



# Bosnia UPDATE

A Summary of Developments Affecting the Balkans and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces by the Staff of the Committee on National Security.

*Floyd Spence*, Chairman

## Special Edition

October 1996  
Vol. 1, Issue 24

### QUOTES ON PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE BOSNIA POLICY

"Secretary of State Christopher and other senior administration officials have reiterated President Clinton's earlier assurances to the Congress that IFOR's mission will terminate this December and that American troops currently participating in Operation Joint Endeavor will be withdrawn. I assume that all Americans can expect these assurances—can take these assurances at face value.

"However, the issue today is not whether IFOR mission will end as planned in December, but what will happen next. Will the end of IFOR mean the end of United States troops in Bosnia, or will it simply mean the beginning of a new phase of American military involvement and the continued deployment of significant combat forces as a part of a restructured multinational peacekeeping force under a revised mandate?

"Already we have learned that an additional 5,000 United States troops will be sent to Bosnia starting next month as a part of a so-called covering force to provide a degree of protection for the initial troops, with withdrawals which are scheduled to commence in December. It has been reported that a follow-on peacekeeping force may include up to 15,000 United States troops and may last for a period of up to two years.

"In addition, the costs to the American taxpayer of the Bosnian operation have already nearly doubled to \$2.8 billion from the estimate provided by the administration to this committee late last year. A continued United States military presence on the ground in Bosnia will inevitably further escalate these costs.

"The administration is quietly preparing for a commitment of United States troops in Bosnia well beyond this December's deadline, but does not want to admit such a fundamental change in plans prior to the November election."

-- Chairman Floyd D. Spence, House National Security Committee, opening statement, full committee hearing on Bosnia, September 25, 1996

#### Duration of Mission:

"NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to complete its mission in 12 months and to withdraw."

-- Gen. John Shalikashvili,  
JCS Chairman, HNSC testimony,  
10/18/95

"...I had recommended to Secretary Perry that we plan on withdrawing that force [IFOR] in one year....What happens otherwise is that you stay longer, that you take on new missions, mission creep starts, and all things that we have discussed here as [sic] ill-advised. We have tried, on two occasions now, to set a specific time line. First in Rwanda...The second time was in Haiti....We think this is the more prudent way to go in this particular operation here. That is why I, for one, recommend the one year time."

-- Gen. John Shalikashvili,  
JCS Chairman, HNSC testimony,  
10/18/95

"The alternative to not having that [a specific time for withdrawal], as General Shali has said, is that everybody brings in other missions and other programs and the expense goes up, the risk goes up. We are much better having a fixed objective and sticking with it."

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, HNSC testimony,  
10/18/95

"NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to complete its mission in 12 months and to withdraw."

-- Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, HNSC testimony, 10/18/95

"We believe that 12 months is a reasonable period of time for the implementation force to accomplish its mission."

-- Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, National Press Club, 11/9/95

"NATO and U.S. military commanders believe, and I expect, that the military mission can be accomplished in about a year. Twelve months will allow IFOR time to complete the military tasks assigned in the Dayton agreement and to establish a secure environment, in which political and economic reconstruction efforts by the parties and international civilian agencies can take hold. Within one year, we expect that the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement will have been carried out, implementation of the civilian aspects and economic reconstruction will have been firmly launched, free elections will have been held under international supervision and a stable military balance will have been established."

-- President Clinton, letter to Speaker Gingrich, 12/13/95

"The president has given a very clear commitment on the 12 months. That is our policy. It will remain our policy."

-- Richard Holbrooke, Former Assistant Secretary of State, Chicago Tribune, 3/19/96

"I'm absolutely convinced that America will not participate with military forces in Bosnia after the conclusion of this year. I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia."

-- Gen. John Shalikashvili, JCS Chairman, Washington Post, 4/3/96

"Let me reiterate that the Department of Defense has no plans to extend

IFOR's mission beyond one year."

-- Thomas Longstreth, DoD Bosnia Task Force Director, HIRC testimony, 4/23/96

"...Our policy...is to have all U.S. forces out on or about the 14th of December."

-- Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, HIRC testimony, 4/23/96

"The mission will end on December 20, 1996, but all the troops won't be out.... it will take a month, maybe longer, to get all the troops out after December 20."

-- Kenneth Bacon, DoD spokesman, Voice of America report, 4/25/96

"The original idea, that we would be down to zero [U.S. troops in Bosnia] by December the 20th, is not going happen....After the election I think it's time to consider whether NATO will have any other security function to perform in Bosnia next year....There may be a mission associated with deterring a war from restarting....If they elect to take on that mission, then the next question will be what's the force required to do that. Can it be done with just maintaining NATO air at Aviano? Do you need to supplement NATO air with a rapid reaction force? If you have a rapid reaction force, does it have to be based in Bosnia, or can it be based in a neighboring country?"

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, press interview, 6/11/96

"NATO will not want simply to give up on the investment that they've made in Bosnia. And if they feel some further action is necessary to preserve the peace in Bosnia, they may very well determine to maintain a NATO force that is so designated...including ground troops."

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Associated Press report, 6/12/96

"If they [NATO] make that decision [to stay in Bosnia], it would be my recommendation that the United States participate in any force that is so designated — including ground troops, including whatever is determined."

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Washington Post, 6/13/96

"There has been no change in the President's view of the current IFOR

mission. It will last about a year."

-- Michael McCurry, White House spokesman, New York Times, 6/13/96

"It would be my recommendation [if NATO decides to stay in Bosnia] that the United States participate.... It is not clear ground troops would be part of the decision. But if ground troops are part of the decision, then I would think the U.S. would want to participate in it."

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Reuters report, 6/13/96

"I believe that we should stick with our timetable. We believe that IFOR can complete its mission in about a year."

-- President Clinton, Reuters report, 6/12/96

"We believe that it has to be an effective military force certainly until Dec. 20 and then some drawdown can begin after that."

-- President Clinton, Reuter report, 6/13/96

"There is no successor mission.... We're not anticipating any such thing."

-- Vice President Albert Gore, Washington Post, 7/25/96

"We have to have more clarity on what the conditions will be and, if there is going to be a [follow-on] force, what kind of mission that force will have.... There is a whole host of questions that have to be addressed before we get to the point of how long, how big, who will command it.... I can tell you that the planning that is going on is how to withdraw the forces at the conclusion of the mandate. There is no other planning going on, at least in the United States."

-- General John Shalikashvili, JCS Chairman, European Stars and Stripes, 9/12/96

"...Clearly [there] will be a need to have some continued international presence in Bosnia [after December]."

-- Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Washington Post, 9/16/96

"...We are prepared to consider participating [in a follow-on peacekeeping force] if the NATO study showed that our involvement was necessary and appropriate."

-- William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Washington Times, 9/27/96

"...The implementation force will be withdrawn at the end of this year.... In our view we are confident that the mission will be completed... and therefore NATO's IFOR force will be withdrawn."

-- John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, HNSC testimony, 9/25/96

"As of today, we do not know whether there will be a follow-on force, and therefore we do not know what its mission would be."

-- John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, HNSC testimony, 9/25/96

"...We'll be sending about 5,000 troops into Bosnia to help the current people in IFOR come out. That whole process is scheduled to be completed early next year. The IFOR people will be out and the covering force is scheduled to depart sometime in March."

-- Kenneth Bacon, DoD spokesman, DoD News Briefing, 10/1/96

## Cost:

"Subject to the approval of the plan by the President, the cost of the U.S. part of the operation will be approximately \$1.5 billion for this 12-month period."

-- Gen. John Shalikashvili, JCS Chairman, HNSC testimony, 10/18/95

"...We now expect a total cost of \$2.5 billion in FY 1996/1997 for this 12-month operation, resulting in a total cost of \$2.8 billion for Bosnia through December 1996."

-- John Hamre, DoD Comptroller, letter to Floyd D. Spence, HNSC Chairman, 4/15/96

"...Our initial estimates, as we know, were low.... So the current number through the end of calendar '96 is \$3,275.8 million."

-- John White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, HNSC testimony, 9/25/96

## Mission Creep:

### Overview:

"We will not allow 'mission creep' that would involve IFOR in a nation-building role. There will be a variety of means in place, involving civil authorities, the local police and others, to address civilian security issues. The principal responsibility for nonmilitary security will

not lie with the IFOR.”

-- *President Clinton, letter to Speaker Gingrich, 12/13/95*

“My goal as the Supreme Allied Commander is...to prevent mission creep. NATO will do what it was sent in there to do, and not to do those things that could be better done by civilian agencies.”

-- *Gen. George Joulwan, NATO commander, CNN report, 11/29/95*

“[NATO] should not become involved in tasks which could detract from its primary mission.”

-- *Lt. Col. Mark Rayner, NATO spokesman, The Baltimore Sun, 1/27/96*

“It is possible, maybe even likely, that there will be other missions there (in Bosnia).”

-- *John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State, Reuters report, 6/11/96*

### **Freedom of Movement:**

“IFOR will have zero tolerance for units that try to stop freedom of movement in the country.... [IFOR troops] will fan out all over the country, and anywhere they come across a checkpoint they’re going to knock it out — and they’re not going to be polite about the way they knock it out.”

-- *William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Washington Times, 3/30/96*

### **Gravesite Security:**

“Security will be needed for grave investigations, and IFOR has a duty under Dayton to provide assistance to war crimes investigators.”

-- *John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, New York Times, 1/22/96*

“NATO is not — I repeat, NATO is not going to provide specific security or, in other words, guarantee security, for teams investigating these grave sites.”

-- *Adm. Leighton Smith, IFOR commander, Washington Post, 1/21/96*

“If the war crimes tribunal wants to go to Srebrenica and dig up some graves, we’ll provide the security that allows them to do that...I don’t consider that mission creep.”

-- *William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Chicago Tribune, 1/13/96*

“We will not clear mines. We will not guard grave sites. We will not dig up grave sites, and we will not provide individual security.”

-- *Adm. Leighton Smith, IFOR commander, CNN report, 3/31/96*

### **War Criminals:**

“War criminals are not going to be tolerated in the post-Paris [i.e., post-Dayton treaty signing] period.”

-- *Richard Holbrooke, Former Assistant Secretary of State, Washington Post, 12/9/95*

“The task of the NATO Implementation Force is to ensure freedom of movement under the terms of the Dayton agreement. We are not set up as a police force.”

-- *William Perry, Secretary of Defense, Washington Post, 1/4/96*

“[W]e’re not in the police business. We’re [a] military force. We’re not in the business of going out and arresting people.”

-- *Kenneth Bacon, DoD spokesman, DoD briefing, 1/25/96*

“If NATO were to get involved in this [detention of civilians issue] deeply, it would, in fact, represent mission creep. It would certainly be mission creep to point at IFOR and say: ‘It is your task.’ It is not IFOR’s task.”

-- *Gen. John Shalikashvili, JCS Chairman, European Stars and Stripes, 1/5/96*

“We will not hunt for them,...If they would present themselves, [NATO] would detain them.”

-- *Lt. Col. Mark Rayer, NATO spokesman, USA Today, 1/4/96*

“Our troops will conduct more visible and proactive patrols throughout the country.... This will improve conditions for freedom of movement and put war criminals at greater risk of apprehension.”

-- *Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Washington Post, 6/3/96*

### **Civilian Reconstruction:**

“The military commanders have now accepted that they will change their emphasis....We’re now saying that we will assist in civil projects in a much

more dynamic way than we have done hitherto. This shift in the emphasis of land-forces operations is in response to the obvious need for civil assistance in repairing and replacing the infrastructure damaged after four years of war.”

-- *Major Simon Haselock, NATO spokesman, Washington Times, 3/26/96*

“This [i.e., assisting in the civilian effort] is not mission creep. This is carrying out the mission we have stated from the beginning. Which is, we would assist with the civil efforts as we had the capability and as we had the resources available, but not the interference [sic] of the military effort.”

-- *William Perry, Secretary of Defense, DoD news briefing, 3/26/96*

### **On The Future of Bosnia:**

“Is this a multi-ethnic state now? No. Can we expect one by December? Probably not.”

-- *Adm. Leighton Smith, IFOR commander, London Independent, 7/10/96*

“The situation that this country faces is a result of military conflict, and perhaps it would take a war to undo [its problems] really fully, effectively.”

-- *Robert Frowick, chief of OSCE mission in Bosnia, Washington Post, 8/23/96*

“Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims have grown further apart — not closer together — in their visions for the country.”

-- *USIA analysis of poll data, New York Times, 8/23/96*

“After nine months, we have failed to change the hearts and minds of the people there. That is true. But that was never part of the Dayton process.”

-- *John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington Post, 9/13/96*

Previous issues of the Update are archived on the world wide web site of the House National Security Committee at: <http://www.house.gov/nsc/bosnia.htm>. Additional background information on any of the items in this UPDATE may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372), David Trachtenberg (x60532), Will Marsh (x56045) on the Committee staff.

