitating peace in Sudan and access to Somalia. Ethiopia, despite its very limited resources, is undertaking an ambitious program of security sector reform and is also committed to combating terrorism and countering extremism within its borders.

As a result of many of the challenging conditions prevailing in the Horn of Africa, our Theater Security Cooperation programs emphasize humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations. Additionally, there is an overarching emphasis on the development of regional security structures. CJTF-HOA's regional security arrangements and preventive humanitarian operations greatly enhance the ability of regional nations to improve their security posture.

Instability in the Horn is a long-term problem. Somalia is a failed state that transnational terrorists use as a transit point and safe haven. Sudan has suffered from continuous civil war for decades and remains a training and staging location for transnational terrorist organizations. Border tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain high with renewed conflict a possibility. Increased funding to reinforce security sector reform and counterterrorism activities in

Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and cautious engagements with Eritrea and Sudan will help us build on progress we have made in the past year.

In the Horn of Africa, our strategy aims to increase pressure on the terrorist networks established there, while at the same time, deterring migration of high-level Al Qaida who may seek sanctuary there. Central to this objective are Coalition efforts to enhance the nations' capability to detect and combat the terrorist threat. Bilateral agreements for intelligence exchanges and in-country intelligence officer training courses are valuable to both our HOA partners and us.

CJTF-HOA serves as a tangible sign of U.S. commitment to governments in the Horn of Africa. They are developing cooperative security arrangements and mitigating the cross-border seams exploited by terrorists. CJTF-HOA also provides an organizational model for the way ahead in the Global War on Terror where our long-term objective is to help nations help themselves.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION AND OTHER REGIONAL CONCERNS

USCENTCOM's security cooperation program paved the way for the essential basing, staging, and overflight rights supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom that augmented access to Diego Garcia granted by our staunchest ally, the United Kingdom. The Command continues to work and train with other nations as a normal course of our operations. In planning cooperative activities, we do so with the view that we must build relationships that promote U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nations' military capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with access and enroute infrastructure.

These ventures require expanded fiscal and political investment to keep them viable. The anticipated FY04 Foreign Military Financing allocation of \$2.15B will strengthen our relationships with Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan, strengthen the Afghan National Army, and improve our cooperation with other nations in the Central Region. Continued investment in security assistance improves the capabilities of friendly nations, enables them to provide for their own security and allows them to provide meaningful contributions to Coalition activities such as counterterrorism.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a cost-effective investment that positively shapes the future security environment by exposing foreign military officers and officials to U.S. practices and operations. This program provides foreign military members the opportunity to attend courses at U.S. military institutions such as Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service Schools. These students become familiar with congressionally mandated subjects such as U.S. concepts of military professionalism, respect for human rights, subordination to civilian authority, and U.S. democratic institutions and culture. A new Department of Defense appropriation, the Counterterrorism Fellowship, allows us to offer relevant courses to officers from key partners in the GWOT. The return on investment is large: international military officers who understand U.S. military values and institutions. The relationships built during fellowships advance international cooperation. Foreign Military Sales and IMET benefit the recipient as well as the United States. CENTCOM recommends continued funding for these effective programs. We should not underestimate the worth of our commitment to these programs; the Command will continue them as a matter of highest priority.

While our two most pressing priorities in the Area of Responsibility are the efforts to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan, the greatest danger may be growing extremist influence in nations such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Our Theater Security Cooperation program aims to support these nations' efforts to reinforce moderation and implement reforms designed to achieve long-term stability.

Pakistan

President Musharraf and Prime Minister Jamali are leading their country to resist extremism and we fully support their efforts to promote regional stability. Pakistan has played a key and essential role in both the GWOT and OEF. Recent diplomatic initiatives between Pakistan and India concerning control of the Kashmir area are encouraging. The presence of the terrorist threat, regional instability and nuclear weapons makes Pakistan a country with which we need to remain heavily engaged.

President Musharraf has made great strides in curtailing the influence of terrorists within his nation and the Pakistani Army has become more effective along the Afghan border. Pakistan faces unique challenges in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where many Al Qaida and Taliban leaders and forces settled following major combat operations in Afghanistan. President Musharraf has begun a long term strategy to engage the tribal leaders in these areas. He is offering them access to government resources if they purge the terrorists from their area of control, but at the same time, he is prepared to take military action against those found non-compliant. We are supporting these efforts through increased intelligence sharing and security

assistance while improving operational coordination between CFC-Afghanistan and the Pakistani military. We also conduct regular meetings between Afghan, Pakistani and U.S. Military leaders to promote transparency and cooperation between governments along the border.

Pakistan has been a steadfast partner of the U.S. since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, providing a wide range of access, basing and overflight support for operations in Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan played an important and active role in the capture of Al Qaida leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. In return, we are conducting a full range of engagement activities with them to include military to military contacts, bilateral exercises, and training programs. Pakistani officers attend the Command and Staff and War Colleges of all four armed services and in turn, a select number of our officers attend their institutions.

The U.S. strategic relationship with Pakistan has been difficult over time, but a stable and moderate Pakistan capable and willing to fight terrorism is in the U.S.'s best interest. Ensuring a positive outcome in Pakistan requires us to stay engaged.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Recent attacks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have convinced Saudi leaders of the direct nature of the threats to the Royal Family and the government. Saudi Arabia is a major battleground in the Global War on Terror because of the presence of Al Qaida, their sympathizers and significant resources. Saudi Arabian security forces have vigorously pursued terrorists inside the Kingdom, killing or capturing hundreds of Al Qaida. The Saudis have also made inroads against terrorist finances and infrastructure, but there is more to be done.

Our engagement activities in Saudi Arabia are long-standing. The U.S. Military Training Mission has worked bilateral training and support issues for years. We intend to build upon our long relationship of good will and mutual support with the Saudi Arabian military and do all we can to reinforce Saudi efforts to defeat terrorist organizations and promote stability.

Other Arabian Gulf States and Yemen

The Arabian Gulf states are valued partners in the Global War on Terror. Our operations in the region would not be possible without support from states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman. The support provided includes overflight rights, base and port access, and staging rights. Kuwait has been host to the Combined Forces Land Component Command Forward Headquarters and our forces operating in the region. Bahrain is the home of the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and Fifth Fleet. Qatar hosts USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters and the CENTAF/9th Air Force Combined Air Operations Center. All members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) support important humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. All are donors to Afghan and Iraqi reconstruction efforts.

In return, we continue to work closely with our Gulf partners in a variety of forums. We work with them in everything from bilateral and multilateral exercises to regional conferences and academic seminars. Officers from these countries are familiar sights at our military colleges and training centers. Our recent efforts with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provide a concrete example of the benefits of cooperation. The UAE has developed the Gulf Air Warfare Center in Abu Dhabi, a state of the art facility modeled after the U.S. Air Force's Air Warfare Center. This facility will promote regional

cooperation and combat effectiveness by hosting academic and flying courses attended by all of the GCC, as well as European allies.

Theater security cooperation with the Gulf States remains important because we will continue to require access to the region and because the threat to these states from terrorism remains extremely high. Yemen's porous land and sea borders and loosely-controlled tribal areas provide opportunities for terrorists to transit, support, and supply their networks. CENTCOM engagement with Yemen is focused on improving their counterterrorism capabilities. SOF training of their counter-terrorism force has measurably improved their capabilities and confidence, resulting in direct action operations that have disrupted foreign fighters and facilitators that previously viewed Yemen as a safe haven. Their recent cooperation with Saudi Arabia to gain control over cross-border smuggling of arms, explosives, and personnel has great potential. Although Oman remains concerned about illegal sea-borne immigration from South Asia and the possibility that terrorists may enter their country with economic refugees, it lacks the fiscal resources to adequately upgrade its military forces. Continued U.S. support to Oman will make the region less hospitable to terrorists.

Egypt

The Arab Republic of Egypt continues to be a strong partner member and ally in the Global War on Terrorism. Egypt's increase of overflight rights and Suez Canal transits were vital to our coalition victories in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Egypt has donated over 60 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghan reconstruction and arms and ammunition to the new Afghan National Army. They deployed a field hospital to Afghanistan where it has treated over 13,000 patients

and contributed demonstrably in achieving the goal of restoring Afghanistan's medical infrastructure to operational levels.

The U.S. has maintained close military relations with Egypt since the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979. Although Bright Star 2003 was cancelled due to operational constraints, we remain engaged with the Egyptians on major regional events and future Bright Star exercises. Egypt's leadership role in the Arab world is important to reinforcing moderation and enhancing stability in the region.

Our Security Assistance mission to Egypt is one of our largest and its objective is to assist Egypt to modernize all branches of their armed forces. Annually, we provide \$1.3 billion for the procurement of U.S. manufactured weapons systems and support. These include the Patriot PAC 3, Avenger, Stinger Block 1, extended range MLRS, etc. over the next five years. To date, 755 M1A1 tanks have been manufactured at the Egyptian Tank plant. In addition, the U.S. provides \$1.2m annually for the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). Graduates of the IMET program are now rising to senior positions in the chain of command. Finally, in an effort to increase their regional Coalition capabilities, Egypt's MOD is building a 600-bed International Medical Center with national funds, while our FMF funding is providing medical equipment, furnishings, and training to train over 138 doctors and seventy nurses, at a cost of \$132 million. Egypt continues to prove itself a key ally, supporting both OEF and OIF operations.

Jordan

Jordan is a stable country within a very dynamic region. The Israeli/Palestinian situation, the Iraq conflict and the war on terror all impact Jordan's geopolitical climate. King Abdullah II supports a very strong military relationship with the United States. His active

support for the Coalition's efforts during OEF and OIF is essential to our success. Jordan deployed a key demining capability to Afghanistan that allowed the coalition to quickly set up air operations at Bagram airfield. They deployed and still maintain a field hospital in Mazar e Sharif that has provided medical care to over 234,000 Afghans since the end of hostilities. Their current effort of training Iraqi Police is a major component of the coalition plan to improve security in Iraq.

Our economic and military aid programs are appreciated by the Government of Jordan and are key elements of their defense plans. We have no better regional partner on counterterrorism and will continue to work closely with this important ally through combined training exercises, military exchanges, coalition deployments and a robust Military Assistance Program.

Central Asian States

Our continuing engagement with these states addresses significant sources of instability in the region. Our partnership with these nations focuses on developing counterterrorism and counter narcotics capabilities, improving border security, and enhancing the professionalization of their military forces. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, for example, have undertaken programs of military reform designed to increase the professionalism of their armed forces. We will continue to foster security sector reform, encourage regional cooperation, and seek their constructive involvement in our effort to stabilize Afghanistan.

It is clear that our relationship is mutually beneficial. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan provide key access and overflight rights necessary to support operations in Afghanistan. The government of Uzbekistan has provided

access to Karshi-Khanabad Airfield at no cost to U.S. forces.

Kyrgyzstan also provides U.S. basing at Manas. Tajikistan formally offered a battalion of troops and other elements to participate in peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan in January of this year.

Kazakhstan has provided engineering troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Our engagement in this region supports the efforts of these nations as they move forward from their Soviet pasts. Military-to-military contacts and educational opportunities provided under IMET can enhance the reform programs that are in place. Through bilateral and multilateral exercises, we will develop greater interoperability and provide a positive example of a professional force subordinated to legitimate civilian authority.

The Central Asian States continue to struggle with reform and enterprise, while their people clearly desire to participate in the growing prosperity enjoyed by other former Soviet countries. The risks associated with failure of these states include regional instability, drug trafficking, smuggling and safe haven for terrorists. Our security cooperation efforts aim to improve border control and enhance counterterrorism capabilities. Al Qaida, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other extremist groups are active in Central Asia. Continued regional cooperation is essential to confront extremist groups in the area.

Iran

Our recent action to provide disaster relief to the victims of the earthquake in Bam, Iran provided the Iranian people a more accurate picture of the American character and demonstrates our commitment to reducing human suffering. The political situation in Iran remains complex. Tension is deepening between moderates who desire a greater

voice in politics and the hard-line religious Mullahs who control the security forces and the mechanisms of political power.

Iran has multiple centers of power and its closed society makes assessing their national intentions difficult. We will watch Iran carefully to try to prevent any destabilizing activities that could complicate our efforts and contribute to internal Iraqi frictions. We will continue to deter Iranian support of terrorism. Iran is also central to our counter proliferation planning and nonproliferation efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed Iran's clandestine nuclear activities and continues its oversight to demand compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

While generally thought to be built for defense, Iran continues to build a credible military capable of power projection within the region. It has the largest military capability in the region and has a record of aggressive military action in and around the Arabian Gulf.

Iran's military force is the primary threat to the free flow of oil from the Gulf region. Their forces include a Navy of small attack boats carrying torpedoes and missiles that are well suited for the restricted confines of the Strait of Hormuz. A new generation of indigenously produced anti-ship cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles threaten both oil infrastructure and shipping. It is important for us to maintain reconnaissance capabilities to monitor these forces. To counter this threat our Global Naval Force Presence Policy ensures a robust carrier strike group and expeditionary strike group presence that demonstrates our commitment to unrestricted international access to the Gulf's resources.

Iran's Revolutionary Guard Force and Intelligence Service (MOIS) are very active throughout the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While Iranian interests have not favored active sponsorship of

anti-U.S. activity in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is clear that Iranian sponsored groups, backed by their intelligence services could create difficulties in both countries.

Joint Warfighting

During Operation Iraqi Freedom our forces advanced the art of Joint Warfighting and built upon the experience we gained in Operation Enduring Freedom approximately one year earlier. Coalition forces struck the enemy at multiple points simultaneously while the main attack covered over 300 miles in 22 days. The result was the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime and the defeat of an opposing force of 28 divisions. Coalition land- and carrier-based air forces achieved total air superiority from the outset, disrupting Iraqi command and control networks, shattering air defenses, and preventing the assembly of large ground formations. Coalition army and naval forces opened waterways into Iraq, allowing for the delivery of humanitarian goods while major combat operations were ongoing. Additionally, Special Operations Forces operated throughout Iraq and seized control of Western Iraq almost in its entirety.

Air, conventional ground forces, and Special Operating Forces continue to demonstrate an unprecedented degree of agility, fight aggressively under uncertain counter-insurgency conditions and retain the initiative in all areas of the battlespace. Recent technological advances do not remove the fog, friction, or uncertainty of war. Combined and Joint teams operating at low levels dominate the enemy in every engagement and with proper intelligence, unravel terrorist cell structures. Operations in the movement phase of OIF represented a shift from Joint "deconfliction" to near full Combined and Joint integration. That integration continues in Iraq under the current

conditions of combat. During Operation Sweeney in October 2003 through January 2004, for example, a British division commanded a large anti-smuggling effort that brought together British air and ground forces, U.S. naval forces, and a Marine Expeditionary unit (MEU). Significant operational coordination achieved by special operations, air and conventional ground forces in finding, fixing, and finishing insurgent cells and key leaders has resulted in considerable success. This Joint integration at low intensity conflict operations is unprecedented.

PROPOSED BASING STRATEGIC

CENTCOM's strategic basing plan is being developed in conjunction with other combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to ensure that it complements the basing strategies of adjoining combatant commands and supports the overall Global Basing Strategy. CENTCOM's basing strategy will complement the overall Global Basing Strategy by positioning key capabilities throughout the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to enable a rapid and flexible response for the execution of major combat operations in support of the Global War on Terror.

Host nation support is key to CENTCOM's basing strategy. As such, site selection is made considering the improvement of host nation capabilities while avoiding the incitement of anti-American sentiment

CENTCOM's strategic plan for basing calls for Forward Operating Sites (FOS), Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) and the contingency use of ports and airfields throughout the AOR. These infrastructure sites have been identified to assure U.S. access to enable the projection and sustainment of forces within the AOR.

THEATER MANNING

While our strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan involves turning security responsibilities over to indigenous forces, this strategy takes time to implement and our forces will have to remain engaged in both countries for a considerable amount of time. Trained forces in depth will prove critical to sustaining those efforts, conducting operations in support of the Global War on Terror, continuing theater security cooperation activities, and maintaining sufficient reserves to deter other potential adversaries. Because our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq involve counter-insurgency operations in complex urban terrain as well as the need to employ dispersed forces across wide areas, there are great needs for infantry, reconnaissance troops, military police, rotary wing aviation, human intelligence, translators, interrogators, and civil affairs teams.

Counter-insurgency operations and high value target (HVT) hunting creates a near insatiable demand for human intelligence (HUMINT) resources. We need to expand our HUMINT forces (case officers, linguists, analysts, and interrogators), provide them with proper training, and build rewarding professional career paths to foster retention. Interrogators have proven to be a critical path for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and throughout the CENTCOM AOR. These skills are required from the tactical level to the strategic level. As our work to secure national stability in Afghanistan and Iraq matures, counterintelligence skills are another high demand low density asset to train for the future.

We must invest in greater culturally literate HUMINT capabilities across the services and build networks that only provide discrete target information, but also help us anticipate enemy actions. We need more linguists who are fluent in Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, Dari, Urdu, Somali, and Swahili. Civil affairs personnel, interagency planning

experts, and psychological operations specialists are also in short supply. We must continue to invest in the recruitment and training of such skilled people.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated high demand for other specialties. These include law enforcement specialists knowledgeable in international law and able to teach professional, high level policing skills such as criminal investigation techniques. Hundreds of thousands of tons of unexploded ordnance left over from decades of strife have spiked our demand for explosive ordnance disposal specialists who are also trained in techniques to counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Because we are planning multiple complex operations simultaneously, we need more strategic field grade plans officers capable of conceptualizing theater strategy and are conversant in Coalition and interagency operations. Information technology managers and systems programmers, and web system and database designers are needed to manage the large database and command and control structures we are employing to prosecute the GWOT and conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition to our conventional force requirements, we see a continued high demand for Special Operations Forces (SOF) throughout the CENTCOM AOR. SOF reconnaissance, deep insertion and surveillance assets, and aviation crews remain in great demand. SOF's capability to train, mentor, and operate with host nation forces is especially important in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the AOR.

We are grateful for the initiatives to fund incentives and quality of life programs to compensate and provide respite for those deployed for extended periods. The highly successful Rest and Recuperation Leave and Fighter Management Pass programs are boosting morale and increasing effectiveness. The expansion of Tactical Field

Exchanges in Iraq and Afghanistan are important tools to sustain morale. Exchanges provide necessary important comfort items and are the sole source of phone services for our troops. Other programs that are important to sustain the high morale of our forces under demanding conditions include Armed Forces Entertainment, compensation and entitlement initiatives, and the Child Care and Family Child Care Subsidy Programs. We applaud the Department of Defense expansion of the Military One Source initiative and feel it is an effective complement to existing Service Family Support Center programs. The servicemen and women serving in the CENTCOM AOR appreciate the continued Congressional concern for supporting programs that encourage reenlistment and officer retention. As always, our people remain the principal source of our strength.

CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS

The missions in Afghanistan and Iraq have identified three key enablers that we rely upon; strategic lift, intelligence, and force protection. Our lack of in-theater infrastructure and assigned forces makes us dependent on strategic lift. Ongoing operations are creating unprecedented demands for fused intelligence across the entire force and we are improving every day. The insurgency tactics we are encountering put a heavy emphasis on organic force protection.

Strategic air and sealift continues to enable our success. Once stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are completed, CENTCOM will be an active theater with a relatively small expeditionary footprint in the region. This means that CENTCOM will remain heavily dependent on pre-positioned equipment and agile forces to respond to contingencies. Adequate sealift and sea-basing capabilities in

conjunction with our strategic air assets are absolutely vital to military success in our area of operations.

Much has been done to develop common databases and an overarching intelligence architecture that permits common access and dissemination to all echelons. These efforts ensure effective collaboration across the intelligence community. However, just as important to this effort is a continuous, unimpeded flow of intelligence. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have proven their value, and we must continue to expand their capabilities and integrate them into our intelligence networks. The requirement for more full motion video (FMV) and infrared (IR) Video is an enabler at all levels of command. Once exposed to the revolutionary capabilities they provide, no commander wants to fight without them. The ability to see the enemy day or night and respond to his defenses and activities before making contact is changing tactical doctrine, especially in urban scenarios.

CENTCOM has built a redundant ISR network integrating strategic, theater and tactical systems, but persistent surveillance is essential to maintaining situational awareness during Joint operations. Increasing the number of UAV systems, signals intelligence systems, and expediting the airborne common sensor program will improve our persistent surveillance capability. This capability can be further enhanced by expanding our capacity to fly more Predator UAVs simultaneously in our theater and by adding qualified linguists aboard signals intelligence aircraft. Improved sensors both on the ground and airborne will help distinguish between enemy and indigenous populations.

We should recognize from our experiences in OEF and OIF, however, that we will not be able to achieve anything close to near-certainty in high intensity combat or counterinsurgency operations because enemy

countermeasures and knowledge of enemy intentions lie beyond the reach of even the most sophisticated technologies.

The requirement for Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to protect our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan remains high. Due mainly to the development of the IED as the enemy's weapon of choice, our requirement for armored HMMWVs has steadily increased from 235 in May 2003 to 4,388 in February 2004. We currently have 2,178 in theater now or 50% of the current requirement. The Joint Staff, Services, and other Combatant Commanders are currently redistributing worldwide stocks of Up-Armored HMMWVs. Funds that you provided in the Emergency Supplemental increased production from 78 per month in October 2003 to 148 per month in February 2004 and will further increase to 220 per month by May 2004. Accelerated production and redistribution should allow current requirements to be met by December 2004.

OIF forces initially deployed with a combination of old Flak vests and the new Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The Defense Logistics Agency and Army managed production and distribution of the new IBA, which is composed of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and Small Arms Protection Inserts (SAPI). 100% of U.S. forces in Iraq now have the full IBA. 100% of U.S. forces in Afghanistan have the new OTV and 86% have SAPI plates. The remainder of the soldiers in Afghanistan will be issued SAPI plates by the middle of March.

Military Construction (MILCON)

CENTCOM's basing strategy supports the Command's vision and mission by establishing bases and facilities that support operational and strategic needs throughout the region. Ongoing operations in support of the GWOT and Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom have

increased our basing footprint for the near term; primarily operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. To meet these requirements, Components have already submitted contingency construction requirements totaling some \$531M through CENTCOM and their component channels, for Joint Staff, OSD and Congressional consideration.

Your continued funding support for MILCON provides needed infrastructure and facilities required to prosecute Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terror. Between the FY04 Appropriation and the FY04 Supplemental, Congress authorized a total of \$340.5 million in MILCON for projects in the CENTCOM AOR. However, additional contingency requirements continually emerge. CENTCOM has prioritized another 44 projects at an estimated cost of \$531 million in urgent, unfunded contingency construction requirements. We submitted these requests to the Joint Staff in January 2004. We expect that other requirements will emerge due to changes in the situation, new missions, and the evolution of our basing strategy. Your support for these requests is important to our ability to sustain operations in the theater.

Funding Priorities

Research and Development Funding - Over \$335M was appropriated to address key force protection shortfalls and over \$70M will fund research and development efforts to address some of the asymmetric problems our soldiers are facing, such as IEDs. DoD has established a counter-IED task force that will review, test, and field promising counter-IED technology to our forces. This effort is already bearing fruit.

Command and Control Infrastructure - Our ability to fight and win throughout our theater of operations relies heavily on a robust, reliable Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) network.

Great progress is being made in enhancing our theater-wide C4 infrastructure, due in large measure to supplemental funds approved for commercialization of our tactical communications resources. The nature of the GWOT, particularly counter-insurgency operations in our theater, however, places significant demands for collection and dissemination of intelligence products and information throughout all components, Joint Task Forces (JTFs), tactical units, and Coalition partners. While we continue to pursue the resources necessary to meet these requirements, the ability to distribute intelligence to all the places remains our single biggest C4 challenge. Continued support of communications initiatives will ensure necessary capability to meet today and future requirements.

Theater Logistics Support - CENTCOM's logistical difficulties stem mainly from limited infrastructure. We place high demand on strategic airlift and sealift; we lack the ability to provide in-transit visibility (ITV) on supplies; we need improvements in the tactical distribution of petroleum products and other goods via military trucks or pipeline. MILCON investments throughout our theater will improve through-put and force projection capabilities.

Legislative Authority Changes

Congress has been generous in providing CENTCOM with greater fiscal flexibility to support nations that provide us with access or assist our efforts. One such example is the Commander's Emergency Response Program with Appropriated Funds (CERP-APF). This program is seen by the commanders in the field as an essential enabler. CERP-APF allows the commanders to seek and satisfy the immediate needs of the local population and demonstrate to the public our commitment to helping them. We seek your continued support for this authority.

Concerns

CENTCOM has been constrained in its support to nations that provide us with access or assist our efforts. Specific concerns include:

Inability to use OMA funds to

- Upgrade permanent facilities.
- Pay for intra and inter-theater airlift transportation for Coalition personnel and material, including medical evacuation.
- Support and sustain the Afghan security forces and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
- Pay travel expenses of foreign military officer involved in Coalition planning or operations while temporarily assigned to CENTCOM.

Difficulty in facilitating Coalition contributions to the GWOT, Combatant, Combined Forces, or Joint Task Force Commanders because of the inability to effect bailment or custodial transfer of United States military equipment to Coalition forces for cooperative operations.

CONCLUSION

The United States Central Command is fully committed to the defeat of transnational terrorism and the creation of secure and stable environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will continually reassess the situation and improve our effectiveness against the enemy. Our command and control restructuring, including the establishment of CFC-Iraq and CFC-Afghanistan, will improve the integration of our operations with interagency efforts and those of our Coalition partners while

permitting the Central Command headquarters to maintain a holistic view of the theater and direct the full range of our activities. Our staff will remain forward in Qatar extensively, especially during this period of multiple transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Eventually, the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters will move to Al Udeid Airfield from Camp As Sayliyah in Qatar. That move will increase our efficiency and allow us to reconstitute our mobile headquarters capability for other contingencies.

The most important person in our theater of operations is the Soldier, Sailor, Marine, or Airmen on patrol in the middle of the night. We are committed to providing our troops and our Coalition partners the resources they need to accomplish the mission. I would like to acknowledge the courage and dedication of our Coalition troops and especially those Afghans and Iraqis who have joined us to win a peaceful and prosperous future for their children. We are committed to doing all we can to support them. We and our Coalition partners will prevail in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Global War on Terror because of the efforts of our servicemen and women and because we offer a positive vision and hope for the future.

I want to thank this committee for your support to our Command and our servicemen and women and also for your oversight of the vital operations we are undertaking.