

DUNCAN HUNTER
520 DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MILITARY READINESS



U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0552

2266 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0552
1202) 225-8672
FAX: (202) 225-0295
366 SOUTH PIERCE STREET
EL CAJON, CA 92020
1819) 579-3001
1181 AIRPORT ROAD, SUITE G
IMPERIAL, CA 92251
1706) 362-6428

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 19, 1999

CONTACT: Maureen Cragin
Ryan Vaart
(202) 225-2539

**STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE DUNCAN HUNTER
CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARING ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM KOSOVO CONFLICT**

Last week the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on the results of their Operation Allied Force “Quick Look” After Action Review. This review was initiated “to determine those most critical lessons learned...to include recommendations on how to fix the problems or sustain those initiatives we want to preserve.” It was a major collaborative undertaking throughout the Department—involving the Commanders-in-Chief, the Services, the Defense Agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff—but, according to the Department, was not intended to be an end-to-end assessment of the Kosovo campaign but rather the basis for further detailed analyses leading to the preparation of a follow-on final report.

This final report will likely be used to prepare two other Congressionally-mandated reports on the successes and deficiencies of the operation. The first such report is directed by Section 1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and the other by Section 8125 of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Both reports are to be submitted not later than January 31, 2000. These reports are to cover all aspects of Operation Allied Force—ranging from its impact on the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars to the conduct of joint/combined operations...and from the performance of U.S. military equipment in the conflict to adjustments that need to be made to forthcoming budgets and specific programs to redress any deficiencies identified.

Today’s hearing will focus on these last two topics and on the question of whether or not a disconnect exists between DOD’s future modernization plans and the kinds of equipment in demand in Allied Force. I recognize that it comes early in the cycle of our normal committee business, but I thought it would be useful to get “out front” of the process—especially since the Secretary and the Chairman did not testify on the “Quick Look” before this committee.

Before I turn my attention to the business at hand, I would like to state for the record the deep appreciation and respect every Member of this subcommittee feels for the men and women who serve their country in the armed forces—and especially to those who participated in the Kosovo conflict. Although this was a NATO-led campaign, it could not have been won without the contributions of the U.S. warfighters—be they soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines. Just listen to these statistics:

(More)

- **Over 640 U.S. aircraft employed from 24 bases**
- **38,000 combat sorties flown in 78 days of round-the-clock operations**
- **25,000 bombs dropped**
- **Almost 8,500 precision guided munitions used**
- **Over 300 cruise missiles launched**

and, most importantly,

- **ZERO aircrews lost**

IMPRESSIVE to say the very least. I would therefore like to thank the witnesses, as representatives of all the men and women who wear the uniform, for their outstanding performance in this Operation. God bless all of you.

There are several topics I would like to address this morning, and each is covered in the background memorandum the staff has prepared for the hearing. I'll mention a few at the outset here, but we'll discuss all of them, as well as others.

- (1) **Precision munitions:** Are our inventories sufficient? Are current platforms with improved smart weapons good enough to maintain the U.S.'s position as the predominant world power into the 21st century?
- (2) **Mission capable rates:** How did the Kosovo campaign affect fleet-wide rates and the rates of the non-deploying forces, who would have been called upon to fight a major theater war had one occurred at the same time? What is the general trend in these rates and what can be done to improve it?
- (3) **Low Density/High Demand assets:** According to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, "low density assets were absolutely in **high** demand. We can't leave home without them...and without them we can't leave home." Specifically, he was referring to electronic warfare aircraft, such as the EA-6B; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, such as the U-2, the RC-135 Rivet Joint, the E-3 AWACS, the E-8 Joint STARS, and the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle; and the long-range, penetrating B-2 bomber. Is the demand for these platforms only going to get higher? Should we be buying more of them?
- (4) **Task Force Hawk:** By all counts, the deployment of Apache attack helicopters and their associated protection equipment to Albania was not among the Operation's highlights. There were doctrine and training problems as well as hardware problems. What hardware deficiencies were exposed by this experience? Why weren't the more capable Apache Longbow models deployed? What lessons, if any, from Task Force Hawk were taken into account in the Army's new strategic vision?
- (5) **Strategic lift:** Despite having completed TWO Mobility Requirements Studies since Desert Storm, an Operation Allied Force-like contingency was not part of the Department's current plans for moving forces to major theater wars, and the rapidly evolving requirements of the conflict strained its ability to quickly develop plans that utilized its lift assets efficiently. Consequently, strategic airlift was heavily relied upon to deploy forces to the theater, and strategic sealift was used sparingly. What are the implications of this situation?

(MORE)

With us today to address these and other questions are:

Lt. General Larry R. Ellis
Deputy Chief of Staff
Operations & Plans
Department of the Army

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments
Department of the Navy

Lt. General Marvin R. Esmond
Deputy Chief of Staff
Air & Space Operations
Department of the Air Force

Lt. General John E. Rhodes
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command

###