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STATEMENT
OF
REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN
RANKING MEMBER, HOUSE INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON TERRORISM
SEPTEMBER
5, 2002
Counterterrorism
Intelligence Capabilities and Performance
prior to 9/11
It
is good to be back with my colleagues on the
Armed Services Committee, where I used to
serve.
The
report is designed to give good people better
tools - more resources, access to watch
lists, digital technologies, advanced
platforms, better language training and career
support.
My
formal statement, which I believe you have,
gives a detailed summary of the
Subcommittee's findings and recommendations
for the NSA and FBI.
I
will focus here on the issues of the most
relevance to this panel.
First,
let me note that this report is filled with
specific findings and recommendations to
improve the performance of these intelligence
agencies.
So was the report of the Bremer
Commission, on which I served for two years.
So are the reports of the Gilmore
Commission, which this committee has
authorized.
The
recommendations of those reports have almost
all been ignored.
I would suggest that it is up to our
committees to make sure that the good work
that went into this report does not meet the
same fate.
The
intelligence community has implemented two
recommendations, as Congressman Chambliss
noted in his statement.
·
Recruiting
guidelines. The CIA formally
rescinded the 1995 recruiting guidelines just
after the release of the subcommittee report.
This rescission was also part of the
FY02 Intelligence Authorization before that.
·
Language.
In response to the subcommittee's finding on
languages (which echoed previous committee
documents and the Bremer Commission), the IC
is taking a look across all agencies for
language improvements.
Steps include pushing to ensure higher
language proficiencies in the needed languages
in their new hires, looking at IT solutions to
help automate translation where possible, and
beefing up language offerings at the
newly-installed CIA university.
HPSCI
has pushed for some additional
language-related fixes in the FY03
authorization.
One unclassified program is support for
the National Security Education Program,
providing $10M additional annual funding for a
new Flagship Language Initiative that supports
the best universities at teaching key
languages such as Arabic and Farsi, and
creating stronger service opportunities in
intelligence jobs for NSEP students after
their language and cultural training.
Much
of the language capabilities for the
intelligence community are part of the
military.
I urge this panel to continue to
support language training resources, and to
explore ways to increase utilization of these
resources to intelligence personnel where
possible.
FBI
The
Subcommittee's principal finding for the
FBI, in fact the most important finding in the
report, was the need to share information
better.
Your
committee is familiar with bureaucratic
stovepipes and fiefdoms that prevent effective
sharing of information.
The same problems exist in the
intelligence community, and especially
internally in the FBI.
We
recommend improvements in culture,
organization, and information technology.
Also,
as recent press coverage has indicated, there
has been high turnover in counterterrorism
leadership at FBI this summer, partly a result
of the grueling pace they've faced in
dealing with the terrorist threat.
FBI agents have shown incredible
dedication but had weak counterterrorism tools
at their disposal.
We
need to demand that their successors push even
harder to make the changes necessary to fight
terrorism.
This turnover is a window of
opportunity to implement the wide range of
changes necessary to enhance the FBI's
prevention mission - improve intelligence
collection, improve analysis, change the
culture of sharing information horizontally
and vertically, and build new information
technology architecture to support these new
priorities.
NSA
Most
importantly, the culture of NSA must change
from that of a "gatherer" of information
to a "hunter." There is simply too much
information out there. The challenge is to go
after the information that will be useful.
The
National Security Agency has the enormous task
of monitoring communications and other signals
intelligence (SIGINT).
More than human intelligence at the CIA
or investigations at the FBI, these NSA
responsibilities have expanded extensively due
to modern information technology and
telecommunications.
Al
Qa'ida is digital - existing in disparate
cells and planning attacks using the Internet
and disposable cell phones.
The NSA must counter this technology
with better technology of its own.
Our report recommends improvements to
the acquisition and use of such technology.
As
the Department of Defense and armed forces
develop improved communications capabilities,
both of our committees should ensure similar
advances at the NSA.
Homeland
Security
Beyond
these findings in the report, I want to
address the Department of Homeland Security
and some related issues.
Of
special interest to the Armed Services
Committee - how will the Department of
Homeland Security interact with the Pentagon,
in particular with the Northern Command and
National Guard?
Coordinating
these forces will be absolutely critical for
success in the war against terrorism, which I
would call the war of our future.
The troops and weapons look different,
but homeland security is the national security
of today and tomorrow.
The
House version of the Homeland Security bill
included the creation of a Homeland Security
Council in the White House, patterned on the
National Security Council, to make sure this
coordination occurs.
Your
experience with the NSC will prove invaluable
to making the HSC work, and your support for
this concept in the Senate debate and
conference is critical to passing the right
organization.
Secondly,
the private sector has a different role in
homeland security than in military
applications.
All the big defense contractors, many
of whom have facilities in my district, now
have entire homeland security divisions.
This is where government funds are, and
this is where their unique capabilities and
resources are sorely needed.
I
would add that these companies will have much
to contribute to homeland security by virtue
of their defense background. Conversely, they will have more to add to military matters by
virtue of their work in homeland security.
These
companies are now looking for the right ways
to get involved in homeland security, and
finding no entrance to the federal government.
There is no equivalent to a Pentagon
office for acquiring new technologies for
chemical detection or biological antidote.
The
Department of Homeland Security bill passed by
the House and pending in the Senate both have
language creating a "clearinghouse" for
homeland security technologies.
This front door to the department for
private companies to demonstrate products and
identify the right federal procurers.
It is based in concept on the DoD
Technical Support Working Group.
Other
lessons for homeland security derived from the
military include chain of command,
interoperable communications, and situational
awareness.
There
is a great deal of shared interest in our
committees in homeland security, and we need
to overcome turf concerns to do homeland
security right.
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