“The hearing will come to order. Today the subcommittee meets to receive testimony from Navy and Marine Corps officials on their aviation programs contained in the fiscal year ’10 budget request.  Today we have with us: Vice Admiral Architzel, serving as principal military deputy to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Stackley for Navy and Marine Corps research, development and acquisition programs; Lieutenant General Trautman, serving as deputy Commandant for Marine Corps aviation programs; and, Rear Admiral Myers, serving as the director for integration of all Naval Warfare programs. Gentlemen, thank you for taking time out of your busy schedules to be with us.

 “Much like the Department’s shipbuilding programs, aviation programs of the Navy and Marine Corps are not without issues.  The most apparent issue is the amount of the budget request and the number of aircraft requested. The aviation budget request for this year is $4.6 billion dollars greater than last year’s plan for fiscal year 2010, but the overall quantity of planned aircraft purchases has decreased by 20.  Very similar to shipbuilding, the amount of funding requested has steadily gone up, but the quantity of aircraft purchased has steadily declined. 

 “I’d like to outline the program and policy issues that, at a minimum, I would like our witnesses to address.

 “First, the primary policy issue I would like to address is that of the strike fighter inventory for the Navy and Marine Corps.  Over the last three years, all four congressional defense committees have had a steady stream of Navy and Marine Corps witnesses testify before them about an impending strike-fighter shortfall.  This shortfall is predicted to peak in the middle of the next decade. 

 “Right now, current analysis puts that peak at 243 aircraft in fiscal year 2018, but if you account for the accepted risk that each service has informed Congress that they are currently incurring, the peak shortage of aircraft climbs to 312 in that same year.  What is more troubling is that it appears there is a disconnect between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of the Navy. 

 “Officials from OSD have recently briefed this committee that there is no strike fighter shortfall but that the totality of the strike fighter inventory is a matter for analysis in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  In other words, OSD has already predetermined the answer and now they’ll use the QDR to build the equation. 

 “I request that the witnesses explain today what the position of the Department of the Navy is regarding the strike fighter shortfall and if they are aware of any new analysis by the Joint Staff or OSD which would contradict what is apparently simple arithmetic. Because, the last time I checked, an aircraft carrier is only worth its weight in gold if it has an embarked air wing.  Otherwise, 90,000 tons of American sovereignty becomes 90,000 tons of American helicopter transportation. 

 “Next, there are a number of programs, and I know that we may not have time to discuss all of them here today, that are of high-interest to members of this subcommittee.

 “The first program is the F-18 Super Hornet which ties directly in with the strike fighter inventory discussion, but what I would like to understand is why the Navy reduced its program request by nine Super Hornets in fiscal year 2010 over the predicted request in last year’s budget. 

 “It’s our understanding that the program is executing very well, on cost target and on schedule. Yet with the Super Hornet line executing well, the Navy and Marine Corps have opted to increase their fiscal year ’10 buy of Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft by two, at an estimated cost of $236 million each. 

 “I know that the Department prefers the advantages of stealth, but given the high-risk and high concurrency regarding the development, testing and production of the F-35, we need to understand at what point that putting combat-proven ‘rubber-on-the-ramp’ Super Hornets is more advantageous than waiting for an experimental aircraft that is behind its original schedule by more than two years, over its original program budget estimate by more than $65 billion dollars, and has already reduced its planned inventory quantity by more than 400 aircraft. 

 “The GAO has noted in its most recent F-35 report to Congress that the program office estimates an additional $2.4 billion is needed to cover cost overruns on the air system and engine contracts and to incorporate the one-year extension to the development schedule.  The prime contractor has already extended the manufacturing schedule three times and due to on-going manufacturing inefficiencies and parts supply problems with its sub-contractors, has only delivered three out of thirteen aircraft. Nine aircraft should have been delivered by now.

 “I would like to understand why the Department wants to accelerate F-35 procurement between 2010 and 2015 by purchasing 28 additional aircraft above its current program of record.  It is my understanding that F-35 contracts are planned as cost reimbursable instead of fixed price, which magnifies the financial risk to the government. 

 “Has the Department learned nothing from the fiascos of the VH 71 program and the Littoral Combat Ship program? The F/A 18 Super Hornet can be purchased for somewhere in the neighborhood of $50 million on a fixed price contract.  For the F-35 the cost growth per airframe alone is $38.3 million dollars.  I think we have a great airframe in the F/A 18 Super Hornet.  It is affordable, it is multi-mission and it is flying off our carriers in combat today.  I would like our witnesses to explain why this committee should recommend removing funds from a proven program to increase procurement in a developmental program?

 “Briefly I would like to address the VH 71 program.  The Navy invested over $3.2 billion dollars, received nine test and pilot-production aircraft, yet was unable to successfully execute this program that ultimately was cancelled by Secretary Gates.  I would like to understand what the plan is for the current aircraft assets that have already been delivered, what the plan is going forward, and how the mistakes of the original program will be prevented from happening in the next program?

 “I understand the E-2-D program may be on the verge of a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach, and I would request the witnesses comment on the health of that program.

 “Finally, I understand that although the MV-22 has performed extremely well in combat operations in Iraq, the aircraft is having sustainment issues and unforeseen additional costs associated with maintenance.  Are there ongoing efforts at design changes to address some of these maintenance issues?

 “I realize that I have outlined a number of issues facing naval aviation.  I believe these are fair concerns and deserve an open and public accounting of the costs and benefits of these programs.  What I am not willing to do is sit by as program after program ‘breaks the bank’ on costs.  I have seen enough of that in shipbuilding programs. 

 “We can no longer afford unaffordable programs, I believe it is time to step back and build what we know works, make it better if and when we can, and get the capability to the Sailor and Marine who need it today, not ten years from now.

 “Again I thank the witnesses for joining us today and would now like to recognize the gentleman from Missouri, the Ranking Member of this subcommittee, the honorable Todd Akin.”